Okay, after thinking a few minutes about the Batman-Joker/where do you put Dark Wizards if you’re determined not to use Dementors anymore problem...
Unbreakable Vow anyone? Just give Dark Wizards the option “either you take an Unbreakable Vow to never knowingly kill/torture/Imperio a human being ever again, nor to ever knowingly assist in such, or we just execute you right now”.
I can think up of possible ways out of this meta-problem, in order to sustain the dilemma: Perhaps really powerful Dark Wizards require too vast a portion of magical power to sustain the vow. Perhaps there are dark rituals whereby using them, Dark Wizards can break out of even an (ill-named) Unbreakable Vow. Perhaps Dark Wizards tend to have made other rituals that already make them immune to Unbreakable Vows… Perhaps unbreakable vows need be really really specific in some weird manner like “I will not kill Bill Weasley”, and “I will not kill Charlie Weasley” necessarily are two separate vows, so that “I will not kill any human” isn’t enforceable...
But these are additional problems that are not yet mentioned/listed/foreshadowed in the story. Ugh, Unbreakable Vows seem something of a game breaker right now.
Sidenote: Whenever I think of something such, I worry that the author will think he’ll have to rewrite/revise everything he had already planned, and that we’ll never get an update again. Not my intention, I swear.
Unbreakable Vows are ridiculously broken, as Harry briefly observes in Ch. 74. They’re even more ridiculous in fanfictions where people can just grab a wand and swear something on their life and magic and thereby create a magically binding vow. I had to nerf the hell out of their activation costs just to make the MoR-verse keep running. I can’t depict a society with zero agency problems, a perfect public commitment process and an infinite trust engine unless the whole story is about that.
I mentioned this in the TVtropes thread, but Merlin did not think through his interdict all that well—If you are going to compromise everyones mental integrity to end a cycle of magical destruction, then limiting information spread is an asinie way to do it—it would make infinitely more sense to subject all wizards to a magical prohibition against large scale destruction and killing. Phrasing it so that it wards agaist Dunning-Kruger fueled magical accidents without shutting down experimentation entirely is an interesting exercise, but should be possible.
Frankly, we don’t know enough about why Merlin did what he did to judge his action either way—we don’t know what danger was being foreseen, we don’t know the limitations of his own powers. There’s really no sense in criticizing him or praising him at this point of time—we lack crucial information.
It’s possible that the Interdict is a natural property of the Source of Magic, and was swept up in the legend of Merlin as time passed. We have no real evidence for a time when people could record spells indefinitely, AFAIK.
I understood Merlins Interdict to be interfering with The Source of Magic, not with “everyones mental integrity”, which would seem much much harder to do. Magic seems to function by checking prerequisites, like “waved magical active stick in spatial pattern X”, “said wingardium leviosa with exact pronounciation Y”- Just add to this list of prerequisites of sufficiently powerfull spells a call of a function which checks wether the user is authorized; if not, check wether user should be authorized. If ve is, add to list of authorized user, if not, deny.
Doesn’t work. It’s not that powerful spells are known but can’t be cast, the function of the Interdict somehow causes powerful wizards’ notes to be unintelligible to the uninitiated.
Not just notes. - All written instructions on how to do spells above a certain level just flat out fail unless someone explains the spell to you in person at least once. Which has to be a mind hack, and if you are willing to alter peoples minds to remove the risk of idiots or madmen blowing up the planet/opening the gates of hell/ect, then picking this specific modification is very.. odd.
Hold up.. checking assumptions. Can anyone think of a way for the edict of merlin to do what it does without tampering with peoples minds?
Back up one step further: what evidence do we have that the Interdict actually exists? As opposed to, say, all powerful wizards simply having the same inclination toward secrecy and self-discovery. How did Quirrell put it...
The fools who can’t resist meddling are killed by the lesser perils early on, and the survivors all know that there are secrets you do not share with anyone who lacks the intelligence and the discipline to discover them for themselves! Every powerful wizard knows that!
I’ve never received the impression that wizards powerful enough to be subject to the Interdict have actually tried to circumvent it. If all known examples of written instructions for powerful spells were gibberish to begin with, would the world look any different? Not to mention, why would it be necessary to cast a huge mind-altering spell to make people do what they were inclined to do anyway?
Hold up.. checking assumptions. Can anyone think of a way for the edict of merlin to do what it does without tampering with peoples minds?
Trivial.
Someone explaining to you in person is the same as someone authorizing you to use a piece of software. You can still speak the words of the spell, still do the sacrifices, but the computer is just not going to listen to your commands unless you’ve been given those privileges.
Yes, that would be a possibility for controlling distribution of powerful spells, except that the Edict of Merlin explicitly doesn’t do that: you can’t speak the words because you can’t understand the writing. If you could read and speak the spell (and whatever else the spell requires) presumably you could cast it. (Otherwise Merlin needn’t have bothered making the texts unintelligible as well.)
Can anyone think of a way for the edict of merlin to do what it does without tampering with peoples minds?
If by “tampering” you mean just “permanently modifying”, the Source of Magic (TM) could just watch wizards’ minds(1) to detect when they’re writing in sufficient detail(2) high-level(3) spell descriptions, and enchant the written artifact.(4)
(1:) I can’t think of a way it would act the way it does—i.e., trigger wand-less and wordless spells, as well as accidental magic—without reading wizards’ minds at all times (or tampering with their minds at birth), anyway, at least not while following Harry’s genetic marker theory.
(2:) It needs to act only when the description tells you what to do, not what it does. Presumably it lets a historian describe what wondrous feats Merlin did as long as he didn’t describe how the spell was cast.
(3:) I’m really curious how that works. It’s clear that some spells are “harder” to cast, and some are “more powerful” than others (not sure if the two are perfectly correlated), but AFAIK it’s never described what that really means, except for trivial things like complex wand patterns and not-really-helpful stuff like “only first-year student magic level”.
(4:) Basilisks turn you to stone when you look at them, the Mirror-of-I-can’t-remember-who-it-was showed you what you wanted when you looked at it, so it’s clear that magic effects can be triggered by looking at the magical item.
(4b:) Exactly what “written artifact” means would be kind of hard to figure out. If it also applies to non-textual artifacts—sound recordings, encoding a description with smells and colors, planting a row of trees of two species to spell the description in ASCII—then it’s really complicated.
It might just look at what people intend to do, but then it would be vulnerable to complicated attacks like encrypting the description with a key, giving the encrypted text to a scribe who knows the described spell but doesn’t know the key nor what the encrypted text is, and asking them to write the encrypted text, then writing the key separately—or even unintentional recordings. Then again, we have no evidence it isn’t vulnerable to all that, there would have been little opportunity centuries ago. Harry’s pouch does respond to languages neither the caster nor the user knows, but then again it doesn’t answer for simple encodings like “1+1” for “2”...
With Unbreakable Vows, the… arbitrator?… sacrifices a portion of their magic permanently yes? One issue is that, after you die you might need that magic for something, like the more magic you have the more pleasant (or less!) magically created heaven is. In any case, even if magical society was fine with sacrifices, they might reason thus, and not use unbreakable vows. Such a society would make investigation (magical!) into potential afterlife a top priority, so lack of use of such a ritual might be compensated by finding out there is a heaven (or hell).
This is a society that has no problem using dementors as prison guards. I’m sure they would be willing to compel each criminal to act as the binder for one other criminal. It seems like a very small price to pay.
Since there seems to be some confusion on this point: in canon, at least, an “Unbreakable” Vow didn’t actually stop you breaking it, it just killed you if you did. If a person is willing to sacrifice their life—and if you resurrect using a horcrux, that could easily be worth it—you can still commit crimes.
And if you swore to obey the law—is being found guilty is now an automatic death sentence, even if you honestly thought it was legal? I doubt a working legal system based on Unbreakable Vows is trivial to come up with.
That said, they are unquestionably broken in canon. Very, very broken. Few are willing to stake their life over, say, business deals, but there are loads of situations in which they would be a massive game-breaker.
Not to mention perfect self-motivation.. Actually I still don’t understand why it is not used that way. Unbreakable Vows only require energy until said vow is fulfilled right?
Seems to be a lot more effective than A. Robbins...
Now we can make the Death Eaters bind trivial Unbreakable Vows over and over again until they lose all of their magic. So now Azkaban is unnecessary and the initial problem with Unbreakable Vows allowing for easy solutions to the prison vs. execution dilemma resurfaces again.
Trivial vows might not trigger the ritual correctly. Remember one of the participants has to have had the option of trying to trust the person in question and choose not to. A vow over something that they’d have no reason to trust the person on otherwise may not work.
The initial statement seems plausible but not the reason you gave for it. Even trivial assertions involve trust. Your statement “a vow over something that they’d have no reason to trust the person on otherwise” reverses the burden of proof/trust that must be overcome. You still have to choose to trust someone even if you don’t have evidence saying that they break promises, lacking evidence proving them distrustful does not preclude having to choose to actively trust them.
One major problem concerns the legal rights of magical criminals; what if you’re later found to be innocent? There’ll be no way to reclaim their magic. Hence I doubt Harry would prefer this solution.
That reminds me—at some point in canon, Dumbledore says “There are worse things than dying”, and my original thought was that Voldemort could be turned into a Muggle. As it turned out, Dumbledore presumably meant the consequences of creating Horcruxes, but I do wonder how Voldeort would manage if he were turned into a Muggle.
Thank you; I even managed to figure that out myself (with the help of our ever vigilant and watchful google); as seen in my response to Desrtopa (24 seconds before you clicked the comment button apparently).
Not to mention perfect self-motivation.. Actually I still don’t understand why it is not used that way. Unbreakable Vows only require energy until said vow is fulfilled right?
I don’t think this is ever stated, and I’d err on the side of assuming not, because that would make them easier to abuse, which would be narratively inconvenient.
Makes sense. I was confused so I looked it up:
“And the third wizard, the binder, permanently sacrifices a small portion of their own magic, to sustain the Vow forever.”
I guess the self-improvement part is out of the question then...
Still; it’d be a pretty hardcore thing to do for an ambitious dying grandfather. Make his grandson, age 3, swear the vow (something along the lines: “I will never spend an awake moment on anything except improving my abilities or the situation of my family”—it could be phrased better) and then die happily.
Still; it’d be a pretty hardcore thing to do for an ambitious dying grandfather. Make his grandson, age 3, swear the vow (something along the lines: “I will never spend an awake moment on anything except improving my abilities or the situation of my family”—it could be phrased better) and then die happily.
Age three? Does the vow actually impel you adhere to it or does it just kill you when you are about to break it? (I thought the latter.) Didn’t he just kill his grandson?
If there exists any ritual that happens to permanently remove a portion of somebody’s magic (Unbreakable Vow), then you could just repeat that ritual meaninglessly until that person was completely stripped of magic permanently. Or you could use other rituals which require similar permanent sacrifices until you achieve the same effect. Keeping a permanently magicless wizard imprisoned is a trivial task, and obviates the need for dementors.
Side Note: That’s actually my pet theory on why Dementors as prison guards are acceptable to the public. It could be that governments used to use rituals to permanently strip prisoners of magic before imprisoning them. This would make them a revenue center instead of a funds sink. This would naturally encourage the magical government to find more and more excuses to imprison people, similar to how the ‘tough on crime’ cycle is accelerated by the for-profit prison systems in some places. A police state would be soon to follow. Then, after a cultural revolution, Dementors were adopted as the less evil option to house criminals. It also helps explain why so many rituals are banned. It’s unlikely to be true in HPMoR, but it’d be a nice thought for another fanfic.
Another problem with this system is the permanence. People get sent to Azkaban for less than lifetime sentences, but if you use this to strip someone of magic it’s gone forever. I suppose you could use degrees of magic removal as punishment but that seems hard to balance to different powerlevels of wizard.
This statement contains at least three assumptions that need to be unpacked before it is of any use.
What do you mean by ethically justifiable?
What do you mean by temporary and torture?
2a. To reduce it to absurdity, I would rather be slapped than lose my hand painlessly. Where do you draw the lines on temporariness and tortureness? Is living without magic after having it a form of torture? How much life expectancy does it take before a permanent disability is worse than a temporary pain?
