This is incorrect—in a p-zombie, the information processing isn’t accompanied by any first-person experience. So if p-zombies are possible, we both do the information processing, but only I am conscious. The p-zombie doesn’t believe it’s conscious, it only acts that way.
You correctly believe that having the correct information processing always goes hand in hand with believing in consciousness, but that’s because p-zombies are impossible. If they were possible, this wouldn’t be the case, and we would have special access to the truth that p-zombies lack.
I am concerned our disagreement here is primarily semantic or based on a simple misunderstanding of each others position. I hope to better understand your objection.
“The p-zombie doesn’t believe it’s conscious, , it only acts that way.”
One of us is mistaken and using a non-traditional definition of p-zombie or we have different definitions of “belief’.
My understanding is that P-zombies are physically identical to regular humans. Their brains contain the same physical patterns that encode their model of the world. That seems, to me, a sufficient physical condition for having identical beliefs.
If your p-zombies are only “acting” like they’re concious, but do not believe it, then they are not physically identical to humans. The existence of p-zombies, as you have described them, wouldn’t refute physicalism.
The main post that I responded to, specifically the section that I directly quoted, assumes it is possible for p-zombies to exist.
My comment begins “Assuming for the sake of argument that p-zombies could exist” but this is distinct from a claim that p-zombies actually exist.
“If they were possible, this wouldn’t be the case, and we would have special access to the truth that p-zombies lack.”
I do not feel this is convincing because this is an assertion my conclusion is incorrect, but without engaging with my arguments I made to reach that conclusion.
Either we define “belief” as a computational state encoding a model of the world containing some specific data, or we define “belief” as a first-person mental state.
For the first definition, both us and p-zombies believe we have consciousness. So we can’t use our belief we have consciousness to know we’re not p-zombies.
For the second definition, only we believe we have consciousness. P-zombies have no beliefs at all. So for the second definition, we can use our belief we have consciousness to know we’re not p-zombies.
Since we have a belief in the existence of our consciousness according to both definitions, but p-zombies only according to the first definition, we can know we’re not p-zombies.
This is incorrect—in a p-zombie, the information processing isn’t accompanied by any first-person experience. So if p-zombies are possible, we both do the information processing, but only I am conscious. The p-zombie doesn’t believe it’s conscious, it only acts that way.
You correctly believe that having the correct information processing always goes hand in hand with believing in consciousness, but that’s because p-zombies are impossible. If they were possible, this wouldn’t be the case, and we would have special access to the truth that p-zombies lack.
I am concerned our disagreement here is primarily semantic or based on a simple misunderstanding of each others position. I hope to better understand your objection.
“The p-zombie doesn’t believe it’s conscious, , it only acts that way.”
One of us is mistaken and using a non-traditional definition of p-zombie or we have different definitions of “belief’.
My understanding is that P-zombies are physically identical to regular humans. Their brains contain the same physical patterns that encode their model of the world. That seems, to me, a sufficient physical condition for having identical beliefs.
If your p-zombies are only “acting” like they’re concious, but do not believe it, then they are not physically identical to humans. The existence of p-zombies, as you have described them, wouldn’t refute physicalism.
This resource indicates that the way you understand the term p-zombie may be mistaken: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/zombies/
“but that’s because p-zombies are impossible”
The main post that I responded to, specifically the section that I directly quoted, assumes it is possible for p-zombies to exist.
My comment begins “Assuming for the sake of argument that p-zombies could exist” but this is distinct from a claim that p-zombies actually exist.
“If they were possible, this wouldn’t be the case, and we would have special access to the truth that p-zombies lack.”
I do not feel this is convincing because this is an assertion my conclusion is incorrect, but without engaging with my arguments I made to reach that conclusion.
I look forward to continuing this discussion.
Either we define “belief” as a computational state encoding a model of the world containing some specific data, or we define “belief” as a first-person mental state.
For the first definition, both us and p-zombies believe we have consciousness. So we can’t use our belief we have consciousness to know we’re not p-zombies.
For the second definition, only we believe we have consciousness. P-zombies have no beliefs at all. So for the second definition, we can use our belief we have consciousness to know we’re not p-zombies.
Since we have a belief in the existence of our consciousness according to both definitions, but p-zombies only according to the first definition, we can know we’re not p-zombies.