“Usually” being the key here. To me, the most interesting coherence theories are broadly bayesian in character.
Bayesianism is even more explicit about the need for compatibility with existing beliefs, I’m priors.
I’m not sure what position you’re trying to take or what argument you’re trying to make here
I don’t think there is a single theory that achieves every desideratum (including minimality of unjustified assumptions). Ie. Epistemology is currently unsolved.
do you think there’s a correct theory which does have the property of convergence on a single truth?
I think convergence is a desideratum.
I don’t know of a theory that achieves all desiderata. Theres any number of trivial theories that can converge, but do nothing else.
I don’t think it’s possible to converge on the truth in all cases, since information is limited—EG, we can’t decide all undecidable mathematical statements, even with infinite time to think. Because this is a fundamental limit, though, it doesn’t seem like a viable charge against an individual theory.
That’s not the core problem: there are reasons to believe that convergence can’t be achieved, even if everyone has access to the same finite pool of information. The problem of the criterion is one of them… if there is fundamental disagreement about the nature of truth and evidence, then agents that fundamentally differ won’t converge in finite time.
“Usually” being the key here. To me, the most interesting coherence theories are broadly bayesian in character.
Bayesianism is even more explicit about the need for compatibility with existing beliefs, ie. priors.
I’m not sure what position you’re trying to take or what argument you’re trying to make here
I don’t think there is a single theory that achieves every desideratum (including minimality of unjustified assumptions). Ie. Epistemology is currently unsolved.
do you think there’s a correct theory which does have the property of convergence on a single truth?
I think convergence is a desideratum.
I don’t know of a theory that achieves all desiderata. Theres any number of trivial theories that can converge, but do nothing else. There’s lots of partial theories as well, but it’s not clear how to make the tradeoffs.
I don’t think it’s possible to converge on the truth in all cases, since information is limited—EG, we can’t decide all undecidable mathematical statements, even with infinite time to think. Because this is a fundamental limit, though, it doesn’t seem like a viable charge against an individual theory.
That’s not the core problem: there are reasons to believe that convergence can’t be achieved, even if everyone has access to the same finite pool of information. The problem of the criterion is one of them… if there is fundamental disagreement about the nature of truth and evidence, then agents that fundamentally differ won’t converge in finite time.
We are not stuck with them because we can change our mind about them based on this deliberation. However, this deliberation had better use our best ideas about how to validate or reject ideas (which is, in a sense, circular when what we are analyzing is our best ideas about how to validate or reject ideas
Yes...the circularity of the method weighs against convergence in the outcome.
He is saying that we can question our rock bottom assumptions in the same way that we question other things. We are not stuck with them because we can change our mind about them based on this deliberation. However, this deliberation had better use our best ideas about how to validate or reject ideas
Out best ideas relatively might not be good enough absolutely. In that passage he is sounding like a Popperism, but the Popperism approach is particularly unable to achieve convergence.
“What else could I possibly use?”
Doesn’t imply that what he must use is any good in absolute terms.
I don’t think there is a single theory that achieves every desideratum (including minimality of unjustified assumptions). Ie. Epistemology is currently unsolved.
I was never arguing against this. I broadly agree. However, I also think it’s a poor problem frame, because “solve epistemology” is quite vague. It seems better to be at least somewhat more precise about what problems one is trying to solve.
Out best ideas relatively might not be good enough absolutely. In that passage he is sounding like a Popperism, but the Popperism approach is particularly unable to achieve convergence.
Well, just because he says some of the things that Popper would say, doesn’t mean he says all of the things that Popper would say.
do you think there’s a correct theory which does have the property of convergence on a single truth?
I think convergence is a desideratum. I don’t know of a theory that achieves all desiderata. Theres any number of trivial theories that can converge, but do nothing else. There’s lots of partial theories as well, but it’s not clear how to make the tradeoffs.
I don’t think it’s possible to converge on the truth in all cases, since information is limited—EG, we can’t decide all undecidable mathematical statements, even with infinite time to think. Because this is a fundamental limit, though, it doesn’t seem like a viable charge against an individual theory.
That’s not the core problem: there are reasons to believe that convergence can’t be achieved, even if everyone has access to the same finite pool of information. The problem of the criterion is one of them… if there is fundamental disagreement about the nature of truth and evidence, then agents that fundamentally differ won’t converge in finite time.
