The explanation about the Laplacian Daemon does not take into account the fact that the very varied pre-existing states of people’s minds/brains has a major influence on their choices. Physics cannot make them choose something they never had in mind. Their choices evolve out of their dispositions under both determinism and indeterminism.
If the choice between A and B is indeterministic, it is indeterministic, but the particular values of A and B come from the particular agent. Whatever happens has a huge amount to do with those reasons since your personified “physics” cannot implant brand new reasons ex nihilo.
I am quite capable of arguing my case against Nagel or anybody else.
Imagine a ‘coarse-grained’ view of the agent, where we don’t ask what’s inside the agent’s head. Then the agent has a huge spectrum of possible actions—our uncertainty about the action taken is massive.
Finding out what’s inside the agent’s head resolves either ‘most’ or ‘all’ of the uncertainty, according as physics is indeterministic or deterministic respectively. If physics is indeterministic then some uncertainty remains, and the resolution of this uncertainty cannot be explained by reference to the agent’s preferences, and cannot serve as a meaningful basis for freedom.
The point is: that extra bit of uncertainty on the end, which you only get with indeterministic physics, doesn’t give any extra scope whatsoever for ‘free will’ or ‘moral responsibility’.
I heartily agree with you that
the very varied pre-existing states of people’s minds/brains has a major influence on their choices. Physics cannot make them choose something they never had in mind. Their choices evolve out of their dispositions under both determinism and indeterminism.”
I can’t figure out why you’re making disagreement noises while putting forward the same exact view as mine!
Some irresoluble uncertainty about what an agent will do is the only meaningful basis for freedom. (Other solutions are in fact disolutions) The point is how an agent can have that freedom without complete disconnection of their actions from their character, values, etc. The answer is to pay attention to quantifiers. Some indeterminism does not mean complete indeterminism, and so does not mean complete disconnection.
Sorry but I think that’s confused, for reasons I’ve already explained.
Honestly, you’d enjoy reading Nagel. If it helps, he’s an anti-reductionist just like you, who doesn’t think in terms of ‘dissolving’ philosophical problems.
The explanation about the Laplacian Daemon does not take into account the fact that the very varied pre-existing states of people’s minds/brains has a major influence on their choices. Physics cannot make them choose something they never had in mind. Their choices evolve out of their dispositions under both determinism and indeterminism.
If the choice between A and B is indeterministic, it is indeterministic, but the particular values of A and B come from the particular agent. Whatever happens has a huge amount to do with those reasons since your personified “physics” cannot implant brand new reasons ex nihilo.
I am quite capable of arguing my case against Nagel or anybody else.
Imagine a ‘coarse-grained’ view of the agent, where we don’t ask what’s inside the agent’s head. Then the agent has a huge spectrum of possible actions—our uncertainty about the action taken is massive.
Finding out what’s inside the agent’s head resolves either ‘most’ or ‘all’ of the uncertainty, according as physics is indeterministic or deterministic respectively. If physics is indeterministic then some uncertainty remains, and the resolution of this uncertainty cannot be explained by reference to the agent’s preferences, and cannot serve as a meaningful basis for freedom.
The point is: that extra bit of uncertainty on the end, which you only get with indeterministic physics, doesn’t give any extra scope whatsoever for ‘free will’ or ‘moral responsibility’.
I heartily agree with you that
I can’t figure out why you’re making disagreement noises while putting forward the same exact view as mine!
Some irresoluble uncertainty about what an agent will do is the only meaningful basis for freedom. (Other solutions are in fact disolutions) The point is how an agent can have that freedom without complete disconnection of their actions from their character, values, etc. The answer is to pay attention to quantifiers. Some indeterminism does not mean complete indeterminism, and so does not mean complete disconnection.
Sorry but I think that’s confused, for reasons I’ve already explained.
Honestly, you’d enjoy reading Nagel. If it helps, he’s an anti-reductionist just like you, who doesn’t think in terms of ‘dissolving’ philosophical problems.
I didn’t say I was anti reductionist. I find this us-and-them stuff rather annoying.
OK. Replace the word “who” with “in that he” in my previous comment.
I don’t mind dissolving prolbems if all else fails. But you cannot reduce everything to nothing.