Much of the debate over the importance of qualia hinges on the definition of the term, and various philosophers emphasize or deny the existence of certain features of qualia. Some philosophers of mind, like Daniel Dennett, argue that qualia do not exist. Other philosophers, as well as neuroscientists and neurologists, believe qualia exist and that the desire by some philosophers to disregard qualia is based on an erroneous interpretation of what constitutes science.
If it was that easy to understand, we wouldn’t be here arguing about it. My claim is that arguments about qualia are (partially) caused by people actually having different cognitive mechanisms that produce different intuitions about how experience works.
Well, I’m glad you’ve settled the nature of qualia. There’s a discussion downthread, between TAG and Signer, which contains several thousand words of philosophical discussion of qualia. What a pity they didn’t think to look in Wikipedia, which settles the question!
Seriously, I definitely have sensations. I just think some people experience an extra thing on top of sensations, which they think is an indissoluble part of cognition, and which causes them to find some things intuitive that I find incomprehensible.
If it was that easy to understand, we wouldn’t be here arguing about it.
Definitions are not theories
Even if there is agreement about the meaning of the word, there can also be disagreement about the correct theory of qualia. Definitions always precede theories—we could define “Sun” for thousands of years before we understood its nature as a fusion reactor. Shared definitions are a prerequisite of disagreement , rather than just talking past each other.
The problem of defining qualia—itself, the first stage in specifying the problem—can be much easier than the problem of coming up with a satisfactory theoretical account, a solution. It’s a term that was created by an English speaking philosopher less than a hundred years ago, so it really doesn’t present the semantic challenges of some philosophical jargon.
(The resistance to qualia can also be motivated by unwillingness to give up commitments—bias, bluntly—not just semantic confusion)
My claim is that arguments about qualia are (partially) caused by people actually having different cognitive mechanisms that produce different intuitions about how experience works.
Semantic confusions and ideological rigidity already abound, so there is no need to propose differing cognitive mechanisms.
Theories about how qualia work don’t have to be based on direct intuition. Chalmers arguments are complex, and stretch over 100s of pages.
Well, I’m glad you’ve settled the nature of qualia. There’s a discussion downthread, between TAG and Signer, which contains several thousand words of philosophical discussion of qualia.
Again, the definition is one thing and the “nature”...the correct ontological theory...is another. The definition is explained by Wikipedia, the correct theory , the ultimate explanation is not.
Seriously, I definitely have sensations.
“Sensation” is ambiguous between a functional capacity—stopping at a red light—and a felt quality—what red looks like. The felt quality is definitely over and above the function, but that’s probably not your concern.
I just think some people experience an extra thing on top of sensations, which they think is an indissoluble part of cognition, and which causes them to find some things intuitive that I find incomprehensible.
It’s true that some people have concluded nonphysical theories from qualia… but it doesn’t follow that they must be directly perceiving or intuiting any kind of nonphysicalism in qualia themselves. Because it’s not true that every conclusion has to be arrived at immediately, without any theoretical, argumentative background. Chalmers’ arguments don’t work that way and are in fact quite complex.
Physics is a complex subject that needs to be learnt. To know what is physical is therefore not a matter of direct intuition...so to know that qualia are not physical is also not a matter of direct intuition.
There’s no existing, successful, physical or computational theory of qualia. The people who think qualia aren’t physical, aren’t necessarily basing that on some kind of direct perception, and don’t necessarily know less physics than the people who do.
Consciousness itself is overloaded (go figure!) since it can refer to both “a high-level computational process” and “an ontologically fundamental property of the universe”.
Again, those are theories of consciousness, not definitions of consciousness.
Qualia can be a synonym for consciousness (if you are in Camp #2) or mean something like “this incredibly annoying and ill-defined concept that confused people insist on talking about” (if you’re in Camp #1). I recommend only using this term if you’re talking to a Camp #2 audience.
There are many more than two possibilities. You can take consciousness seriously, in Chalmer’s sense, and accept that there is a Hard Problem, without denying that there are other, easier aspects to consciousness..
Chalmers accepts that there are easy problem as well.
