Xachariah

Karma: 3,633

Xachariah 6 Jan 2016 8:13 UTC
2 points
in reply to: ChristianKl’s comment on: Why CFAR’s Mission?
This is my main question. I’ve never seen anything to imply that multi-day workshops are effective methods of learning. Going further, I’m not sure how Less Wrong supports Spaced Repetition and Distributed Practice on one hand, while also supporting an organization that’s primary outreach seems to be crash courses. It’s like Less Wrong is showing a forum wide cognitive dissonance that nobody notices.

That leaves a few options:
- I’m wrong (though I consider it highly unlikely)
- CFAR never bothered to look it up or uses self selection to convince themselves it’s effective
- CFAR is trying to optimize for something aside from spreading rationality, but they aren’t actually saying what.

Xachariah 2 May 2015 19:53 UTC
4 points
in reply to: Kindly’s comment on: Stupid Questions May 2015
I didn’t mean to imply nonlinear functions are bad. It’s just how humans are.

Picking gambles 1A and 2B, on the other hand, cannot be described by any utility function.

Prospect Theory describes this and even has a post here on lesswrong. My understanding is that humans have both a non-linear utility function as well as a non-linear risk function. This seems like a useful safeguard against imperfect risk estimation.

[Insurance is] not a Dutch Book in the usual sense: it doesn’t guarantee either side a profit.

If you setup your books correctly, then it is guaranteed. A dutch book doesn’t need to work with only one participant, and in fact many dutch books only work with on populations rather than individuals, in the same way insurance only guarantees a profit when properly spread across groups.

Xachariah 2 May 2015 18:33 UTC
3 points
in reply to: sixes_and_sevens’s comment on: Stupid Questions May 2015
The point of the Allais paradox is less about how humans violate the axiom of independence and more about how our utility functions are nonlinear, especially with respect to infinitesimal risk.

There is an existing Dutch Book for eliminating infinitesimal risk, and it’s called insurance.

Xachariah 3 Jan 2015 13:49 UTC
0 points
in reply to: Adam Zerner’s comment on: Stupid Questions January 2015
You may be interested in the term ‘inverted classroom’, if you’re not already aware of it.

The basic idea is that it’s the normal school system you grew up with, except students watch video lectures as homework, then do all work in class while they’ve got an expert there to help. Also, the time when the student is stuck in one place and forced to focus is when they’re actually doing the hard stuff.

There’s so many reasons why it’s better than traditional education. I just hope inverted classrooms start to catch on sooner rather than later.

(Edit: I know this isn’t your exact proposal, but it uses many of the features you mention and it can be immediately grafted into the existing public school system with a single change of curriculum and the creation of some videos. It’s the low hanging fruit for education.)

Xachariah 29 Oct 2014 6:26 UTC
1 point
in reply to: somnicule’s comment on: Stupid Questions (10/27/2014)
Anecdotally someone close to me did one of those and it was a quick way to burn thousands of dollars.

I tried to dissuade them, but end the end they came back with less knowledge than I did of the subject, and all I did was follow some youtube tutorials and look at stack overflow to create a couple learning apps for android.

Xachariah 15 Aug 2014 3:33 UTC
1 point
in reply to: DanielLC’s comment on: Ethical frameworks are isomorphic
All ethical frameworks are equal the same way that all graphing systems are equal.

But I’ll be damned if it isn’t easier to graph circles with polar coordinates than it is with Cartesian coordinates.

Xachariah 13 Aug 2014 6:56 UTC
2 points
in reply to: [deleted]’s comment on: Open thread, 11-17 August 2014
You don’t need to upvote them necessarily. Just flip a coin.

If you downvote them too, then it just looks like they made a bad post.

Xachariah 27 Jul 2014 22:27 UTC
6 points
in reply to: [deleted]’s comment on: Harry Potter and the Methods of Rationality discussion thread, July 2014, chapter 102
Transfiguration sickness isn’t because things turn into poison. Your body goes into a transfigured state, minor changes occur, and when you come back from that state things are different. It’d be tiny things. Huge problems would cause you to die instantly, but little transcription errors would kill you in the timeframe described.