Why is “probably much more ethically justifiable” a fact about either of these things rather than a fact about how you feel about them?
How deep of an analysis do you want? Ultimately, what I mean is that torture tends to foreseeably decrease the net positive valence of all experience to a greater extent than does incapacitation.
We both know those are fuzzy terms. And as a utilitarian I acknowledge that some extremely minimal torture could in principle be more justifiable than an especially severe incapacitation. But everyday cases of what we call ‘torture’ are intuitively much more painful and dehumanizing than, say, permanently depriving a person of a firearms or automobile license. Do you think that one’s long-term ability to use magic would tend to cluster on the other side of torture, on a scale of resultant human suffering?
Descriptively, most ethical systems would, I think, agree with my assessment; so if ‘ethically justifiable’ just means ‘able to be justified under what various people take to be the right ethical principles,’ it is an empirical statement. But I’ll instead take the approach of stipulating what I mean by ethical justifiability in psychological terms, the felt positive and negative valence of experiences. If this is a real property of mental states, what I call ‘ethical justifiability’ will rest on the distribution of those states. I am responsible for how I use my words, but my words are not on that account ‘about me.’
Based on your description it seems more sensible to put torture on a continuum with incapacitation rather than holding it separate, as if it decreases future positive utility it seems like another sort of incapacitation to me. At this point I think we’re down to math/data on happiness of post torture experiences versus post incapacitating experiences, which because it is 1 am and I have already taken melatonin I am too sleepy to want to look into. My intuitive leaning is that the effects of torture fade with time more than the effects of incapicitation, eg because I might eventually begin to forget how bad being tortured was but can never forget how I have one fewer limb, but this is only an intuition.
Our ability to fruitfully debate this issue, while we remain in fiction, is probably very limited. It may be underdetermined whether losing one’s magic feels more like losing a driver’s license or like losing a limb. If I’m conceiving of magic loss more in the former terms (magic as a toolbox), you more in the latter terms (magic as an intimate part of the magician), then it’s unsurprising that we’ll arrive at different intuitions.
That said, I’m unclear on what your argument is for treating torture and incapacitation as a ‘continuum.’ I of course think they can be placed on a continuum of suffering; and I concede that their distribution over the continuum partly overlaps, though I think the bulk of torture involves more intense aggregate suffering than does the bulk of incapacitation. But you seem to be making a different claim now—that torture IS a kind of incapacitation, or that incapacitation is a kind of torture.
The latter claim I can understand, but reject; incapacitation can sometimes be used to torture someone, but it does not follow that incapacitation itself is always just watered-down torture, for the same reason that the existence of ‘Chinese water torture’ does not imply that drinking water is, in any interesting sense, on a continuum with torture.
The former claim, that torture is a kind of incapacitation, seems more paradoxical. Is the suggestion that inflicting involuntary pain on someone is nothing but depriving that person of a certain ability—the ability, presumably, to be happy during the torture, or the ability to not suffer flashbacks afterward? I’m not sure this is a useful reframing, though it is interesting.
It’s not my argument, I thought it was yours. When you talk about torture decreasing future positive utility of all experiences that seems pretty clearly to me the same reason to dislike disability.
The reasons to dislike acute torture and superpower incapacitation are the same only in the very reductive way in which any two bad things are, given a monistic meta-ethics, bad for ‘the same reason.’ Sexual assault and poor dinner etiquette, if (monistically) bad, are bad for ‘the same reason’ in some attenuated sense. But for practical purposes this is not very informative, and I was trying to be at least a little practical in comparing the costs of torture and incapacitation.
Likewise, superpower incapacitation can be worse than torture mostly in the sense that any two generic acts can be dustspecked. This falls out of quantitative sensitivity in ethics (especially consequentialist ethics) as a boring side-effect, just as reducibility of reasons falls out of monism as a boring side-effect. In both cases, it has no special relevance to the topic at hand, and noting these general features of utilitarian tradeoffs doesn’t prevent us from also noting that typical real-world torture tends to produce more net suffering than typical real-world superpower incapacitation. (To make magic loss a counterexample to this trend, one would need to better flesh out what one takes magic to be.)
I’ve been reading about muggle prison conditions lately, and while I’ve understood that “prison conditions are terrible and torturing people is pointless etc” for both systems, it did not occur to me that you were making a commentary.
It actually made me sit and think for a minute (though not the full five—oops) about whether there was any way I could contribute to improving conditions in prisons, that was comparatively low-cost, that I had overlooked.
I didn’t think of one, but it’s worth thinking about some more, probably.
In general, how does one determine whether X in HPMOR is supposed to [represent / be commentary on] Y? I could make up a connection between Azkaban and Muggle prisons, probably by running it through my black-box mental model of Eliezer, but I don’t feel any kind of justified in the connection.
Congratulations, you have just discovered the difference between art and design. If Azkaban had been designed to be a commentary on muggle prisons, the connection would have had to have been made explicit within the text. The fact that Eliezer pointed out the connection does not mean he consciously tried to make it explicit in the text. Since the connection is implicit rather than explicit, the commentary is an artistic interpretation of the text. You don’t need to feel justified in an artistic interpretation.
It seems much more like a commentary on the American prison system than anything else. The Western European systems don’t generally suffer many of the problems of American Muggle prisons, or the problems they do share are often to a smaller degree. Britain is one of the middle range countries in this regard, but this may be enough for some people to not get the point.
While American prisons may indeed be worse (on average) than their Western European counterparts, the latter are still more than bad enough for the commentary to apply.
In any case, most of the suffering of imprisonment is psychological and derives from having one’s freedom restricted and status reduced (to put it mildly). So the (physical) conditions of the facility may be almost beside the point (despite the fact that this is what it is most socially acceptable to focus on).
So the (physical) conditions of the facility may be almost beside the point (despite the fact that this is what it is most socially acceptable to focus on).
So the (physical) conditions of the facility may be almost beside the point (despite the fact that this is what it is most socially acceptable to focus on).
...not to mention the fact that the behavior of persons is arguably not within the scope of “the (physical) conditions of the facility”.
In short, the comment contained more than enough hedging to preclude such a retort.
In short, the comment contained more than enough hedging to preclude such a retort.
Even if it did, orthonormal’s point contains a significant subclass of the suffering that occurs in prisons. Hence ignoring it or sweeping it under a hedge seems somewhat strange.
It seems much more like a commentary on the American prison system than anything else. The Western European systems don’t generally suffer many of the problems of American Muggle prisons, or the problems they do share are often to a smaller degree. Britain is one of the middle range countries in this regard, but this may be enough for some people to not get the point.
Notice what this says: Western European prisons are so good that Eliezer’s commentary is really only about American prisons. (Also note the implication that the Muggle world is partitioned into two regions: Western Europe and the United States.)
3. I—having become familiar with the similarities and differences between the U.S. and European criminal justice systems as a result of the Amanda Knox case—disputed this, in a comment whose point was to argue that Western European prisons are not pleasant places. They are, in fact, really awful places. Yes, they may not be as bad as U.S. prisons, but they are still bad: places of torment, suffering and despair, despite the fact that the facilities may be a little nicer. They are bad enough that the Azkaban metaphor applies. (And U.S. prisons are nowhere near as bad as those in other, non-Western-European parts of the world—so was Eliezer’s commentary “only” or “mostly” about China, Iran, or North Korea, and not really about the American justice system at all? Of course not.)
Furthermore, at the time he was writing the Azkaban-rescue sequence, Eliezer knew that Amanda Knox—then trapped in a Western European prison—was among his readers. This is just one of many reasons why it simply isn’t plausible that the commentary was meant to be geographically (and thus, in effect, politically) limited to the United States.
4. Some people (bizarrely) downvoted my comment and attempted to educate me about the evils of United States prisons, as if I were unfamiliar with the subject. This is completely missing the point. My comment argued that European prisons are bad, not that American prisons are good. My point was that the fact that European prisons have (for example) bidets does not make them spas. I did take a slightly “extreme” line—that the real torment of incarceration is psychological. But this is not actually an absurd position by any means. I expect that relatively few who have actually been incarcerated would disagree—even among those who had been imprisoned in terrible physical conditions. For one thing, such treatment often has a specifically psychological purpose.
The two “sides” in this argument are: people who think the Azkaban metaphor applies universally (me), and people who think its scope is restricted to the United States (JoshuaZ). Everything
I have said in this thread should be understood in that context. In no sense am I downplaying any bad aspect of American prisons. To “correct” me on such a point is to increase the noise and decrease the signal.
This is not a case of me not reading the previous thread before commenting.
It seems much more like a commentary on the American prison system than anything else. The Western European systems don’t generally suffer many of the problems of American Muggle prisons, or the problems they do share are often to a smaller degree. Britain is one of the middle range countries in this regard, but this may be enough for some people to not get the point.
Notice what this says: Western European prisons are so good that Eliezer’s commentary is really only about American prisons. (Also note the implication that the Muggle world is partitioned into two regions: Western Europe and the United States.)
In my opinion, you’re reading too much into the original comment. There are fewer Western Europeans in prison than Americans. Aside: their “Western Europe” is much larger than the traditional one, which already has a higher population than the United States, and so we can also say there are fewer prisoners per capita in Europe than the United States.
It’d be surprising if American prisons didn’t tend to have more problems.
For all narrative purposes, the only regions of the Muggle world that significantly matter to the story are Europe and the United States, so your aside seems a misplaced criticism.
I more or less agree with your assessment of the metaphor, but there is no purpose to letting a poorly-grounded argument carry through just because one agrees with the conclusion.
To “correct” me on such a point is to increase the noise and decrease the signal.
Aye, but pray, where was the signal in the first place?
It’s not under the scope of “having one’s freedom restricted and status reduced”, either. Sorry if I misinterpreted you, but it looks as if I’m not the only one who thought you were omitting the most significant part of the horror of modern prisons.
I thought it was a nice commentary, but I hadn’t realized it was intentional (on either your or Rowling’s part). If you want anyone to get it, you need to slip in anal rape or something, and even then most readers will miss it.
Do you oppose jokes involving rape because of social consequences of rape being found to be funny, jokes involving rape because of direct consequences on people hearing the joke, jokes about prison rape because of consequences of prisoners, or something else?
I was quite serious. And why not? Murder is worse than anal rape, and that has already been included; besides that, people have argued we see at least one kind of rape already in MoR.
Especially those of us who deliberately try to avoid drawing conclusions about authorial intent from text. Whether the author is trying to make an analogical point with a fictional construct is not something I think about too much while reading fiction, though of course correspondences I notice (intentional or not) inform my reading.
Here’s one more option: e) People don’t think enough about the level of brutality in prisons, and when they do think and talk about it they find it easier to applaud brutality; because anyone who spoke against it “would associate themselves with criminals, with weakness, with distasteful things that people would rather not think about”, while speaking in its favor make you look tough on crime.
Given political discussions I’ve partaken in other forums, I know full well that whenever I condemned prison rape and suggested ways in which it might be reduced/prevented, the typical response was something to the effect of “Why do you love criminals so much?”
Given political discussions I’ve partaken in other forums, I know full well that whenever I condemned prison rape and suggested ways in which it might be reduced/prevented,
For example: Punish rapes among inmates in the same manner that other rapes of citizens by other citizens. Punish rapes of inmates by wardens in the same way with the additional loading that should be applied to all abuses of authority, particularly state sanctioned authority. But to do that we would need to replace Uncle Sam with Uncle Ben.
That would be by sending them to prison, which is not much of a punishment to someone who’s already in prison.
Yes it is. Not all sentences are life sentences. Then there are the obvious differences in types of imprisonment—including level of security and whether they have access to other prisoners or are confined to solitary.
Not all, but entirely too many. If someone is already going to be in a big concrete box for the next ten years no matter what they do, and doesn’t expect to survive more than five years in that environment, what more can you do to them?
Assume they’re already in the worst box that various legislation (mostly related to human rights) permits you to construct, or the closest cost-effective approximation thereof.
At that point, if they are not already, they should be put into solitary. Some would consider it reward, but if they prey on others, then they should be put somewhere that they can’t—that’s (ostensibly) why they’re there in the first place, at least in part.
