And if believing that “sexy skirts increase the chances of rape” increases the chances of rape, I want to believe that believing that “sexy skirts increase the chances of rape” increases the chances of rape. If believing that “sexy skirts increase the chances of rape” doesn’t increase the chances of rape, I want to believe that believing that “sexy skirts increase the chances of rape” doesn’t increase the chances of rape.
I mean that statement directly, AND as a reminder that social systems are rife with metacognition.
To explain more explicitly: because you and I are not perfectly rational beings, each belief that we hold does not operate in a vacuum. Holding a belief influences how we interact with other beliefs, in a cascade of interdependent loops. It is entirely possible for a fact to be technically true in the sense that you think you mean it, but to have implications when it interfaces with the rest of your belief system that are not, in fact, rational on the whole.
Being rational about fact X is less important than winning (by which I mean “achieving your goals”, not “proving your superiority in an internet debate”).
1) I don’t see very solid reasons for believing that “me believing sexy skirts increase the chances of rape” actually increases the chances of rape. There are probably cases where true beliefs have bad consequences, but this isn’t on the top of the list.
2) When evaluating whether to believe a lie for the Greater Good, one shouldn’t just consider the consequences of that lie considered in isolation, but also the consequences of increasing one’s willingness to believe lies.
1) I don’t see very solid reasons for believing that “me believing sexy skirts increase the chances of rape” actually increases the chances of rape. There are probably cases where true beliefs have bad consequences, but this isn’t on the top of the list.
2) When evaluating whether to believe a lie for the Greater Good, one shouldn’t just consider the consequences of that lie considered in isolation, but also the consequences of increasing one’s willingness to believe lies.
And here’s where the problem actually lies:
It’s not that “sexy skirts doesn’t increase the chance of rape” is a lie. It’s that “sexy skirts doesn’t increase the chance of rape” is irrelevant when we’re discussing the wrongness of rape, which is where that argument often pops up. The problem isn’t that this argument is wrong, it’s that this argument is hacking everyone’s availability bias.
One of the more common tactics is in shifting the argument from the relevance of a fact, back onto the truth of a fact, and then relying on the fact that the human cognitive system will forget about the shift, and uptick both whenever an argument is made about either.
Sure, I agree it’s irrelevant to the discussion of the wrongness of rape (though not to discussions of specific strategies for avoiding rape or catcalls) - which is why in a grand-cousin-nephew-great-aunt of this subthread I was telling MixedNuts to stop paying attention to “stupid” feminist arguments, and focus on the strong ones.
Note though that this discussion didn’t start from a discussion of the wrongness of rape, but from a discussion of what kind of dress triggered catcalls—so that point isn’t completely irrelevant! (though not very interesting)
If in a discussion of the wrongness of rape someone brings up the question of sexy skirts, my reaction wouldn’t be to tell them that it’s a shifty strategy, it would be to say “okay, let’s assume for argument’s sake that girls with sexy skirts are more likely to get raped—now what?”—because I don’t think any important disagreements actually hinge on that fact (unless the discussion is the tactics of rape-avoidance).
1) I don’t see very solid reasons for believing that “me believing sexy skirts increase the chances of rape” actually increases the chances of rape.
It would seem to decrease the chance of rape. I mean… “Believe X has negative consequence Y. Consider Y when evaluating when to do X. Influence others to do the same. Expect less Y.”
There are probably cases where true beliefs have bad consequences, but this isn’t on the top of the list.
There are negative consequences of this true belief when held by people that also have false (and abhorrent) beliefs like “If sexy skirts increase the chance of rape then less blame, shame and punishment should be directed at rapists when they rape women (or men, I suppose) in sexy skirts”.
Personally I prefer to see those abhorrent beliefs actively punished and shamed rather than forcing people to believe false things that put them or those they speak to in increased personal danger.
And if believing that “sexy skirts increase the chances of rape” increases the chances of rape, I want to believe that believing that “sexy skirts increase the chances of rape” increases the chances of rape. If believing that “sexy skirts increase the chances of rape” doesn’t increase the chances of rape, I want to believe that believing that “sexy skirts increase the chances of rape” doesn’t increase the chances of rape.
I mean that statement directly, AND as a reminder that social systems are rife with metacognition.
To explain more explicitly: because you and I are not perfectly rational beings, each belief that we hold does not operate in a vacuum. Holding a belief influences how we interact with other beliefs, in a cascade of interdependent loops. It is entirely possible for a fact to be technically true in the sense that you think you mean it, but to have implications when it interfaces with the rest of your belief system that are not, in fact, rational on the whole.
Being rational about fact X is less important than winning (by which I mean “achieving your goals”, not “proving your superiority in an internet debate”).
I agree with the gist of that, but:
1) I don’t see very solid reasons for believing that “me believing sexy skirts increase the chances of rape” actually increases the chances of rape. There are probably cases where true beliefs have bad consequences, but this isn’t on the top of the list.
2) When evaluating whether to believe a lie for the Greater Good, one shouldn’t just consider the consequences of that lie considered in isolation, but also the consequences of increasing one’s willingness to believe lies.
And here’s where the problem actually lies:
It’s not that “sexy skirts doesn’t increase the chance of rape” is a lie. It’s that “sexy skirts doesn’t increase the chance of rape” is irrelevant when we’re discussing the wrongness of rape, which is where that argument often pops up. The problem isn’t that this argument is wrong, it’s that this argument is hacking everyone’s availability bias.
One of the more common tactics is in shifting the argument from the relevance of a fact, back onto the truth of a fact, and then relying on the fact that the human cognitive system will forget about the shift, and uptick both whenever an argument is made about either.
Does that make any sense?
Sure, I agree it’s irrelevant to the discussion of the wrongness of rape (though not to discussions of specific strategies for avoiding rape or catcalls) - which is why in a grand-cousin-nephew-great-aunt of this subthread I was telling MixedNuts to stop paying attention to “stupid” feminist arguments, and focus on the strong ones.
Note though that this discussion didn’t start from a discussion of the wrongness of rape, but from a discussion of what kind of dress triggered catcalls—so that point isn’t completely irrelevant! (though not very interesting)
If in a discussion of the wrongness of rape someone brings up the question of sexy skirts, my reaction wouldn’t be to tell them that it’s a shifty strategy, it would be to say “okay, let’s assume for argument’s sake that girls with sexy skirts are more likely to get raped—now what?”—because I don’t think any important disagreements actually hinge on that fact (unless the discussion is the tactics of rape-avoidance).
It would seem to decrease the chance of rape. I mean… “Believe X has negative consequence Y. Consider Y when evaluating when to do X. Influence others to do the same. Expect less Y.”
There are negative consequences of this true belief when held by people that also have false (and abhorrent) beliefs like “If sexy skirts increase the chance of rape then less blame, shame and punishment should be directed at rapists when they rape women (or men, I suppose) in sexy skirts”.
Personally I prefer to see those abhorrent beliefs actively punished and shamed rather than forcing people to believe false things that put them or those they speak to in increased personal danger.