The existence of people without qualia might be a way to displace the question from philosophy to cognitive psychology, where at least we have some ways to answer questions. I don’t think it’s illegitimate for me to say what I say; I think it’s fascinating additional data.
Well, we have to be careful to keep the two concepts separate. I don’t think I have qualia, but I’m sure other people do. They’ve claimed to on many occasions, and I don’t think they’re lying or deceived. From my point of view, other people have some extra thing on top of their sensations, which produces philosophical conundrums when they try to think about it.
You tell me! People say qualia are the most obvious thing in the world. Do you feel like you have them?
From my point of view, other people have some extra thing on top of their sensations, which produces philosophical conundrums when they try to think about it.
As someone who definitely has qualia (and believes that you do too), no, that’s not what’s going on. There’s some confusing extra thing on top of behavior—namely, sensations. There would be no confusion if the world were coupled differential equations all the way down (and not just because there would be no one home to be confused), but instead we’re something that acts like a collection of coupled differential equations but also, unlike abstract mathematical structures, is like something to be.
“There’s some confusing extra thing on top of behavior, namely sensations.” Wow, that’s a fascinating notion. But presumably if we didn’t have visual sensations, we’d be blind, assuming the rest of our brain worked the same, right? So what exactly requires explanation? You’re postulating something that acts just like me but has no sensations, I.e. is blind, deaf, etc. I don’t see how that can be a coherent thing you’re imagining.
When I read you saying “is like something to be,” I get the same feeling I get when someone tries to tell me what qualia are— it’s a peculiar collection of familiar words. It seems to me that you’re trying to turn a two-place predicate “A imagines what it feels like to be B” into a one-place predicate “B is like something to be”, where it’s a pure property of B.
I’m two years late to the discussion, but I think I can clear this up. The idea is that a person without qualia might still have sensory processing that leads to the construction of percepts which can inform our actions, but without any consciousness of sensation. There is also a distinction between sensory data and sensation. Consider this scenario:
I am looking at a red square on a white wall. The light from some light source reflects off the wall and enters my eye, where it activates cone and rod cells. This is sensory data, but it is not sensation, in that I do not feel the activation of my cone and rod cells. My visual cortex processes the sensory data, and generates a sensory experience (qualia) corresponding in some way to the wall I am looking at. I analyze this sensory experience and thus derive percepts like “white wall” and “red square”. The generation of these percepts will typically also lead to a sensory experience (qualia) in the form of an inner monologue: “that’s a red square on a white wall”. But sometimes it won’t, since I don’t always have an inner monologue. Yet, even when it doesn’t, I am still able to act on the basis of having seen a red square on a white wall. For example, if I am subsequently quizzed on what I saw, I will be able to answer it correctly.
Well, that’s my formulation of how qualia works, having thought about it a great deal. But there are people who profess that they experience qualia and yet suspect that the generation of percepts does not come from the analysis of conscious sensory experience, but from the processing of sensory data itself, and that the analysis of sensory experience just happens to coincide with it (Leibniz’s pre-ordained harmony of God).
Finally, we could also imagine cases where the sensory experience is not generated at all; where there is merely sensory data that, despite being processed by the visual cortex, never becomes sensory experience (never generates the visual analogue of an internal monologue), but still crystallises into sufficiently ordered sensory data that it can give rise to percepts. This would be the hypothetical “philosophical zombie”.
I don’t think this last scenario is possible, because I don’t think qualia are epiphenomena; I think they are an intrinsic part of the process by which human beings (and probably other entities with metacognition) make decisions on the basis of sensory data. Without this, I do not believe our cognition could advance significantly beyond that of infancy (I do not think infants possess qualia), but there are certain cases where our instincts can respond to sensory data in a manner that does not require attention to qualia, and may indeed not require qualia at all.
Wow, that’s a fascinating notion. But presumably if we didn’t have visual sensations, we’d be blind, assuming the rest of our brain worked the same, right?
If you lacked information about your environment, you would be functionally impaired. Information about your environment doesn’t have to be visual...it could be sonar or something. It doesn’t have to be sensory either...you could just somehow know that there is a door ahead of you ,and a turning to the left. Presumably , that’s how Dennett thinks it works. For everybody else, the difference between different ways-of-experiencing shows that ways-of-experiencing are more than just information.