The stated function of a prison is to imprison (i.e. detain). If the function of the prison was to get people physically hurt, then the state would have official torturers to brutalize people to such exact specifications as their convictions by the courts (e.g. official sentences would state things like “ten years in prison, plus three beatings and one anal rape per month”, and the state would hire official rapists for the purpose).
If brutality was supposed to be part of a prison’s specification, then we would have the responsibility of quantifying how much brutality is deserved for each crime. (the question you asked “How brutal should they be?” doesn’t only work for people criticizing their current brutality, but also for the people who support it, you see)
But the delegation of this task randomly to convicts speaks of the same hypocrisy that Quirrel mocks in the chapters in question.
The stated function of a prison is to imprison (i.e. detain).
There are several functions commonly ascribed to prisons, including:
Detention: to prevent people with criminal tendencies from having the opportunity to commit crimes against the general public, by physically separating them from the public.
Deterrence: to deprive criminals of the pleasures of normal society, in order to discourage other people from becoming criminals. If you would like to live with your partner, children, and friends in relative comfort instead of with a cellmate in relative discomfort, you have a motivation for staying out of prison.
Rehabilitation: to cure criminals of tendencies that may lead them to commit crimes; for instance, lack of cultural or moral education, or lack of non-criminal job skills. This is given as a reason for prisons to offer classes, job training, etc.
Penitence: to put criminals in an isolating environment where they will reflect on their crimes and regret them — or a panoptic environment in which they will internalize the conduct standards of the authorities.
(I’m not disagreeing with you on the badness of prison brutality; just on the “stated function” claim.)
Penitentiaries were name for the theory that prisoners should be penitent. More generally, rehabilitation is often a purpose of imprisonment.
It’s a factor for every US federal judge to consider when deciding what sentence to impose. In fairness, 3553(a) authorizes a judge to consider just about anything—it’s totally agnostic as to the appropriate theory of punishment.
When it comes down to it, the purpose of prisons is to reduce crime. The two main methods by which they accomplish this are being sufficiently nasty to deter would be criminals, and keeping the people who fail to be deterred confined so they can’t victimize law-abiding citizens.
Rehabilitation mostly exists so that (some of the) people doing the locking up can signal their compassion by supporting it.
Rapes, murders, and beatings in prison are also supposed to be crimes, no?
The two main methods by which they accomplish this are being sufficiently nasty to deter would be criminals,
At this point you’re surely using the same argument that would be used to justify Dementors in Azkaban—it makes Azkaban nastier: hence it serves as deterrent.
At this point you’re surely using the same argument that would be used to justify Dementors in Azkaban—it makes Azkaban nastier: hence it serves as deterrent.
If your argument is simply “brutality acts as a deterrent,” it’s almost certainly true. If your argument is, “Therefore the current level of prison brutality is optimal,” or, “we should be happy with prison brutality,” the only counterargument needed is that nobody’s provided any evidence at all for those positions.
But if either of those is the assertion, here are some counterarguments:
1) There is a countereffect: longer (and therefore more brutal) prison sentences increase rates of recidivism.
2) Flogging and caning are brutal deterrents. Many (most?) people will take a punishment of flogging over a punishment of a long prison sentence when given the choice. Ergo at least for many, prisons are more brutal than literal torture.
3) From a cursory glance at stats, violent crime rates don’t seem to be much lower in countries with higher incidences of prison rape or prison hospitalizations. I would like to see some rigorous analysis on this.
4) Violent crime rates don’t seem to be much higher in countries that employ flogging or caning. Again, not a rigorous statistical analysis, but weak evidence nonetheless.
5) Let’s not forget that we’re trying to minimize violent crime, and prison brutality is just the perpetration of violent crime while in prison. Prisoners are people too, and many of them are innocent or overcharged. Determining optimal brutality levels will take this into account.
6) And of course I shouldn’t even have to say that a large number of people undergoing the brutality of prison are completely innocent of hurting anybody at all; they are only guilty of crimes that shouldn’t be crimes.
I don’t think there’s any evidence at all that the brutality levels in western prisons are optimal. But are they a deterrent? Yeah, sure. And the death penalty is a deterrent of shoplifting. What’s the relevance to the actual debate of prison brutality? That people who applaud prison brutality have a point? Not any more than advocates of the death penalty for shoplifting do.
In that case you are completely correct! But I think the counteropinion generally being expressed here, if not clearly, is that prisons are extremely brutal.
But I think the counteropinion generally being expressed here, if not clearly, is that prisons are extremely brutal.
My point is basically “so what?”, i.e., they’re missing part of their argument.
Also, extremely brutal compared to what? As ArisKatsaris pointed out in several places in this thread the most dangerous thing prisoners have to fear in modern prisons is their fellow prisoners.
There’s an argument (first advanced by Beccaria in the late 18th century) that it matters more that punishment be swift and certain, than that it be harsh. If people don’t really believe a punishment is likely to happen to them, it won’t deter reliably. Human cognitive biases being what they are, we might be better served trying to make punishment visible, rather than horrifying. Azkaban, being remote and unpleasant to think about, is perhaps less effective than some punishment that would be constantly in sight. Having the convicted criminal’s wand broken. say.
In a society with veritaserum, legilimency and assorted other magic you’d think it would be straightforward to establish guilt or innocence in the vast majority of cases.
In a society with veritaserum, legilimency and assorted other magic you’d think it would be straightforward to establish guilt or innocence in the vast majority of cases.
Of course, said society also has occlumency and memory charms.
My point is that with prisons, the more brutal, the more effective. Yes, there are tradeoffs to consider. I actually agree with your statement here that the justice system would work better if people were willing to admit its main purpose was deterrent, secondarily detention, and not implicitly delegate the brutality part to other convicts so they can wipe their hands of it.
My $0.02: there are several different functions person A can perform by punishing person B for some action C.
For example: (a) lowering B’s chances of performing C in the future (b) lowering the chances of observers performing C (c) encouraging observers to anti-identify with B (d) encouraging observers who anti-identify with B to support A (e) encouraging observers who identify with B to oppose A
IME, conversations about how prisons should work become really confused because people aren’t very clear about which of those functions they endorse.
Personally, it seems clear to me that (b) is by far the most valuable of these goals. That said, prison policy has almost no influence on (b); law enforcement and courts are far more relevant, and their current implementation pretty much screens off the effects of prison policy.
People who are interested in (a) and also value B’s continued existence will tend to be interested in punishment as a behavioral modification tool, and will happily set it aside in favor of more effective behavioral modification tools as science develops them.
People interested in (a) who don’t value B’s continued existence will be uninterested in punishment, since simply killing B is more efficient.
AFAICT, the folks who establish the policies that govern prisoner punishment (as distinct from prisoner restraint) are primarily motivated by the desire to obtain political support, which suggests minimizing (e) and maximizing (d), which does seem to be what most of our prison policies are designed to do. Maximizing (c) is one way to minimize (e), though there are many others.
Personally, it seems clear to me that (b) is by far the most valuable of these goals. That said, prison policy has almost no influence on (b); law enforcement and courts are far more relevant, and their current implementation pretty much screens off the effects of prison policy.
This isn’t obvious at all. In particular if prisons were extremely nice, their deterrent effect would be much less no matter how law enforcement and the courts worked. One could argue that the policies in the current Overton window aren’t significantly different from each other, but that argument would have to be made.
Agreed that if prisons were extremely nice, their deterrent effect due to the threat of punishment would be lower than it is now.
That said… when the mechanism that results in my being punished for an act is perceived as unreliable and capricious (including, but not limited to, cases where it is unreliable and capricious), the correlation between the severity of the punishment and the intensity of the deterrent effect is much, much lower than when the mechanism is perceived as fair and reliable.
So if law enforcement and courts were perceived as fair and reliable (that is, reliably assigning punishment to criminals and not assigning punishment to noncriminals), I expect making prisons equally unpleasant would create a much greater deterrent effect (to being a criminal) than it does now.
If my goal is to maximize deterrent effect, then, I expect that I would do better to invest my efforts in increasing the perception of law enforcement and courts as fair and reliable than to invest them in increasing the perception of prisons as unpleasant.
But, as I say, I don’t think many people involved in setting prison policies are primarily motivated by maximizing deterrent effect.
That said… when the mechanism that results in my being punished for an act is perceived as unreliable and capricious (including, but not limited to, cases where it is unreliable and capricious), the correlation between the severity of the punishment and the intensity of the deterrent effect is much, much lower than when the mechanism is perceived as fair and reliable.
Depending on what you mean by “unreliable and capricious”, I find this dubious. At the very least it seems to me that brutal dictatorships are much better at reducing crime (at least the crimes they care about) than democracies. For example, Mussolini’s successful campaign against the Sicilian mafia.
What I mean by enforcement being unreliable and capricious is, roughly. that agents believe that their performing the act is not well-correlated with their being punished.
It sounds from that wiki article like Mussolini created an environment where people believed that being a mafioso would reliably result in being punished.
I suspect they also believed that not being a mafioso stood a good chance of being punished, which has other consequences; when punishment occurs in the absence of a reliable and controllable cue, the result is learned helplessness. But if we care about deterring criminals and we don’t care about the effect on noncriminals, punishing 90% of criminals and 5% of noncriminals can work OK, even if only 5% of the people we punish are criminals.
Of course, if we care about things in addition to deterrence, that may not be a great policy, but that’s another conversation.
What I mean by enforcement being unreliable and capricious is, roughly. that agents believe that their performing the act is not well-correlated with their being punished.
So what you’re saying is that in modern developed states committing crimes is not well-correlated with being punished? I find this highly dubious.
At the very least, I’m saying that that’s the perception: most crimes go unpunished. But yes, I also suspect that perception is true.
I haven’t done any research on the matter, though, and attempts to find statistics via cursory Googling failed. If you have any cites handy, I’m happy to be corrected.
committing crimes is not well-correlated with being punished? I find this highly dubious.
TheOtherDave said:
the perception [is] most crimes go unpunished.
These aren’t actually in contradiction. If a criminal committing a “mid-size” offense has a 25% chance of being caught for each crime, then being a career criminal is likely to end you in jail, but most crimes will still be unpunished.
My sense is that most crimes (and most dollar-loss to crime) are small/midsize thefts; hundreds or thousands of dollars, not more. Thefts big enough to set you up for a lifetime are freakishly rare compared to the number of criminals. And that means to have a tolerable lifestyle as a criminal, you have to commit lots of offenses—so even a small chance of being caught for each mugging or burglary starts to add up.
Yeah, I agree with this. I’d be surprised if the chance was as high as .25, but the principle is the same; career criminals can count on eventually being arrested.
That said, the original context of this discussion was the behavior-modification effects of prison policy on the not-yet-arrested population, and from a behavior modification point of view a punishment that usually fails to kick in for the first several crimes doesn’t do much to deter those first few crimes.
And making the punishment more and more severe doesn’t help the deterrence factor all that much in that situation, which was my original point.
and from a behavior modification point of view a punishment that usually fails to kick in for the first several crimes doesn’t do much to deter those first few crimes.
Disagree. It deters the first crime. It’s deterrent power will decrease for subsequent crimes (until caught) unless the criminal has friends who have been caught.
Can you say more about the mechanism whereby increasing the severity of a punishment I am confident won’t apply to my first crime deters my first crime? That seems pretty implausible to me.
If committing a crime required playing Russian Roulette, a gun with a bullet in it would be more of a deterrent than a gun with a paintball in it. Yes?
The law-enforcement/courts system has significantly better first-time odds than Russian Roulette. For most crimes, the odds that I will be arrested and convicted and sentenced to significant jail time for a first crime are significantly lower than one in six.
“But Dave,” someone will now patiently explain to me, “that doesn’t matter. An N% chance of death is always going to be significantly worse than an N% chance of a paintball in the head, no matter how low N%. It’s scale-invariant!”
Except the decision to ignore the psychological effects of scale is precisely what I’m skeptical about here. Sure, if I make prisons bad enough (supposing I can do so), then everyone rational does an EV calculation and concludes that even a miniscule chance of going to prison is more disutility than the opportunity cost of foregoing a crime.
