Yes, I know about it. In fact, it is originally purposed by Prof. Radford Neal from university of Toronto. And he is replying right below you. :)
No, it is very different from my view. In my opinion, FNC is similar to SIA and SSA. It still assumes a particular sampling procedure and considers indexical (like “I” or “now”) as the outcome of this sampling process. Though FNC is more subtle as it does not explicitly state anything in the like of “consider oneself as randomly selected from such and such”. Nonetheless, it performs probability calculations as if someone with all the specific experience of “me” (first person) is being sampled and successfully found among existing observers.
My opinion is indexicals cannot be regarded as a sampling outcome and they cannot be removed from anthropic problems. They should be treated as concepts inherently understood. e.g. I don’t need anything to differentiate myself from all people. I just inherently know who “I” is. Anthropic problems are set up using indexicals as such. They should be solved as such.
There is something lost in the discussion of the octopus example between me and Prof Neal. What I meant is that if a theory suggests there are many intelligent octopuses whose subjective experience is human-like. (maybe like matrix-style octopus-in-a-vets experiment). i.e. the octopus thinks they have are biped humans, even though they are physically not. Then no matter how crazy that sounds, as long as the theory greatly inflates the total number of observers with human-like experience, SIA will endorse it with a high degree of confidence. FNC does so too.
There is a theory called “full non-indexical conditioning”.
Do you know about it? Is it close to your view? I am not yet very good in it, but I saw some papers on arXiv.
Yes, I know about it. In fact, it is originally purposed by Prof. Radford Neal from university of Toronto. And he is replying right below you. :)
No, it is very different from my view. In my opinion, FNC is similar to SIA and SSA. It still assumes a particular sampling procedure and considers indexical (like “I” or “now”) as the outcome of this sampling process. Though FNC is more subtle as it does not explicitly state anything in the like of “consider oneself as randomly selected from such and such”. Nonetheless, it performs probability calculations as if someone with all the specific experience of “me” (first person) is being sampled and successfully found among existing observers.
My opinion is indexicals cannot be regarded as a sampling outcome and they cannot be removed from anthropic problems. They should be treated as concepts inherently understood. e.g. I don’t need anything to differentiate myself from all people. I just inherently know who “I” is. Anthropic problems are set up using indexicals as such. They should be solved as such.
The octopus example helped me to grok the FNC, but I still don’t have a clear example which will help me to better understand your point of view.
There is something lost in the discussion of the octopus example between me and Prof Neal. What I meant is that if a theory suggests there are many intelligent octopuses whose subjective experience is human-like. (maybe like matrix-style octopus-in-a-vets experiment). i.e. the octopus thinks they have are biped humans, even though they are physically not. Then no matter how crazy that sounds, as long as the theory greatly inflates the total number of observers with human-like experience, SIA will endorse it with a high degree of confidence. FNC does so too.
For my position, see this post for a start.
Thanks for the link.