If you’ve got an argument that a desideratum can’t be achieved, don’t you want to take a step back and think about what’s achievable? In the quoted section above, it seems like I offer one argument that convergence isn’t achievable, and you pile on more, but you still stick to a position something like, we should throw out theories that don’t achieve it?
Bayesianism is even more explicit about the need for compatibility with existing beliefs, ie. priors.
That’s why I’m using it as an example of coherentism.
IDK what the problem is here, but it seems to me like there’s some really weird disconnect happening in this conversation, which keeps coming back in full force despite our respective attempts to clarify things to each other.
I was never arguing against this. I broadly agree.
But you also said that:-
Also note that I prefer to claim Eliezer’s view is essentially correct
Correct about what? That he has solved epistemology, or that epistemology is unsolved, or what to do in the absence of a solution? Remember , the standard rationalist claim is that epistemology is solved by Bayes. That’s the claim that people like Gordon and David Chapman are arguing against. If you say you agree with Yudkowsky, that is what people are going to assume you mean.
However, I also think it’s a poor problem frame, because “solve epistemology” is quite vague.
I just told you told you what that means “a single theory that achieves every desideratum (including minimality of unjustified assumptions)”
Also note that I prefer to claim Eliezer’s view is essentially correct without claiming that it solves the problem of the criterion, since I find the criterion problem to be worryingly vague
So Yudkowsky is essentially correct about ….something… but not necessarily about the thing this discussion is about.
Well, just because he says some of the things that Popper would say, doesn’t mean he says all of the things that Popper would say.
He says different things in different places, as I said. He says different things in different places, so hes unclear.
If you’ve got an argument that a desideratum can’t be achieved, don’t you want to take a step back and think about what’s achievable
I don’t think all desiderata are achievable by one theory. That’s my precise reason for thinking that epistemology is unsolved.
but you still stick to a position something like, we should throw out theories that don’t achieve it?
I didn’t say that. I haven’t even got into the subject of what to do given the failure of epistemology to meet all its objectives.
What I was talking about specifically was the inability of Bayes to achieve convergence. You seem to disagree, because you were talking about “agreement Bayes”.
Also note that I prefer to claim Eliezer’s view is essentially correct
Correct about what? That he has solved epistemology, or that epistemology is unsolved, or what to do in the absence of a solution? Remember , the standard rationalist claim is that epistemology is solved by Bayes. That’s the claim that people like Gordon and David Chapman are arguing against. If you say you agree with Yudkowsky, that is what people are going to assume you mean.
I already addressed this in a previous comment:
I’m also not sure what “a solution to epistemology” means.
Quoting from Eliezer:
But this doesn’t answer the legitimate philosophical dilemma: If every belief must be justified, and those justifications in turn must be justified, then how is the infinite recursion terminated?
So I think it’s fair to say that Eliezer is trying to answer the regress argument.
I am trying to be specific about my claims. I feel like you are trying to pin very general and indefensible claims on me. I am not endorsing everything Eliezer says; I am endorsing the specific essay.
However, I also think it’s a poor problem frame, because “solve epistemology” is quite vague.
I just told you told you what that means “a single theory that achieves every desideratum (including minimality of unjustified assumptions)”
Is there some full list of desiderata which has broad agreement or which you otherwise want to defend??
I feel like any good framing of “solve epistemology” should start by being more precise than “solve epistemology”, wrt what problem or problems are being approached.
but you still stick to a position something like, we should throw out theories that don’t achieve it?
I didn’t say that. I haven’t even got into the subject of what to do given the failure of epistemology to meet all its objectives.
Agreement that you didn’t say that. It’s merely my best attempt at interpretation. I was trying to ask a question about what you were trying to say. It seems to me like one thing you have been trying to do in this conversation is dismiss coherentism as a possible answer, on the argument that it doesn’t satisfy some specific criteria, in particular truth-convergence. I’m arguing that truth-convergence should clearly be thrown out as a criterion because it’s impossible to satisfy (although it can be revised into more feasible criteria). On my understanding, you yourself seemed to agree about its infeasibility, although you seemed to think we should focus on different arguments about why it is infeasible (you said that my argument misses the point). But (on my reading) you continued to seem to reject coherentism on the same argument, namely the truth-convergence problem. So I am confused about your view.
