Einstein is not saying that humans are necessarily moral, but rather that they ought to be moral.
Furthermore, it is arguable that nuclear weapons are not necessarily immoral in and of themselves. Like any tool or weapon, they can be used for moral and immoral ends. For instance, nuclear weapons may well be one of the most effective means of destroying Earth-directed masses such as Existential Risk threatening asteroids. They may also be extremely effective for deterring conventional warfare between major powers.
The only previous actual use of nuclear weapons against human targets was for the ends of ending a world war, and it did so rather successfully. That we have chosen not to use nuclear weapons irresponsibly may well suggest that those with the power to wield nuclear weapons have in fact been more morally responsible than we give them credit.
suggest that those with the power to wield nuclear weapons have in fact been more morally responsible than we give them credit.
Perhaps. Alternatively, when faced with a similarly-armed opponent, even our habitually bloody rulers can be detered by the prospect of being personally burned to death with nuclear fire.
I’ve always wondered why, on discovering nuclear weapons, the leaders of America didn’t continually pour a huge budget into it—stockpile a sufficient number of them and then destroy all their potential peers.
I can’t think of any explanation bar the morality in their culture. They could certainly have secured sufficient material for the task.
Doesn’t help me much. The purpose of weapons—all weapons—is to kill. What exactly is the moral difference between a nuclear bomb and a conventional bomb?
More exactly, the purpose of a weapon is to use pain to change behavior—which matches a general definition of “punishment.” Sometimes the mere threat of pain suffices to change behavior. In cases of mutual deterrence (or less drastic, like everyday border patrols) that’s the point: to make you behave differently from what you would otherwise, by appealing merely to your expectation of pain.
More exactly, the purpose of a weapon is to use pain to change behavior
No, I don’t think so. But to avoid the distraction of trying to define “weapons”, let me assert that we are talking about military weapons—instruments devised and used with the express purpose of killing other humans. The issue is whether nuclear weapons have any special moral status, so we’re not really concerned with tear gas and tasers.
Why are nuclear weapons morally different from conventional bombs or machine guns or cannons?
Why are nuclear weapons morally different from conventional bombs or machine guns or cannons?
Strategic nuclear weapons—the original and most widespread nuclear weapons—cannot be used with restraint. They have huge a blast radius and they kill everyone in it indiscriminately.
The one time they were used demonstrated this well. They are the most effective and efficient way, not merely to defeat an enemy army (which has bunkers, widely dispersed units, and retaliation capabilities), but to kill the entire civilian population of an enemy city.
To kill all the inhabitants of an enemy city, usually by one or another type of bombardment, was a goal pursued by all sides in both world wars. Nuclear weapons made it much easier, cheaper, and harder to defend against.
Tactical nuclear weapons are probably different; they haven’t seen (much? any?) use in real wars to be certain.
Strategic nuclear weapons—the original and most widespread nuclear weapons—cannot be used with restraint.
They can. One of the problems that America had, going into the 80s, was that its ICBM force was becoming vulnerable to a potential surprise attack by the CCCP. This concerned them because only the ICBM force, at the time, had the sort of accuracy necessary for taking out hardened targets in a limited strike—like their opponent’s strategic forces. And they were understandably reluctant to rely on systems that could only be used for city busting—i.e. the submarine force.
If you’re interested in this, I suggest the—contemporary with that problem—documentary First Strike.
Strategic nuclear weapons—the original and most widespread nuclear weapons—cannot be used with restraint. They have huge a blast radius and they kill everyone in it indiscriminately.
What do you mean by “restraint”?
For example, the nuclear bombing of Nagasaki killed around 70,000 people. The fire-bombing of Tokyo in March of 1945 (a single bombing raid) killed about 100,000 people.
In addition to nshepperd’s point, there’s the fact that sending a bomber fleet to destroy an enemy city is very expensive—the costs of planes, fuel, and bombs add up quickly, not to mention pilots’ lives. And if the defenders can destroy 50% of the planes before they drop their bombs, the bombing campaign becomes 50% less effective.
