Doesn’t this deny the existence of rape within marriage? Isn’t it, in fact, the exact argument that was used to oppose laws prohibiting rape within marriage?
Yes, and do you have an reason why this is in fact not a valid conclusion? Or this is an appeal to what the law happens to say today?
I, personally, find this situation morally repugnant. Psychological unity of mankind leads me to hope Alicorn does too. What more justification could you ask?
However, even though signing a contract does not seem to remove the harm of rape, I of course cannot rule out the possibility that I am picturing the situation incorrectly, or that that the benefits would not outweigh the rape. (Yes, Alicorn has stated that they care about harms outside their framework of rights.)
Alicorn, on the other hand, likely already holds the standard opinion on rape (it is bad), and thus would find a certain inconsistency in endorsing a position that was OK with it. So in that sense, yes, the law today is valid evidence that this might be an issue, if one looks at the causal change that led up to it changing.
I, personally, find this situation morally repugnant. Psychological unity of mankind leads me to hope Alicorn does too. What more justification could you ask?
Well, the fact that these laws were only passed very recently suggests that it is you who is out of step with the psychological unity.
So in that sense, yes, the law today is valid evidence that this might be an issue, if one looks at the causal change that led up to it changing.
The context appears to be a moral panic about rape that among other things argues for despising with due process for accused rapists, and that if two drunk people have sex and regret it later this means the man raped the woman. So no, the law today is not in fact valid evidence.
Well, the fact that these laws were only passed very recently suggests that it is you who is out of step with the psychological unity.
I was relying on the framing; obviously I wouldn’t expect people to respond the same way in literally any context. (You’re right, I didn’t make that clear.)
The context appears to be a moral panic about rape that among other things argues for despising with due process for accused rapists, and that if two drunk people have sex and regret it later this means the man raped the woman. So no, the law today is not in fact valid evidence.
Hmm. It is true that rapists are demonized, and this is sometimes extended past edge cases—but obviously, you are yourself relying on the fact that this is obvious nonsense to most people for your rhetorical point.
This seems more akin to similar affects that spring up around other major crimes—not that that makes it rational, of course, or implies that the laws genuinely have greater expected utility than their inverse.
I have no idea how to interpret this even semi-charitably. To me this translates to “I was relying on dark arts”.
It is true that rapists are demonized, and this is sometimes extended past edge cases—but obviously, you are yourself relying on the fact that this is obvious nonsense to most people for your rhetorical point.
I was relying/hoping that you weren’t sufficiently caught up in the panic to no longer recognize this as obvious nonsense. My point that relying on laws that have only been passed in the previous decade, especially given that there’s a moral panic involved, to be highly dubious.
This seems more akin to similar affects that spring up around other major crimes
Yes, similar effects have sprung up around other major crimes in the past. However, I believe that rapists is the moral panic du jour.
I have no idea how to interpret this even semi-charitably.
It’s less likely that someone will ignore facts that have been recently brought to their attention. You’re right, I wasn’t quite sure what word to use there, I may have screwed up.
you are yourself relying on the fact that this is obvious nonsense to most people for your rhetorical point.
I was relying/hoping that you weren’t sufficiently caught up in the panic to no longer recognize this as obvious nonsense.
With respect, have you ever said that to someone and had them respond “Well yeah, sure! Of course women can retroactively make anyone they’ve ever had sex with a rapist.”
I’m sure you’ve seen people endorse equivalent conclusions via deceptive wording, but the general response I would predict from all but a very small core would be “we don’t believe that!”
This seems more akin to similar affects that spring up around other major crimes
Yes, similar effects have sprung up around other major crimes in the past. However, I believe that rapists is the moral panic du jour.
Hmm, perhaps. I would have gone for pedophiles myself (a term already spreading to include all creepily large age gaps, by the way), but this isn’t really a contest.
Psychological what of what? You mean “current societal norms based on a multitude of shifting cultural and biological determinants, subject to change”?
The belief is not universal. The ability to empathise with rape victims is (well, actually, we define our terms so as to exclude psychopaths and the like.) Also, yes, I share certain cultural assumptions and conventions, so I have reason to think Alicorn may respond the same way.
