There is something lost in the discussion of the octopus example between me and Prof Neal. What I meant is that if a theory suggests there are many intelligent octopuses whose subjective experience is human-like. (maybe like matrix-style octopus-in-a-vets experiment). i.e. the octopus thinks they have are biped humans, even though they are physically not. Then no matter how crazy that sounds, as long as the theory greatly inflates the total number of observers with human-like experience, SIA will endorse it with a high degree of confidence. FNC does so too.
The octopus example helped me to grok the FNC, but I still don’t have a clear example which will help me to better understand your point of view.
There is something lost in the discussion of the octopus example between me and Prof Neal. What I meant is that if a theory suggests there are many intelligent octopuses whose subjective experience is human-like. (maybe like matrix-style octopus-in-a-vets experiment). i.e. the octopus thinks they have are biped humans, even though they are physically not. Then no matter how crazy that sounds, as long as the theory greatly inflates the total number of observers with human-like experience, SIA will endorse it with a high degree of confidence. FNC does so too.
For my position, see this post for a start.
Thanks for the link.