Whereas a strategic nuclear warhead only requires one plane to deliver it (or one ICBM). Much cheaper, much less risky, and much more stealthy. If you build a small fleet of nuclear bombers (or, again, a small stable of ICBMs), you can theoretically destroy all of the enemy’s cities in one night.
If the atom bomb had by chance been developed a few years earlier, when the US still faced serious opposition in Europe, then quite probably they would have used it to wipe out all the major German and German-held cities.
Not Paris, of course, which had a lot of diplomatic and sentimental value and little industrial value. I meant cities of high industrial value in occupied Czechoslovakia, Austria, Poland, and other countries the West didn’t care as much about.
It’s one thing to create a weapon that can be used to kill O(100,000) people at once (though, it’s not really “at once” if you do it by dropping N bombs consecutively). It’s another thing to create a weapon that can only be used to kill O(100,000) people at once.
Or something. Of course, if inventing nukes is evidence humans aren’t very moral, the fact that people chose to kill a hundred thousand people in Tokyo with conventional weapons is a different kind of evidence for humans being not very moral.
It’s another thing to create a weapon that can only be used to kill O(100,000) people at once.
Clearly a nuke is not that.
evidence for humans being not very moral
Given that both humans and moralities are quite diverse, I don’t see any information content in the phrase “humans are not very moral”. It’s just trivially true and pretty meaningless.
Given that both humans and moralities are quite diverse, I don’t see any information content in the phrase “humans are not very moral”. It’s just trivially true and pretty meaningless.
I agree, and besides I’m not a moral realist. I was originally responding to people in this thread who discussed whether humans could be described as moral.
If the bombing of Nagasaki contributed more to the end of the war than the bombing of Tokyo, then we could easily say it was morally superior. That is not to say there weren’t better options of course.
We can debate endlessly the wisdom of bombing Hiroshima, but does anybody have a defence for bombing Nagasaki? Since this is the quotation thread, I’ll quote Dave Barry:
It was Truman who made the difficult decision to drop the first atomic bomb on the Japanese city of Hiroshima, the rationale being that only such a devastating, horrendous display of destructive power would convince Japan that it had to surrender. Truman also made the decision to drop the second atomic bomb on Nagasaki, the rationale being, hey, we had another bomb.
I’m seriously curious. (Reasonably rational arguments, of course.)
I read that, amongst other WP articles, while researching my comment. That one doesn’t even attempt to explain the reasons for dropping the second bomb. (The quotation from the comedian is not meant to be an argument either.)
At first, some refused to believe the United States had built an atomic bomb. The Japanese Army and Navy had their own independent atomic-bomb programs and therefore the Japanese understood enough to know how very difficult building it would be.[74] Admiral Soemu Toyoda, the Chief of the Naval General Staff, argued that even if the United States had made one, they could not have many more.[75] American strategists, having anticipated a reaction like Toyoda’s, planned to drop a second bomb shortly after the first, to convince the Japanese that the U.S. had a large supply.[59][76]
OK, thanks, I must have missed that anticipating the immediately following section.
Looking over my posts, I see that I may have given the impression that I doubted that there was any rational argument in favour of dropping the second bomb. I only meant to say that I didn’t know one, because the discussion (here and elsewhere) always seems to focus on the first one.
It would be more accurate to say ‘barely surrendered even after the simultaneous bombing of Nagasaki and their most feared enemy Soviet Russia declaring war on them’.
Many (most?) historians believe that the Soviet entry into the war induced the Japanese surrender. Some historians believe that American decision makers expected Japan to surrender soon and wanted to use atomic bombs before the end of the war, to demonstrate their power to the Soviets. Gaddis Smith:
It has been demonstrated that the decision to bomb Japan was centrally connected to Truman’s confrontational approach to the Soviet Union.