But I don’t think that’s what most people reliably do faced with small probabilities of large disutilities. Some people, faced with that situation, look at the magnitude of the disutility and ignore the probability (“Sure it’s unlikely, but if it happened it would be really awful, so let’s not take the risk!”). Some people look at the magnitude of the probability and ignore the disutility (“Sure, it would be awful, but it’s not going to happen, so who cares?”).
Very few look at the EV.
That said, if we restrict our domain of discourse to potential criminals who do perform EV calculations (which I think is a silly thing to do in the real world, but leaving that aside for now), then I agree that doubling the expected disutility-of-punishment (e.g., making prisons twice as unpleasant) halves their chance of performing the crime.
Of course, so does doubling the expected chance of being punished in the first place .
That is, if I start out with a P1 confidence that I will be arrested and convicted for commiting a crime, a P2 confidence that if convicted I will receive significant prison time, and a >.99 confidence that the disutility of significant prison time is D1, and you want to double my expected disutility of commiting that crime, you can double P1, or P2, or D1, or mix-and-match.
So a system primarily interested in maximizing deterrent effect among rational EV calculators asks which of those strategies gets the largest increase in expected disutility for a given cost.
It’s not at all clear to me that in the U.S. today, doubling D1 is the most cost-effective way to do that if I consider decreasing the QALYs of prison inmates to be a cost. So if someone insists on doubling D1, I infer that either...: ...(a) they value the QALYs of prison inmates less than I do, or ...(b) they have some reason to believe that doubling D1 is the most cost-effective way of buying deterrence, or ...(c) they aren’t exclusively interested in deterrence, or ...(d) something else I haven’t thought of.
In practice I usually assume some combination of (a) and (c), but I considered (b) potentially interesting enough to be worth exploring the question. At this point, though, my confidence that I can explore (b) in this conversation in an interesting way is low.
Some people look at the magnitude of the probability and ignore the disutility (“Sure, it would be awful, but it’s not going to happen, so who cares?”).
It seems rather difficult to actually affect those people, though. The difference between P1=.04 and P1=.08 would have dramatic effects on an EV-calculator, but very little effect on the sort of person who judges probabilities by ‘feel’.
That is, if I start out with a P1 confidence that I will be arrested and convicted for commiting a crime, a P2 confidence that if convicted I will receive significant prison time, and a >.99 confidence that the disutility of significant prison time is D1, and you want to double my expected disutility of commiting that crime, you can double P1, or P2, or D1, or mix-and-match.
I would suppose the D1 advocates would argue that the hidden costs of increasing P1 are higher than you think, or possibly they just value them more (e.g. the right to privacy). I admit I’ve never heard a good argument that what the US needs is to greatly increase the likelihood of sentencing a convict to significant prison time.
The difference between P1=.04 and P1=.08 would have dramatic effects on an EV-calculator, but very little effect on the sort of person who judges probabilities by ‘feel’.
I would expect it depends a lot on the algorithms underlying “feel” and what aspects of the environment they depend on. It’s unlikely these people are choosing their behaviors or beliefs at random, after all.
More generally, if I actually want to manipulate the behavior of a group, I should expect that a good first step is to understand how their behavior depends on aspects of their environment, since often their environment is what I can actually manipulate.
Edit: I should add to this that I certainly agree that it’s possible in principle for a system to be in a state where the most cost-effective thing to do to achieve deterrence is increase D. I just don’t think it’s necessarily true, and am skeptical that the U.S. is currently in such a state.
the hidden costs of increasing P1 are higher than you think
Sure, that’s another possibility. Or of P2, come to that.
I admit I’ve never heard a good argument that what the US needs is to greatly increase the likelihood of sentencing a convict to significant prison time.
Is this not the rationale behind mandatory sentencing laws?
I admit I’ve never heard a good argument that what the US needs is to greatly increase the likelihood of sentencing a convict to significant prison time.
Is this not the rationale behind mandatory sentencing laws?
I can’t think of a response to this that isn’t threatening to devolve into a political argument, so I’ll bow out here. Sorry.
At the very least, I’m saying that that’s the perception: most crimes go unpunished.
But yes, I also suspect that perception is true. I haven’t done any research on the matter, though, and attempts to find statistics via cursory Googling failed.
If you have any cites handy, I’m happy to be corrected.
In that case, why aren’t you stealing money and donating to SIAI? ;)
But seriously, there are countries where your comment is actually true. You can tell the difference pretty easily.
To be honest, I’m not convinced that it isn’t true even in first-world countries. Solve rates for murders in the US appear to be around 66% as of 2007. I haven’t directly been able to dig up solve rates for crimes in general, but clearance rates (the rate of crimes prosecuted to crimes reported) are available, and are well under 50% for pretty much everything except murder. Most prosecuted crimes appear to result in convictions, but this still says to me that TheOtherDave’s got it right, at least in a US context and assuming that most reports aren’t frivolous.
YMMV for other nations.
ETA: Looking over these statistics again, I strongly suspect that the “solve” figures you find in various places are in fact identical to the clearance rates I refer to. So the reports-to-convictions ratio would be significantly lower—compare conviction rates for cases brought to court.
I infer that your intuitions differ from mine but you don’t have any cites handy either. Fair enough. Updated, to a degree proportional to my confidence in the reliability of your intuition on this matter, in your direction.
Yeah, but due to the politics is a mind-killer thing, we don’t really comment on it… just like a lot of other political hints are left alone (at least on my behalf) and I try to focus on making predictions and figuring out where the agents in this story will go given their apparent rationality (or lack thereof) and value sets. That’s the reason why I read this: it’s well-written entertainment I can use to train my ability to predict and phrase said predictions. Plus I like to see theories put to practice.
By the way, I believe the rescue of Bellatrix was around the point in the story that Amanda Knox had gotten to when she made it out of Muggle Azkaban herself.
Really? I understood from the human interest fluff pieces I tried to avoid that she had used her time in Azkaban very well, learning Italian to a high level and catching up on a great deal of high-quality reading. I don’t think Bellatrix would regard their stays, pound for pound, as equivalent.
I think you misunderstood me: by “point in the story she had gotten to” I meant literally the point in the actual story (MoR). It wasn’t some kind of figure of speech about her experience. (I wonder how many other people misunderstood my comment in this way; it’s an interpretation that never occurred to me. I thought people knew she was a MoR reader.)
However, her experience itself was no picnic, fluff pieces notwithstanding.
I wasn’t aware that was a particularly politically charged example since it’s not currently on either side’s discussion plate.
I do think it’s somewhat relevant with them both being profit motivations that encourage increasingly stricter laws and enforcement. Then again if I’d been able to notice the problem I wouldn’t have put it in there in the first place.
Taking your advice, do you think I should edit it out and remove the example? Or better yet, could anyone think of an example that’s not so politically proximate that illustrates the same effect? I’d image a similar thing would occur in ancient Rome with slaves, or maybe colonial-era governments with indentured servitude, but I’m not quite as familiar with those.
Edit: And thank you for reminding me, I’ve edited.
I wonder if this fact is possibly relevant to some Cunning Plot in which—perhaps just as one among many positive results—Voldemort “died” and resurrected via horcrux in order to escape an Unbreakable Vow. I remember in response to chapter 84, people were wondering what, if Voldie’s apparent death at Godric’s Hollow was intentional, was in it for him.
Not in the specifications. They just say, ‘anyone who breaks the Vow dies.’ Ending with death is a feature.
Though if the people who first found the spell really thought that way, they must not have truly believed anyone could stay in their world after death.
Unbreakable Vow anyone? Just give Dark Wizards the option “either you take an Unbreakable Vow to never knowingly kill/torture/Imperio a human being ever again, nor to ever knowingly assist in such, or we just execute you right now”.
I don’t think it would be that easy. This is isomorphic to making wishes with an evil genie—or coding a human-level AI with a list of deontological commands. It could be done, but probably not in an EY fanfic and probably not without a skilled magical lawyer.
The difference is that evil wizards are not, as a rule, a different intellectual order than we are. We have some idea of their set of options. Not so for a powerful AI. A dark lord is at least somewhat bounded by the human imagination.
are not, as a rule, a different intellectual order than we are
Yes they are— in the sense that they will have decades to spend ruminating on workarounds, experimenting, consulting with others. And when they find a solution the result is potentially an easily transmitted whole class compromise that frees them all at once.
Decades of dedicated human time, teams of humans, etc. are all forms of super-humanity. If you demanded that the same man hours be spent drafting the language as would be spent under its rule, then I’d agree that there was no differential advantage, but then it would be quite a challenge to write the rule.
also, unlike the case of an AI where you have to avoid crippling it, lest it becomes pointless to build it in the first place, using unbreakable wows as a punishment for grand crimes against humanity means that the restraints can be nearly abritarily harsh. The people writing the wows have no need to preserve the decision space they leave their victim or respect their autonomy.
TLDR: Voldemort would not be able to spend decades thinking of ways around the wow, because doing so would violate any sensibly formulated wow. (stray toughts, sure, you have to permit that, or the wow kills in a day. Sitting down and working at it? No.)
Decades of dedicated human time, teams of humans, etc. are all forms of super-humanity.
Only in an extremely weak sense. Humans can do and think things that cats just can’t, even if they think for a long, long time, or have a bunch of cats working together. The power of a truly superhuman intellect is hard to imagine, and easily underestimated.
In any case, the drafter of the rules would have an enormous comparative advantage, because he can unilaterally enforce dictates on the other party, while the other party has no such authority. It’s not guaranteed he’ll cover all the angles within the human domain, but it’s at least possible, unlike in the case of an AI, where such a strategy is basically guaranteed to fail.
Okay, after thinking a few minutes about the Batman-Joker/where do you put Dark Wizards if you’re determined not to use Dementors anymore problem...
Kill them. With great power comes great getting-held-responsible-if-necessary.
Unbreakable Vow anyone? Just give Dark Wizards the option “either you take an Unbreakable Vow to never knowingly kill/torture/Imperio a human being ever again, nor to ever knowingly assist in such, or we just execute you right now”.
Oh, no, this is much better. Magical evilness castration.
I thought Dumbeldore said that he found a way to imprison Grindelwald without dementors but I can’t find were he says that.
edit fixed major spelling error can->can’t
“What?” said the old wizard. “No! I would not have done that even to him—”
The old wizard stared at the young boy, who had straightened, and his face changed.
“In other words,” the boy said, as though talking to himself without any other people in the room, “it’s already known how to keep powerful Dark Wizards in prison, without using Dementors. People know they know that.”
I’m pretty sure that both canon and MoR are silent on how it’s done, which is a real pity.
In canon there is a scene where Voldemort breaks into Nurmengard to ask Grindelwald where the Wand is, and then kills him. In a non-magical world I’d say that the fact that somebody can break in means that somebody can break out too, with help from the outside. Even if that’s not the case in a magical world, it means that his followers could continue to communicate with him. Not good.
On the other hand there seems to be magic in canon that cannot be broken or circumvented, except for a very specific trigger. Think of the Fidelius charm, which hides a building from everybody, except those that the secret keeper has told the location. Or the potion in the cave that must be drunk, and cannot be vanished, transigured or otherwise “magiced”. Maybe a similar kind of “absolute” magic exists that can be used to imprison people reliably. So reliably that no Auror need to stand guard, and are tortured with humming.
the fact that somebody can break in means that somebody can break out too, with help from the outside
There is the issue of wands. Wandless magic is, at least for humans, much less powerful than wand magic. So it’s perfectly conceivable to me to have obstacles that are virtually impossible to overpower if you’re wandless, but possible to overpower if you’re a wand and are a good wizard (which Voldemort surely is).
The “his followers could continue to communicate with him” is indeed a real problem. But it seems (both in canon and in MOR) Azkaban itself is not so hard to break from the outside, only (almost) impossible to escape from inside.
Dumbledore doesn’t come right out and say it, but it’s there in Chapter 77;
“In other words,” the boy said, as though talking to himself without any other people in the room, “it’s already known how to keep powerful Dark Wizards in prison, without using Dementors. People know they know that.”
Unbreakable Vow anyone? Just give Dark Wizards the option “either you take an Unbreakable Vow to never knowingly kill/torture/Imperio a human being ever again, nor to ever knowingly assist in such, or we just execute you right now”.
Ugh, Unbreakable Vows seem something of a game breaker right now.
