I’m curious where you’d estimate 50% chance of it existing and where you’d estimate 90%.
The jump from 76% to 99.8% is to my mind striking for a variety of reasons. Among other concerns, I suspect that many people here would put a greater than 0.2% chance of some sort of extreme civilization disrupting event above that. Assuming a 0. 2% chance of a civilization disrupting event in an 8 year period is roughly the same as a 2% chance of such an event occurring in the next hundred years which doesn’t look to be so unreasonable but for the fact that longer term predictions should have more uncertainty. Overall, a 0.2% chance of disruption seems to be too high, and if your probability model is accurate then one should expect the functional simulation to arrive well before then. But note also that civilization collapsing is not the only thing that could easily block this sort of event. Events much smaller than full on collapse could do it also, as could many more mundane issues.
That high an estimate seems to be likely vulnerable to the planning fallacy.
Overall, your estimate seems to be too confident, the 2020 estimate especially so.
I would put something like a 0.04% chance on a neuroscience disrupting event (including a biology disrupting event, or a science disrupting event, or a civilization disrupting event). I put something like a 0.16% chance on uploading the nematode actually being so hard that it takes 8 years. I totally buy that this estimate is a planning fallacy. Unfortunately, being aware of the planning fallacy does not make it go away.
Unfortunately, being aware of the planning fallacy does not make it go away.
True. But there are ways to calibrate for it. It seems that subtracting off 10-15% for technological predictions works well. If one is being more careful it probably would do something that was more careful, say taking not a fixed percentage but something that became less severe as the probability estimate of the event went up, so that one could still have genuinely high confidence intervals. But if one is in doubt simply reducing the probability until it doesn’t look like the planning fallacy is likely is one way to approach things.
Bleh, I see I was again unclear about what I meant by nailing down—more precisely, how would one judge whatever has been accomplished by 2014/2020 as being ‘complete’ or ‘functional’? Frequently there are edge cases (there’s this paper reporting one group’s abandoned simulation which seemed complete oh except for this wave pattern didn’t show up and they had to simplify that...). But since you were good enough to write them:
Ah, I see. This is the sort of question that the X Prize Foundation has to wrestle with routinely. It generally takes a few months of work to take even a relatively clear problem statement and boil it down to a purely objective judging procedure. Since I already have an oracle for what I it is I want to develop (does it feel satisfying to me?), and I’m not trying to incentivize other people to do it for me, I’m not convinced that I should do said work for the C. elegans upload project. I’m not even particularly interested in formalizing my prediction for futurological purposes since it’s probably planning fallacy anyway. However, I’m open to arguments to the contrary.
I’m not convinced that I should do said work for the C. elegans upload project. I’m not even particularly interested in formalizing my prediction for futurological purposes since it’s probably planning fallacy anyway.
Well, that’s fine. I’ve make done with worse predictions than that.
“A complete functional simulation of the C. elegans nervous system will exist on 2014-06-08.” 76% confidence
“A complete functional simulation of the C. elegans nervous system will exist on 2020-01-01.” 99.8% confidence
Any thoughts on this today?
See here
I’m curious where you’d estimate 50% chance of it existing and where you’d estimate 90%.
The jump from 76% to 99.8% is to my mind striking for a variety of reasons. Among other concerns, I suspect that many people here would put a greater than 0.2% chance of some sort of extreme civilization disrupting event above that. Assuming a 0. 2% chance of a civilization disrupting event in an 8 year period is roughly the same as a 2% chance of such an event occurring in the next hundred years which doesn’t look to be so unreasonable but for the fact that longer term predictions should have more uncertainty. Overall, a 0.2% chance of disruption seems to be too high, and if your probability model is accurate then one should expect the functional simulation to arrive well before then. But note also that civilization collapsing is not the only thing that could easily block this sort of event. Events much smaller than full on collapse could do it also, as could many more mundane issues.
That high an estimate seems to be likely vulnerable to the planning fallacy.
Overall, your estimate seems to be too confident, the 2020 estimate especially so.
I would put something like a 0.04% chance on a neuroscience disrupting event (including a biology disrupting event, or a science disrupting event, or a civilization disrupting event). I put something like a 0.16% chance on uploading the nematode actually being so hard that it takes 8 years. I totally buy that this estimate is a planning fallacy. Unfortunately, being aware of the planning fallacy does not make it go away.
True. But there are ways to calibrate for it. It seems that subtracting off 10-15% for technological predictions works well. If one is being more careful it probably would do something that was more careful, say taking not a fixed percentage but something that became less severe as the probability estimate of the event went up, so that one could still have genuinely high confidence intervals. But if one is in doubt simply reducing the probability until it doesn’t look like the planning fallacy is likely is one way to approach things.
Bleh, I see I was again unclear about what I meant by nailing down—more precisely, how would one judge whatever has been accomplished by 2014/2020 as being ‘complete’ or ‘functional’? Frequently there are edge cases (there’s this paper reporting one group’s abandoned simulation which seemed complete oh except for this wave pattern didn’t show up and they had to simplify that...). But since you were good enough to write them:
http://predictionbook.com/predictions/4123
http://predictionbook.com/predictions/4124
Ah, I see. This is the sort of question that the X Prize Foundation has to wrestle with routinely. It generally takes a few months of work to take even a relatively clear problem statement and boil it down to a purely objective judging procedure. Since I already have an oracle for what I it is I want to develop (does it feel satisfying to me?), and I’m not trying to incentivize other people to do it for me, I’m not convinced that I should do said work for the C. elegans upload project. I’m not even particularly interested in formalizing my prediction for futurological purposes since it’s probably planning fallacy anyway. However, I’m open to arguments to the contrary.
For your information, the above two links were judged as wrong
@davidad, any updates on your work?
See https://www.jefftk.com/p/we-havent-uploaded-worms and Why Is There No Successful Whole Brain Simulation Yet (2019)
Well, that’s fine. I’ve make done with worse predictions than that.
(Which paper are you referring to?)
That was just a rhetorical example; I don’t actually know what the edge cases will be in advance.
99.8% confidence—can I bet with you at those odds?
Thoughts on that first prediction?