I do note that it would probably be perceived differently by someone who was aware of its truth (this person would certainly be hurt by the reminder of the bad thing), than by someone who was not (i.e. a religious person).
Maybe, although I strongly suspect religious people alieve that their relatives are gone (otherwise, as others have noted, a funeral would be more like a going-away party).
This one is interesting. A tangential thought: have there been studies to determine the power of stereotype threat to affect people who are aware of stereotype threat?
Good question. Wikipedia turns up this link, which would seem to say “Yes.” So happily, the corrective for this contextually harmful empirical statement is a contextually helpful empirical statement.
...one solution I would vehemently oppose would be to forbid such statements from being made at all.
Oh yes, certainly. Refusing to notice ingroup/outgroup differences is just the opposite failure mode.
There’s something wrong with your assessment (of the revealing clothing --> sexual assault case) here and I can’t quite put my finger on it. Intuitively it feels like the category of “blame” is being abused, but I have to think more about this one.
I am still philosophically confused about this issue, although I have been thinking about it for a while. You are probably objecting to the fact that ex hypothesi, less revealing clothing leads to fewer sexual assaults, so why wouldn’t we follow that advice—yes? As I say, I don’t have a full account of that. All I wanted to draw attention to is the ethical questionable-ness of making such a statement without any acknowledgement that one is asking potential victims to change their (blameless) behaviour in order to avoid (blameworthy) assault from others. Compounding the issue is the suspicion that statements like this ALSO tend to be a form of whitewashed slut-shaming.
The problem here, I think, is that some people use “X is going to happen” with the additional meaning of “X should happen”, often without realizing it; in other words they have the unconscious belief that what does happen is what should happen. Such people often have substantial difficulty even understanding replies like “Yes, X will happen, but it’s not right for X to happen”; they perceive such replies as incoherent.
Yes, in my experience this is very common in muggle society.
If I think X will happen (or not happen), it’s important (imo) that I have the ability and right to make that empirical prediction, unimpeded by social norms against offense. If people who are afflicted with status quo bias, or other failures of reasoning, fail to distinguish between “is” and “ought” and in consequence take my prediction to have some sort of normative content — well, it may be flippant to say “that’s their problem”, but the situation definitely falls into the “audience is insufficiently intelligent/sane” category. Saying “this statement is offensive” in such a case is not only wrong, it’s detrimental to open discourse.
Right. The rubric that I try to use in such situations is essentially a consequentialist one. Roughly speaking, the idea is that you should try to predict how your statements might be misinterpreted by a (possibly silly) audience, and if the expected harm of the misinterpretation is significant as compared to the potential benefit of your statement, then reformulate/be silent/narrow your audience/educate your audience about why they shouldn’t misinterpret you. I sympathize, believe me! It’s incredibly annoying to be read uncharitably. But if you know how to prevent an uncharitable/harmful reading, and don’t as a matter of principle because the audience should know better… I think the LW term for that would be “living in the should-universe.”
Agreed. I just think that branding certain sorts of statements as “offensive” is entirely the wrong way to go about treating this issue with the care it deserves, because of the detrimental effects that approach has on free discourse.
As it happens, I broadly agree about the term “offensive,” which is an incredibly censorious and abuse-prone word. I think we should try to give better fault assessments than that—and happily, on LW most people usually do.
I am still philosophically confused about this issue, although I have been thinking about it for a while. You are probably objecting to the fact that ex hypothesi, less revealing clothing leads to fewer sexual assaults, so why wouldn’t we follow that advice—yes? As I say, I don’t have a full account of that. All I wanted to draw attention to is the ethical questionable-ness of making such a statement without any acknowledgement that one is asking potential victims to change their (blameless) behaviour in order to avoid (blameworthy) assault from others.
Would you have similar objections if I advised you to lock your house to reduce theft?
If the context is that you (or others) are telling me that it wasn’t the thief’s fault that they stole my TV, or that the fact that my house was unlocked is evidence that I consented to the taking of my TV, that context may make the advice seem part and parcel of the blame-shifting.
For that matter, the reason to lock your house may well be to avoid being low-hanging fruit — IOW, someone else’s TV gets stolen, not yours; theft is not actually reduced, just shifted around. There’s no guarantee that everyone locking their house would reduce theft. The thieves learn to pick locks and everyone’s costs are higher — but now a person who doesn’t pay that cost is stigmatized as too foolish to protect themselves.
As an old boss of mine used to say, “locks are to keep your friends out.” They work against casual intruders, not committed ones.
If the context is that you (or others) are telling me that it wasn’t the thief’s fault that they stole my TV, or that the fact that my house was unlocked is evidence that I consented to the taking of my TV
That also depends. An insurance company would be well within its rights to charge you a higher premium if you refused to lock your house.
