If dogs & cats were raised specifically to be eaten & not involved socially in our lives as if they were members of the family, I don’t think I’d care about them any more than I care about chickens or cows.
This article seems to assume that I oppose all suffering everywhere, which I’m not sure is true. Getting caught stealing causes suffering to the thief and I don’t think there’s anything wrong with that. I care about chickens & cows significantly less than I care about thieves because thieves are at least human.
Why don’t you care about non-humans? If other animals suffer in roughly the same way as humans, why should it matter at all what species they belong to?
Getting caught stealing causes suffering to the thief and I don’t think there’s anything wrong with that.
In this case I think that’s justified because catching a thief leads to less suffering overall than failing to catch the thief.
In this case I think that’s justified because catching a thief leads to less suffering overall than failing to catch the thief.
Not everyone has harm (avoidance) as their primary moral value; many people would voluntarily accept harm to have more purity, autonomy, or economic efficiency, to give three examples.
If a moral theory accepted and acted upon by all moral people led to an average decrease in suffering, I’d take that as a sign that it was doing something right. For example, if no one initiated violence against anyone else (except in self defense), I have a hard time imagining how that could create more net suffering though it certainly would create more suffering for the subset of the population who previously used violence to get what they wanted.
I don’t think that very many people would except extreme harm to have these things, though. I used to think that I valued some non-experiential things very strongly, but I don’t think that I was taking seriously how strong my preference not to be tortured is. And for most people I don’t think there are peak levels of those three things that could outweigh torture.
While I definitely value autonomy (and, to a lesser extent, some sorts of purity), and would trade away some pleasure or happiness to get those things, a theory of harm could include autonomy, purity, etc., by counting lack of satisfaction of preferences for those things as harm.
I mean harm as one of the moral foundations. It seems like a five-factor model of morality fits human intuitions better than contorting everything into feeding into one morality and calling it ‘harm’ or ‘weal’ or something else.
That story strikes me as accepting harm to have more economic activity. I was thinking more of trading off physical or emotional health for wealth-generating abilities or opportunities, or institutions which don’t invest in care and thus come off as soulless.
To me morality is an agreement that people can come to with one another. Since animals can’t come to agreements with one another, what happens between animals is amoral. It isn’t immoral when a bird kills a worm or a cat kills a rat and it doesn’t make me feel bad either. Humans could make agreements between themselves about how they want to treat other animals, but humans can’t make agreements with other animals. For this reason, I consider all interactions with animals to be outside the realm of morality, although there are certain behaviors that disgust me & that are probably indicative of mental illness & a sign that someone is probably a danger to others (eg torturing kittens).
What about the way we treat others with whom we can’t come to agreements? Is that a matter of morality? For example, consider young children. I suspect most people regard cruelty to a young child as a particular moral horror, precisely because the child cannot argue back or defend itself. Indeed, I would argue that our moral obligations are strongest to groups such as children.
To be completely honest, I agree with you but find it hard to come up for a good argument for why that should be. One way I’ve thought about it in the past is that the parents or caretakers of a child are sort of like stewards of a property that will be inherited one day. If I’m going to inherit a mansion from my grandfather on my 18th birthday, my parents can’t arbitrarily decide to burn it down when I’m 17 & 364 days old. Harming children (physically or emotionally) is damaging the person they will be when they are an adult in a similar way.
What about a mentally disabled person, or other groups of humans who will never be capable of consciously entering into a ‘moral agreement’ with society? Should they also be considered ‘outside the realm of morality’? What makes them different from an animal, other than anthropocentricism?
Yes, I consider them outside the realm of morality. If a mentally disabled person committed murder, for example, he or she could not be held morally liable for their actions—instead the parent or guardian has the moral & legal responsibility for making sure that he or she doesn’t steal, kill, etc.
So are you saying it should only be considered “wrong” to torture mentally disabled people because of agreements made between non-mentally-disabled people, and if non-mentally-disabled people made a different agreement, then it would be okay?
Say the only beings in existence are you and a mentally disabled person. Are you bound by any morality in how you treat them?
By this reasoning, if the child is 5 years old but the world is going to be hit by an asteroid tomorrow, unavoidably killing everyone, it would be okay to be cruel to the child.
To save the original idea, I’d suggest modifying it to distinguish between having impaired ability to come to agreements and not having the ability to come to agreements. Children are generally in the former category, at least if they can speak and reason. This extends to more than just children; you shouldn’t take advantage of someone who’s stupid, but you can “take advantage” of the fact that a stick of broccoli doesn’t understand what it means to be eaten and can’t run away anyway.
Right. Like I said, I find it hard to come up with a good argument. I don’t like arguments that extend things into the future, because everything has to get all probabilistic. Is it possible to prove that any particular child is going to grow into an adult? Nope.
If you found that you cared much more about your present self than your future self, you might reflect on that and decide that because those two things are broadly similar you would want to change your mind about this case. Even if those selves are not counted as such by your sentiments right now.
This article is trying to get you to undertake similar reflections about pets and humans vs. other animals.
This post is a demonstration of what social justice activists (along with scholars such as Steven Pinker and Richard Dawkins) describe as species bigotry.
I assume you similarly would have stood with white supremacists in the 1950s and 60s, as they sought to crush the hopes, dreams, and dignity of non-whites, because even if said white supremacists were violent and abusive, well, at least they were white?
If dogs & cats were raised specifically to be eaten & not involved socially in our lives as if they were members of the family, I don’t think I’d care about them any more than I care about chickens or cows.
