Psychological what of what? You mean “current societal norms based on a multitude of shifting cultural and biological determinants, subject to change”?
The belief is not universal. The ability to empathise with rape victims is (well, actually, we define our terms so as to exclude psychopaths and the like.) Also, yes, I share certain cultural assumptions and conventions, so I have reason to think Alicorn may respond the same way.
My model predicted Alicorn would react to this specific question about that belief, after living her sort of life, with a reluctance or outright refusal to bite the bullet and endorse rape. Not that every human ever would unilaterally endorse my particular belief about rape.
[Kawoomba—you have no way of knowing this—strenuously objects to my model of human nature, since it predicts human CEV coheres rather well, whereas they believe that ethics are (and should be?) entirely relative and largely determined by one’s circumstances. They like to jump on anything I say that even vaguely implies human morality is somehow universal. There are some quite comprehensive discussions of this point scattered throughout LessWrong.]
My model predicted Alicorn would react to this specific question about that belief, after living her sort of life, with a reluctance or outright refusal to bite the bullet and endorse rape.
Whether the activity in question constitutes “rape” is precisely the question under discussion.
Actually, I don’t doubt that there are many characteristics that apply to a vast majority of humans, thanks e.g. to mirror neurons et al. As such, basing predictions on such common factors is quite valid. For example, predicting that someone who doesn’t eat for extended periods will experience a state called “being hungry”, and will show certain behavioral characteristics associated with that state.
I just dislike the term because it’s typically used not as a descriptor (“many humans show a propensity for X”, in the example: “if you don’t eat for a period of time, you will probably act in accordance to “being hungry”) but (invalidly) as prescriptive (“if you don’t eat for a period of time, you should act in accordance to “being hungry”). Getting an “ought” from an “is”, and all that.
I can predict with reasonably confidence that all participants in the current discussion are currently wearing clothes. Based on the “garmental unity of mankind”. Doesn’t mean they should.
If PUoM means there are shared desires, then the only way you could fail to get the “ought” from the “is”, is by denying that “oughts” have anything to do with desires, surely,
For one, if there are supposedly universally shared desires among a group of agents, and yet you find one agent among them who doesn’t share those, you’ve found a contradiction—those universally shared desires weren’t universally shared, after all.
For two, describing that a majority (or even a supermajority, or a super-duper-overwhelming majority) shares certain desires would be a description, not some majority-tyrannical edict for the outliers to conform to. For example: Stating that a majority of humans share heterosexual desires doesn’t mean that those who don’t somehow should, as well (just to go with the obvious applause-light example which is applicable in this case, it’s easy to come up with arbitrarily many other examples).
Facts about desires coinjoined with with an intuitively appealing Maxim, such as “everyone ought to maximize the satisfaction of everyone’s” desires” can imply oughts.
Psychological what of what? You mean “current societal norms based on a multitude of shifting cultural and biological determinants, subject to change”?
No, I don’t, as you’re well aware from our many, many lengthy discussions on the point.
I’ll note that my prediction in this case was correct, no?
Alicorn is part of the same WEIRD cultrue you are, so I don’t see how this is evidence that the belief is universal.
The belief is not universal. The ability to empathise with rape victims is (well, actually, we define our terms so as to exclude psychopaths and the like.) Also, yes, I share certain cultural assumptions and conventions, so I have reason to think Alicorn may respond the same way.
My model predicted Alicorn would react to this specific question about that belief, after living her sort of life, with a reluctance or outright refusal to bite the bullet and endorse rape. Not that every human ever would unilaterally endorse my particular belief about rape.
[Kawoomba—you have no way of knowing this—strenuously objects to my model of human nature, since it predicts human CEV coheres rather well, whereas they believe that ethics are (and should be?) entirely relative and largely determined by one’s circumstances. They like to jump on anything I say that even vaguely implies human morality is somehow universal. There are some quite comprehensive discussions of this point scattered throughout LessWrong.]
Whether the activity in question constitutes “rape” is precisely the question under discussion.
Actually, I don’t doubt that there are many characteristics that apply to a vast majority of humans, thanks e.g. to mirror neurons et al. As such, basing predictions on such common factors is quite valid. For example, predicting that someone who doesn’t eat for extended periods will experience a state called “being hungry”, and will show certain behavioral characteristics associated with that state.
I just dislike the term because it’s typically used not as a descriptor (“many humans show a propensity for X”, in the example: “if you don’t eat for a period of time, you will probably act in accordance to “being hungry”) but (invalidly) as prescriptive (“if you don’t eat for a period of time, you should act in accordance to “being hungry”). Getting an “ought” from an “is”, and all that.
I can predict with reasonably confidence that all participants in the current discussion are currently wearing clothes. Based on the “garmental unity of mankind”. Doesn’t mean they should.
If PUoM means there are shared desires, then the only way you could fail to get the “ought” from the “is”, is by denying that “oughts” have anything to do with desires, surely,
For one, if there are supposedly universally shared desires among a group of agents, and yet you find one agent among them who doesn’t share those, you’ve found a contradiction—those universally shared desires weren’t universally shared, after all.
For two, describing that a majority (or even a supermajority, or a super-duper-overwhelming majority) shares certain desires would be a description, not some majority-tyrannical edict for the outliers to conform to. For example: Stating that a majority of humans share heterosexual desires doesn’t mean that those who don’t somehow should, as well (just to go with the obvious applause-light example which is applicable in this case, it’s easy to come up with arbitrarily many other examples).
And don’t call me Shirley.
Facts about desires coinjoined with with an intuitively appealing Maxim, such as “everyone ought to maximize the satisfaction of everyone’s” desires” can imply oughts.
What is this “intuitively appealing” justification, and why would it be binding for those it doesn’t “intuitively appeal” to? It’s not my intuition.