A very small number of historians believe that the atomic bomb on net cost American lives. Martin Sherwin:
Many more American soldiers… might have had the opportunity to grow old if Truman had accepted Grew’s advice. [that all that would be needed to induce Japanese surrender starting in May was explaining that US occupying forces would follow the rules of war, not exploit the Japanese, etc, and that delaying to use the atomic bomb was wasteful]
Some historians believe that American decision makers expected Japan to surrender soon and wanted to use atomic bombs before the end of the war, to demonstrate their power to the Soviets.
I favor this hypothesis, it seems to me the demonstration of the power of atomic bombs was as much for Stalin’s benefit as it was for the Japanese leadership’s. One can make a reasonable case that Hiroshima and Nagasaki were the real reason why the battle-hardened Soviet army stopped in Germany and didn’t just roll over the rest of Western Europe.
That is no reason to drop the bomb on a city though; there are plenty of non-living targets that can be blown up to demonstrate destructive power. I suppose doing so wouldn’t signal the will to use the atomic bomb, but in a time when hundreds of thousands died in air raids I would think such a thing would be assumed.
I suppose this highlights the fundamental problem of the era: the assumption that targeting civilians with bombs was the best course of action.
If you drop a nuke on a Japanese city you kill three birds with one stone: you get to test how it works for intended use (remember, it was the first real test so uncertainty was high); you get to intimidate Japan into surrender; and you get to hint to Stalin that he should behave himself or else.
What I think places the atom bomb on its own category is that its potential for destruction is completely out of proportion with whatever tactical reason you may have for using it. Here we’re dealing with destruction on a civilization level. This is the first time in human history when the end of the world may come from our own hands. Nothing in our evolutionary past could have equipped us to deal with such a magnitude of danger.
In the Middle Ages, the Pope was shocked at the implications of archery—you could kill from a distance, almost as effectively as with a sword, but without exposing yourself too much. He thought it was a dishonorable way of killing.
By the time cannons were invented, everyone was more or less used to seeing archers in battle, but this time it was the capacity for devastation brought by cannons that was beyond anything previously experienced.
Ditto for every increasing level of destructive power: machine guns, bomber airplanes, all the way up to the atom bomb. But the atom bomb is a gamechanger. No amount of animosity or vengefulness or spite can possibly justify vaporizing millions of human lives in an instant. Even if your target were a military citadel, the destruction will inevitably reach countless innocents that the post-WW2 international war protocols were designed to protect.
Throwing the atom bomb is the Muggle equivalent of Avada Kedavra—there is no excuse that you can claim in your defense.
In the Middle Ages, the Pope was shocked at the implications of archery—you could kill from a distance, almost as effectively as with a sword, but without exposing yourself too much. He thought it was a dishonorable way of killing. By the time cannons were invented, everyone was more or less used to seeing archers in battle...
Er, archery’s been around since at least the Mesolithic and has been used to kill people for almost as long, if skeletal evidence is anything to go by. That’s actually older than the sword, which originated as a Bronze Age weapon.
Canon 29 of the Second Lateran Council under Pope Innocent II is often cited as banning the use of projectile weapons against Christians, but as the notes through the link imply it’s not clear that a military prohibition was intended in context. In any case, deadly novelty is unlikely as a motivation; crossbows had been known in Europe since Classical Greece, bows and slings far longer. And their military use, of course, continued even after the council.
Why? Your arguments boil down to “it’s very destructive”. Note that during WW2 at least two air raids using conventional bombs killed more people than atomic weapons (Tokyo and Dresden).
there is no excuse that you can claim in your defense.
Why not? It’s just like saying there’s no excuse for killing. That’s not correct, there are lots of justifications for killing. Again, I don’t see what makes nukes special.
