Anti realism needs key terms like “map”,”observer”, “experience” and predict. Giving clear definitions is a problem everyone faces.
And it’s hard to see it how it can get by without an ontology. Not only does “observer” need to be defined , observers need to exist. Strong anti realism seems to be incoherent.
Again, I’m not quite anti-realist, but I can define those words. A map is a mental model I use to make predictions. I don’t need the term observer nor do I need observers to exist—all I really need is for myself to exist, and I’m fairly comfortable with Descartes on that regard. So yes, I exist and I have experiences, and I can know that directly. Anything beyond that is meaningless.
I’ve identified a specific concept, asserted it lacks meaning, and built up a worldview that doesn’t require it. I don’t know which part of my argument or which terms you object to here.
How would you like me to prove a negative, other than pointing out the total lack of reason to believe the positive and building up an alternative theory without it?
Can you give a specific value system and explain how realism helps it? Right now you seem to be vaguely claiming that an alternative system could theoretically be useful, without really explaining how it would be coherent or what the system is.
The God hypothesis does produce different predictions. MW produces different predictions to the extent that you accept quantum immortality, although “I predict I will never have died” is not quite a prediction as to sensory data so I’m not sure if it counts.
Regardless, I view believing in quantum or modal immortality as consistent with my view.
Deism is incoherent on my views, to the extent it makes no predictions. I don’t know why you’d *care* if it was “correct” or not, even if that was somehow a coherent concept.
QI is weird regardless of realism, I think it’s an edge case but I don’t think it really presents a problem for my view.
>That isn’t the definition of incoherence that you previously offered.
I’m not offering a definition in the comment you replied to, I’m simply stating a consequence of my earlier definition. To the extent Deism does not make predictions, it’s a claim about external reality and is meaningless.
>The definition of coherence you previously offered was that everything gets unamiguously sorted into either of two categories.
What is the exact claim that you think is ambiguously coherent under my definition?
Again, I’m not quite anti-realist, but I can define those words. A map is a mental model I use to make predictions. I don’t need the term observer nor do I need observers to exist—all I really need is for myself to exist, and I’m fairly comfortable with Descartes on that regard. So yes, I exist and I have experiences, and I can know that directly. Anything beyond that is meaningless.
Who are you talking to?
My map says that if I talk in a certain manner I’ll get interesting feedback in return. So far it’s worked out pretty well.
Of course, I might internalize the usage of this map to an extent where I don’t explicitly think of it as a map unless reflecting on it.
But I could say the same thing about you, making your argument incoherent ;-)
How exactly does that make my argument incoherent?
You’ve never provided an exact definition of incoherence, why should I (whoever I am)
I’ve identified a specific concept, asserted it lacks meaning, and built up a worldview that doesn’t require it. I don’t know which part of my argument or which terms you object to here.
That would be the asserting rather than proving.
What are you trying to say? What are you objecting to?
How would you like me to prove a negative, other than pointing out the total lack of reason to believe the positive and building up an alternative theory without it?
The reason to build an alternative is s value system other than yours.
Can you give a specific value system and explain how realism helps it? Right now you seem to be vaguely claiming that an alternative system could theoretically be useful, without really explaining how it would be coherent or what the system is.
Any value system where you care about what is real.
EY didn’t wholeheartedly embrace verificationism, because he cares about MW being real, and God not being real.
The God hypothesis does produce different predictions. MW produces different predictions to the extent that you accept quantum immortality, although “I predict I will never have died” is not quite a prediction as to sensory data so I’m not sure if it counts.
Regardless, I view believing in quantum or modal immortality as consistent with my view.
The Deism hypothesis does not lead to different predictions.
QI is not empirical evidence as usually understood.
Deism is incoherent on my views, to the extent it makes no predictions. I don’t know why you’d *care* if it was “correct” or not, even if that was somehow a coherent concept.
QI is weird regardless of realism, I think it’s an edge case but I don’t think it really presents a problem for my view.
That isn’t the definition of incoherence that you previously offered.
The definition of coherence you previously offered was that everything gets unamiguously sorted into either of two categories.
>That isn’t the definition of incoherence that you previously offered.
I’m not offering a definition in the comment you replied to, I’m simply stating a consequence of my earlier definition. To the extent Deism does not make predictions, it’s a claim about external reality and is meaningless.
>The definition of coherence you previously offered was that everything gets unamiguously sorted into either of two categories.
What is the exact claim that you think is ambiguously coherent under my definition?