I don’t think all desiderata are achievable by one theory. That’s my precise reason for thinking that epistemology is unsolved.
To reiterate: then why would they continue to be enshrined as The Desiderata?
So Yudkowsky is essentially correct about ….something… but not necessarily about the thing this discussion is about.
I mean, looking back, it was me who initially agreed with the OP [original post], in a top-level comment, that Eliezer’s essay was essentially correct. You questioned that, and I have been defending my position… and now it’s somehow off-topic?
Correct about what? That he has solved epistemology, or that epistemology is unsolved, or what to do in the absence of a solution?
I already addressed this in a previous comment
I don’t see where.
Is there some full list of desiderata which has broad agreement or which you otherwise want to defend??
Certainty. A huge issue in early modern philosophy which has now been largely abandoned.
Completeness. Everything is either true or false, nothing is neither.
Consistency. Nothing is both true and false.
Convergence. Everyone can agree.
Objectivity: Everyone can agree on something that’s actually true
It seems to me like one thing you have been trying to do in this conversation is dismiss coherentism as a possible
I dismissed it as an answer that fulfills all criteria, because it doesn’t fulfil Convergence. I didn’t use the word possible—you did in another context, but I couldn’t see what you meant. If nothing fulfils all criteria, then coherentism could be preferable to approaches with other flaws.
To reiterate: then why would they continue to be enshrined as The Desiderata?
Because all of them individually can be achieved if you make trade offs.
Because things don’t stop being desireable when they are unavailable.
I’m arguing that truth-convergence should clearly be thrown out as a criterion because it’s impossible to satisfy
That isn’t at all clear.
Lowering the bar to whatever you can jump over ,AKA Texas sharpshooting,isn’t a particularly rational procedure. The absolute standard you are or are not hitting relates to what you can consistently claim on the object level: without the possibility convergence on objective truth, you can’t claim that people with other beliefs are irrational or wrong, (at least so long as they hit some targets).
It’s still important to make relative comparisons even if you can’t hit the absolute standard...but it’s also important to remember your relatively best theory is falling short of absolute standards.
Completeness: I don’t need everything to be either true or false, I just need everything to have a justifiable probability.
That’s also Completeness.
Convergence+ObjectivityConvergence
Giving up on convergence has practical consequences. To be Consistent, you need to give up on the stance that your views are a slam dunk, and the other tribe’s views are indefensible.
Bayesianism is even more explicit about the need for compatibility with existing beliefs, I’m priors.
I don’t think there is a single theory that achieves every desideratum (including minimality of unjustified assumptions). Ie. Epistemology is currently unsolved.
I think convergence is a desideratum. I don’t know of a theory that achieves all desiderata. Theres any number of trivial theories that can converge, but do nothing else.
That’s not the core problem: there are reasons to believe that convergence can’t be achieved, even if everyone has access to the same finite pool of information. The problem of the criterion is one of them… if there is fundamental disagreement about the nature of truth and evidence, then agents that fundamentally differ won’t converge in finite time.
Bayesianism is even more explicit about the need for compatibility with existing beliefs, ie. priors.
I don’t think there is a single theory that achieves every desideratum (including minimality of unjustified assumptions). Ie. Epistemology is currently unsolved.
I think convergence is a desideratum. I don’t know of a theory that achieves all desiderata. Theres any number of trivial theories that can converge, but do nothing else. There’s lots of partial theories as well, but it’s not clear how to make the tradeoffs.
That’s not the core problem: there are reasons to believe that convergence can’t be achieved, even if everyone has access to the same finite pool of information. The problem of the criterion is one of them… if there is fundamental disagreement about the nature of truth and evidence, then agents that fundamentally differ won’t converge in finite time.
Yes...the circularity of the method weighs against convergence in the outcome.
Out best ideas relatively might not be good enough absolutely. In that passage he is sounding like a Popperism, but the Popperism approach is particularly unable to achieve convergence.
Doesn’t imply that what he must use is any good in absolute terms.
I was never arguing against this. I broadly agree. However, I also think it’s a poor problem frame, because “solve epistemology” is quite vague. It seems better to be at least somewhat more precise about what problems one is trying to solve.
Well, just because he says some of the things that Popper would say, doesn’t mean he says all of the things that Popper would say.