From a strategic perspective the initial significance of the atomic bomb was to skew air warfare even further toward the attacking side. As early as the Thirties, strategic bombing had been understood to favor attackers—the phrase at the time was “the bomber will always get through”—but the likes of Tokyo and Dresden required massive effort, hundreds of bombers flying near-concurrent sorties. After the invention of the atomic bomb, that was no longer true—bomber groups that earlier would have been considered trivial now could destroy cities. Suddenly there was no acceptable penetration of air defenses.
Still, defensive efforts continued. Surface-to-air missiles were a great improvement over anti-aircraft gunnery, and nuclear-armed missiles like the AIM-26 were intended to provide high kill probabilities in a defensive role or even take out entire formations at a shot. The development of ICBMs in the late Fifties and early Sixties may have led to more extensive changes in strategy; these could not be effectively stopped by air defenses (though anti-ballistic missile programs continued until the START treaties killed them), leaving mutually assured destruction as the main defensive option.
The radar changed tactics and contributed to some successful defenses, but I don’t think it had much long-term effect on the overall strategic balance. We can use the strategic bombing of Germany during WWII for comparison: before the Axis possessed radar, bombers had been distributed as widely as possible so that few could be predictably intercepted. After, bombers were concentrated into a stream to overwhelm local air defenses. This proved effective, although Allied air superiority had largely been established by that time. The development of long-range radar-guided air-to-air or surface-to-air missiles, or for that matter better fire control radars, would have changed things back in the defenders’ favor, but by that point nuclear weapons had already made their mark.
ABM programs are alive and well at the moment.
Quite, but I didn’t want to clutter an already long comment with post-Cold War development.
Consider what “the cold war” might have been like if we hadn’t of had nuclear weapons. It probably would have been less cold. Come to think of it, cold wars are the best kind of wars. We could use more of them.
Yes nukes have done terrible things, could have done far worse, and still might. However since their invention conventional weapons have still killed far, far more people. We’ve seen plenty of chances for countries to use nukes where they’ve not, so I think its safe to say the existence of nukes isn’t on average more dangerous than the existence of other weapons. The danger in them seems to come from the existential risk which is not present when using conventional weapons.
That’s not obvious to me. Consider empirical data: the casualties from conventional bombing raids. And more empirical data: the US did not drop a nuke on Tokyo. Neither did it drop a nuke on Kyoto or Osaka. The use of atomic bombs was not designed for maximum destruction/casualties.
The actual use of the atom bomb against Japan was against an already defeated enemy. The US had nothing to fear from Japan at that point, and so they didn’t need to strike with maximum power.
On the other hand, imagine a scenario where use of the Bomb isn’t guaranteed to end the war at one stroke, and you have to worry about an enemy plausibly building their own Bomb before being defeated. What would Stalin, or Hitler, or Churchill, do with an atom bomb in 1942? The same thing they tried to do with ordinary bombs, scaled up: build up an arsenal of at least a few dozen (time permitting), then try to drop one simultaneously on every major enemy city within a few days of one another.
WW2 casualties were bad enough, but they never approached the range of “kill 50% of the population in each of the 50 biggest enemy cities, in a week’s bombing campaign, conditional only on getting a single bomber with a single bomb to the target”.
Given that neither Hitler nor Churchill choose to use the chemical weapons that they had on the enemy I don’t see the argument for why they would have used atom bombs the same way as conventional bombs.
I don’t know the details of why they didn’t use chemical weapons, and what they might have accomplished if they had. But I’m not sure what your argument is here. Do you think that they thought they could achieve major military objectives with chemical weapons, but refrained because of the Geneva Protocols, or because of fear of retaliation in kind?
Many bombing campaigns were indeed waged with an explicit goal of maximum civilian casualties, in order to terrorize the enemy into submission, or to cause the collapse of order among enemy civilians. This includes the German Blitz of London and the V-1 and V-2 campaigns, most of the British Bomber Command war effort, US bombing attacks against German cities such as Hamburg and Dresden, Japanese bombing of Nanjing and Canton, and US fire-bombing of Japanese cities including Tokyo. That’s not taking the Eastern Front in account, which saw the majority of the fighting.