And the definition problem becomes much easier if you remember that definitions aren’t theories.
Again, those are theories of consciousness, not definitions of consciousness.
I would agree that people who use consciousness to denote the computational process vs. the fundamental aspect generally have different theories of consciousness, but they’re also using the term to denote two different things.
(I think this is bc consciousness notably different from other phenomena—e.g., fiber decreasing risk of heart disease—where the phenomenon is relatively uncontroversial and only the theory about how the phenomenon is explained is up for debate. With consciousness, there are a bunch of “problems” about which people debate whether they’re even real problems at all (e.g., binding problem, hard problem). Those kinds of disagreements are likely causally upstream of inconsistent terminology.)
Again, those are theories of consciousness, not definitions of consciousness.
I would agree that people who use consciousness to denote the computational process vs. the fundamental aspect generally have different theories of consciousness, but they’re also using the term to denote two different things.
But that doesn’t imply that they disagree about (all of) the meaning of the term “qualia”..since denotation (extension, reference)doesn’t exhaust meaning. The other thing is connotation, AKA intension, AKA sense.
Everyone can understand that the qualia are ,minimally, things like the-way-a-tomato-seems-to-you, so that’s agreement on sense , and the disagreement on whether the referent is “physical property”, “nonphysical property” , “information processing”, etc, arises from different theoretical stances.
(I think this is bc consciousness notably different from other phenomena—e.g., fiber decreasing risk of heart disease—where the phenomenon is relatively uncontroversial and only the theory about how the phenomenon is explained is up for debate.
That’s an odd use of “phenomenon”...the physical nature of a heart attack is uncontroversial, and the controversy is about the physical cause. Whereas with qualia, they are phenomenal properly speaking..they are appearences...and yet lack a prima facie interpretation in physical (or information theoretic) terms. Since qualia do present themselves immediately as phenomenal, then outright denial …feigning anaesthesia or zombiehood.. is a particular poor response to the problem. And the problem is different to “how does one physical event cause another one that is subsequent in time”...it’s more like “how or whether qualia, phenomenal consciousness supervenes synchronously on brain states”.
.
With consciousness, there are a bunch of “problems” about which people debate whether they’re even real problems at all (e.g., binding problem, hard problem). Those kinds of disagreements are likely causally upstream of inconsistent terminology.)
If you don’t like the terminology, you can invent better terminology. Throughout this exchange , you have been talking in terms of “consciousness” , and I have been replying in terms of “qualia”, because “qualia” is a term that was invented to hone in on the problem, on the aspects of consciousness where it isn’t obviously just information processing. (I’m personally OK with using information theoretic explanations, such as global workplace theory, to address Easy Problem issues , such as Access Consciousness).
Theres a lot to be said for addressing terminological.issues, but it’s not an easy win for camp #1.
And I think you believe others to experience this extra thing because you have failed to understand what they’re talking about when they discuss qualia.
Well, let me quote Wikipedia:
If it was that easy to understand, we wouldn’t be here arguing about it. My claim is that arguments about qualia are (partially) caused by people actually having different cognitive mechanisms that produce different intuitions about how experience works.
Wikipedia also provides, in the first paragraph of the article you quoted, a quite straightforward definition:
I am skeptical that you lack the cognitive architecture to experience these things, so I think your claim is false.
Well, I’m glad you’ve settled the nature of qualia. There’s a discussion downthread, between TAG and Signer, which contains several thousand words of philosophical discussion of qualia. What a pity they didn’t think to look in Wikipedia, which settles the question!
Seriously, I definitely have sensations. I just think some people experience an extra thing on top of sensations, which they think is an indissoluble part of cognition, and which causes them to find some things intuitive that I find incomprehensible.
Definitions are not theories
Even if there is agreement about the meaning of the word, there can also be disagreement about the correct theory of qualia. Definitions always precede theories—we could define “Sun” for thousands of years before we understood its nature as a fusion reactor. Shared definitions are a prerequisite of disagreement , rather than just talking past each other.
