Even if the way they dress and instances of catcalling and rape were 100% correlated (that is, their odds of getting catcalled/raped depend only and always on how ‘hot’/‘slutty’/whatever they are dressed), the blame still would lie fully with the rapists.
It’s like asserting that it’s your fault you were victim of theft, because you owned things, and the more things you own the more likely you are to be a victim of theft, so you shouldn’t ever have anything to steal; having things means you deserve to be stolen from.
To rephrase, perhaps more clearly, if X increases the odds that (Amoral Agent) K does Y to you instead of to someone else (i.e. K selects for X as targets to do Y upon), where Ks are some subset of the population, are you morally obligated to not-X, else you deserve Y?
How much is rape displaced vs reduced, when a potential rapist decides not to target a potential victim? You’re sort of assuming 100% displacement here.
As “blame” goes, of course you jail rapists and support victims and only then collect “what were you wearing?” data for statistical research. “How do my clothing choices influence my likelihood to get raped?” is a rather salient question for many people, and girls at my school certainly avoid some actions they (usually mistakenly) believe increase risk.
How much is rape displaced vs reduced, when a potential rapist decides not to target a potential victim? You’re sort of assuming 100% displacement here.
Very much worth looking into more, IMO, but I’m not sure I assumed this that explicitly. If you change “to someone else” to “to someone else or not at all” in the last part of the grandparent, it counters the 100%-displacement notion more explicitly, but “K selects for X as targets to do Y” doesn’t necessarily imply displacement.
Nevertheless, it’s something worth distinguishing when trying to do utility estimations.
That confusion exists strongly within the social landscape; perhaps what is needed is a more rigorous distinction between “views that have to be constantly defended against” and “facts which happen to be true”, whenever the two happen to be bound together by some form of social assumption.
The problem is “well, I don’t think that way” has turned into a poor signaling mechanism, so stronger (and more expensive) signals need to be developed.
EDIT: In the past 5 minutes, every post and comment I have ever made on this site has been downvoted, including ones made weeks ago, and including posts and comments which have nothing to do with this topic.
Can we please try to have a discussion, rather than engage in petty anonymous retribution?
EDIT: In the past 5 minutes, every post and comment I have ever made on this site has been downvoted, including ones made weeks ago, and including posts and comments which have nothing to do with this topic.
Since you were replying to me, I’d like to take this opportunity to condemn this. Seriously, people, this defeats the whole purpose of the karma system. Play by the rules.
EDIT: In the past 5 minutes, every post and comment I have ever made on this site has been downvoted, including ones made weeks ago, and including posts and comments which have nothing to do with this topic.
This sort of thing happens from time to time. It means you’re posting the kind of thing that petty abusers don’t like.
Okay then. I’m submitting a bug report, requesting that the karma system be updated to prevent mass-downvoting. Ideally, if a single user downvotes multiple comments or articles by a specific other user within a short timespan, and the downvoted posts are spread across multiple articles, then some sort of flag should be raised to review the downvoter’s actions.
Is there a sort of meta-lesswrong discussion where we can discuss stuff like this? I feel like it’s something of a derail of the current topic.
As Emile said, I was attempting to stress the point that people do confuse these, but it does not follow logically by any means (and isn’t even remotely implied by any reasonable moral theory I’ve ever read about other than “Obey The Bible” (If you accept that moral theory as reasonable)).
The second paragraph compares my distinction with “what this confusion would look like if it were about theft”; a reductio ad absurdum attempt of the conflation of risk-factors with moral deservingness.
Edit: On that note, I apologize if my use of the ”;” punctuation is nonstandard. I’ll try to be more careful in my use of it in the future.
Except in the real world it’s not a “risk factor” because if anything the causation works the other way around. People treat it like “asking for it” → therefore nobody looks further than her to assign blame → therefore she won’t even bother to report it because the police would laugh at her → therefore I will get away with it, again and again and again.
Once again, the fact that clothing can influence whether a rapist will choose you is not the same as the claim that this somehow shifts the blame to you if he does choose you. As it were.
I’m claiming he chooses women who have attributes that shift blame onto the victim. There is correlation, but the causation goes the other way from what you’re thinking.