My model predicted Alicorn would react to this specific question about that belief, after living her sort of life, with a reluctance or outright refusal to bite the bullet and endorse rape. Not that every human ever would unilaterally endorse my particular belief about rape.
[Kawoomba—you have no way of knowing this—strenuously objects to my model of human nature, since it predicts human CEV coheres rather well, whereas they believe that ethics are (and should be?) entirely relative and largely determined by one’s circumstances. They like to jump on anything I say that even vaguely implies human morality is somehow universal. There are some quite comprehensive discussions of this point scattered throughout LessWrong.]
My model predicted Alicorn would react to this specific question about that belief, after living her sort of life, with a reluctance or outright refusal to bite the bullet and endorse rape.
Whether the activity in question constitutes “rape” is precisely the question under discussion.
Actually, I don’t doubt that there are many characteristics that apply to a vast majority of humans, thanks e.g. to mirror neurons et al. As such, basing predictions on such common factors is quite valid. For example, predicting that someone who doesn’t eat for extended periods will experience a state called “being hungry”, and will show certain behavioral characteristics associated with that state.
I just dislike the term because it’s typically used not as a descriptor (“many humans show a propensity for X”, in the example: “if you don’t eat for a period of time, you will probably act in accordance to “being hungry”) but (invalidly) as prescriptive (“if you don’t eat for a period of time, you should act in accordance to “being hungry”). Getting an “ought” from an “is”, and all that.
I can predict with reasonably confidence that all participants in the current discussion are currently wearing clothes. Based on the “garmental unity of mankind”. Doesn’t mean they should.
If PUoM means there are shared desires, then the only way you could fail to get the “ought” from the “is”, is by denying that “oughts” have anything to do with desires, surely,
For one, if there are supposedly universally shared desires among a group of agents, and yet you find one agent among them who doesn’t share those, you’ve found a contradiction—those universally shared desires weren’t universally shared, after all.
For two, describing that a majority (or even a supermajority, or a super-duper-overwhelming majority) shares certain desires would be a description, not some majority-tyrannical edict for the outliers to conform to. For example: Stating that a majority of humans share heterosexual desires doesn’t mean that those who don’t somehow should, as well (just to go with the obvious applause-light example which is applicable in this case, it’s easy to come up with arbitrarily many other examples).
Facts about desires coinjoined with with an intuitively appealing Maxim, such as “everyone ought to maximize the satisfaction of everyone’s” desires” can imply oughts.
Yes, and do you have an reason why this is in fact not a valid conclusion? Or this is an appeal to what the law happens to say today?
I, personally, find this situation morally repugnant. Psychological unity of mankind leads me to hope Alicorn does too. What more justification could you ask?
However, even though signing a contract does not seem to remove the harm of rape, I of course cannot rule out the possibility that I am picturing the situation incorrectly, or that that the benefits would not outweigh the rape. (Yes, Alicorn has stated that they care about harms outside their framework of rights.)
Alicorn, on the other hand, likely already holds the standard opinion on rape (it is bad), and thus would find a certain inconsistency in endorsing a position that was OK with it. So in that sense, yes, the law today is valid evidence that this might be an issue, if one looks at the causal change that led up to it changing.
Well, the fact that these laws were only passed very recently suggests that it is you who is out of step with the psychological unity.
The context appears to be a moral panic about rape that among other things argues for despising with due process for accused rapists, and that if two drunk people have sex and regret it later this means the man raped the woman. So no, the law today is not in fact valid evidence.
I was relying on the framing; obviously I wouldn’t expect people to respond the same way in literally any context. (You’re right, I didn’t make that clear.)
Hmm. It is true that rapists are demonized, and this is sometimes extended past edge cases—but obviously, you are yourself relying on the fact that this is obvious nonsense to most people for your rhetorical point.
This seems more akin to similar affects that spring up around other major crimes—not that that makes it rational, of course, or implies that the laws genuinely have greater expected utility than their inverse.