RE: the game breaker opening example: Iron vs bronze weapons is a game breaker? Hardly. The difference in weapon quality there is minor (and even arguable). Bronze vs Steel… sure, that’s a big deal but even then not worthy of ‘game breaker’ accolades.
IIRC, it’s not actually easier to make iron (you need higher temperatures), but the ore is more easy to obtain. Copper and tin ores are rarely found together, so you need long-range trading to make lots of bronze.
I thought of a possible reason why they wouldn’t do this. Basically, you’ve got two choices with the unbreakable vow ploy: Obtain a class of civil servants willing to give up their own magic to do the job (fat chance), or force the criminals to do it to each other. The natural answer is the latter right? Well yes, except the part where you have to hand a criminal whose crime was severe enough to warrant stripping some of his magic a wand and give him enough mental breathing room to perform a complicated, powerful ritual. Some of them are just gonna go along with it, sure, but you only gotta have one high-profile screwup before that kind of a policy is abolished.
The natural answer is the latter right? Well yes, except the part where you have to hand a criminal whose crime was severe enough to warrant stripping some of his magic a wand and give him enough mental breathing room to perform a complicated, powerful ritual. Some of them are just gonna go along with it, sure, but you only gotta have one high-profile screwup before that kind of a policy is abolished.
Or, you could think strategically for a few minutes then, for example, only give magic wands to wizards for this purpose after they have themselves sworn unbreakable vows that would prevent any misuse.
Okay, after thinking a few minutes about the Batman-Joker/where do you put Dark Wizards if you’re determined not to use Dementors anymore problem...
Unbreakable Vow anyone? Just give Dark Wizards the option “either you take an Unbreakable Vow to never knowingly kill/torture/Imperio a human being ever again, nor to ever knowingly assist in such, or we just execute you right now”.
I can think up of possible ways out of this meta-problem, in order to sustain the dilemma: Perhaps really powerful Dark Wizards require too vast a portion of magical power to sustain the vow. Perhaps there are dark rituals whereby using them, Dark Wizards can break out of even an (ill-named) Unbreakable Vow. Perhaps Dark Wizards tend to have made other rituals that already make them immune to Unbreakable Vows… Perhaps unbreakable vows need be really really specific in some weird manner like “I will not kill Bill Weasley”, and “I will not kill Charlie Weasley” necessarily are two separate vows, so that “I will not kill any human” isn’t enforceable...
But these are additional problems that are not yet mentioned/listed/foreshadowed in the story. Ugh, Unbreakable Vows seem something of a game breaker right now.
Sidenote: Whenever I think of something such, I worry that the author will think he’ll have to rewrite/revise everything he had already planned, and that we’ll never get an update again. Not my intention, I swear.
Unbreakable Vows are ridiculously broken, as Harry briefly observes in Ch. 74. They’re even more ridiculous in fanfictions where people can just grab a wand and swear something on their life and magic and thereby create a magically binding vow. I had to nerf the hell out of their activation costs just to make the MoR-verse keep running. I can’t depict a society with zero agency problems, a perfect public commitment process and an infinite trust engine unless the whole story is about that.
I mentioned this in the TVtropes thread, but Merlin did not think through his interdict all that well—If you are going to compromise everyones mental integrity to end a cycle of magical destruction, then limiting information spread is an asinie way to do it—it would make infinitely more sense to subject all wizards to a magical prohibition against large scale destruction and killing. Phrasing it so that it wards agaist Dunning-Kruger fueled magical accidents without shutting down experimentation entirely is an interesting exercise, but should be possible.
Frankly, we don’t know enough about why Merlin did what he did to judge his action either way—we don’t know what danger was being foreseen, we don’t know the limitations of his own powers. There’s really no sense in criticizing him or praising him at this point of time—we lack crucial information.
It’s possible that the Interdict is a natural property of the Source of Magic, and was swept up in the legend of Merlin as time passed. We have no real evidence for a time when people could record spells indefinitely, AFAIK.
I understood Merlins Interdict to be interfering with The Source of Magic, not with “everyones mental integrity”, which would seem much much harder to do. Magic seems to function by checking prerequisites, like “waved magical active stick in spatial pattern X”, “said wingardium leviosa with exact pronounciation Y”- Just add to this list of prerequisites of sufficiently powerfull spells a call of a function which checks wether the user is authorized; if not, check wether user should be authorized. If ve is, add to list of authorized user, if not, deny.
Doesn’t work. It’s not that powerful spells are known but can’t be cast, the function of the Interdict somehow causes powerful wizards’ notes to be unintelligible to the uninitiated.
Not just notes. - All written instructions on how to do spells above a certain level just flat out fail unless someone explains the spell to you in person at least once. Which has to be a mind hack, and if you are willing to alter peoples minds to remove the risk of idiots or madmen blowing up the planet/opening the gates of hell/ect, then picking this specific modification is very.. odd.
Hold up.. checking assumptions. Can anyone think of a way for the edict of merlin to do what it does without tampering with peoples minds?
Back up one step further: what evidence do we have that the Interdict actually exists? As opposed to, say, all powerful wizards simply having the same inclination toward secrecy and self-discovery. How did Quirrell put it...
I’ve never received the impression that wizards powerful enough to be subject to the Interdict have actually tried to circumvent it. If all known examples of written instructions for powerful spells were gibberish to begin with, would the world look any different? Not to mention, why would it be necessary to cast a huge mind-altering spell to make people do what they were inclined to do anyway?
Trivial.
Someone explaining to you in person is the same as someone authorizing you to use a piece of software. You can still speak the words of the spell, still do the sacrifices, but the computer is just not going to listen to your commands unless you’ve been given those privileges.
Yes, that would be a possibility for controlling distribution of powerful spells, except that the Edict of Merlin explicitly doesn’t do that: you can’t speak the words because you can’t understand the writing. If you could read and speak the spell (and whatever else the spell requires) presumably you could cast it. (Otherwise Merlin needn’t have bothered making the texts unintelligible as well.)
If by “tampering” you mean just “permanently modifying”, the Source of Magic (TM) could just watch wizards’ minds(1) to detect when they’re writing in sufficient detail(2) high-level(3) spell descriptions, and enchant the written artifact.(4)
(1:) I can’t think of a way it would act the way it does—i.e., trigger wand-less and wordless spells, as well as accidental magic—without reading wizards’ minds at all times (or tampering with their minds at birth), anyway, at least not while following Harry’s genetic marker theory.
(2:) It needs to act only when the description tells you what to do, not what it does. Presumably it lets a historian describe what wondrous feats Merlin did as long as he didn’t describe how the spell was cast.
(3:) I’m really curious how that works. It’s clear that some spells are “harder” to cast, and some are “more powerful” than others (not sure if the two are perfectly correlated), but AFAIK it’s never described what that really means, except for trivial things like complex wand patterns and not-really-helpful stuff like “only first-year student magic level”.
(4:) Basilisks turn you to stone when you look at them, the Mirror-of-I-can’t-remember-who-it-was showed you what you wanted when you looked at it, so it’s clear that magic effects can be triggered by looking at the magical item.
(4b:) Exactly what “written artifact” means would be kind of hard to figure out. If it also applies to non-textual artifacts—sound recordings, encoding a description with smells and colors, planting a row of trees of two species to spell the description in ASCII—then it’s really complicated.
It might just look at what people intend to do, but then it would be vulnerable to complicated attacks like encrypting the description with a key, giving the encrypted text to a scribe who knows the described spell but doesn’t know the key nor what the encrypted text is, and asking them to write the encrypted text, then writing the key separately—or even unintentional recordings. Then again, we have no evidence it isn’t vulnerable to all that, there would have been little opportunity centuries ago. Harry’s pouch does respond to languages neither the caster nor the user knows, but then again it doesn’t answer for simple encodings like “1+1” for “2”...
With Unbreakable Vows, the… arbitrator?… sacrifices a portion of their magic permanently yes? One issue is that, after you die you might need that magic for something, like the more magic you have the more pleasant (or less!) magically created heaven is. In any case, even if magical society was fine with sacrifices, they might reason thus, and not use unbreakable vows. Such a society would make investigation (magical!) into potential afterlife a top priority, so lack of use of such a ritual might be compensated by finding out there is a heaven (or hell).
This is a society that has no problem using dementors as prison guards. I’m sure they would be willing to compel each criminal to act as the binder for one other criminal. It seems like a very small price to pay.
Since there seems to be some confusion on this point: in canon, at least, an “Unbreakable” Vow didn’t actually stop you breaking it, it just killed you if you did. If a person is willing to sacrifice their life—and if you resurrect using a horcrux, that could easily be worth it—you can still commit crimes.
And if you swore to obey the law—is being found guilty is now an automatic death sentence, even if you honestly thought it was legal? I doubt a working legal system based on Unbreakable Vows is trivial to come up with.
That said, they are unquestionably broken in canon. Very, very broken. Few are willing to stake their life over, say, business deals, but there are loads of situations in which they would be a massive game-breaker.
Not to mention perfect self-motivation.. Actually I still don’t understand why it is not used that way. Unbreakable Vows only require energy until said vow is fulfilled right?
Seems to be a lot more effective than A. Robbins...
Nope, ritual magic = permanent sacrifice.
Now we can make the Death Eaters bind trivial Unbreakable Vows over and over again until they lose all of their magic. So now Azkaban is unnecessary and the initial problem with Unbreakable Vows allowing for easy solutions to the prison vs. execution dilemma resurfaces again.
Trivial vows might not trigger the ritual correctly. Remember one of the participants has to have had the option of trying to trust the person in question and choose not to. A vow over something that they’d have no reason to trust the person on otherwise may not work.
The initial statement seems plausible but not the reason you gave for it. Even trivial assertions involve trust. Your statement “a vow over something that they’d have no reason to trust the person on otherwise” reverses the burden of proof/trust that must be overcome. You still have to choose to trust someone even if you don’t have evidence saying that they break promises, lacking evidence proving them distrustful does not preclude having to choose to actively trust them.
One major problem concerns the legal rights of magical criminals; what if you’re later found to be innocent? There’ll be no way to reclaim their magic. Hence I doubt Harry would prefer this solution.
That reminds me—at some point in canon, Dumbledore says “There are worse things than dying”, and my original thought was that Voldemort could be turned into a Muggle. As it turned out, Dumbledore presumably meant the consequences of creating Horcruxes, but I do wonder how Voldeort would manage if he were turned into a Muggle.
Thank you; I even managed to figure that out myself (with the help of our ever vigilant and watchful google); as seen in my response to Desrtopa (24 seconds before you clicked the comment button apparently).
FTFY. Show proper reverence, heathen!
I don’t think this is ever stated, and I’d err on the side of assuming not, because that would make them easier to abuse, which would be narratively inconvenient.
Makes sense. I was confused so I looked it up: “And the third wizard, the binder, permanently sacrifices a small portion of their own magic, to sustain the Vow forever.” I guess the self-improvement part is out of the question then...
Still; it’d be a pretty hardcore thing to do for an ambitious dying grandfather. Make his grandson, age 3, swear the vow (something along the lines: “I will never spend an awake moment on anything except improving my abilities or the situation of my family”—it could be phrased better) and then die happily.
Age three? Does the vow actually impel you adhere to it or does it just kill you when you are about to break it? (I thought the latter.) Didn’t he just kill his grandson?
In canon at least, you just die if you break the Vow.
You could just strip their magic.
If there exists any ritual that happens to permanently remove a portion of somebody’s magic (Unbreakable Vow), then you could just repeat that ritual meaninglessly until that person was completely stripped of magic permanently. Or you could use other rituals which require similar permanent sacrifices until you achieve the same effect. Keeping a permanently magicless wizard imprisoned is a trivial task, and obviates the need for dementors.
Side Note: That’s actually my pet theory on why Dementors as prison guards are acceptable to the public. It could be that governments used to use rituals to permanently strip prisoners of magic before imprisoning them. This would make them a revenue center instead of a funds sink. This would naturally encourage the magical government to find more and more excuses to imprison people, similar to how the ‘tough on crime’ cycle is accelerated by the for-profit prison systems in some places. A police state would be soon to follow. Then, after a cultural revolution, Dementors were adopted as the less evil option to house criminals. It also helps explain why so many rituals are banned. It’s unlikely to be true in HPMoR, but it’d be a nice thought for another fanfic.