The reasons why rapists choose (...) are correlated and most likely causally linked with the (predicted) blame-shifting process, reasons given for blame-shifting, and argumentative strength of the blame-shift.
If the only reason left for why he chooses you if you wear a particular item is “That guy is clearly completely insane and sociopathic!”, then you have a lot more social recourse, more deterring power, and lots more retaliation / fixing-it options afterwards, along with more social support overall.
Well, wearing attractive clothing might make you, y’know, more attractive, and thus a “better” target for the rapist. My point is that, as long as you value not -being-raped, it’s a good idea to avoid any clothing that increases the odds of rape, whether because it makes it easier to get away with or for some other reason.
I think it is important not to conflate desirability risk and getting-away-with-it risk.
Being targeting because the perpetrator will get away with it—even if caught—is a societal failure mode. Often, it comes in the form “Society does not believe you are a crime victim because you were not behaving the social role that society expected of you.” I challenge you to come up with even one other defensible (or actually defended) circumstance where failure to follow social roles leads to a captured perpetrator being released without appropriate punishment.
The social roles are particularly aggravating because the assigned roles are ridiculous.
Don’t dress like you are partying (even though you’d be ridiculous if you didn’t).
Don’t drink alcohol (except that personal enjoyment is the purpose of the activity)
In short, don’t go out and party at the club. Because enjoying yourself how you want to enjoy yourself is apparently not allowed.
Most importantly, the content of the social rules is outside the victim’s control. Until she is the victim of rape, there’s no way to know whether the outfit was “too sexy” or “very fashionable.” It’s hindsight bias and more concerned with enforcing social roles than protecting personal autonomy.
Personally, I suspect that desirability risk doesn’t really exist. But regardless, getting-away-with-it-even-if-caught risk is not even vaguely under the victim’s control. We ought to change society so that it doesn’t exist.
Personally, I suspect that desirability risk doesn’t really exist.
… how?
But regardless, getting-away-with-it-even-if-caught risk is not even vaguely under the victim’s control.
Yes, it is. That’s the whole point of this discussion: dressing a certain way can, to a certain extent, increase risk of rape; and it is reasonable to take this into account when choosing clothing.
We ought to change society so that it doesn’t exist.
dressing a certain way can, to a certain extent, increase risk of rape; and it is reasonable to take this into account when choosing clothing.
Dressing in a certain way will make people believe you that you actually didn’t consent to sex. But other than judging based on social rules, what is the relationship between consent and dress?
I’m open to additional evidence, but I suspect a rapist given a choice between the tipsy but extremely hot girl and the falling-down drunk but average girl will pick the average girl >90% of the time. This analysis assumes hotness is related to dress—which I think we all agree is true. But the advice “don’t get falling-down drunk” is totally unrelated to “don’t dress so that you look hot.”
Plus, “Don’t get falling-down drunk” is very controlling advice. And we don’t acquit muggers because the victim was drunk.
No, but what is being claimed is that the very discussion of whether certain behaviors have an effect on the likelihood of rape creates groundwork that others often use to absolve the rapist of blame, and that it’s far better to salt those fields than risk a derailing, even a Rationalist one.
To clarify: I’m not saying your argument isn’t rational, or even factually correct. I’m attempting to provide information that will allow you to empathize with people who dismiss your argument out of hand, so that you can better see their map of the social landscape.
If sexy skirts increase the chances of rape, I want to believe that sexy skirts increase the chances of rape. If sexy skirts don’t increase the chances of rape, I want to believe that sexy skirts don’t increase the chances of rape. I don’t care whether it creates a “groundwork” that some hypothetical others may use.
And if believing that “sexy skirts increase the chances of rape” increases the chances of rape, I want to believe that believing that “sexy skirts increase the chances of rape” increases the chances of rape. If believing that “sexy skirts increase the chances of rape” doesn’t increase the chances of rape, I want to believe that believing that “sexy skirts increase the chances of rape” doesn’t increase the chances of rape.
I mean that statement directly, AND as a reminder that social systems are rife with metacognition.
To explain more explicitly: because you and I are not perfectly rational beings, each belief that we hold does not operate in a vacuum. Holding a belief influences how we interact with other beliefs, in a cascade of interdependent loops. It is entirely possible for a fact to be technically true in the sense that you think you mean it, but to have implications when it interfaces with the rest of your belief system that are not, in fact, rational on the whole.