The problem of defining qualia—itself, the first stage in specifying the problem—can be much easier than the problem of coming up with a satisfactory theoretical account, a solution. It’s a term that was created by an English speaking philosopher less than a hundred years ago, so it really doesn’t present the semantic challenges of some philosophical jargon.
(The resistance to qualia can also be motivated by unwillingness to give up commitments—bias, bluntly—not just semantic confusion)
Semantic confusions and ideological rigidity already abound, so there is no need to propose differing cognitive mechanisms.
Theories about how qualia work don’t have to be based on direct intuition. Chalmers arguments are complex, and stretch over 100s of pages.
Again, the definition is one thing and the “nature”...the correct ontological theory...is another. The definition is explained by Wikipedia, the correct theory , the ultimate explanation is not.
“Sensation” is ambiguous between a functional capacity—stopping at a red light—and a felt quality—what red looks like. The felt quality is definitely over and above the function, but that’s probably not your concern.
It’s true that some people have concluded nonphysical theories from qualia… but it doesn’t follow that they must be directly perceiving or intuiting any kind of nonphysicalism in qualia themselves. Because it’s not true that every conclusion has to be arrived at immediately, without any theoretical, argumentative background. Chalmers’ arguments don’t work that way and are in fact quite complex.
Physics is a complex subject that needs to be learnt. To know what is physical is therefore not a matter of direct intuition...so to know that qualia are not physical is also not a matter of direct intuition.
There’s no existing, successful, physical or computational theory of qualia. The people who think qualia aren’t physical, aren’t necessarily basing that on some kind of direct perception, and don’t necessarily know less physics than the people who do.
@Rafael Harth
Again, those are theories of consciousness, not definitions of consciousness.
There are many more than two possibilities. You can take consciousness seriously, in Chalmer’s sense, and accept that there is a Hard Problem, without denying that there are other, easier aspects to consciousness.. Chalmers accepts that there are easy problem as well.
And the definition problem becomes much easier if you remember that definitions aren’t theories.
I would agree that people who use consciousness to denote the computational process vs. the fundamental aspect generally have different theories of consciousness, but they’re also using the term to denote two different things.
(I think this is bc consciousness notably different from other phenomena—e.g., fiber decreasing risk of heart disease—where the phenomenon is relatively uncontroversial and only the theory about how the phenomenon is explained is up for debate. With consciousness, there are a bunch of “problems” about which people debate whether they’re even real problems at all (e.g., binding problem, hard problem). Those kinds of disagreements are likely causally upstream of inconsistent terminology.)
But that doesn’t imply that they disagree about (all of) the meaning of the term “qualia”..since denotation (extension, reference)doesn’t exhaust meaning. The other thing is connotation, AKA intension, AKA sense.
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sense_and_reference
Everyone can understand that the qualia are ,minimally, things like the-way-a-tomato-seems-to-you, so that’s agreement on sense , and the disagreement on whether the referent is “physical property”, “nonphysical property” , “information processing”, etc, arises from different theoretical stances.
That’s an odd use of “phenomenon”...the physical nature of a heart attack is uncontroversial, and the controversy is about the physical cause. Whereas with qualia, they are phenomenal properly speaking..they are appearences...and yet lack a prima facie interpretation in physical (or information theoretic) terms. Since qualia do present themselves immediately as phenomenal, then outright denial …feigning anaesthesia or zombiehood.. is a particular poor response to the problem. And the problem is different to “how does one physical event cause another one that is subsequent in time”...it’s more like “how or whether qualia, phenomenal consciousness supervenes synchronously on brain states”. .
If you don’t like the terminology, you can invent better terminology. Throughout this exchange , you have been talking in terms of “consciousness” , and I have been replying in terms of “qualia”, because “qualia” is a term that was invented to hone in on the problem, on the aspects of consciousness where it isn’t obviously just information processing. (I’m personally OK with using information theoretic explanations, such as global workplace theory, to address Easy Problem issues , such as Access Consciousness).
Theres a lot to be said for addressing terminological.issues, but it’s not an easy win for camp #1.
And I think you believe others to experience this extra thing because you have failed to understand what they’re talking about when they discuss qualia.