Eg, your veins wouldn’t match up right. The DNA in your cells would be just a little bit off and you’d get spontaneous cancer in your entire body. Some small percent of neurotransmitters and hormones would be transformed into slightly different ones… etc. None of that would be contagious or even harmful to somebody consuming it. But to the animal itself it’d be devastating.

Also remember that once the transfiguration reverts and you’re back to yourself, you’re in a stable state. The only issue is that you’re not back together perfectly. Quirrell would only get sick if he drank the blood while it was transfigured and then it changed form while inside of him.

Xachariah 27 Jul 2014 0:56 UTC
10 points
in reply to: jaime2000’s comment on: Harry Potter and the Methods of Rationality discussion thread, July 2014, chapter 102

Death iss not truly gainssaid. Real sself is losst, as you ssay. Not to my pressent tasste. Admit I conssidered it, long ago.

It’s still not a lie.

He considered it long ago and then he did it. He doesn’t want to try it again because he’s already got some and/or they wouldn’t fix his current situation. Literally truthful but appropriately misleading.

Xachariah 19 Jul 2014 7:57 UTC
21 points
on: [LINK] Another “LessWrongers are crazy” article—this time on Slate
I thought the article was quite good.

Yes it pokes fun at lesswrong. That’s to be expected. But it’s well written and clearly conveys all the concepts in an easy to understand manner. The author understands lesswrong and our goals and ideas on a technical level, even if he doesn’t agree with them. I was particularly impressed in how the author explained why TDT solves Newcomb’s problem. I could give that explanation to my grandma and she’d understand it.

I don’t generally believe that “any publicity is good publicity.” However, this publicity is good publicity. Most people who read the article will forget it and only remember lesswrong as that kinda weird place that’s really technical about decision stuff (which is frankly accurate). Those people who do want to learn more are exactly the people lesswrong wants to attract.

I’m not sure what people’s expectations are for free publicity but this is, IMO, best case scenario.

Xachariah 8 Apr 2014 21:34 UTC
0 points
in reply to: gjm’s comment on: Open Thread April 8 - April 14 2014
Maybe I should back up a bit.

I agree that at 1000004:1000000, you’re looking at the wrong hypothesis. But in the above example, 104:100, you’re looking at the wrong hypothesis too. It’s just that a factor of 10,000x makes it easier to spot. In fact, at 34:30 or even a fewer number of iterations, you’re probably also getting the wrong hypothesis.

A single percentage point of doubt gets blown up and multiplied, but that percentage point has to come from somewhere. It can’t just spring forth from nothingness once you get to past 50 iterations. That means you can’t be 96.6264% certain at the start, but just a little lower (Eliezer’s pre-rounding certainty).

The real question in my mind is when that 1% of doubt actually becomes a significant 5%->10%->20% that something’s wrong. 8:4 feels fine. 104:100 feels overwhelming. But how much doubt am I supposed to feel at 10:6 or at 18:14?

How do you even calculate that if there’s no allowance in the original problem?

Xachariah 8 Apr 2014 14:09 UTC
3 points
in reply to: Emile’s comment on: Open Thread April 8 - April 14 2014
Surely that can’t be correct.

Intuitively, I would be pretty ready to bet that I know the correct bookbag if I pulled out 5 red chips and 1 blue. 97% seems a fine level of confidence.

But if we get 1,000,004 red and 1,000,000 blues, I doubt I’d be so sure. It seems pretty obvious to me that you should be somewhere close to ⁵⁰⁄₅₀ because you’re clearly getting random data. To say that you could be 97% confident is insane.

I concede that you’re getting screwed over by the multi-verse at that point, but there’s got to be some accounting for ratio. There is no way that you should be equally confident in your guess regardless of if you receive ratios of 5:1, 10:6, 104:100, or 1000004:1000000.

Xachariah 7 Jan 2014 10:22 UTC
6 points
in reply to: whales’s comment on: Open thread for January 1-7, 2014
Hmm, reward myself after a fixed interval of 30 minutes? That’s just crazy enough to work! (I have heard of the Pomodoro technique before, and I’m not quite sure why I didn’t just go for that at the start.)