Being rational about fact X is less important than winning (by which I mean “achieving your goals”, not “proving your superiority in an internet debate”).
1) I don’t see very solid reasons for believing that “me believing sexy skirts increase the chances of rape” actually increases the chances of rape. There are probably cases where true beliefs have bad consequences, but this isn’t on the top of the list.
2) When evaluating whether to believe a lie for the Greater Good, one shouldn’t just consider the consequences of that lie considered in isolation, but also the consequences of increasing one’s willingness to believe lies.
1) I don’t see very solid reasons for believing that “me believing sexy skirts increase the chances of rape” actually increases the chances of rape. There are probably cases where true beliefs have bad consequences, but this isn’t on the top of the list.
2) When evaluating whether to believe a lie for the Greater Good, one shouldn’t just consider the consequences of that lie considered in isolation, but also the consequences of increasing one’s willingness to believe lies.
And here’s where the problem actually lies:
It’s not that “sexy skirts doesn’t increase the chance of rape” is a lie. It’s that “sexy skirts doesn’t increase the chance of rape” is irrelevant when we’re discussing the wrongness of rape, which is where that argument often pops up. The problem isn’t that this argument is wrong, it’s that this argument is hacking everyone’s availability bias.
One of the more common tactics is in shifting the argument from the relevance of a fact, back onto the truth of a fact, and then relying on the fact that the human cognitive system will forget about the shift, and uptick both whenever an argument is made about either.
Sure, I agree it’s irrelevant to the discussion of the wrongness of rape (though not to discussions of specific strategies for avoiding rape or catcalls) - which is why in a grand-cousin-nephew-great-aunt of this subthread I was telling MixedNuts to stop paying attention to “stupid” feminist arguments, and focus on the strong ones.
Note though that this discussion didn’t start from a discussion of the wrongness of rape, but from a discussion of what kind of dress triggered catcalls—so that point isn’t completely irrelevant! (though not very interesting)
If in a discussion of the wrongness of rape someone brings up the question of sexy skirts, my reaction wouldn’t be to tell them that it’s a shifty strategy, it would be to say “okay, let’s assume for argument’s sake that girls with sexy skirts are more likely to get raped—now what?”—because I don’t think any important disagreements actually hinge on that fact (unless the discussion is the tactics of rape-avoidance).
1) I don’t see very solid reasons for believing that “me believing sexy skirts increase the chances of rape” actually increases the chances of rape.
It would seem to decrease the chance of rape. I mean… “Believe X has negative consequence Y. Consider Y when evaluating when to do X. Influence others to do the same. Expect less Y.”
There are probably cases where true beliefs have bad consequences, but this isn’t on the top of the list.
There are negative consequences of this true belief when held by people that also have false (and abhorrent) beliefs like “If sexy skirts increase the chance of rape then less blame, shame and punishment should be directed at rapists when they rape women (or men, I suppose) in sexy skirts”.
Personally I prefer to see those abhorrent beliefs actively punished and shamed rather than forcing people to believe false things that put them or those they speak to in increased personal danger.
Oh, I know that. It’s just best to avoid such confusion from the get-go. If Tim wants to argue our discussion here is itself dangerous that’s one thing, but I’l be damned if he’s going to strawman me.
My core assertion is that discussion of skirt length increases getting-away-with-it-even-if-caught risk. There’s factual dispute about its effect on environmental risk.
I think the best predictor of rape (especially acquaintance rape) is opportunity. Generally, it isn’t an accident when a guy ends up alone with a very drunk girl at a party. By contrast, pure sexiness is orders of magnitude less likely to increase rape risk.
Therefore, focusing on skirt-length in discussion of rape risk doesn’t do much good in reducing rape risk. If pure sexiness is low enough environmental risk and group norms getting-away-with-it rape risk is large enough, discussing skirt-length increases rape risk.
That’s an empirical question, for which we (a) lack sufficient data, and (b) have very different intuitions.