If you’ve got an argument that a desideratum can’t be achieved, don’t you want to take a step back and think about what’s achievable? In the quoted section above, it seems like I offer one argument that convergence isn’t achievable, and you pile on more, but you still stick to a position something like, we should throw out theories that don’t achieve it?
That’s why I’m using it as an example of coherentism.
IDK what the problem is here, but it seems to me like there’s some really weird disconnect happening in this conversation, which keeps coming back in full force despite our respective attempts to clarify things to each other.
But you also said that:-
Correct about what? That he has solved epistemology, or that epistemology is unsolved, or what to do in the absence of a solution? Remember , the standard rationalist claim is that epistemology is solved by Bayes. That’s the claim that people like Gordon and David Chapman are arguing against. If you say you agree with Yudkowsky, that is what people are going to assume you mean.
I just told you told you what that means “a single theory that achieves every desideratum (including minimality of unjustified assumptions)”
So Yudkowsky is essentially correct about ….something… but not necessarily about the thing this discussion is about.
He says different things in different places, as I said. He says different things in different places, so hes unclear.
I don’t think all desiderata are achievable by one theory. That’s my precise reason for thinking that epistemology is unsolved.
I didn’t say that. I haven’t even got into the subject of what to do given the failure of epistemology to meet all its objectives.
What I was talking about specifically was the inability of Bayes to achieve convergence. You seem to disagree, because you were talking about “agreement Bayes”.
I already addressed this in a previous comment:
I am trying to be specific about my claims. I feel like you are trying to pin very general and indefensible claims on me. I am not endorsing everything Eliezer says; I am endorsing the specific essay.
Is there some full list of desiderata which has broad agreement or which you otherwise want to defend??
I feel like any good framing of “solve epistemology” should start by being more precise than “solve epistemology”, wrt what problem or problems are being approached.
Agreement that you didn’t say that. It’s merely my best attempt at interpretation. I was trying to ask a question about what you were trying to say. It seems to me like one thing you have been trying to do in this conversation is dismiss coherentism as a possible answer, on the argument that it doesn’t satisfy some specific criteria, in particular truth-convergence. I’m arguing that truth-convergence should clearly be thrown out as a criterion because it’s impossible to satisfy (although it can be revised into more feasible criteria). On my understanding, you yourself seemed to agree about its infeasibility, although you seemed to think we should focus on different arguments about why it is infeasible (you said that my argument misses the point). But (on my reading) you continued to seem to reject coherentism on the same argument, namely the truth-convergence problem. So I am confused about your view.
To reiterate: then why would they continue to be enshrined as The Desiderata?
I mean, looking back, it was me who initially agreed with the OP [original post], in a top-level comment, that Eliezer’s essay was essentially correct. You questioned that, and I have been defending my position… and now it’s somehow off-topic?
I don’t see where.
Certainty. A huge issue in early modern philosophy which has now been largely abandoned.
Completeness. Everything is either true or false, nothing is neither.
Consistency. Nothing is both true and false.
Convergence. Everyone can agree.
Objectivity: Everyone can agree on something that’s actually true
I dismissed it as an answer that fulfills all criteria, because it doesn’t fulfil Convergence. I didn’t use the word possible—you did in another context, but I couldn’t see what you meant. If nothing fulfils all criteria, then coherentism could be preferable to approaches with other flaws.
Because all of them individually can be achieved if you make trade offs.
Because things don’t stop being desireable when they are unavailable.
That isn’t at all clear.
Lowering the bar to whatever you can jump over ,AKA Texas sharpshooting,isn’t a particularly rational procedure. The absolute standard you are or are not hitting relates to what you can consistently claim on the object level: without the possibility convergence on objective truth, you can’t claim that people with other beliefs are irrational or wrong, (at least so long as they hit some targets).
It’s still important to make relative comparisons even if you can’t hit the absolute standard...but it’s also important to remember your relatively best theory is falling short of absolute standards.
Except for consistency, none of these seem actually desirable as requirements.
Certainty: Don’t need it, I’m fine with probabilities.
Completeness: I don’t need everything to be either true or false, I just need everything to have a justifiable probability.
Consistency: Agree.
Convergence+Objectivity: No Universally Compelling Arguments
That’s also Completeness.
Giving up on convergence has practical consequences. To be Consistent, you need to give up on the stance that your views are a slam dunk, and the other tribe’s views are indefensible.