Wikipedia has a lot of details (excepting the Eastern Front) given and linked here.
If any of the combatants had had the atom bomb, possibly including the US when they were not yet confident of being close to victory, they would surely have used them. After all, dead is dead, and it’s better to build and field only one plane and (expensive) bomb per city, not a fleet of thousands. Given the power of even a single bomb, they would surely have gone on to bomb other cities, stopping only when the enemy surrendered.
Many bombing campaigns were indeed waged with an explicit goal of maximum civilian casualties, in order to terrorize the enemy into submission, or to cause the collapse of order among enemy civilians.
If Germany would have wanting to maximize causalities they would have bombed London with chemical weapons. They decided against doing so.
They wanted to destroy military industry and reduce civilian moral. They didn’t want to kill as many civilian’s as possible but demoralize them.
Estarlio seems to be correct: they didn’t use chemical weapons because they feared retaliation in kind. Quoting Wikipedia:
During the war, Germany stockpiled tabun, sarin, and soman but refrained from their use on the battlefield. In total, Germany produced about 78,000 tons of chemical weapons.[2] By 1945 the nation produced about 12,000 tons of tabun and 1,000 pounds (450 kg) of sarin.[2] Delivery systems for the nerve agents included 105 mm and 150 mm artillery shells, a 250 kg bomb and a 150 mm rocket.[2] Even when the Soviets neared Berlin, Adolf Hitler was persuaded not to use tabun as the final trump card. The use of tabun was opposed by Hitler’s Minister of Armaments, Albert Speer, who, in 1943, brought IG Farben’s nerve agent expert Otto Ambros to report to Hitler. He informed Hitler that the Allies had stopped publication of research into organophosphates (a type of organic compound that emcompasses nerve agents) at the beginning of the war, that the essential nature of nerve gases had been published as early as the turn of the century, and that he believed that Allies could not have failed to produce agents like tabun. This was not in fact the case (Allied research into organophosphates had been kept secret to protect DDT), but Hitler accepted Ambros’s deduction, and Germany’s tabun arsenal remained unused.
However, one doesn’t fear retaliation in kind if one can win with a first strike. Chemical weapons used as bombs would not be that much more effective than firebombing. Atom bombs are far more effective and also easier to deliver and possibly cheaper per city destroyed. Since Hitler (as well as the other sides) accepted the premise that sufficient bombing of enemy civilian populations would cause the enemy to seek terms, if they had had atom bombs and thought their enemies didn’t yet have them, they would likely have used them.
Indeed, I’m pretty sure that if not for nuclear weapons, some right-thinking Russian would have declared war over the phrase “hadn’t of had”. And very rightly so. The slaughter inflicted by mere armies of millions, with a few tens of thousands of tanks, would have been a small price to pay to rid the world of abominations like that one.
The existence of nuclear weapons should be taken as evidence that humans are not very moral. (And yet survive so far.)
Einstein is not saying that humans are necessarily moral, but rather that they ought to be moral.
Furthermore, it is arguable that nuclear weapons are not necessarily immoral in and of themselves. Like any tool or weapon, they can be used for moral and immoral ends. For instance, nuclear weapons may well be one of the most effective means of destroying Earth-directed masses such as Existential Risk threatening asteroids. They may also be extremely effective for deterring conventional warfare between major powers.
The only previous actual use of nuclear weapons against human targets was for the ends of ending a world war, and it did so rather successfully. That we have chosen not to use nuclear weapons irresponsibly may well suggest that those with the power to wield nuclear weapons have in fact been more morally responsible than we give them credit.
Perhaps. Alternatively, when faced with a similarly-armed opponent, even our habitually bloody rulers can be detered by the prospect of being personally burned to death with nuclear fire.
I’ve always wondered why, on discovering nuclear weapons, the leaders of America didn’t continually pour a huge budget into it—stockpile a sufficient number of them and then destroy all their potential peers.