And my core assertion is that refusing to take into account skirt length, as you put it, is irrational and not the winning thing to do, which seems like a bad thing when losing results in, y’know, rape. Not that rapists are somehow innocent because their victim failed to discourage them. Their choices are their own, but so are ours; the universe doesn’t care that they broke the rules, you still lose.
I think we need to separate our long-term and short-term goals.
To use an analogy: in the long term, we need to create a world where accidental death from hypothermia (among other things) is virtually impossible—due to, say, satellite-guided nanotech. But in the short term, we don’t live in such a world. Thus, when people go out cross-country skiing in the winter, they need to balance risks and rewards. Naturally, the safest course of action is not to ski at all, but this option sacrifices too much reward. The next best course is to go skiing anyway, while taking as many precautions as is practical. What counts as “practical” depends on the individuals involved, and on the weights they place on all the sub-tasks of skiing.
Similarly, a woman who goes out to a club faces a very real danger of rape. Rapists are part of the environment there, just as cold is part of the environment out in the wintry wilderness. Yes, we do need to change the world to eliminate this danger; but until that’s done, every woman needs to balance risk and reward, and take as many precautions as possible without reducing the reward below her acceptability threshold.
Just as there are other options besides “go skiing alone without warm clothing” and “never ski at all”, there are also other options besides “party as hard as you can” and “never party at all”.
But rapists are people, not forces of nature. And the particular worrying about environmental risk that comes out as “Don’t dress too sexy” increases the getting-away-with-it-even-when-caught risk much more than it decreases environmental risk.
Plus, it emboldens the let’s tolerate the local rapist vibe that makes reporting a rapist you know so much more difficult. Rapists aren’t just environment. They are people in a community that the community needs to address directly—hard as that is.
Rapists aren’t just environment. They are people in a community...
As I said, I think these are two separate issues. From the point of view of a woman who is planning her night out, rapists are as environmental as blizzards, because there’s absolutely nothing she can personally do to reduce their numbers in the short term. However, in the long term, that same woman could sponsor legislation and/or community measures aimed at making rape easier to report and harder to perpetrate.
Similarly, a skier who is planning his cross-country trip can’t do anything in the short term to make the weather milder or the road safer. However, in the long term, he could sponsor the construction of additional cell towers, emergency shelters, ranger stations, etc., to make skiing safer for everyone.
Taking this line to the extreme:
Even if the way they dress and instances of catcalling and rape were 100% correlated (that is, their odds of getting catcalled/raped depend only and always on how ‘hot’/‘slutty’/whatever they are dressed), the blame still would lie fully with the rapists.
It’s like asserting that it’s your fault you were victim of theft, because you owned things, and the more things you own the more likely you are to be a victim of theft, so you shouldn’t ever have anything to steal; having things means you deserve to be stolen from.
To rephrase, perhaps more clearly, if X increases the odds that (Amoral Agent) K does Y to you instead of to someone else (i.e. K selects for X as targets to do Y upon), where Ks are some subset of the population, are you morally obligated to not-X, else you deserve Y?
How much is rape displaced vs reduced, when a potential rapist decides not to target a potential victim? You’re sort of assuming 100% displacement here.
As “blame” goes, of course you jail rapists and support victims and only then collect “what were you wearing?” data for statistical research. “How do my clothing choices influence my likelihood to get raped?” is a rather salient question for many people, and girls at my school certainly avoid some actions they (usually mistakenly) believe increase risk.
Very much worth looking into more, IMO, but I’m not sure I assumed this that explicitly. If you change “to someone else” to “to someone else or not at all” in the last part of the grandparent, it counters the 100%-displacement notion more explicitly, but “K selects for X as targets to do Y” doesn’t necessarily imply displacement.
Nevertheless, it’s something worth distinguishing when trying to do utility estimations.
You seem to be confusing “you did X, which is a risk factor for Y” with “you did X, therefore you deserve Y”.
That confusion exists strongly within the social landscape; perhaps what is needed is a more rigorous distinction between “views that have to be constantly defended against” and “facts which happen to be true”, whenever the two happen to be bound together by some form of social assumption.
The problem is “well, I don’t think that way” has turned into a poor signaling mechanism, so stronger (and more expensive) signals need to be developed.