I get the same feeling I get when someone tries to tell me what qualia are— it’s a peculiar collection of familiar words
“Time and space are the same, and they can bend and warp” is a peculiar combination of familiar words.
The existence of people without qualia might be a way to displace the question from philosophy to cognitive psychology,
There are both philosophical (What are qualia? What having/not having qualia implies?) and neuroscientific (How exactly the closest referent to “qualia” actually works?) aspects to the problem. Both require an answer. Substituting one for another won’t do. The issue with the philosophical aspect isn’t that we can’t get an answer. It’s that we get too many, incompatible with each other answers and it’s hard to use definitions consistently in such situation.
I agree that there may be fascinating additional data in the realm of neurosciency. I wouldn’t be much surprised if some people indeed have much more impressive subjective experiences than others. It’s legitimate to talk about it as a possibility, and yet it’s only tangental to the philosophical questions at hand.
I don’t think I have qualia, but I’m sure other people do. They’ve claimed to on many occasions, and I don’t think they’re lying or deceived.
As you may see from the comments these people also claim that you misunderstand them with such interpretaton. I don’t think they are lying either.
You tell me! People say qualia are the most obvious thing in the world. Do you feel like you have them?
See my reply to GeorgeWilfrid and his original comment. I have qualia defined the way he did and I expect you to have them too. Let’s call it weak qualia (wq). On the other hand, if qualia are defined as irreducible and non-physical—hard qualia (hq) - then I believe that I don’t have them, nor that I had them in my subjective idealist days and I don’t think anyone does no matter how awesome their subjective experience is.
The problem, however, that there is mob and bailey dynamics going on. Some people confuse wq with hq, some people think that wq imply hq. People that think they have hq often use the same language that people who think they have only wq. People arguing past each other often use different definitions. And so on.
When we’ve fixed the definitions. I believe we can properly solve the philosophical aspect. The question is reduced to whether wq indeed imply hq. I think the argument for works like that (if there is someone who holds wq->hq position here, please correct me):
I have direct access to experience. My experience is different from matter. Thus the fact that I have experience at all means that it’s not material.
The mistake her is in failure to account for map-territoiry destinction. What if you have direct access only to your experience of experience and not experience itself? Then
My experience of experience is different from my experience of matter. Which doesn’t necessary means that experience is not material only that I feel this way even if it’s not true.
The existence of people without qualia might be a way to displace the question from philosophy to cognitive psychology, where at least we have some ways to answer questions. I don’t think it’s illegitimate for me to say what I say; I think it’s fascinating additional data.
Well, we have to be careful to keep the two concepts separate. I don’t think I have qualia, but I’m sure other people do. They’ve claimed to on many occasions, and I don’t think they’re lying or deceived. From my point of view, other people have some extra thing on top of their sensations, which produces philosophical conundrums when they try to think about it.
You tell me! People say qualia are the most obvious thing in the world. Do you feel like you have them?
As someone who definitely has qualia (and believes that you do too), no, that’s not what’s going on. There’s some confusing extra thing on top of behavior—namely, sensations. There would be no confusion if the world were coupled differential equations all the way down (and not just because there would be no one home to be confused), but instead we’re something that acts like a collection of coupled differential equations but also, unlike abstract mathematical structures, is like something to be.
“There’s some confusing extra thing on top of behavior, namely sensations.” Wow, that’s a fascinating notion. But presumably if we didn’t have visual sensations, we’d be blind, assuming the rest of our brain worked the same, right? So what exactly requires explanation? You’re postulating something that acts just like me but has no sensations, I.e. is blind, deaf, etc. I don’t see how that can be a coherent thing you’re imagining.
When I read you saying “is like something to be,” I get the same feeling I get when someone tries to tell me what qualia are— it’s a peculiar collection of familiar words. It seems to me that you’re trying to turn a two-place predicate “A imagines what it feels like to be B” into a one-place predicate “B is like something to be”, where it’s a pure property of B.
