Scientists discuss possible experiments that would come out differently based on this map, and if they figure one out, then they’ve determined that the revision is meaningful and can then test it.
And if it turns out that the new particle or force is indetectable , their discussions were retrospectively meaningless, by your definition..despite the fact that they were communicating successfully. You need to show that the ordinary theory is false, and to show that verificationism is true.
Of course, that’s an appeal to the standard theory..and there is nothing wrong with that. You are making a novel, contentious claim about what “meaning” always meant. Verificationism less than a hundred years old. Modern linguistics is at least twice as old. We were never in a vacuum about what “meaning” means.
Your stipulative definition doesn’t match ordinary usage, so why should anyone accept it?
And if it turns out that the new particle or force is indetectable , their discussions were retrospectively meaningless, by your definition..despite the fact that they were communicating successfully.
No—those discussions were about a meaningful purely mathematical question—does X map differ from Y map in an observable manner?
Re standard model—as elsewhere, most people will agree with both of these statements:
There is some sense in which “external reality exists” is true
This is not related to ease of communication. External reality would exist even without any communication and if language had never been invented.
I don’t see how those can be squared away with an account of meaning solely grounded in communication, when the parties to that communication will strongly dispute that their meaning is grounded in communication.
I don’t see how those can be squared away with an account of meaning solely grounded in communication, when the parties to that communication will strongly dispute that their meaning is grounded in communication.
People can be wrong. You could be under the impression that you are speaking Mandarin when you are speaking English. The object level is not the meta level. If you can’t speak English , and I can’t speak mandarin, the fact that we are communicating means one of us is wrong.
What coordinated action is taken that can only be explained by assuming they’ve managed to communicate about something unverifiable in my sense (i.e. external reality)?
Recall that verificationism and anti realism are different things. I don’t have to prove realism in order to show that the verificationist criterion of meaning is not the only one.
Which definition have you put forward? My complaint is that the definitions are circular.
>The counter argument is that since realism is valuable, at least to some, verificationism is too limited as a theory of meaning .
I would deny that one can meaningfully have preferences over incoherent claims, and note that one can’t validly reason that something is coherent based on the fact that one can have a preference over it, as that would be question-begging.
That said, if you have a good argument for why realism can be valuable, it might be relevant. But all you actually have is an assertion that some find it valuable.
Meanwhile, you’ve asserted both that communication implies meaning, and that parties to a communication can be mistaken about what something means. I don’t see how the two are consistent.
Presence of shared meaning enabled communication.
Absence of share meaning prevents communication.
Basically, meaning is about communication.
And if it turns out that the new particle or force is indetectable , their discussions were retrospectively meaningless, by your definition..despite the fact that they were communicating successfully. You need to show that the ordinary theory is false, and to show that verificationism is true.
Of course, that’s an appeal to the standard theory..and there is nothing wrong with that. You are making a novel, contentious claim about what “meaning” always meant. Verificationism less than a hundred years old. Modern linguistics is at least twice as old. We were never in a vacuum about what “meaning” means.
Your stipulative definition doesn’t match ordinary usage, so why should anyone accept it?
No—those discussions were about a meaningful purely mathematical question—does X map differ from Y map in an observable manner?
Re standard model—as elsewhere, most people will agree with both of these statements:
There is some sense in which “external reality exists” is true
This is not related to ease of communication. External reality would exist even without any communication and if language had never been invented.
I don’t see how those can be squared away with an account of meaning solely grounded in communication, when the parties to that communication will strongly dispute that their meaning is grounded in communication.
People can be wrong. You could be under the impression that you are speaking Mandarin when you are speaking English. The object level is not the meta level. If you can’t speak English , and I can’t speak mandarin, the fact that we are communicating means one of us is wrong.
If they can be wrong about that, why can’t they be wrong about whether what they’re saying is meaningful?
Because there is evidence of successful communication in coordinated action.
What coordinated action is taken that can only be explained by assuming they’ve managed to communicate about something unverifiable in my sense (i.e. external reality)?
I don’t have to assume your sense is correct .
That’s not responsive to my question. I didn’t say you needed to assume that.
Recall that verificationism and anti realism are different things. I don’t have to prove realism in order to show that the verificationist criterion of meaning is not the only one.
Sure, I don’t think anything I’ve said is inconsistent with that?
Whenever I try to put forward a defense of realism , you say it is in meaningless under the verificationist definition of meaning.
But everyone knows that realism is hard to justify using verificationism.
The counter argument is that since realism is valuable, at least to some, verificationism is too limited as a theory of meaning .
So there is a ponens/ tolens thing going on.
Which definition have you put forward? My complaint is that the definitions are circular.
>The counter argument is that since realism is valuable, at least to some, verificationism is too limited as a theory of meaning .
I would deny that one can meaningfully have preferences over incoherent claims, and note that one can’t validly reason that something is coherent based on the fact that one can have a preference over it, as that would be question-begging.
That said, if you have a good argument for why realism can be valuable, it might be relevant. But all you actually have is an assertion that some find it valuable.
Meanwhile, you’ve asserted both that communication implies meaning, and that parties to a communication can be mistaken about what something means. I don’t see how the two are consistent.
Meaningless! Incoherent!
Incoherent! Meaningless!
Those words are interchangable. Not sure what your point is.