That’s a statement of faith, not a statement of fact. Love is a subjective experience, and subjective experience is not “captured” by any physics that we know about. We may be able to say something about how hormonal and other physiological variables are correlated with changes in affect, but are you able to give me a naturalistic, non-behavioristic account of what affect is?
Let’s taboo physics: it can mean ‘the set of laws on which the universe runs’ (henceforth physical laws), or ‘the academic discipline studying those laws’ (physical science). Is love captured by physics? It is captured by physical laws (i.e. a logically omniscient being could derive a description of love from them¹), but not by physical science (i.e. not all physicists are much better at getting laid than a typical layman).
Caveats about needing both differential equations and boundary conditions (the equations of the SM and of GR as known today don’t even predict an arrow of time, without the boundary condition of very low entropy in the past), which could be moot given some as-yet-unknown law (Hawking and Penrose sometimes think about such things).
Is love captured by physics? It is captured by physical laws (i.e. a logically omniscient being could derive a description of love from them)
This is still the same “statement of faith” that I criticized at greater length, later in the thread. Love is an experience, and you will not even find a description (to say nothing of an explanation) of an experience, in any sort of physics that we know about, nor in any other discourse that can be reduced to that sort of physics. Our mathematical physics describes what the shadows on the wall of Plato’s cave are doing, but it says nothing about what anything is. The nature of experience is a problem of the latter kind, which is one reason why explanations of it in terms of matter, number, and computation are hollow. Then there is the more specific problem that the atomized ontology of physics is an ill-suited place in which to find complex unities like conscious states, which is why I say there will need to be new formal developments in physics, and new physical discoveries in neurobiology, before even a revised physicalism has any chance of explaining us.
Love is an experience, and you will not even find a description (to say nothing of an explanation) of an experience, in any sort of physics that we know about, nor in any other discourse that can be reduced to that sort of physics.
If you simulate the standard model of particle physics with appropriate initial conditions, your simulation will include four-limbed beings who will be happy to describe the experience of love to you at great length. (It’s true that no one will be able to verify this claim any time soon, but there’s every reason to believe it, because the laws underlying the physics of everyday life are completely understood). Doesn’t this mean that physics contains a description of the experience of love?
Are you singling out “love” for any specific reason or are you using it as a general example of all human emotions (e.g. fear, trust, jealousy, feeling of knowing, hate, happiness, etc.)?
It means that something is being asserted as true, when it is not known to be true.
ETA Well, it does mean a little more than that. It means that the basis of the assertion is coming from faith in a comprehensive belief system, rather than from any scrutiny of relevant facts; in this case the belief system is “everything reduces to physics”, with no indication that “physics” meant anything other than “physics as it is presently formulated and conceived”.
If I were to use the sequences as my guide, then on this site, the default approach for explaining all forms of experience should be “that’s how it feels to be physical system X”. So the facts about reality are 1) a lot of strictly physical facts, and 2) “what-it’s-like-to-be-an-X” facts. In the first class of facts, I include complex physical facts that can be obtained from the elementary physical facts, like facts about temperature, which are really facts about average energies of large ensembles of particles. Occasionally it’s said that the “feeling” facts are of this type—complex but strictly physical facts—but then that was the point of my question: I was daring the reader to make such a claim and to be specific about how it works. I was careful to stipulate that the explanation should be non-behavioristic; thus iDante’s later comment, about replicative behaviors, doesn’t qualify, and indeed iDante takes care to add that the property described may not actually be the same thing as love, even if it has something to do with the functional consequences and adaptive role of love. Descriptions in terms of function, adaptive value, or physical composition do not say anything about “experience” or “how it feels”, and I think people generally recognize this.
So occasionally it’s said that there are no feeling facts; for example, that seems to be the point of Stephen Diamond’s recent post. That post was strongly downvoted, so I guess people don’t like that option either. But they also aren’t willing to be psychophysical property dualists, and say that there are physical facts, and there are psychological facts, and that the latter are distinct from the former but nonetheless correlated with them.
So we are left with the schizophrenic situation in which people assert their faith in materialism, but also admit the obvious fact that experiences do exist. I’ve made my pitch for a new nondualistic ontology, but that wasn’t very well-received either, and I concede that it’s not easy to understand. Eventually I’ll produce a proper exposition. Meanwhile, I can at least point out the problem, because it’s not going away.
The current setup discourages explanations of downvoting, as it makes the downvoter vulnerable to losing karma. It’s not going to change, so just live with it.
The current setup discourages explanations of downvoting, as it makes the downvoter vulnerable to losing karma.
I don’t think so. It’s the very implication that downvoting requires explanation that’s discouraged, since its presence would increase the cost of downvoting. If there is a social norm of explaining your downvotes, or of explaining them when asked to, then downvoting carries an obligation to also write an explaining comment (perhaps on request), which some downvoters won’t be willing to spend effort on (or get involved in), and wouldn’t downvote as a result. But they want to be able to signal disapproval cheaply, hence the comments that appeal to (and so strengthen if approved) the hypothetical social norm of requiring an explanation would also be downvoted.
