What coordinated action is taken that can only be explained by assuming they’ve managed to communicate about something unverifiable in my sense (i.e. external reality)?
Recall that verificationism and anti realism are different things. I don’t have to prove realism in order to show that the verificationist criterion of meaning is not the only one.
Which definition have you put forward? My complaint is that the definitions are circular.
>The counter argument is that since realism is valuable, at least to some, verificationism is too limited as a theory of meaning .
I would deny that one can meaningfully have preferences over incoherent claims, and note that one can’t validly reason that something is coherent based on the fact that one can have a preference over it, as that would be question-begging.
That said, if you have a good argument for why realism can be valuable, it might be relevant. But all you actually have is an assertion that some find it valuable.
Meanwhile, you’ve asserted both that communication implies meaning, and that parties to a communication can be mistaken about what something means. I don’t see how the two are consistent.
If they can be wrong about that, why can’t they be wrong about whether what they’re saying is meaningful?
Because there is evidence of successful communication in coordinated action.
What coordinated action is taken that can only be explained by assuming they’ve managed to communicate about something unverifiable in my sense (i.e. external reality)?
I don’t have to assume your sense is correct .
That’s not responsive to my question. I didn’t say you needed to assume that.
Recall that verificationism and anti realism are different things. I don’t have to prove realism in order to show that the verificationist criterion of meaning is not the only one.
Sure, I don’t think anything I’ve said is inconsistent with that?
Whenever I try to put forward a defense of realism , you say it is in meaningless under the verificationist definition of meaning.
But everyone knows that realism is hard to justify using verificationism.
The counter argument is that since realism is valuable, at least to some, verificationism is too limited as a theory of meaning .
So there is a ponens/ tolens thing going on.
Which definition have you put forward? My complaint is that the definitions are circular.
>The counter argument is that since realism is valuable, at least to some, verificationism is too limited as a theory of meaning .
I would deny that one can meaningfully have preferences over incoherent claims, and note that one can’t validly reason that something is coherent based on the fact that one can have a preference over it, as that would be question-begging.
That said, if you have a good argument for why realism can be valuable, it might be relevant. But all you actually have is an assertion that some find it valuable.
Meanwhile, you’ve asserted both that communication implies meaning, and that parties to a communication can be mistaken about what something means. I don’t see how the two are consistent.
Meaningless! Incoherent!
Incoherent! Meaningless!
Those words are interchangable. Not sure what your point is.