This article seems to assume that I oppose all suffering everywhere, which I’m not sure is true. Getting caught stealing causes suffering to the thief and I don’t think there’s anything wrong with that. I care about chickens & cows significantly less than I care about thieves because thieves are at least human.
Indeed, few westerners appear to be that bothered that it is customary to eat dog meat in China.
Why don’t you care about non-humans? If other animals suffer in roughly the same way as humans, why should it matter at all what species they belong to?
In this case I think that’s justified because catching a thief leads to less suffering overall than failing to catch the thief.
Not everyone has harm (avoidance) as their primary moral value; many people would voluntarily accept harm to have more purity, autonomy, or economic efficiency, to give three examples.
If a moral theory accepted and acted upon by all moral people led to an average decrease in suffering, I’d take that as a sign that it was doing something right. For example, if no one initiated violence against anyone else (except in self defense), I have a hard time imagining how that could create more net suffering though it certainly would create more suffering for the subset of the population who previously used violence to get what they wanted.
I don’t think that very many people would except extreme harm to have these things, though. I used to think that I valued some non-experiential things very strongly, but I don’t think that I was taking seriously how strong my preference not to be tortured is. And for most people I don’t think there are peak levels of those three things that could outweigh torture.
While I definitely value autonomy (and, to a lesser extent, some sorts of purity), and would trade away some pleasure or happiness to get those things, a theory of harm could include autonomy, purity, etc., by counting lack of satisfaction of preferences for those things as harm.
I mean harm as one of the moral foundations. It seems like a five-factor model of morality fits human intuitions better than contorting everything into feeding into one morality and calling it ‘harm’ or ‘weal’ or something else.
That’s usually the result of confusion.
That story strikes me as accepting harm to have more economic activity. I was thinking more of trading off physical or emotional health for wealth-generating abilities or opportunities, or institutions which don’t invest in care and thus come off as soulless.
How does this make you care?
To me morality is an agreement that people can come to with one another. Since animals can’t come to agreements with one another, what happens between animals is amoral. It isn’t immoral when a bird kills a worm or a cat kills a rat and it doesn’t make me feel bad either. Humans could make agreements between themselves about how they want to treat other animals, but humans can’t make agreements with other animals. For this reason, I consider all interactions with animals to be outside the realm of morality, although there are certain behaviors that disgust me & that are probably indicative of mental illness & a sign that someone is probably a danger to others (eg torturing kittens).
What about the way we treat others with whom we can’t come to agreements? Is that a matter of morality? For example, consider young children. I suspect most people regard cruelty to a young child as a particular moral horror, precisely because the child cannot argue back or defend itself. Indeed, I would argue that our moral obligations are strongest to groups such as children.
To be completely honest, I agree with you but find it hard to come up for a good argument for why that should be. One way I’ve thought about it in the past is that the parents or caretakers of a child are sort of like stewards of a property that will be inherited one day. If I’m going to inherit a mansion from my grandfather on my 18th birthday, my parents can’t arbitrarily decide to burn it down when I’m 17 & 364 days old. Harming children (physically or emotionally) is damaging the person they will be when they are an adult in a similar way.
What about a mentally disabled person, or other groups of humans who will never be capable of consciously entering into a ‘moral agreement’ with society? Should they also be considered ‘outside the realm of morality’? What makes them different from an animal, other than anthropocentricism?
Yes, I consider them outside the realm of morality. If a mentally disabled person committed murder, for example, he or she could not be held morally liable for their actions—instead the parent or guardian has the moral & legal responsibility for making sure that he or she doesn’t steal, kill, etc.
So are you saying it should only be considered “wrong” to torture mentally disabled people because of agreements made between non-mentally-disabled people, and if non-mentally-disabled people made a different agreement, then it would be okay?
Say the only beings in existence are you and a mentally disabled person. Are you bound by any morality in how you treat them?
By this reasoning, if the child is 5 years old but the world is going to be hit by an asteroid tomorrow, unavoidably killing everyone, it would be okay to be cruel to the child.
To save the original idea, I’d suggest modifying it to distinguish between having impaired ability to come to agreements and not having the ability to come to agreements. Children are generally in the former category, at least if they can speak and reason. This extends to more than just children; you shouldn’t take advantage of someone who’s stupid, but you can “take advantage” of the fact that a stick of broccoli doesn’t understand what it means to be eaten and can’t run away anyway.
Right. Like I said, I find it hard to come up with a good argument. I don’t like arguments that extend things into the future, because everything has to get all probabilistic. Is it possible to prove that any particular child is going to grow into an adult? Nope.
But if we’re 99.9% confident that a child is going to die (say, they have a very terminal disease), is being cruel to the child 99.99% less bad?
No.
(If this is making some clever rhetorical point then perhaps consider a quotation? Right now it is just a rather easy question.)
Thanks for the answer, I think I formulated my original question incorrectly: why do you care about human suffering?
Don’t know. I imagine any answer I could produce would be a rationalization.
If you found that you cared much more about your present self than your future self, you might reflect on that and decide that because those two things are broadly similar you would want to change your mind about this case. Even if those selves are not counted as such by your sentiments right now.
This article is trying to get you to undertake similar reflections about pets and humans vs. other animals.
This post is a demonstration of what social justice activists (along with scholars such as Steven Pinker and Richard Dawkins) describe as species bigotry.
I assume you similarly would have stood with white supremacists in the 1950s and 60s, as they sought to crush the hopes, dreams, and dignity of non-whites, because even if said white supremacists were violent and abusive, well, at least they were white?