EDIT: In the past 5 minutes, every post and comment I have ever made on this site has been downvoted, including ones made weeks ago, and including posts and comments which have nothing to do with this topic.
Can we please try to have a discussion, rather than engage in petty anonymous retribution?
Since you were replying to me, I’d like to take this opportunity to condemn this. Seriously, people, this defeats the whole purpose of the karma system. Play by the rules.
This sort of thing happens from time to time. It means you’re posting the kind of thing that petty abusers don’t like.
Similar thing happened to me earlier today after a post on this same topic. C’mon lesswrong.
Okay then. I’m submitting a bug report, requesting that the karma system be updated to prevent mass-downvoting. Ideally, if a single user downvotes multiple comments or articles by a specific other user within a short timespan, and the downvoted posts are spread across multiple articles, then some sort of flag should be raised to review the downvoter’s actions.
Is there a sort of meta-lesswrong discussion where we can discuss stuff like this? I feel like it’s something of a derail of the current topic.
Hm. Perhaps make a post in Discussion? This seems like a pretty good idea :)
Done
As Emile said, I was attempting to stress the point that people do confuse these, but it does not follow logically by any means (and isn’t even remotely implied by any reasonable moral theory I’ve ever read about other than “Obey The Bible” (If you accept that moral theory as reasonable)).
The second paragraph compares my distinction with “what this confusion would look like if it were about theft”; a reductio ad absurdum attempt of the conflation of risk-factors with moral deservingness.
Edit: On that note, I apologize if my use of the ”;” punctuation is nonstandard. I’ll try to be more careful in my use of it in the future.
… oops. Guess I misread that.
Is he actually confusing those? It seems to me that he’s taking pains to stress the difference!
… oops.
Except in the real world it’s not a “risk factor” because if anything the causation works the other way around. People treat it like “asking for it” → therefore nobody looks further than her to assign blame → therefore she won’t even bother to report it because the police would laugh at her → therefore I will get away with it, again and again and again.
Once again, the fact that clothing can influence whether a rapist will choose you is not the same as the claim that this somehow shifts the blame to you if he does choose you. As it were.
I’m claiming he chooses women who have attributes that shift blame onto the victim. There is correlation, but the causation goes the other way from what you’re thinking.
But when you choose your clothing, do you really care why he will choose you if you wear that particular item?
No, but you DO care why other people will shift the blame, because that’s part of the process you’re (hopefully) trying to re-engineer.
I don’t understand this comment.
The reasons why rapists choose (...) are correlated and most likely causally linked with the (predicted) blame-shifting process, reasons given for blame-shifting, and argumentative strength of the blame-shift.
If the only reason left for why he chooses you if you wear a particular item is “That guy is clearly completely insane and sociopathic!”, then you have a lot more social recourse, more deterring power, and lots more retaliation / fixing-it options afterwards, along with more social support overall.
Well, wearing attractive clothing might make you, y’know, more attractive, and thus a “better” target for the rapist. My point is that, as long as you value not -being-raped, it’s a good idea to avoid any clothing that increases the odds of rape, whether because it makes it easier to get away with or for some other reason.
I think it is important not to conflate desirability risk and getting-away-with-it risk.
Being targeting because the perpetrator will get away with it—even if caught—is a societal failure mode. Often, it comes in the form “Society does not believe you are a crime victim because you were not behaving the social role that society expected of you.” I challenge you to come up with even one other defensible (or actually defended) circumstance where failure to follow social roles leads to a captured perpetrator being released without appropriate punishment.
The social roles are particularly aggravating because the assigned roles are ridiculous.
Don’t dress like you are partying (even though you’d be ridiculous if you didn’t).
Don’t drink alcohol (except that personal enjoyment is the purpose of the activity)
In short, don’t go out and party at the club. Because enjoying yourself how you want to enjoy yourself is apparently not allowed.
Most importantly, the content of the social rules is outside the victim’s control. Until she is the victim of rape, there’s no way to know whether the outfit was “too sexy” or “very fashionable.” It’s hindsight bias and more concerned with enforcing social roles than protecting personal autonomy.
Personally, I suspect that desirability risk doesn’t really exist. But regardless, getting-away-with-it-even-if-caught risk is not even vaguely under the victim’s control. We ought to change society so that it doesn’t exist.