Another problem with this system is the permanence. People get sent to Azkaban for less than lifetime sentences, but if you use this to strip someone of magic it’s gone forever. I suppose you could use degrees of magic removal as punishment but that seems hard to balance to different powerlevels of wizard.
A permanent loss of magic is probably much more ethically justifiable than a temporary period of torture.
This statement contains at least three assumptions that need to be unpacked before it is of any use.
What do you mean by ethically justifiable?
What do you mean by temporary and torture? 2a. To reduce it to absurdity, I would rather be slapped than lose my hand painlessly. Where do you draw the lines on temporariness and tortureness? Is living without magic after having it a form of torture? How much life expectancy does it take before a permanent disability is worse than a temporary pain?
Why is “probably much more ethically justifiable” a fact about either of these things rather than a fact about how you feel about them?
Sorry for the slow response, I was at gencon.
Also, welcome to posting!
Thanks, drethelin!
How deep of an analysis do you want? Ultimately, what I mean is that torture tends to foreseeably decrease the net positive valence of all experience to a greater extent than does incapacitation.
We both know those are fuzzy terms. And as a utilitarian I acknowledge that some extremely minimal torture could in principle be more justifiable than an especially severe incapacitation. But everyday cases of what we call ‘torture’ are intuitively much more painful and dehumanizing than, say, permanently depriving a person of a firearms or automobile license. Do you think that one’s long-term ability to use magic would tend to cluster on the other side of torture, on a scale of resultant human suffering?
Descriptively, most ethical systems would, I think, agree with my assessment; so if ‘ethically justifiable’ just means ‘able to be justified under what various people take to be the right ethical principles,’ it is an empirical statement. But I’ll instead take the approach of stipulating what I mean by ethical justifiability in psychological terms, the felt positive and negative valence of experiences. If this is a real property of mental states, what I call ‘ethical justifiability’ will rest on the distribution of those states. I am responsible for how I use my words, but my words are not on that account ‘about me.’
Based on your description it seems more sensible to put torture on a continuum with incapacitation rather than holding it separate, as if it decreases future positive utility it seems like another sort of incapacitation to me. At this point I think we’re down to math/data on happiness of post torture experiences versus post incapacitating experiences, which because it is 1 am and I have already taken melatonin I am too sleepy to want to look into. My intuitive leaning is that the effects of torture fade with time more than the effects of incapicitation, eg because I might eventually begin to forget how bad being tortured was but can never forget how I have one fewer limb, but this is only an intuition.
Our ability to fruitfully debate this issue, while we remain in fiction, is probably very limited. It may be underdetermined whether losing one’s magic feels more like losing a driver’s license or like losing a limb. If I’m conceiving of magic loss more in the former terms (magic as a toolbox), you more in the latter terms (magic as an intimate part of the magician), then it’s unsurprising that we’ll arrive at different intuitions.
That said, I’m unclear on what your argument is for treating torture and incapacitation as a ‘continuum.’ I of course think they can be placed on a continuum of suffering; and I concede that their distribution over the continuum partly overlaps, though I think the bulk of torture involves more intense aggregate suffering than does the bulk of incapacitation. But you seem to be making a different claim now—that torture IS a kind of incapacitation, or that incapacitation is a kind of torture.
The latter claim I can understand, but reject; incapacitation can sometimes be used to torture someone, but it does not follow that incapacitation itself is always just watered-down torture, for the same reason that the existence of ‘Chinese water torture’ does not imply that drinking water is, in any interesting sense, on a continuum with torture.
The former claim, that torture is a kind of incapacitation, seems more paradoxical. Is the suggestion that inflicting involuntary pain on someone is nothing but depriving that person of a certain ability—the ability, presumably, to be happy during the torture, or the ability to not suffer flashbacks afterward? I’m not sure this is a useful reframing, though it is interesting.
It’s not my argument, I thought it was yours. When you talk about torture decreasing future positive utility of all experiences that seems pretty clearly to me the same reason to dislike disability.
The reasons to dislike acute torture and superpower incapacitation are the same only in the very reductive way in which any two bad things are, given a monistic meta-ethics, bad for ‘the same reason.’ Sexual assault and poor dinner etiquette, if (monistically) bad, are bad for ‘the same reason’ in some attenuated sense. But for practical purposes this is not very informative, and I was trying to be at least a little practical in comparing the costs of torture and incapacitation.
Likewise, superpower incapacitation can be worse than torture mostly in the sense that any two generic acts can be dustspecked. This falls out of quantitative sensitivity in ethics (especially consequentialist ethics) as a boring side-effect, just as reducibility of reasons falls out of monism as a boring side-effect. In both cases, it has no special relevance to the topic at hand, and noting these general features of utilitarian tradeoffs doesn’t prevent us from also noting that typical real-world torture tends to produce more net suffering than typical real-world superpower incapacitation. (To make magic loss a counterexample to this trend, one would need to better flesh out what one takes magic to be.)
Beware political examples where they are not necessary.
Azkaban is commentary on Muggle prisons. I really hope people got that.
I’ve been reading about muggle prison conditions lately, and while I’ve understood that “prison conditions are terrible and torturing people is pointless etc” for both systems, it did not occur to me that you were making a commentary.
It actually made me sit and think for a minute (though not the full five—oops) about whether there was any way I could contribute to improving conditions in prisons, that was comparatively low-cost, that I had overlooked.
I didn’t think of one, but it’s worth thinking about some more, probably.
In general, how does one determine whether X in HPMOR is supposed to [represent / be commentary on] Y? I could make up a connection between Azkaban and Muggle prisons, probably by running it through my black-box mental model of Eliezer, but I don’t feel any kind of justified in the connection.
Usually it more or less outright says it in the title.
Congratulations, you have just discovered the difference between art and design. If Azkaban had been designed to be a commentary on muggle prisons, the connection would have had to have been made explicit within the text. The fact that Eliezer pointed out the connection does not mean he consciously tried to make it explicit in the text. Since the connection is implicit rather than explicit, the commentary is an artistic interpretation of the text. You don’t need to feel justified in an artistic interpretation.
I don’t think your distinction carves reality, or language, at the joints.
It seems much more like a commentary on the American prison system than anything else. The Western European systems don’t generally suffer many of the problems of American Muggle prisons, or the problems they do share are often to a smaller degree. Britain is one of the middle range countries in this regard, but this may be enough for some people to not get the point.
While American prisons may indeed be worse (on average) than their Western European counterparts, the latter are still more than bad enough for the commentary to apply.
In any case, most of the suffering of imprisonment is psychological and derives from having one’s freedom restricted and status reduced (to put it mildly). So the (physical) conditions of the facility may be almost beside the point (despite the fact that this is what it is most socially acceptable to focus on).
I’m going to go out on a limb and say that massive institutionalized rape is not beside the point.
Ahem:
...not to mention the fact that the behavior of persons is arguably not within the scope of “the (physical) conditions of the facility”.
In short, the comment contained more than enough hedging to preclude such a retort.
Even if it did, orthonormal’s point contains a significant subclass of the suffering that occurs in prisons. Hence ignoring it or sweeping it under a hedge seems somewhat strange.
Let’s back up. Here is the history of this conversation:
Eliezer stated that “Azkaban is commentary on Muggle prisons”.
JoshuaZ replied:
Notice what this says: Western European prisons are so good that Eliezer’s commentary is really only about American prisons. (Also note the implication that the Muggle world is partitioned into two regions: Western Europe and the United States.)
3. I—having become familiar with the similarities and differences between the U.S. and European criminal justice systems as a result of the Amanda Knox case—disputed this, in a comment whose point was to argue that Western European prisons are not pleasant places. They are, in fact, really awful places. Yes, they may not be as bad as U.S. prisons, but they are still bad: places of torment, suffering and despair, despite the fact that the facilities may be a little nicer. They are bad enough that the Azkaban metaphor applies. (And U.S. prisons are nowhere near as bad as those in other, non-Western-European parts of the world—so was Eliezer’s commentary “only” or “mostly” about China, Iran, or North Korea, and not really about the American justice system at all? Of course not.)
Furthermore, at the time he was writing the Azkaban-rescue sequence, Eliezer knew that Amanda Knox—then trapped in a Western European prison—was among his readers. This is just one of many reasons why it simply isn’t plausible that the commentary was meant to be geographically (and thus, in effect, politically) limited to the United States.
4. Some people (bizarrely) downvoted my comment and attempted to educate me about the evils of United States prisons, as if I were unfamiliar with the subject. This is completely missing the point. My comment argued that European prisons are bad, not that American prisons are good. My point was that the fact that European prisons have (for example) bidets does not make them spas. I did take a slightly “extreme” line—that the real torment of incarceration is psychological. But this is not actually an absurd position by any means. I expect that relatively few who have actually been incarcerated would disagree—even among those who had been imprisoned in terrible physical conditions. For one thing, such treatment often has a specifically psychological purpose.
The two “sides” in this argument are: people who think the Azkaban metaphor applies universally (me), and people who think its scope is restricted to the United States (JoshuaZ). Everything I have said in this thread should be understood in that context. In no sense am I downplaying any bad aspect of American prisons. To “correct” me on such a point is to increase the noise and decrease the signal.
This is not a case of me not reading the previous thread before commenting.
In my opinion, you’re reading too much into the original comment. There are fewer Western Europeans in prison than Americans. Aside: their “Western Europe” is much larger than the traditional one, which already has a higher population than the United States, and so we can also say there are fewer prisoners per capita in Europe than the United States.
It’d be surprising if American prisons didn’t tend to have more problems.
For all narrative purposes, the only regions of the Muggle world that significantly matter to the story are Europe and the United States, so your aside seems a misplaced criticism.
I more or less agree with your assessment of the metaphor, but there is no purpose to letting a poorly-grounded argument carry through just because one agrees with the conclusion.
Aye, but pray, where was the signal in the first place?
It’s not under the scope of “having one’s freedom restricted and status reduced”, either. Sorry if I misinterpreted you, but it looks as if I’m not the only one who thought you were omitting the most significant part of the horror of modern prisons.
I thought it was a nice commentary, but I hadn’t realized it was intentional (on either your or Rowling’s part). If you want anyone to get it, you need to slip in anal rape or something, and even then most readers will miss it.
IAWYC but don’t actually make it a rape.
I think the “anal rape” was a joke on Gwern’s part; I oppose such jokes on political grounds.
Do you oppose jokes involving rape because of social consequences of rape being found to be funny, jokes involving rape because of direct consequences on people hearing the joke, jokes about prison rape because of consequences of prisoners, or something else?
All three of those, and I could probably think of other adverse consequences given time.
I was quite serious. And why not? Murder is worse than anal rape, and that has already been included; besides that, people have argued we see at least one kind of rape already in MoR.
Especially those of us who deliberately try to avoid drawing conclusions about authorial intent from text. Whether the author is trying to make an analogical point with a fictional construct is not something I think about too much while reading fiction, though of course correspondences I notice (intentional or not) inform my reading.
What specific commentary were you trying to make? The possible commentaries that I can think of:
a) prisons are too brutal. If so how brutal do you think prisons should be?
b) prisons should be replaced with a different form of punishment. If so what punishment do you have in mind?
c) criminals shouldn’t be punished at all.
d) I haven’t really thought about these issues at all but saying “boo, prisons!” is a great way to signal that I’m compassionate.
The people who seem to agree with Eliezer’s commentary should feel free to specify which commentary they agree with.
Here’s one more option:
e) People don’t think enough about the level of brutality in prisons, and when they do think and talk about it they find it easier to applaud brutality; because anyone who spoke against it “would associate themselves with criminals, with weakness, with distasteful things that people would rather not think about”, while speaking in its favor make you look tough on crime.
Given political discussions I’ve partaken in other forums, I know full well that whenever I condemned prison rape and suggested ways in which it might be reduced/prevented, the typical response was something to the effect of “Why do you love criminals so much?”
For example: Punish rapes among inmates in the same manner that other rapes of citizens by other citizens. Punish rapes of inmates by wardens in the same way with the additional loading that should be applied to all abuses of authority, particularly state sanctioned authority. But to do that we would need to replace Uncle Sam with Uncle Ben.