Right — but an insurance company would do that even if it didn’t reduce theft overall, but merely shifted theft away from their insured customers onto others. It could even be negative-sum thanks to the cost of locks. If we actually want to reduce theft overall, shifting it around doesn’t suffice.
That is, no-one here is arguing for that position. I am well aware that there are people out there who hold all sorts of unjustifiable beliefs, but conflating then with my reasonable claims is logically rude.
I do note that it would probably be perceived differently by someone who was aware of its truth (this person would certainly be hurt by the reminder of the bad thing), than by someone who was not (i.e. a religious person).
Maybe, although I strongly suspect religious people alieve that their relatives are gone (otherwise, as others have noted, a funeral would be more like a going-away party).
One counter-example: In Julia Sweeney’s Letting Go of God (an account of how Bible study eventually led a Catholic to become an atheist) , she says that accepting that there is no afterlife led to her having to mourn all her relatives again.
Perhaps there is something between verbal belief and gut-level alief.
Perhaps there is something between verbal belief and gut-level alief.
Alternative hypothesis: some religious people are mourning the fact that they will never be able to interact with the person again, not the fact that the person’s mind has been irrevocably destroyed.
Maybe, although I strongly suspect religious people alieve that their relatives are gone (otherwise, as others have noted, a funeral would be more like a going-away party).
Good question. Wikipedia turns up this link, which would seem to say “Yes.” So happily, the corrective for this contextually harmful empirical statement is a contextually helpful empirical statement.
Oh yes, certainly. Refusing to notice ingroup/outgroup differences is just the opposite failure mode.
I am still philosophically confused about this issue, although I have been thinking about it for a while. You are probably objecting to the fact that ex hypothesi, less revealing clothing leads to fewer sexual assaults, so why wouldn’t we follow that advice—yes? As I say, I don’t have a full account of that. All I wanted to draw attention to is the ethical questionable-ness of making such a statement without any acknowledgement that one is asking potential victims to change their (blameless) behaviour in order to avoid (blameworthy) assault from others. Compounding the issue is the suspicion that statements like this ALSO tend to be a form of whitewashed slut-shaming.
Yes, in my experience this is very common in muggle society.
Right. The rubric that I try to use in such situations is essentially a consequentialist one. Roughly speaking, the idea is that you should try to predict how your statements might be misinterpreted by a (possibly silly) audience, and if the expected harm of the misinterpretation is significant as compared to the potential benefit of your statement, then reformulate/be silent/narrow your audience/educate your audience about why they shouldn’t misinterpret you. I sympathize, believe me! It’s incredibly annoying to be read uncharitably. But if you know how to prevent an uncharitable/harmful reading, and don’t as a matter of principle because the audience should know better… I think the LW term for that would be “living in the should-universe.”
As it happens, I broadly agree about the term “offensive,” which is an incredibly censorious and abuse-prone word. I think we should try to give better fault assessments than that—and happily, on LW most people usually do.
Would you have similar objections if I advised you to lock your house to reduce theft?
Doesn’t that depend on the context of the advice?
If the context is that you (or others) are telling me that it wasn’t the thief’s fault that they stole my TV, or that the fact that my house was unlocked is evidence that I consented to the taking of my TV, that context may make the advice seem part and parcel of the blame-shifting.
For that matter, the reason to lock your house may well be to avoid being low-hanging fruit — IOW, someone else’s TV gets stolen, not yours; theft is not actually reduced, just shifted around. There’s no guarantee that everyone locking their house would reduce theft. The thieves learn to pick locks and everyone’s costs are higher — but now a person who doesn’t pay that cost is stigmatized as too foolish to protect themselves.
As an old boss of mine used to say, “locks are to keep your friends out.” They work against casual intruders, not committed ones.
That also depends. An insurance company would be well within its rights to charge you a higher premium if you refused to lock your house.
Right — but an insurance company would do that even if it didn’t reduce theft overall, but merely shifted theft away from their insured customers onto others. It could even be negative-sum thanks to the cost of locks. If we actually want to reduce theft overall, shifting it around doesn’t suffice.
The whole point is that this is a strawman.
(Not sure what the point of the rest is—clarification please?)
It’s not. Maybe you’re lucky enough to have never encountered it.
That is, no-one here is arguing for that position. I am well aware that there are people out there who hold all sorts of unjustifiable beliefs, but conflating then with my reasonable claims is logically rude.
One counter-example: In Julia Sweeney’s Letting Go of God (an account of how Bible study eventually led a Catholic to become an atheist) , she says that accepting that there is no afterlife led to her having to mourn all her relatives again.
Perhaps there is something between verbal belief and gut-level alief.
Alternative hypothesis: some religious people are mourning the fact that they will never be able to interact with the person again, not the fact that the person’s mind has been irrevocably destroyed.