It’s not as though Mitchell’s belief is uniquely untestable. It’s more like we can’t collect any evidence at all about whether identity is preserved, just by reanimating a bunch of people and asking them.
We’d need some sort of neurological description of what “selfhood” means, and then presumably testing to see whether this property is preserved after reanimation would be the actual surprising observation.
Until then, it’s irrational to dismiss either theory based purely on the argument that “even if we cryopreserve you, it wouldn’t falsify your theory”, since this applies to both sides.
I don’t think so. I’m a processist (though I do think it’s unlikely that quantum effects matter), but I can imagine kinds of discoveries that would falsify my current belief on that matter. It could turn out, once we localize and understand consciousness:
...that it’s not even “on” or merely suspended all the time, but sometimes is “off” in the normal course of brain operation.
...that it’s possible to erase clear memories even with the brain in the same physical state (this would support either Porter’s view or some more spiritual dualism).
...that there is more than a single thread of consciousness, and no particular continuity of identity for the person as a whole, even though some thread is operating all the time.
Of those, one and three even seem plausible, but I can’t think of a way to do the experiments at our current level of understanding and technology. In any case, once we actually have a working and well-tested theory of consciousness, identity will either vanish or be similarly well-understood.
I suspect you wrong him here—I’m guessing post-freeze Mitchell would say “Obviously I feel like I’m the same person, but now I know I’ve been cryopreserved I must conclude I’m a copy, not the real thing. I feel good about being alive, but it’s copy-Mitchell who feels good, not the guy who got frozen.”
When you say you would be surprised, is there any actual observation that could surprise you here?
It’s not as though Mitchell’s belief is uniquely untestable. It’s more like we can’t collect any evidence at all about whether identity is preserved, just by reanimating a bunch of people and asking them.
We’d need some sort of neurological description of what “selfhood” means, and then presumably testing to see whether this property is preserved after reanimation would be the actual surprising observation.
Until then, it’s irrational to dismiss either theory based purely on the argument that “even if we cryopreserve you, it wouldn’t falsify your theory”, since this applies to both sides.
No, the position that is unfalsifiable is that there is a distinction here at all.
I don’t think so. I’m a processist (though I do think it’s unlikely that quantum effects matter), but I can imagine kinds of discoveries that would falsify my current belief on that matter. It could turn out, once we localize and understand consciousness:
...that it’s not even “on” or merely suspended all the time, but sometimes is “off” in the normal course of brain operation.
...that it’s possible to erase clear memories even with the brain in the same physical state (this would support either Porter’s view or some more spiritual dualism).
...that there is more than a single thread of consciousness, and no particular continuity of identity for the person as a whole, even though some thread is operating all the time.
Of those, one and three even seem plausible, but I can’t think of a way to do the experiments at our current level of understanding and technology. In any case, once we actually have a working and well-tested theory of consciousness, identity will either vanish or be similarly well-understood.
Actually, there is. If we cryopreserved Mitchell and then reanimated him, he would be very surprised: it would falsify his theory.
If we did it to anyone else, however, that wouldn’t be enough. It would have to be him.
I suspect you wrong him here—I’m guessing post-freeze Mitchell would say “Obviously I feel like I’m the same person, but now I know I’ve been cryopreserved I must conclude I’m a copy, not the real thing. I feel good about being alive, but it’s copy-Mitchell who feels good, not the guy who got frozen.”
Well, in that case he really has joined the fairy cult.