That would be by sending them to prison, which is not much of a punishment to someone who’s already in prison.
Yes it is. Not all sentences are life sentences. Then there are the obvious differences in types of imprisonment—including level of security and whether they have access to other prisoners or are confined to solitary.
Not all, but entirely too many. If someone is already going to be in a big concrete box for the next ten years no matter what they do, and doesn’t expect to survive more than five years in that environment, what more can you do to them?
Put them in a smaller concrete box and with other prisoners that lower that estimate of their lifespan?
Assume they’re already in the worst box that various legislation (mostly related to human rights) permits you to construct, or the closest cost-effective approximation thereof.
At that point, if they are not already, they should be put into solitary. Some would consider it reward, but if they prey on others, then they should be put somewhere that they can’t—that’s (ostensibly) why they’re there in the first place, at least in part.
Locking criminals up for years, away from everyone else, seems like a horrible way of scaring others into not committing crimes.
Following this train of thought, ideally prisons should be replaced with a more public/visible type of punishment. Maybe caning?
I dunno. In the real world, I know a lot of people who seem awfully frightened of prisons. But sure, maybe they’d be more frightened of public caning.
Well, being brutal is directly connected to a prison’s ability to serve its function.
The stated function of a prison is to imprison (i.e. detain). If the function of the prison was to get people physically hurt, then the state would have official torturers to brutalize people to such exact specifications as their convictions by the courts (e.g. official sentences would state things like “ten years in prison, plus three beatings and one anal rape per month”, and the state would hire official rapists for the purpose).
If brutality was supposed to be part of a prison’s specification, then we would have the responsibility of quantifying how much brutality is deserved for each crime. (the question you asked “How brutal should they be?” doesn’t only work for people criticizing their current brutality, but also for the people who support it, you see)
But the delegation of this task randomly to convicts speaks of the same hypocrisy that Quirrel mocks in the chapters in question.
There are several functions commonly ascribed to prisons, including:
Detention: to prevent people with criminal tendencies from having the opportunity to commit crimes against the general public, by physically separating them from the public.
Deterrence: to deprive criminals of the pleasures of normal society, in order to discourage other people from becoming criminals. If you would like to live with your partner, children, and friends in relative comfort instead of with a cellmate in relative discomfort, you have a motivation for staying out of prison.
Rehabilitation: to cure criminals of tendencies that may lead them to commit crimes; for instance, lack of cultural or moral education, or lack of non-criminal job skills. This is given as a reason for prisons to offer classes, job training, etc.
Penitence: to put criminals in an isolating environment where they will reflect on their crimes and regret them — or a panoptic environment in which they will internalize the conduct standards of the authorities.
(I’m not disagreeing with you on the badness of prison brutality; just on the “stated function” claim.)
That’s not exactly an undisputed assertion.
Penitentiaries were name for the theory that prisoners should be penitent. More generally, rehabilitation is often a purpose of imprisonment.
It’s a factor for every US federal judge to consider when deciding what sentence to impose. In fairness, 3553(a) authorizes a judge to consider just about anything—it’s totally agnostic as to the appropriate theory of punishment.
True, but neither is the theory of evolution. ;)
When it comes down to it, the purpose of prisons is to reduce crime. The two main methods by which they accomplish this are being sufficiently nasty to deter would be criminals, and keeping the people who fail to be deterred confined so they can’t victimize law-abiding citizens.
Rehabilitation mostly exists so that (some of the) people doing the locking up can signal their compassion by supporting it.
Rapes, murders, and beatings in prison are also supposed to be crimes, no?
At this point you’re surely using the same argument that would be used to justify Dementors in Azkaban—it makes Azkaban nastier: hence it serves as deterrent.
And I’ve yet to hear a good counterargument.
If your argument is simply “brutality acts as a deterrent,” it’s almost certainly true. If your argument is, “Therefore the current level of prison brutality is optimal,” or, “we should be happy with prison brutality,” the only counterargument needed is that nobody’s provided any evidence at all for those positions.
But if either of those is the assertion, here are some counterarguments: 1) There is a countereffect: longer (and therefore more brutal) prison sentences increase rates of recidivism. 2) Flogging and caning are brutal deterrents. Many (most?) people will take a punishment of flogging over a punishment of a long prison sentence when given the choice. Ergo at least for many, prisons are more brutal than literal torture. 3) From a cursory glance at stats, violent crime rates don’t seem to be much lower in countries with higher incidences of prison rape or prison hospitalizations. I would like to see some rigorous analysis on this. 4) Violent crime rates don’t seem to be much higher in countries that employ flogging or caning. Again, not a rigorous statistical analysis, but weak evidence nonetheless. 5) Let’s not forget that we’re trying to minimize violent crime, and prison brutality is just the perpetration of violent crime while in prison. Prisoners are people too, and many of them are innocent or overcharged. Determining optimal brutality levels will take this into account. 6) And of course I shouldn’t even have to say that a large number of people undergoing the brutality of prison are completely innocent of hurting anybody at all; they are only guilty of crimes that shouldn’t be crimes.
I don’t think there’s any evidence at all that the brutality levels in western prisons are optimal. But are they a deterrent? Yeah, sure. And the death penalty is a deterrent of shoplifting. What’s the relevance to the actual debate of prison brutality? That people who applaud prison brutality have a point? Not any more than advocates of the death penalty for shoplifting do.
My point that the merely pointing out that prisons are brutal is not enough to argue that they should be made less brutal.
In that case you are completely correct! But I think the counteropinion generally being expressed here, if not clearly, is that prisons are extremely brutal.
My point is basically “so what?”, i.e., they’re missing part of their argument.
Also, extremely brutal compared to what? As ArisKatsaris pointed out in several places in this thread the most dangerous thing prisoners have to fear in modern prisons is their fellow prisoners.
Hurting people is bad.
There’s an argument (first advanced by Beccaria in the late 18th century) that it matters more that punishment be swift and certain, than that it be harsh. If people don’t really believe a punishment is likely to happen to them, it won’t deter reliably. Human cognitive biases being what they are, we might be better served trying to make punishment visible, rather than horrifying. Azkaban, being remote and unpleasant to think about, is perhaps less effective than some punishment that would be constantly in sight. Having the convicted criminal’s wand broken. say.
Beccaria puts it much better than I could, so I’ll just refer you to his essay on the topic: http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/An_Essay_on_Crimes_and_Punishments/Chapter_XXVII
In a society with veritaserum, legilimency and assorted other magic you’d think it would be straightforward to establish guilt or innocence in the vast majority of cases.
Of course, said society also has occlumency and memory charms.
It’s not as if you’ve stated the exact position you want a counterargument to: Is it “the more brutal the better”?
My point is that with prisons, the more brutal, the more effective. Yes, there are tradeoffs to consider. I actually agree with your statement here that the justice system would work better if people were willing to admit its main purpose was deterrent, secondarily detention, and not implicitly delegate the brutality part to other convicts so they can wipe their hands of it.
My $0.02: there are several different functions person A can perform by punishing person B for some action C.
For example:
(a) lowering B’s chances of performing C in the future
(b) lowering the chances of observers performing C
(c) encouraging observers to anti-identify with B
(d) encouraging observers who anti-identify with B to support A
(e) encouraging observers who identify with B to oppose A
IME, conversations about how prisons should work become really confused because people aren’t very clear about which of those functions they endorse.
Personally, it seems clear to me that (b) is by far the most valuable of these goals. That said, prison policy has almost no influence on (b); law enforcement and courts are far more relevant, and their current implementation pretty much screens off the effects of prison policy.
People who are interested in (a) and also value B’s continued existence will tend to be interested in punishment as a behavioral modification tool, and will happily set it aside in favor of more effective behavioral modification tools as science develops them.
People interested in (a) who don’t value B’s continued existence will be uninterested in punishment, since simply killing B is more efficient.
AFAICT, the folks who establish the policies that govern prisoner punishment (as distinct from prisoner restraint) are primarily motivated by the desire to obtain political support, which suggests minimizing (e) and maximizing (d), which does seem to be what most of our prison policies are designed to do. Maximizing (c) is one way to minimize (e), though there are many others.
This isn’t obvious at all. In particular if prisons were extremely nice, their deterrent effect would be much less no matter how law enforcement and the courts worked. One could argue that the policies in the current Overton window aren’t significantly different from each other, but that argument would have to be made.
Agreed that if prisons were extremely nice, their deterrent effect due to the threat of punishment would be lower than it is now.
That said… when the mechanism that results in my being punished for an act is perceived as unreliable and capricious (including, but not limited to, cases where it is unreliable and capricious), the correlation between the severity of the punishment and the intensity of the deterrent effect is much, much lower than when the mechanism is perceived as fair and reliable.
So if law enforcement and courts were perceived as fair and reliable (that is, reliably assigning punishment to criminals and not assigning punishment to noncriminals), I expect making prisons equally unpleasant would create a much greater deterrent effect (to being a criminal) than it does now.
If my goal is to maximize deterrent effect, then, I expect that I would do better to invest my efforts in increasing the perception of law enforcement and courts as fair and reliable than to invest them in increasing the perception of prisons as unpleasant.
But, as I say, I don’t think many people involved in setting prison policies are primarily motivated by maximizing deterrent effect.
Depending on what you mean by “unreliable and capricious”, I find this dubious. At the very least it seems to me that brutal dictatorships are much better at reducing crime (at least the crimes they care about) than democracies. For example, Mussolini’s successful campaign against the Sicilian mafia.
What I mean by enforcement being unreliable and capricious is, roughly. that agents believe that their performing the act is not well-correlated with their being punished.
It sounds from that wiki article like Mussolini created an environment where people believed that being a mafioso would reliably result in being punished.
I suspect they also believed that not being a mafioso stood a good chance of being punished, which has other consequences; when punishment occurs in the absence of a reliable and controllable cue, the result is learned helplessness. But if we care about deterring criminals and we don’t care about the effect on noncriminals, punishing 90% of criminals and 5% of noncriminals can work OK, even if only 5% of the people we punish are criminals.
Of course, if we care about things in addition to deterrence, that may not be a great policy, but that’s another conversation.
So what you’re saying is that in modern developed states committing crimes is not well-correlated with being punished? I find this highly dubious.
At the very least, I’m saying that that’s the perception: most crimes go unpunished.
But yes, I also suspect that perception is true. I haven’t done any research on the matter, though, and attempts to find statistics via cursory Googling failed.
If you have any cites handy, I’m happy to be corrected.
Eugine said:
TheOtherDave said:
These aren’t actually in contradiction. If a criminal committing a “mid-size” offense has a 25% chance of being caught for each crime, then being a career criminal is likely to end you in jail, but most crimes will still be unpunished.
My sense is that most crimes (and most dollar-loss to crime) are small/midsize thefts; hundreds or thousands of dollars, not more. Thefts big enough to set you up for a lifetime are freakishly rare compared to the number of criminals. And that means to have a tolerable lifestyle as a criminal, you have to commit lots of offenses—so even a small chance of being caught for each mugging or burglary starts to add up.
Yeah, I agree with this. I’d be surprised if the chance was as high as .25, but the principle is the same; career criminals can count on eventually being arrested.
That said, the original context of this discussion was the behavior-modification effects of prison policy on the not-yet-arrested population, and from a behavior modification point of view a punishment that usually fails to kick in for the first several crimes doesn’t do much to deter those first few crimes.
And making the punishment more and more severe doesn’t help the deterrence factor all that much in that situation, which was my original point.
Disagree. It deters the first crime. It’s deterrent power will decrease for subsequent crimes (until caught) unless the criminal has friends who have been caught.
Can you say more about the mechanism whereby increasing the severity of a punishment I am confident won’t apply to my first crime deters my first crime? That seems pretty implausible to me.
If committing a crime required playing Russian Roulette, a gun with a bullet in it would be more of a deterrent than a gun with a paintball in it. Yes?
The law-enforcement/courts system has significantly better first-time odds than Russian Roulette. For most crimes, the odds that I will be arrested and convicted and sentenced to significant jail time for a first crime are significantly lower than one in six.