I have no idea how to interpret this even semi-charitably. To me this translates to “I was relying on dark arts”.
I was relying/hoping that you weren’t sufficiently caught up in the panic to no longer recognize this as obvious nonsense. My point that relying on laws that have only been passed in the previous decade, especially given that there’s a moral panic involved, to be highly dubious.
Yes, similar effects have sprung up around other major crimes in the past. However, I believe that rapists is the moral panic du jour.
It’s less likely that someone will ignore facts that have been recently brought to their attention. You’re right, I wasn’t quite sure what word to use there, I may have screwed up.
With respect, have you ever said that to someone and had them respond “Well yeah, sure! Of course women can retroactively make anyone they’ve ever had sex with a rapist.”
I’m sure you’ve seen people endorse equivalent conclusions via deceptive wording, but the general response I would predict from all but a very small core would be “we don’t believe that!”
Hmm, perhaps. I would have gone for pedophiles myself (a term already spreading to include all creepily large age gaps, by the way), but this isn’t really a contest.
Psychological what of what? You mean “current societal norms based on a multitude of shifting cultural and biological determinants, subject to change”?
No, I don’t, as you’re well aware from our many, many lengthy discussions on the point.
I’ll note that my prediction in this case was correct, no?
Alicorn is part of the same WEIRD cultrue you are, so I don’t see how this is evidence that the belief is universal.
The belief is not universal. The ability to empathise with rape victims is (well, actually, we define our terms so as to exclude psychopaths and the like.) Also, yes, I share certain cultural assumptions and conventions, so I have reason to think Alicorn may respond the same way.
My model predicted Alicorn would react to this specific question about that belief, after living her sort of life, with a reluctance or outright refusal to bite the bullet and endorse rape. Not that every human ever would unilaterally endorse my particular belief about rape.
[Kawoomba—you have no way of knowing this—strenuously objects to my model of human nature, since it predicts human CEV coheres rather well, whereas they believe that ethics are (and should be?) entirely relative and largely determined by one’s circumstances. They like to jump on anything I say that even vaguely implies human morality is somehow universal. There are some quite comprehensive discussions of this point scattered throughout LessWrong.]
Whether the activity in question constitutes “rape” is precisely the question under discussion.
Actually, I don’t doubt that there are many characteristics that apply to a vast majority of humans, thanks e.g. to mirror neurons et al. As such, basing predictions on such common factors is quite valid. For example, predicting that someone who doesn’t eat for extended periods will experience a state called “being hungry”, and will show certain behavioral characteristics associated with that state.
I just dislike the term because it’s typically used not as a descriptor (“many humans show a propensity for X”, in the example: “if you don’t eat for a period of time, you will probably act in accordance to “being hungry”) but (invalidly) as prescriptive (“if you don’t eat for a period of time, you should act in accordance to “being hungry”). Getting an “ought” from an “is”, and all that.
I can predict with reasonably confidence that all participants in the current discussion are currently wearing clothes. Based on the “garmental unity of mankind”. Doesn’t mean they should.
If PUoM means there are shared desires, then the only way you could fail to get the “ought” from the “is”, is by denying that “oughts” have anything to do with desires, surely,
For one, if there are supposedly universally shared desires among a group of agents, and yet you find one agent among them who doesn’t share those, you’ve found a contradiction—those universally shared desires weren’t universally shared, after all.
For two, describing that a majority (or even a supermajority, or a super-duper-overwhelming majority) shares certain desires would be a description, not some majority-tyrannical edict for the outliers to conform to. For example: Stating that a majority of humans share heterosexual desires doesn’t mean that those who don’t somehow should, as well (just to go with the obvious applause-light example which is applicable in this case, it’s easy to come up with arbitrarily many other examples).
And don’t call me Shirley.
Facts about desires coinjoined with with an intuitively appealing Maxim, such as “everyone ought to maximize the satisfaction of everyone’s” desires” can imply oughts.
What is this “intuitively appealing” justification, and why would it be binding for those it doesn’t “intuitively appeal” to? It’s not my intuition.