… how?
Yes, it is. That’s the whole point of this discussion: dressing a certain way can, to a certain extent, increase risk of rape; and it is reasonable to take this into account when choosing clothing.
Obviously. Until then, however...
Dressing in a certain way will make people believe you that you actually didn’t consent to sex. But other than judging based on social rules, what is the relationship between consent and dress?
I’m open to additional evidence, but I suspect a rapist given a choice between the tipsy but extremely hot girl and the falling-down drunk but average girl will pick the average girl >90% of the time. This analysis assumes hotness is related to dress—which I think we all agree is true. But the advice “don’t get falling-down drunk” is totally unrelated to “don’t dress so that you look hot.”
Plus, “Don’t get falling-down drunk” is very controlling advice. And we don’t acquit muggers because the victim was drunk.
No-one here is claiming that dress can absolve the rapist of blame.
No, but what is being claimed is that the very discussion of whether certain behaviors have an effect on the likelihood of rape creates groundwork that others often use to absolve the rapist of blame, and that it’s far better to salt those fields than risk a derailing, even a Rationalist one.
To clarify: I’m not saying your argument isn’t rational, or even factually correct. I’m attempting to provide information that will allow you to empathize with people who dismiss your argument out of hand, so that you can better see their map of the social landscape.
If sexy skirts increase the chances of rape, I want to believe that sexy skirts increase the chances of rape. If sexy skirts don’t increase the chances of rape, I want to believe that sexy skirts don’t increase the chances of rape. I don’t care whether it creates a “groundwork” that some hypothetical others may use.
And if believing that “sexy skirts increase the chances of rape” increases the chances of rape, I want to believe that believing that “sexy skirts increase the chances of rape” increases the chances of rape. If believing that “sexy skirts increase the chances of rape” doesn’t increase the chances of rape, I want to believe that believing that “sexy skirts increase the chances of rape” doesn’t increase the chances of rape.
I mean that statement directly, AND as a reminder that social systems are rife with metacognition.
To explain more explicitly: because you and I are not perfectly rational beings, each belief that we hold does not operate in a vacuum. Holding a belief influences how we interact with other beliefs, in a cascade of interdependent loops. It is entirely possible for a fact to be technically true in the sense that you think you mean it, but to have implications when it interfaces with the rest of your belief system that are not, in fact, rational on the whole.
Being rational about fact X is less important than winning (by which I mean “achieving your goals”, not “proving your superiority in an internet debate”).
I agree with the gist of that, but:
1) I don’t see very solid reasons for believing that “me believing sexy skirts increase the chances of rape” actually increases the chances of rape. There are probably cases where true beliefs have bad consequences, but this isn’t on the top of the list.
2) When evaluating whether to believe a lie for the Greater Good, one shouldn’t just consider the consequences of that lie considered in isolation, but also the consequences of increasing one’s willingness to believe lies.
And here’s where the problem actually lies:
It’s not that “sexy skirts doesn’t increase the chance of rape” is a lie. It’s that “sexy skirts doesn’t increase the chance of rape” is irrelevant when we’re discussing the wrongness of rape, which is where that argument often pops up. The problem isn’t that this argument is wrong, it’s that this argument is hacking everyone’s availability bias.
One of the more common tactics is in shifting the argument from the relevance of a fact, back onto the truth of a fact, and then relying on the fact that the human cognitive system will forget about the shift, and uptick both whenever an argument is made about either.
Does that make any sense?
Sure, I agree it’s irrelevant to the discussion of the wrongness of rape (though not to discussions of specific strategies for avoiding rape or catcalls) - which is why in a grand-cousin-nephew-great-aunt of this subthread I was telling MixedNuts to stop paying attention to “stupid” feminist arguments, and focus on the strong ones.
Note though that this discussion didn’t start from a discussion of the wrongness of rape, but from a discussion of what kind of dress triggered catcalls—so that point isn’t completely irrelevant! (though not very interesting)
If in a discussion of the wrongness of rape someone brings up the question of sexy skirts, my reaction wouldn’t be to tell them that it’s a shifty strategy, it would be to say “okay, let’s assume for argument’s sake that girls with sexy skirts are more likely to get raped—now what?”—because I don’t think any important disagreements actually hinge on that fact (unless the discussion is the tactics of rape-avoidance).
