dressing a certain way can, to a certain extent, increase risk of rape; and it is reasonable to take this into account when choosing clothing.
Dressing in a certain way will make people believe you that you actually didn’t consent to sex. But other than judging based on social rules, what is the relationship between consent and dress?
I’m open to additional evidence, but I suspect a rapist given a choice between the tipsy but extremely hot girl and the falling-down drunk but average girl will pick the average girl >90% of the time. This analysis assumes hotness is related to dress—which I think we all agree is true. But the advice “don’t get falling-down drunk” is totally unrelated to “don’t dress so that you look hot.”
Plus, “Don’t get falling-down drunk” is very controlling advice. And we don’t acquit muggers because the victim was drunk.
No, but what is being claimed is that the very discussion of whether certain behaviors have an effect on the likelihood of rape creates groundwork that others often use to absolve the rapist of blame, and that it’s far better to salt those fields than risk a derailing, even a Rationalist one.
To clarify: I’m not saying your argument isn’t rational, or even factually correct. I’m attempting to provide information that will allow you to empathize with people who dismiss your argument out of hand, so that you can better see their map of the social landscape.
If sexy skirts increase the chances of rape, I want to believe that sexy skirts increase the chances of rape. If sexy skirts don’t increase the chances of rape, I want to believe that sexy skirts don’t increase the chances of rape. I don’t care whether it creates a “groundwork” that some hypothetical others may use.
And if believing that “sexy skirts increase the chances of rape” increases the chances of rape, I want to believe that believing that “sexy skirts increase the chances of rape” increases the chances of rape. If believing that “sexy skirts increase the chances of rape” doesn’t increase the chances of rape, I want to believe that believing that “sexy skirts increase the chances of rape” doesn’t increase the chances of rape.
I mean that statement directly, AND as a reminder that social systems are rife with metacognition.
To explain more explicitly: because you and I are not perfectly rational beings, each belief that we hold does not operate in a vacuum. Holding a belief influences how we interact with other beliefs, in a cascade of interdependent loops. It is entirely possible for a fact to be technically true in the sense that you think you mean it, but to have implications when it interfaces with the rest of your belief system that are not, in fact, rational on the whole.
Being rational about fact X is less important than winning (by which I mean “achieving your goals”, not “proving your superiority in an internet debate”).
1) I don’t see very solid reasons for believing that “me believing sexy skirts increase the chances of rape” actually increases the chances of rape. There are probably cases where true beliefs have bad consequences, but this isn’t on the top of the list.
2) When evaluating whether to believe a lie for the Greater Good, one shouldn’t just consider the consequences of that lie considered in isolation, but also the consequences of increasing one’s willingness to believe lies.
1) I don’t see very solid reasons for believing that “me believing sexy skirts increase the chances of rape” actually increases the chances of rape. There are probably cases where true beliefs have bad consequences, but this isn’t on the top of the list.
2) When evaluating whether to believe a lie for the Greater Good, one shouldn’t just consider the consequences of that lie considered in isolation, but also the consequences of increasing one’s willingness to believe lies.
And here’s where the problem actually lies:
It’s not that “sexy skirts doesn’t increase the chance of rape” is a lie. It’s that “sexy skirts doesn’t increase the chance of rape” is irrelevant when we’re discussing the wrongness of rape, which is where that argument often pops up. The problem isn’t that this argument is wrong, it’s that this argument is hacking everyone’s availability bias.
One of the more common tactics is in shifting the argument from the relevance of a fact, back onto the truth of a fact, and then relying on the fact that the human cognitive system will forget about the shift, and uptick both whenever an argument is made about either.
Sure, I agree it’s irrelevant to the discussion of the wrongness of rape (though not to discussions of specific strategies for avoiding rape or catcalls) - which is why in a grand-cousin-nephew-great-aunt of this subthread I was telling MixedNuts to stop paying attention to “stupid” feminist arguments, and focus on the strong ones.
