“Physics chooses” is vague. An agents physical state will evolve under the laws
of physics whether they are deterministic or not. If an agents state never contained the slightest inkling of committing murder, for instance, then they will not choose to do that—deterministically or not. A choice, random or not, can only be made from the options available, and will depend on their values or preferences.
That FW can be dissolved under determinism does not mean it should be disolved under determinism or disolved at all. A case has to be made for dissolution over solution.
“Physics chooses [between A with probability p and B with probability 1-p]” is vague.
It means nothing other than “a Laplacean superbeing, given complete knowledge of the prior state and of the laws of physics, would calculate that at time t+dt, the state of the system will either be A with probability p or B with probability 1-p”. (You can see why I tried not to write all of that out! Although this may have been unwise given that you’ve now made me do just that.)
Complete knowledge of the prior state includes complete knowledge of the agent. Hence, there is no property of the agent which explains why A rather than B happens. The Laplacean superbeing has already taken all of the agent’s reasons for preferring A (or B) into account in computing its probabilities, so given that those were the probabilities, whatever ultimately happens has nothing to do with the agent’s reasons.
You should read chapter VII of Nagel’s book The View From Nowhere. He explains very clearly how the problem of free will arises from the tension between the ‘internal, subjective’ and ‘external, objective’ views of a decision. From the ‘external, objective’ view, freedom in the sense you want inevitably disappears regardless of whether physics is deterministic.
The explanation about the Laplacian Daemon does not take into account the fact that the very varied pre-existing states of people’s minds/brains has a major influence on their choices. Physics cannot make them choose something they never had in mind. Their choices evolve out of their dispositions under both determinism and indeterminism.
If the choice between A and B is indeterministic, it is indeterministic, but the particular values of A and B come from the particular agent. Whatever happens has a huge amount to do with those reasons since your personified “physics” cannot implant brand new reasons ex nihilo.
I am quite capable of arguing my case against Nagel or anybody else.
Imagine a ‘coarse-grained’ view of the agent, where we don’t ask what’s inside the agent’s head. Then the agent has a huge spectrum of possible actions—our uncertainty about the action taken is massive.
Finding out what’s inside the agent’s head resolves either ‘most’ or ‘all’ of the uncertainty, according as physics is indeterministic or deterministic respectively. If physics is indeterministic then some uncertainty remains, and the resolution of this uncertainty cannot be explained by reference to the agent’s preferences, and cannot serve as a meaningful basis for freedom.
The point is: that extra bit of uncertainty on the end, which you only get with indeterministic physics, doesn’t give any extra scope whatsoever for ‘free will’ or ‘moral responsibility’.
I heartily agree with you that
the very varied pre-existing states of people’s minds/brains has a major influence on their choices. Physics cannot make them choose something they never had in mind. Their choices evolve out of their dispositions under both determinism and indeterminism.”
I can’t figure out why you’re making disagreement noises while putting forward the same exact view as mine!
Some irresoluble uncertainty about what an agent will do is the only meaningful basis for freedom. (Other solutions are in fact disolutions) The point is how an agent can have that freedom without complete disconnection of their actions from their character, values, etc. The answer is to pay attention to quantifiers. Some indeterminism does not mean complete indeterminism, and so does not mean complete disconnection.
Sorry but I think that’s confused, for reasons I’ve already explained.
Honestly, you’d enjoy reading Nagel. If it helps, he’s an anti-reductionist just like you, who doesn’t think in terms of ‘dissolving’ philosophical problems.
“Physics chooses” is vague. An agents physical state will evolve under the laws of physics whether they are deterministic or not. If an agents state never contained the slightest inkling of committing murder, for instance, then they will not choose to do that—deterministically or not. A choice, random or not, can only be made from the options available, and will depend on their values or preferences.
That FW can be dissolved under determinism does not mean it should be disolved under determinism or disolved at all. A case has to be made for dissolution over solution.
It means nothing other than “a Laplacean superbeing, given complete knowledge of the prior state and of the laws of physics, would calculate that at time t+dt, the state of the system will either be A with probability p or B with probability 1-p”. (You can see why I tried not to write all of that out! Although this may have been unwise given that you’ve now made me do just that.)
Complete knowledge of the prior state includes complete knowledge of the agent. Hence, there is no property of the agent which explains why A rather than B happens. The Laplacean superbeing has already taken all of the agent’s reasons for preferring A (or B) into account in computing its probabilities, so given that those were the probabilities, whatever ultimately happens has nothing to do with the agent’s reasons.
You should read chapter VII of Nagel’s book The View From Nowhere. He explains very clearly how the problem of free will arises from the tension between the ‘internal, subjective’ and ‘external, objective’ views of a decision. From the ‘external, objective’ view, freedom in the sense you want inevitably disappears regardless of whether physics is deterministic.
The explanation about the Laplacian Daemon does not take into account the fact that the very varied pre-existing states of people’s minds/brains has a major influence on their choices. Physics cannot make them choose something they never had in mind. Their choices evolve out of their dispositions under both determinism and indeterminism.
If the choice between A and B is indeterministic, it is indeterministic, but the particular values of A and B come from the particular agent. Whatever happens has a huge amount to do with those reasons since your personified “physics” cannot implant brand new reasons ex nihilo.
I am quite capable of arguing my case against Nagel or anybody else.
Imagine a ‘coarse-grained’ view of the agent, where we don’t ask what’s inside the agent’s head. Then the agent has a huge spectrum of possible actions—our uncertainty about the action taken is massive.
Finding out what’s inside the agent’s head resolves either ‘most’ or ‘all’ of the uncertainty, according as physics is indeterministic or deterministic respectively. If physics is indeterministic then some uncertainty remains, and the resolution of this uncertainty cannot be explained by reference to the agent’s preferences, and cannot serve as a meaningful basis for freedom.
The point is: that extra bit of uncertainty on the end, which you only get with indeterministic physics, doesn’t give any extra scope whatsoever for ‘free will’ or ‘moral responsibility’.
I heartily agree with you that
I can’t figure out why you’re making disagreement noises while putting forward the same exact view as mine!
Some irresoluble uncertainty about what an agent will do is the only meaningful basis for freedom. (Other solutions are in fact disolutions) The point is how an agent can have that freedom without complete disconnection of their actions from their character, values, etc. The answer is to pay attention to quantifiers. Some indeterminism does not mean complete indeterminism, and so does not mean complete disconnection.
Sorry but I think that’s confused, for reasons I’ve already explained.
Honestly, you’d enjoy reading Nagel. If it helps, he’s an anti-reductionist just like you, who doesn’t think in terms of ‘dissolving’ philosophical problems.
I didn’t say I was anti reductionist. I find this us-and-them stuff rather annoying.
OK. Replace the word “who” with “in that he” in my previous comment.
I don’t mind dissolving prolbems if all else fails. But you cannot reduce everything to nothing.