The hidden random timer is to make myself resilient to extinction and ingrain the habit even without reward. Although, randomly choosing to reward at the end of pomodoros would work too. IIRC, intermittent time interval is the reward structure that survives the longest without extinction, whereas a variable ratio reward structure creates the most vigorous workers.

Also, I think what you describe is a conditional reinforcer and not an intermittent one. What I mean by that is after a long enough time, they subject would become attached to the coin flip itself as a partial reward. Kind of like clicker training for animals, or how a shot at a jackput pull is a reward even when it doesn’t payout. Then you could use the stronger conditional training systems...

Your suggestion is brilliant. Aaaand now I’ve got “write a gamblerdoro app” on my to-do list.

Xachariah 7 Jan 2014 5:54 UTC
11 points
on: Open thread for January 1-7, 2014
Dumb reinforcement question: How do I reward the successful partial-completion of an open ended task without reinforcing myself for quitting?

Basically I’m picking up the practice of using chocolates as reinforcement. I reward myself when I start and when I finish. This normally works very well. Start doing dishes → chocolate → do dishes → finish doing dishes → chocolate. It seems viable for anything with discrete end states.

Problem—I’ve got a couple long term tasks (fiction writing and computer program I’m making) that don’t have markers, and I can put anywhere from 30 minutes to 3 days into them without necessarily seeing a stopping point. I’m worried that rewarding chocolates whenever I get up from working will (in the long run) reinforce me to quit more frequently. I don’t want to end up with a hummingbird work ethic for these tasks.

How should I reinforce to maximize my time-on-task?

(So far my best plan is to write a smartphone app that creates a hidden random timer between 5-55 minutes (bell curve) that goes off, and I reward myself chocolate if I’m on task when the alarm activates. But there’s logistical hurtles and it seems like quite a bit of work for something that might be solved easily otherwise. Plus, I don’t know what possible bad behavior that might incitivize.)

Xachariah 15 Dec 2013 0:24 UTC
22 points
in reply to: linkhyrule5’s comment on: Harry Potter and the Methods of Rationality discussion thread, part 28, chapter 99-101
I’d think that unicorn blood has unique properties on phoenix tears.

Otherwise Quirrel would be tracking down Phoenixes and… showing them the first 5 minutes of ‘Up’ or something.

Xachariah 15 Nov 2013 1:18 UTC
3 points
in reply to: A1987dM’s comment on: 2013 Census/Survey: call for changes and additions
I normally understand the LW use of ‘taboo’.

It’s just that ‘taboo sex’ brings up its own meaning/mental image faster.

Xachariah 14 Nov 2013 20:37 UTC
7 points
in reply to: A1987dM’s comment on: 2013 Census/Survey: call for changes and additions
“Taboo ‘sex’” might want to be rephrased though.

Until I saw Luke’s response I thought it meant “Yes”, “No”, and “Yes, and it was really kinky sex!”

Xachariah 14 Nov 2013 20:34 UTC
2 points
in reply to: gjm’s comment on: 2013 Census/Survey: call for changes and additions
“Voting in primaries” is US specific, but it is significantly stronger than “voting in other elections.” We have an order of magnitude more people voting in state elections than in primaries.

In fact, it’s probably the strongest thing that you can do to influence politics in America. It’s significantly rarer than volunteering to help elect parties or writing letters to your senator, and everyone who’s at a primary already does those things.

Xachariah 14 Nov 2013 20:15 UTC
0 points
in reply to: ChristianKl’s comment on: 2013 Census/Survey: call for changes and additions
Everyone does research before voting according to them.

My family members aren’t familiar with even the most basic differences between the executive and legislative branches, and routinely make mistakes that would be cleared up with a 1st year understanding of government. They attribute blame/praise to one branch that they couldn’t possibly be responsible due to how the separation of powers works.

But they’ve all “done their research, and [they] know a lot better than [I] do about who to vote for.”

Xachariah 26 Aug 2013 12:45 UTC
28 points
on: The 50 Shades of Grey Book Club
This seems dangerous. Last time I did something like this, I became a huge fan of ponies.