Note though that this discussion didn’t start from a discussion of the wrongness of rape, but from a discussion of what kind of dress triggered catcalls—so that point isn’t completely irrelevant! (though not very interesting)
If in a discussion of the wrongness of rape someone brings up the question of sexy skirts, my reaction wouldn’t be to tell them that it’s a shifty strategy, it would be to say “okay, let’s assume for argument’s sake that girls with sexy skirts are more likely to get raped—now what?”—because I don’t think any important disagreements actually hinge on that fact (unless the discussion is the tactics of rape-avoidance).
1) I don’t see very solid reasons for believing that “me believing sexy skirts increase the chances of rape” actually increases the chances of rape.
It would seem to decrease the chance of rape. I mean… “Believe X has negative consequence Y. Consider Y when evaluating when to do X. Influence others to do the same. Expect less Y.”
There are probably cases where true beliefs have bad consequences, but this isn’t on the top of the list.
There are negative consequences of this true belief when held by people that also have false (and abhorrent) beliefs like “If sexy skirts increase the chance of rape then less blame, shame and punishment should be directed at rapists when they rape women (or men, I suppose) in sexy skirts”.
Personally I prefer to see those abhorrent beliefs actively punished and shamed rather than forcing people to believe false things that put them or those they speak to in increased personal danger.
Oh, I know that. It’s just best to avoid such confusion from the get-go. If Tim wants to argue our discussion here is itself dangerous that’s one thing, but I’l be damned if he’s going to strawman me.
My core assertion is that discussion of skirt length increases getting-away-with-it-even-if-caught risk. There’s factual dispute about its effect on environmental risk.
I think the best predictor of rape (especially acquaintance rape) is opportunity. Generally, it isn’t an accident when a guy ends up alone with a very drunk girl at a party. By contrast, pure sexiness is orders of magnitude less likely to increase rape risk.
Therefore, focusing on skirt-length in discussion of rape risk doesn’t do much good in reducing rape risk. If pure sexiness is low enough environmental risk and group norms getting-away-with-it rape risk is large enough, discussing skirt-length increases rape risk.
That’s an empirical question, for which we (a) lack sufficient data, and (b) have very different intuitions.
And my core assertion is that refusing to take into account skirt length, as you put it, is irrational and not the winning thing to do, which seems like a bad thing when losing results in, y’know, rape. Not that rapists are somehow innocent because their victim failed to discourage them. Their choices are their own, but so are ours; the universe doesn’t care that they broke the rules, you still lose.
Dressing in a certain way will make people believe you that you actually didn’t consent to sex. But other than judging based on social rules, what is the relationship between consent and dress?
I’m open to additional evidence, but I suspect a rapist given a choice between the tipsy but extremely hot girl and the falling-down drunk but average girl will pick the average girl >90% of the time. This analysis assumes hotness is related to dress—which I think we all agree is true. But the advice “don’t get falling-down drunk” is totally unrelated to “don’t dress so that you look hot.”
Plus, “Don’t get falling-down drunk” is very controlling advice. And we don’t acquit muggers because the victim was drunk.
No-one here is claiming that dress can absolve the rapist of blame.
No, but what is being claimed is that the very discussion of whether certain behaviors have an effect on the likelihood of rape creates groundwork that others often use to absolve the rapist of blame, and that it’s far better to salt those fields than risk a derailing, even a Rationalist one.
To clarify: I’m not saying your argument isn’t rational, or even factually correct. I’m attempting to provide information that will allow you to empathize with people who dismiss your argument out of hand, so that you can better see their map of the social landscape.
If sexy skirts increase the chances of rape, I want to believe that sexy skirts increase the chances of rape. If sexy skirts don’t increase the chances of rape, I want to believe that sexy skirts don’t increase the chances of rape. I don’t care whether it creates a “groundwork” that some hypothetical others may use.
And if believing that “sexy skirts increase the chances of rape” increases the chances of rape, I want to believe that believing that “sexy skirts increase the chances of rape” increases the chances of rape. If believing that “sexy skirts increase the chances of rape” doesn’t increase the chances of rape, I want to believe that believing that “sexy skirts increase the chances of rape” doesn’t increase the chances of rape.
I mean that statement directly, AND as a reminder that social systems are rife with metacognition.