That’s a statement of faith, not a statement of fact. Love is a subjective experience, and subjective experience is not “captured” by any physics that we know about. We may be able to say something about how hormonal and other physiological variables are correlated with changes in affect, but are you able to give me a naturalistic, non-behavioristic account of what affect is?
Let’s taboo physics: it can mean ‘the set of laws on which the universe runs’ (henceforth physical laws), or ‘the academic discipline studying those laws’ (physical science). Is love captured by physics? It is captured by physical laws (i.e. a logically omniscient being could derive a description of love from them¹), but not by physical science (i.e. not all physicists are much better at getting laid than a typical layman).
Caveats about needing both differential equations and boundary conditions (the equations of the SM and of GR as known today don’t even predict an arrow of time, without the boundary condition of very low entropy in the past), which could be moot given some as-yet-unknown law (Hawking and Penrose sometimes think about such things).
This is still the same “statement of faith” that I criticized at greater length, later in the thread. Love is an experience, and you will not even find a description (to say nothing of an explanation) of an experience, in any sort of physics that we know about, nor in any other discourse that can be reduced to that sort of physics. Our mathematical physics describes what the shadows on the wall of Plato’s cave are doing, but it says nothing about what anything is. The nature of experience is a problem of the latter kind, which is one reason why explanations of it in terms of matter, number, and computation are hollow. Then there is the more specific problem that the atomized ontology of physics is an ill-suited place in which to find complex unities like conscious states, which is why I say there will need to be new formal developments in physics, and new physical discoveries in neurobiology, before even a revised physicalism has any chance of explaining us.
If you simulate the standard model of particle physics with appropriate initial conditions, your simulation will include four-limbed beings who will be happy to describe the experience of love to you at great length. (It’s true that no one will be able to verify this claim any time soon, but there’s every reason to believe it, because the laws underlying the physics of everyday life are completely understood). Doesn’t this mean that physics contains a description of the experience of love?
Are you singling out “love” for any specific reason or are you using it as a general example of all human emotions (e.g. fear, trust, jealousy, feeling of knowing, hate, happiness, etc.)?
Using it as a general example.
I said
and I guess the answer is no, since none of the 5+ downvoters has bothered to do so.
ETA: Let me emphasize that I’m talking about this word, I’m not misspelling “effect”.
I would downvote just about any comment that used the below claim as if it meant something:
It means that something is being asserted as true, when it is not known to be true.
ETA Well, it does mean a little more than that. It means that the basis of the assertion is coming from faith in a comprehensive belief system, rather than from any scrutiny of relevant facts; in this case the belief system is “everything reduces to physics”, with no indication that “physics” meant anything other than “physics as it is presently formulated and conceived”.
If I were to use the sequences as my guide, then on this site, the default approach for explaining all forms of experience should be “that’s how it feels to be physical system X”. So the facts about reality are 1) a lot of strictly physical facts, and 2) “what-it’s-like-to-be-an-X” facts. In the first class of facts, I include complex physical facts that can be obtained from the elementary physical facts, like facts about temperature, which are really facts about average energies of large ensembles of particles. Occasionally it’s said that the “feeling” facts are of this type—complex but strictly physical facts—but then that was the point of my question: I was daring the reader to make such a claim and to be specific about how it works. I was careful to stipulate that the explanation should be non-behavioristic; thus iDante’s later comment, about replicative behaviors, doesn’t qualify, and indeed iDante takes care to add that the property described may not actually be the same thing as love, even if it has something to do with the functional consequences and adaptive role of love. Descriptions in terms of function, adaptive value, or physical composition do not say anything about “experience” or “how it feels”, and I think people generally recognize this.
So occasionally it’s said that there are no feeling facts; for example, that seems to be the point of Stephen Diamond’s recent post. That post was strongly downvoted, so I guess people don’t like that option either. But they also aren’t willing to be psychophysical property dualists, and say that there are physical facts, and there are psychological facts, and that the latter are distinct from the former but nonetheless correlated with them.
So we are left with the schizophrenic situation in which people assert their faith in materialism, but also admit the obvious fact that experiences do exist. I’ve made my pitch for a new nondualistic ontology, but that wasn’t very well-received either, and I concede that it’s not easy to understand. Eventually I’ll produce a proper exposition. Meanwhile, I can at least point out the problem, because it’s not going away.
The current setup discourages explanations of downvoting, as it makes the downvoter vulnerable to losing karma. It’s not going to change, so just live with it.
I don’t think so. It’s the very implication that downvoting requires explanation that’s discouraged, since its presence would increase the cost of downvoting. If there is a social norm of explaining your downvotes, or of explaining them when asked to, then downvoting carries an obligation to also write an explaining comment (perhaps on request), which some downvoters won’t be willing to spend effort on (or get involved in), and wouldn’t downvote as a result. But they want to be able to signal disapproval cheaply, hence the comments that appeal to (and so strengthen if approved) the hypothetical social norm of requiring an explanation would also be downvoted.
Or gaining it.