It would seem to decrease the chance of rape. I mean… “Believe X has negative consequence Y. Consider Y when evaluating when to do X. Influence others to do the same. Expect less Y.”
There are negative consequences of this true belief when held by people that also have false (and abhorrent) beliefs like “If sexy skirts increase the chance of rape then less blame, shame and punishment should be directed at rapists when they rape women (or men, I suppose) in sexy skirts”.
Personally I prefer to see those abhorrent beliefs actively punished and shamed rather than forcing people to believe false things that put them or those they speak to in increased personal danger.
Oh, I know that. It’s just best to avoid such confusion from the get-go. If Tim wants to argue our discussion here is itself dangerous that’s one thing, but I’l be damned if he’s going to strawman me.
My core assertion is that discussion of skirt length increases getting-away-with-it-even-if-caught risk. There’s factual dispute about its effect on environmental risk.
I think the best predictor of rape (especially acquaintance rape) is opportunity. Generally, it isn’t an accident when a guy ends up alone with a very drunk girl at a party. By contrast, pure sexiness is orders of magnitude less likely to increase rape risk.
Therefore, focusing on skirt-length in discussion of rape risk doesn’t do much good in reducing rape risk. If pure sexiness is low enough environmental risk and group norms getting-away-with-it rape risk is large enough, discussing skirt-length increases rape risk.
That’s an empirical question, for which we (a) lack sufficient data, and (b) have very different intuitions.
And my core assertion is that refusing to take into account skirt length, as you put it, is irrational and not the winning thing to do, which seems like a bad thing when losing results in, y’know, rape. Not that rapists are somehow innocent because their victim failed to discourage them. Their choices are their own, but so are ours; the universe doesn’t care that they broke the rules, you still lose.
I think we need to separate our long-term and short-term goals.
To use an analogy: in the long term, we need to create a world where accidental death from hypothermia (among other things) is virtually impossible—due to, say, satellite-guided nanotech. But in the short term, we don’t live in such a world. Thus, when people go out cross-country skiing in the winter, they need to balance risks and rewards. Naturally, the safest course of action is not to ski at all, but this option sacrifices too much reward. The next best course is to go skiing anyway, while taking as many precautions as is practical. What counts as “practical” depends on the individuals involved, and on the weights they place on all the sub-tasks of skiing.
Similarly, a woman who goes out to a club faces a very real danger of rape. Rapists are part of the environment there, just as cold is part of the environment out in the wintry wilderness. Yes, we do need to change the world to eliminate this danger; but until that’s done, every woman needs to balance risk and reward, and take as many precautions as possible without reducing the reward below her acceptability threshold.
Just as there are other options besides “go skiing alone without warm clothing” and “never ski at all”, there are also other options besides “party as hard as you can” and “never party at all”.
Sure.
But rapists are people, not forces of nature. And the particular worrying about environmental risk that comes out as “Don’t dress too sexy” increases the getting-away-with-it-even-when-caught risk much more than it decreases environmental risk.
Plus, it emboldens the let’s tolerate the local rapist vibe that makes reporting a rapist you know so much more difficult. Rapists aren’t just environment. They are people in a community that the community needs to address directly—hard as that is.
As I said, I think these are two separate issues. From the point of view of a woman who is planning her night out, rapists are as environmental as blizzards, because there’s absolutely nothing she can personally do to reduce their numbers in the short term. However, in the long term, that same woman could sponsor legislation and/or community measures aimed at making rape easier to report and harder to perpetrate.
Similarly, a skier who is planning his cross-country trip can’t do anything in the short term to make the weather milder or the road safer. However, in the long term, he could sponsor the construction of additional cell towers, emergency shelters, ranger stations, etc., to make skiing safer for everyone.
There’s no particular reason to think stranger rape is more frequent than acquaintance rape. The opposite appears to be true.
Focusing on an infrequent type of rape while ignoring more comment types does not seem aimed at decreasing the frequency of the problem.
I think most people were assuming you don’t know the rapist in this case.
Not a very sturdy assumption. That’s true in a minority of cases.