The God hypothesis does produce different predictions. MW produces different predictions to the extent that you accept quantum immortality, although “I predict I will never have died” is not quite a prediction as to sensory data so I’m not sure if it counts.
Regardless, I view believing in quantum or modal immortality as consistent with my view.
Deism is incoherent on my views, to the extent it makes no predictions. I don’t know why you’d *care* if it was “correct” or not, even if that was somehow a coherent concept.
QI is weird regardless of realism, I think it’s an edge case but I don’t think it really presents a problem for my view.
>That isn’t the definition of incoherence that you previously offered.
I’m not offering a definition in the comment you replied to, I’m simply stating a consequence of my earlier definition. To the extent Deism does not make predictions, it’s a claim about external reality and is meaningless.
>The definition of coherence you previously offered was that everything gets unamiguously sorted into either of two categories.
What is the exact claim that you think is ambiguously coherent under my definition?
Any value system where you care about what is real.
EY didn’t wholeheartedly embrace verificationism, because he cares about MW being real, and God not being real.
The God hypothesis does produce different predictions. MW produces different predictions to the extent that you accept quantum immortality, although “I predict I will never have died” is not quite a prediction as to sensory data so I’m not sure if it counts.
Regardless, I view believing in quantum or modal immortality as consistent with my view.
The Deism hypothesis does not lead to different predictions.
QI is not empirical evidence as usually understood.
Deism is incoherent on my views, to the extent it makes no predictions. I don’t know why you’d *care* if it was “correct” or not, even if that was somehow a coherent concept.
QI is weird regardless of realism, I think it’s an edge case but I don’t think it really presents a problem for my view.
That isn’t the definition of incoherence that you previously offered.
The definition of coherence you previously offered was that everything gets unamiguously sorted into either of two categories.
>That isn’t the definition of incoherence that you previously offered.
I’m not offering a definition in the comment you replied to, I’m simply stating a consequence of my earlier definition. To the extent Deism does not make predictions, it’s a claim about external reality and is meaningless.
>The definition of coherence you previously offered was that everything gets unamiguously sorted into either of two categories.
What is the exact claim that you think is ambiguously coherent under my definition?