Some irresoluble uncertainty about what an agent will do is the only meaningful basis for freedom. (Other solutions are in fact disolutions) The point is how an agent can have that freedom without complete disconnection of their actions from their character, values, etc. The answer is to pay attention to quantifiers. Some indeterminism does not mean complete indeterminism, and so does not mean complete disconnection.
Sorry but I think that’s confused, for reasons I’ve already explained.
Honestly, you’d enjoy reading Nagel. If it helps, he’s an anti-reductionist just like you, who doesn’t think in terms of ‘dissolving’ philosophical problems.
Some irresoluble uncertainty about what an agent will do is the only meaningful basis for freedom. (Other solutions are in fact disolutions) The point is how an agent can have that freedom without complete disconnection of their actions from their character, values, etc. The answer is to pay attention to quantifiers. Some indeterminism does not mean complete indeterminism, and so does not mean complete disconnection.
Sorry but I think that’s confused, for reasons I’ve already explained.
Honestly, you’d enjoy reading Nagel. If it helps, he’s an anti-reductionist just like you, who doesn’t think in terms of ‘dissolving’ philosophical problems.
I didn’t say I was anti reductionist. I find this us-and-them stuff rather annoying.
OK. Replace the word “who” with “in that he” in my previous comment.
I don’t mind dissolving prolbems if all else fails. But you cannot reduce everything to nothing.