I’m two years late to the discussion, but I think I can clear this up. The idea is that a person without qualia might still have sensory processing that leads to the construction of percepts which can inform our actions, but without any consciousness of sensation. There is also a distinction between sensory data and sensation. Consider this scenario:
I am looking at a red square on a white wall. The light from some light source reflects off the wall and enters my eye, where it activates cone and rod cells. This is sensory data, but it is not sensation, in that I do not feel the activation of my cone and rod cells. My visual cortex processes the sensory data, and generates a sensory experience (qualia) corresponding in some way to the wall I am looking at. I analyze this sensory experience and thus derive percepts like “white wall” and “red square”. The generation of these percepts will typically also lead to a sensory experience (qualia) in the form of an inner monologue: “that’s a red square on a white wall”. But sometimes it won’t, since I don’t always have an inner monologue. Yet, even when it doesn’t, I am still able to act on the basis of having seen a red square on a white wall. For example, if I am subsequently quizzed on what I saw, I will be able to answer it correctly.
Well, that’s my formulation of how qualia works, having thought about it a great deal. But there are people who profess that they experience qualia and yet suspect that the generation of percepts does not come from the analysis of conscious sensory experience, but from the processing of sensory data itself, and that the analysis of sensory experience just happens to coincide with it (Leibniz’s pre-ordained harmony of God).
Finally, we could also imagine cases where the sensory experience is not generated at all; where there is merely sensory data that, despite being processed by the visual cortex, never becomes sensory experience (never generates the visual analogue of an internal monologue), but still crystallises into sufficiently ordered sensory data that it can give rise to percepts. This would be the hypothetical “philosophical zombie”.
I don’t think this last scenario is possible, because I don’t think qualia are epiphenomena; I think they are an intrinsic part of the process by which human beings (and probably other entities with metacognition) make decisions on the basis of sensory data. Without this, I do not believe our cognition could advance significantly beyond that of infancy (I do not think infants possess qualia), but there are certain cases where our instincts can respond to sensory data in a manner that does not require attention to qualia, and may indeed not require qualia at all.
If you lacked information about your environment, you would be functionally impaired. Information about your environment doesn’t have to be visual...it could be sonar or something. It doesn’t have to be sensory either...you could just somehow know that there is a door ahead of you ,and a turning to the left. Presumably , that’s how Dennett thinks it works. For everybody else, the difference between different ways-of-experiencing shows that ways-of-experiencing are more than just information.
“Time and space are the same, and they can bend and warp” is a peculiar combination of familiar words.
There are both philosophical (What are qualia? What having/not having qualia implies?) and neuroscientific (How exactly the closest referent to “qualia” actually works?) aspects to the problem. Both require an answer. Substituting one for another won’t do. The issue with the philosophical aspect isn’t that we can’t get an answer. It’s that we get too many, incompatible with each other answers and it’s hard to use definitions consistently in such situation.
I agree that there may be fascinating additional data in the realm of neurosciency. I wouldn’t be much surprised if some people indeed have much more impressive subjective experiences than others. It’s legitimate to talk about it as a possibility, and yet it’s only tangental to the philosophical questions at hand.
As you may see from the comments these people also claim that you misunderstand them with such interpretaton. I don’t think they are lying either.
See my reply to GeorgeWilfrid and his original comment. I have qualia defined the way he did and I expect you to have them too. Let’s call it weak qualia (wq). On the other hand, if qualia are defined as irreducible and non-physical—hard qualia (hq) - then I believe that I don’t have them, nor that I had them in my subjective idealist days and I don’t think anyone does no matter how awesome their subjective experience is.
The problem, however, that there is mob and bailey dynamics going on. Some people confuse wq with hq, some people think that wq imply hq. People that think they have hq often use the same language that people who think they have only wq. People arguing past each other often use different definitions. And so on.
When we’ve fixed the definitions. I believe we can properly solve the philosophical aspect. The question is reduced to whether wq indeed imply hq. I think the argument for works like that (if there is someone who holds wq->hq position here, please correct me):
The mistake her is in failure to account for map-territoiry destinction. What if you have direct access only to your experience of experience and not experience itself? Then