Unfortunately, I think the pattern theory of identity (according to which your copy is still you) is an illusion, and that this is all cryonics is likely to provide—a way to make copies of the frozen original
I think that cryonics patients could actually be repaired rather than sliced and scanned. It would be more difficult, but with advanced nanotechnology and the nice access that the blood vessels provide, it seems that it would be pretty easy to do. Repairing the body would be even easier.
I think that cryonics patients could actually be repaired
So do I. But the result will be a copy. During sleep and hypothermia, the brain remains in the same physical phase. Cellular metabolism never shuts down, for example. But I would be rather surprised if the “neurophysical correlate of selfhood” survives the freezing transition.
It’s not as though Mitchell’s belief is uniquely untestable. It’s more like we can’t collect any evidence at all about whether identity is preserved, just by reanimating a bunch of people and asking them.
We’d need some sort of neurological description of what “selfhood” means, and then presumably testing to see whether this property is preserved after reanimation would be the actual surprising observation.
Until then, it’s irrational to dismiss either theory based purely on the argument that “even if we cryopreserve you, it wouldn’t falsify your theory”, since this applies to both sides.
I don’t think so. I’m a processist (though I do think it’s unlikely that quantum effects matter), but I can imagine kinds of discoveries that would falsify my current belief on that matter. It could turn out, once we localize and understand consciousness:
...that it’s not even “on” or merely suspended all the time, but sometimes is “off” in the normal course of brain operation.
...that it’s possible to erase clear memories even with the brain in the same physical state (this would support either Porter’s view or some more spiritual dualism).
...that there is more than a single thread of consciousness, and no particular continuity of identity for the person as a whole, even though some thread is operating all the time.
Of those, one and three even seem plausible, but I can’t think of a way to do the experiments at our current level of understanding and technology. In any case, once we actually have a working and well-tested theory of consciousness, identity will either vanish or be similarly well-understood.
I suspect you wrong him here—I’m guessing post-freeze Mitchell would say “Obviously I feel like I’m the same person, but now I know I’ve been cryopreserved I must conclude I’m a copy, not the real thing. I feel good about being alive, but it’s copy-Mitchell who feels good, not the guy who got frozen.”
I think that cryonics patients could actually be repaired rather than sliced and scanned. It would be more difficult, but with advanced nanotechnology and the nice access that the blood vessels provide, it seems that it would be pretty easy to do. Repairing the body would be even easier.
So do I. But the result will be a copy. During sleep and hypothermia, the brain remains in the same physical phase. Cellular metabolism never shuts down, for example. But I would be rather surprised if the “neurophysical correlate of selfhood” survives the freezing transition.
ETA: See followup comment.
When you say you would be surprised, is there any actual observation that could surprise you here?
It’s not as though Mitchell’s belief is uniquely untestable. It’s more like we can’t collect any evidence at all about whether identity is preserved, just by reanimating a bunch of people and asking them.
We’d need some sort of neurological description of what “selfhood” means, and then presumably testing to see whether this property is preserved after reanimation would be the actual surprising observation.
Until then, it’s irrational to dismiss either theory based purely on the argument that “even if we cryopreserve you, it wouldn’t falsify your theory”, since this applies to both sides.
No, the position that is unfalsifiable is that there is a distinction here at all.
I don’t think so. I’m a processist (though I do think it’s unlikely that quantum effects matter), but I can imagine kinds of discoveries that would falsify my current belief on that matter. It could turn out, once we localize and understand consciousness:
...that it’s not even “on” or merely suspended all the time, but sometimes is “off” in the normal course of brain operation.
...that it’s possible to erase clear memories even with the brain in the same physical state (this would support either Porter’s view or some more spiritual dualism).
...that there is more than a single thread of consciousness, and no particular continuity of identity for the person as a whole, even though some thread is operating all the time.
Of those, one and three even seem plausible, but I can’t think of a way to do the experiments at our current level of understanding and technology. In any case, once we actually have a working and well-tested theory of consciousness, identity will either vanish or be similarly well-understood.
Actually, there is. If we cryopreserved Mitchell and then reanimated him, he would be very surprised: it would falsify his theory.
If we did it to anyone else, however, that wouldn’t be enough. It would have to be him.
I suspect you wrong him here—I’m guessing post-freeze Mitchell would say “Obviously I feel like I’m the same person, but now I know I’ve been cryopreserved I must conclude I’m a copy, not the real thing. I feel good about being alive, but it’s copy-Mitchell who feels good, not the guy who got frozen.”
Well, in that case he really has joined the fairy cult.
The neurophysical correlate of selfhood can survive a temperature drop to 0 but it can’t survive a phase change?
So selfhood is kind of like latent heat of fusion?
This is grade A+ magical thinking.
So that is why there is such interest in vitrification! grin/duck/run...
Yes, that’s right, if you get vitrified, does that count as a different phase?!