Yes. If qualia is defined as George Wilfrid describes it elsewhere in this thread, as nothing more than sensation, then I definitely have it. But I suspect there’s something more— plenty of people have tried to point to it, using phrases like “conceptually separate the information content from what it feels like”. Well, I can’t. That phrase doesn’t mesh with a phenomenon in my mind. The information content is what it feels like.
That depends on how we define “information”—for one definition of information, qualia are information (and also everything else is, since we can only recognize something by the pattern it presents to us).
But for another definition of information, there is a conceptual difference—for example, morphine users report knowing they are in pain, but not feeling the quale of pain.
Yes.
If qualia is defined as George Wilfrid describes it elsewhere in this thread, as nothing more than sensation, then I definitely have it. But I suspect there’s something more— plenty of people have tried to point to it, using phrases like “conceptually separate the information content from what it feels like”. Well, I can’t. That phrase doesn’t mesh with a phenomenon in my mind. The information content is what it feels like.
It’s not more than sensation. It’s just the subjective aspect without the behavioural aspect.
That depends on how we define “information”—for one definition of information, qualia are information (and also everything else is, since we can only recognize something by the pattern it presents to us).
But for another definition of information, there is a conceptual difference—for example, morphine users report knowing they are in pain, but not feeling the quale of pain.