We think that religions are false, and a shared priority of Less Wrong denizens is to believe things that are true instead. I’ll readily admit that religion has some good effects. Many people find it comforting; it’s inspired great works of art and music and architecture; it does a lot of work to funnel money to charitable causes, some of which are very helpful; it encourages community-building; and it has historically served as a cultural touchstone to enable the development of some very powerful iconography and tropes.
It’s still false.
If you like the good things about religion, there are alternatives (although most of them only work piecemeal). For instance, there’s Ethical Culture, which fills in the community gap a departing religion can leave.
We think that religions are false, and a shared priority of Less Wrong denizens is to >believe things that are true instead
You’ll get no argument from me that religions are false. You will get practically no argument from me that it makes sense to want to believe things that are true. What I question is, is it always rational to make others believe things that are true? If I leave my lights on when I leave the house so that would-be robbers think I am home when I am not, I am making a rational decision to make others believe something that is false.
If I am playing the Prisoner’s Dilemma with someone (just once, so no tit-for-tat or anything), and I have the choice of making my opponent either act rationally or irrationally, the rational thing for me to do is make him act irrationally.
Thanks; the Bayesians vs. Barbarians post is exactly the kind of thing I was looking for. I’ll have to read some of the posts that it links to (as well as re-read the background posts you referred to; haven’t read them in a while), as the way it stands I still think the Barbarians would win.
If I am playing the Prisoner’s Dilemma with someone (just once, so no tit-for-tat or anything), and I have the choice of making my opponent either act rationally or irrationally, the rational thing for me to do is make him act irrationally.
is it always rational to make others believe things that are true?
This depends on your values. If chief among them is “honesty”, and you caveat the “make others believe things that are true” with a “for the right reasons” clause, then probably, yeah. If honesty has to compete with things like keeping your property, maybe not.
If I am playing the Prisoner’s Dilemma with someone (just once, so no tit-for-tat or anything), and I have the choice of making my opponent either act rationally or irrationally, the rational thing for me to do is make him act irrationally.
I’m not sure what the content of “making your opponent behave (ir)rationally” is supposed to be. It’s certainly not an uncontroversial tidbit of received wisdom that the rational thing to do in the Prisoner’s Dilemma is to defect, which is what you seem to imply.
I’m not sure what the content of “making your opponent behave (ir)rationally” is >supposed to be. It’s certainly not an uncontroversial tidbit of received wisdom that the >rational thing to do in the Prisoner’s Dilemma is to defect, which is what you seem to >imply.
Exactly, if I was able to make him act irrationally, he would not defect, whereas I would. And if the definition of rationality is that it makes you win, then it can be perfectly rational to have others act irrationally (i.e. believe wrong things).
If you both cooperate, instead of you both defecting, you’d both be better off, which is a more rational (more winning) outcome. Thus, making “cooperation” a synonym for “irrational” will irk people around here. (Of course if you defect and the other player cooperates, you’d have the best possible payoff.)
We think that religions are false, and a shared priority of Less Wrong denizens is to believe things that are true instead. I’ll readily admit that religion has some good effects. Many people find it comforting; it’s inspired great works of art and music and architecture; it does a lot of work to funnel money to charitable causes, some of which are very helpful; it encourages community-building; and it has historically served as a cultural touchstone to enable the development of some very powerful iconography and tropes.
It’s still false.
If you like the good things about religion, there are alternatives (although most of them only work piecemeal). For instance, there’s Ethical Culture, which fills in the community gap a departing religion can leave.
You’ll get no argument from me that religions are false. You will get practically no argument from me that it makes sense to want to believe things that are true. What I question is, is it always rational to make others believe things that are true? If I leave my lights on when I leave the house so that would-be robbers think I am home when I am not, I am making a rational decision to make others believe something that is false.
If I am playing the Prisoner’s Dilemma with someone (just once, so no tit-for-tat or anything), and I have the choice of making my opponent either act rationally or irrationally, the rational thing for me to do is make him act irrationally.
See Bayesians vs. Barbarians. You may need the following posts for the background:
Newcomb’s Problem and Regret of Rationality
Newcomb’s Problem standard positions
The True Prisoner’s Dilemma
Thanks; the Bayesians vs. Barbarians post is exactly the kind of thing I was looking for. I’ll have to read some of the posts that it links to (as well as re-read the background posts you referred to; haven’t read them in a while), as the way it stands I still think the Barbarians would win.
Rationalists should win.
This depends on your values. If chief among them is “honesty”, and you caveat the “make others believe things that are true” with a “for the right reasons” clause, then probably, yeah. If honesty has to compete with things like keeping your property, maybe not.
I’m not sure what the content of “making your opponent behave (ir)rationally” is supposed to be. It’s certainly not an uncontroversial tidbit of received wisdom that the rational thing to do in the Prisoner’s Dilemma is to defect, which is what you seem to imply.
Exactly, if I was able to make him act irrationally, he would not defect, whereas I would. And if the definition of rationality is that it makes you win, then it can be perfectly rational to have others act irrationally (i.e. believe wrong things).
If you both cooperate, instead of you both defecting, you’d both be better off, which is a more rational (more winning) outcome. Thus, making “cooperation” a synonym for “irrational” will irk people around here. (Of course if you defect and the other player cooperates, you’d have the best possible payoff.)
He didn’t claim that religion isn’t false.
I didn’t say that he so claimed.
Yes you didn’t, but the discussion is at cross-purposes.