To explain more explicitly: because you and I are not perfectly rational beings, each belief that we hold does not operate in a vacuum. Holding a belief influences how we interact with other beliefs, in a cascade of interdependent loops. It is entirely possible for a fact to be technically true in the sense that you think you mean it, but to have implications when it interfaces with the rest of your belief system that are not, in fact, rational on the whole.
Being rational about fact X is less important than winning (by which I mean “achieving your goals”, not “proving your superiority in an internet debate”).
I agree with the gist of that, but:
1) I don’t see very solid reasons for believing that “me believing sexy skirts increase the chances of rape” actually increases the chances of rape. There are probably cases where true beliefs have bad consequences, but this isn’t on the top of the list.
2) When evaluating whether to believe a lie for the Greater Good, one shouldn’t just consider the consequences of that lie considered in isolation, but also the consequences of increasing one’s willingness to believe lies.
And here’s where the problem actually lies:
It’s not that “sexy skirts doesn’t increase the chance of rape” is a lie. It’s that “sexy skirts doesn’t increase the chance of rape” is irrelevant when we’re discussing the wrongness of rape, which is where that argument often pops up. The problem isn’t that this argument is wrong, it’s that this argument is hacking everyone’s availability bias.
One of the more common tactics is in shifting the argument from the relevance of a fact, back onto the truth of a fact, and then relying on the fact that the human cognitive system will forget about the shift, and uptick both whenever an argument is made about either.
Does that make any sense?
Sure, I agree it’s irrelevant to the discussion of the wrongness of rape (though not to discussions of specific strategies for avoiding rape or catcalls) - which is why in a grand-cousin-nephew-great-aunt of this subthread I was telling MixedNuts to stop paying attention to “stupid” feminist arguments, and focus on the strong ones.
Note though that this discussion didn’t start from a discussion of the wrongness of rape, but from a discussion of what kind of dress triggered catcalls—so that point isn’t completely irrelevant! (though not very interesting)
If in a discussion of the wrongness of rape someone brings up the question of sexy skirts, my reaction wouldn’t be to tell them that it’s a shifty strategy, it would be to say “okay, let’s assume for argument’s sake that girls with sexy skirts are more likely to get raped—now what?”—because I don’t think any important disagreements actually hinge on that fact (unless the discussion is the tactics of rape-avoidance).
It would seem to decrease the chance of rape. I mean… “Believe X has negative consequence Y. Consider Y when evaluating when to do X. Influence others to do the same. Expect less Y.”
There are negative consequences of this true belief when held by people that also have false (and abhorrent) beliefs like “If sexy skirts increase the chance of rape then less blame, shame and punishment should be directed at rapists when they rape women (or men, I suppose) in sexy skirts”.
Personally I prefer to see those abhorrent beliefs actively punished and shamed rather than forcing people to believe false things that put them or those they speak to in increased personal danger.
Oh, I know that. It’s just best to avoid such confusion from the get-go. If Tim wants to argue our discussion here is itself dangerous that’s one thing, but I’l be damned if he’s going to strawman me.
My core assertion is that discussion of skirt length increases getting-away-with-it-even-if-caught risk. There’s factual dispute about its effect on environmental risk.
I think the best predictor of rape (especially acquaintance rape) is opportunity. Generally, it isn’t an accident when a guy ends up alone with a very drunk girl at a party. By contrast, pure sexiness is orders of magnitude less likely to increase rape risk.
Therefore, focusing on skirt-length in discussion of rape risk doesn’t do much good in reducing rape risk. If pure sexiness is low enough environmental risk and group norms getting-away-with-it rape risk is large enough, discussing skirt-length increases rape risk.
That’s an empirical question, for which we (a) lack sufficient data, and (b) have very different intuitions.
And my core assertion is that refusing to take into account skirt length, as you put it, is irrational and not the winning thing to do, which seems like a bad thing when losing results in, y’know, rape. Not that rapists are somehow innocent because their victim failed to discourage them. Their choices are their own, but so are ours; the universe doesn’t care that they broke the rules, you still lose.