“But Dave,” someone will now patiently explain to me, “that doesn’t matter. An N% chance of death is always going to be significantly worse than an N% chance of a paintball in the head, no matter how low N%. It’s scale-invariant!”
Except the decision to ignore the psychological effects of scale is precisely what I’m skeptical about here. Sure, if I make prisons bad enough (supposing I can do so), then everyone rational does an EV calculation and concludes that even a miniscule chance of going to prison is more disutility than the opportunity cost of foregoing a crime.
But I don’t think that’s what most people reliably do faced with small probabilities of large disutilities. Some people, faced with that situation, look at the magnitude of the disutility and ignore the probability (“Sure it’s unlikely, but if it happened it would be really awful, so let’s not take the risk!”). Some people look at the magnitude of the probability and ignore the disutility (“Sure, it would be awful, but it’s not going to happen, so who cares?”).
Very few look at the EV.
That said, if we restrict our domain of discourse to potential criminals who do perform EV calculations (which I think is a silly thing to do in the real world, but leaving that aside for now), then I agree that doubling the expected disutility-of-punishment (e.g., making prisons twice as unpleasant) halves their chance of performing the crime.
Of course, so does doubling the expected chance of being punished in the first place .
That is, if I start out with a P1 confidence that I will be arrested and convicted for commiting a crime, a P2 confidence that if convicted I will receive significant prison time, and a >.99 confidence that the disutility of significant prison time is D1, and you want to double my expected disutility of commiting that crime, you can double P1, or P2, or D1, or mix-and-match.
So a system primarily interested in maximizing deterrent effect among rational EV calculators asks which of those strategies gets the largest increase in expected disutility for a given cost.
It’s not at all clear to me that in the U.S. today, doubling D1 is the most cost-effective way to do that if I consider decreasing the QALYs of prison inmates to be a cost. So if someone insists on doubling D1, I infer that either...:
...(a) they value the QALYs of prison inmates less than I do, or
...(b) they have some reason to believe that doubling D1 is the most cost-effective way of buying deterrence, or
...(c) they aren’t exclusively interested in deterrence, or
...(d) something else I haven’t thought of.
In practice I usually assume some combination of (a) and (c), but I considered (b) potentially interesting enough to be worth exploring the question. At this point, though, my confidence that I can explore (b) in this conversation in an interesting way is low.
It seems rather difficult to actually affect those people, though. The difference between P1=.04 and P1=.08 would have dramatic effects on an EV-calculator, but very little effect on the sort of person who judges probabilities by ‘feel’.
I would suppose the D1 advocates would argue that the hidden costs of increasing P1 are higher than you think, or possibly they just value them more (e.g. the right to privacy). I admit I’ve never heard a good argument that what the US needs is to greatly increase the likelihood of sentencing a convict to significant prison time.
I would expect it depends a lot on the algorithms underlying “feel” and what aspects of the environment they depend on. It’s unlikely these people are choosing their behaviors or beliefs at random, after all.
More generally, if I actually want to manipulate the behavior of a group, I should expect that a good first step is to understand how their behavior depends on aspects of their environment, since often their environment is what I can actually manipulate.
Edit: I should add to this that I certainly agree that it’s possible in principle for a system to be in a state where the most cost-effective thing to do to achieve deterrence is increase D. I just don’t think it’s necessarily true, and am skeptical that the U.S. is currently in such a state.
Sure, that’s another possibility. Or of P2, come to that.
Is this not the rationale behind mandatory sentencing laws?
I can’t think of a response to this that isn’t threatening to devolve into a political argument, so I’ll bow out here. Sorry.
In that case, why aren’t you stealing money and donating to SIAI? ;)
But seriously, there are countries where your comment is actually true. You can tell the difference pretty easily.
To be honest, I’m not convinced that it isn’t true even in first-world countries. Solve rates for murders in the US appear to be around 66% as of 2007. I haven’t directly been able to dig up solve rates for crimes in general, but clearance rates (the rate of crimes prosecuted to crimes reported) are available, and are well under 50% for pretty much everything except murder. Most prosecuted crimes appear to result in convictions, but this still says to me that TheOtherDave’s got it right, at least in a US context and assuming that most reports aren’t frivolous.
YMMV for other nations.
ETA: Looking over these statistics again, I strongly suspect that the “solve” figures you find in various places are in fact identical to the clearance rates I refer to. So the reports-to-convictions ratio would be significantly lower—compare conviction rates for cases brought to court.
I infer that your intuitions differ from mine but you don’t have any cites handy either.
Fair enough.
Updated, to a degree proportional to my confidence in the reliability of your intuition on this matter, in your direction.
Yeah, but due to the politics is a mind-killer thing, we don’t really comment on it… just like a lot of other political hints are left alone (at least on my behalf) and I try to focus on making predictions and figuring out where the agents in this story will go given their apparent rationality (or lack thereof) and value sets. That’s the reason why I read this: it’s well-written entertainment I can use to train my ability to predict and phrase said predictions. Plus I like to see theories put to practice.
By the way, I believe the rescue of Bellatrix was around the point in the story that Amanda Knox had gotten to when she made it out of Muggle Azkaban herself.
Really? I understood from the human interest fluff pieces I tried to avoid that she had used her time in Azkaban very well, learning Italian to a high level and catching up on a great deal of high-quality reading. I don’t think Bellatrix would regard their stays, pound for pound, as equivalent.
I think you misunderstood me: by “point in the story she had gotten to” I meant literally the point in the actual story (MoR). It wasn’t some kind of figure of speech about her experience. (I wonder how many other people misunderstood my comment in this way; it’s an interpretation that never occurred to me. I thought people knew she was a MoR reader.)
However, her experience itself was no picnic, fluff pieces notwithstanding.
It’s been mentioned in Author’s Notes. For what it’s worth, I thought gwern’s comment was a non sequitur on first reading.
I took your original post to mean this, and looked for other information about it, and found none.
See here.
I wasn’t aware that was a particularly politically charged example since it’s not currently on either side’s discussion plate.
I do think it’s somewhat relevant with them both being profit motivations that encourage increasingly stricter laws and enforcement. Then again if I’d been able to notice the problem I wouldn’t have put it in there in the first place.
Taking your advice, do you think I should edit it out and remove the example? Or better yet, could anyone think of an example that’s not so politically proximate that illustrates the same effect? I’d image a similar thing would occur in ancient Rome with slaves, or maybe colonial-era governments with indentured servitude, but I’m not quite as familiar with those.
Edit: And thank you for reminding me, I’ve edited.
I’m pretty sure “tough on crime” is associated with the “right wing”.
That said, it might seem better if you just left out “in America”, or replaced it with “in some places”.
Well, they can die. I’ve seen nothing to suggest that Vows destroy Horcruxes.
I wonder if this fact is possibly relevant to some Cunning Plot in which—perhaps just as one among many positive results—Voldemort “died” and resurrected via horcrux in order to escape an Unbreakable Vow. I remember in response to chapter 84, people were wondering what, if Voldie’s apparent death at Godric’s Hollow was intentional, was in it for him.
But will they come back free of the Vow? It seems entirely plausible to me that it would follow them into their new incarnation.
They could still break it once per incarnation.
… thus killing one human per incarnation, thus creating one horcrux per incarnation.
Now, if there were some way to automate the whole getting-a-body-business …
Not in the specifications. They just say, ‘anyone who breaks the Vow dies.’ Ending with death is a feature.
Though if the people who first found the spell really thought that way, they must not have truly believed anyone could stay in their world after death.
I don’t think it would be that easy. This is isomorphic to making wishes with an evil genie—or coding a human-level AI with a list of deontological commands. It could be done, but probably not in an EY fanfic and probably not without a skilled magical lawyer.
The difference is that evil wizards are not, as a rule, a different intellectual order than we are. We have some idea of their set of options. Not so for a powerful AI. A dark lord is at least somewhat bounded by the human imagination.
Yes they are— in the sense that they will have decades to spend ruminating on workarounds, experimenting, consulting with others. And when they find a solution the result is potentially an easily transmitted whole class compromise that frees them all at once.
Decades of dedicated human time, teams of humans, etc. are all forms of super-humanity. If you demanded that the same man hours be spent drafting the language as would be spent under its rule, then I’d agree that there was no differential advantage, but then it would be quite a challenge to write the rule.
also, unlike the case of an AI where you have to avoid crippling it, lest it becomes pointless to build it in the first place, using unbreakable wows as a punishment for grand crimes against humanity means that the restraints can be nearly abritarily harsh. The people writing the wows have no need to preserve the decision space they leave their victim or respect their autonomy. TLDR: Voldemort would not be able to spend decades thinking of ways around the wow, because doing so would violate any sensibly formulated wow. (stray toughts, sure, you have to permit that, or the wow kills in a day. Sitting down and working at it? No.)
Only in an extremely weak sense. Humans can do and think things that cats just can’t, even if they think for a long, long time, or have a bunch of cats working together. The power of a truly superhuman intellect is hard to imagine, and easily underestimated.
In any case, the drafter of the rules would have an enormous comparative advantage, because he can unilaterally enforce dictates on the other party, while the other party has no such authority. It’s not guaranteed he’ll cover all the angles within the human domain, but it’s at least possible, unlike in the case of an AI, where such a strategy is basically guaranteed to fail.
Kill them. With great power comes great getting-held-responsible-if-necessary.
Oh, no, this is much better. Magical evilness castration.
I thought Dumbeldore said that he found a way to imprison Grindelwald without dementors but I can’t find were he says that. edit fixed major spelling error can->can’t
That seems like a significant plot point. Do we know how that is done?
In canon it’s definitively done.
But how?
I’m pretty sure that both canon and MoR are silent on how it’s done, which is a real pity.
In canon there is a scene where Voldemort breaks into Nurmengard to ask Grindelwald where the Wand is, and then kills him. In a non-magical world I’d say that the fact that somebody can break in means that somebody can break out too, with help from the outside. Even if that’s not the case in a magical world, it means that his followers could continue to communicate with him. Not good.
On the other hand there seems to be magic in canon that cannot be broken or circumvented, except for a very specific trigger. Think of the Fidelius charm, which hides a building from everybody, except those that the secret keeper has told the location. Or the potion in the cave that must be drunk, and cannot be vanished, transigured or otherwise “magiced”. Maybe a similar kind of “absolute” magic exists that can be used to imprison people reliably. So reliably that no Auror need to stand guard, and are tortured with humming.
There is the issue of wands. Wandless magic is, at least for humans, much less powerful than wand magic. So it’s perfectly conceivable to me to have obstacles that are virtually impossible to overpower if you’re wandless, but possible to overpower if you’re a wand and are a good wizard (which Voldemort surely is).
The “his followers could continue to communicate with him” is indeed a real problem. But it seems (both in canon and in MOR) Azkaban itself is not so hard to break from the outside, only (almost) impossible to escape from inside.
Nope.
Dumbledore doesn’t come right out and say it, but it’s there in Chapter 77;
Wands as Oath Rods? I’m ok with this.
ETA: Apparently the relevant historical use is under binding rod. Same thing.
RE: the game breaker opening example: Iron vs bronze weapons is a game breaker? Hardly. The difference in weapon quality there is minor (and even arguable). Bronze vs Steel… sure, that’s a big deal but even then not worthy of ‘game breaker’ accolades.
I believe the reason is that iron weapons are easier to make, hence you can field larger armies.
IIRC, it’s not actually easier to make iron (you need higher temperatures), but the ore is more easy to obtain. Copper and tin ores are rarely found together, so you need long-range trading to make lots of bronze.
That roughly the same as my understanding of the advantage of basic iron vs bronze.
I thought of a possible reason why they wouldn’t do this. Basically, you’ve got two choices with the unbreakable vow ploy: Obtain a class of civil servants willing to give up their own magic to do the job (fat chance), or force the criminals to do it to each other. The natural answer is the latter right? Well yes, except the part where you have to hand a criminal whose crime was severe enough to warrant stripping some of his magic a wand and give him enough mental breathing room to perform a complicated, powerful ritual. Some of them are just gonna go along with it, sure, but you only gotta have one high-profile screwup before that kind of a policy is abolished.
Or, you could think strategically for a few minutes then, for example, only give magic wands to wizards for this purpose after they have themselves sworn unbreakable vows that would prevent any misuse.