I can’t think of any explanation bar the morality in their culture. They could certainly have secured sufficient material for the task.
More like our supposedly bloody soldiers, at least in some of the more alarming close calls.
I was about to say your point stands, but actually, wouldn’t at least some of them have been in bunkers? I’ll have to check that, now...
Huh? Can you unpack this for me, I don’t see how it can make sense.
Start from “The very existence of flame-throwers proves that some time, somewhere, someone said to themselves, You know, I want to set those people over there on fire, but I’m just not close enough to get the job done”, I guess.
Doesn’t help me much. The purpose of weapons—all weapons—is to kill. What exactly is the moral difference between a nuclear bomb and a conventional bomb?
Not true. The purpose of some weapons is to incapacitate or subdue. For example, stun guns, tear gas, truncheons, flashbangs, etc.
More exactly, the purpose of a weapon is to use pain to change behavior—which matches a general definition of “punishment.” Sometimes the mere threat of pain suffices to change behavior. In cases of mutual deterrence (or less drastic, like everyday border patrols) that’s the point: to make you behave differently from what you would otherwise, by appealing merely to your expectation of pain.
No, I don’t think so. But to avoid the distraction of trying to define “weapons”, let me assert that we are talking about military weapons—instruments devised and used with the express purpose of killing other humans. The issue is whether nuclear weapons have any special moral status, so we’re not really concerned with tear gas and tasers.
Why are nuclear weapons morally different from conventional bombs or machine guns or cannons?
Strategic nuclear weapons—the original and most widespread nuclear weapons—cannot be used with restraint. They have huge a blast radius and they kill everyone in it indiscriminately.
The one time they were used demonstrated this well. They are the most effective and efficient way, not merely to defeat an enemy army (which has bunkers, widely dispersed units, and retaliation capabilities), but to kill the entire civilian population of an enemy city.
To kill all the inhabitants of an enemy city, usually by one or another type of bombardment, was a goal pursued by all sides in both world wars. Nuclear weapons made it much easier, cheaper, and harder to defend against.
Tactical nuclear weapons are probably different; they haven’t seen (much? any?) use in real wars to be certain.
They can. One of the problems that America had, going into the 80s, was that its ICBM force was becoming vulnerable to a potential surprise attack by the CCCP. This concerned them because only the ICBM force, at the time, had the sort of accuracy necessary for taking out hardened targets in a limited strike—like their opponent’s strategic forces. And they were understandably reluctant to rely on systems that could only be used for city busting—i.e. the submarine force.
If you’re interested in this, I suggest the—contemporary with that problem—documentary First Strike.
You mean СССР?
What do you mean by “restraint”?
For example, the nuclear bombing of Nagasaki killed around 70,000 people. The fire-bombing of Tokyo in March of 1945 (a single bombing raid) killed about 100,000 people.
Was the bombing of Nagasaki morally worse?
In addition to nshepperd’s point, there’s the fact that sending a bomber fleet to destroy an enemy city is very expensive—the costs of planes, fuel, and bombs add up quickly, not to mention pilots’ lives. And if the defenders can destroy 50% of the planes before they drop their bombs, the bombing campaign becomes 50% less effective.
Whereas a strategic nuclear warhead only requires one plane to deliver it (or one ICBM). Much cheaper, much less risky, and much more stealthy. If you build a small fleet of nuclear bombers (or, again, a small stable of ICBMs), you can theoretically destroy all of the enemy’s cities in one night.
If the atom bomb had by chance been developed a few years earlier, when the US still faced serious opposition in Europe, then quite probably they would have used it to wipe out all the major German and German-held cities.
German-held? Like Paris?
Not Paris, of course, which had a lot of diplomatic and sentimental value and little industrial value. I meant cities of high industrial value in occupied Czechoslovakia, Austria, Poland, and other countries the West didn’t care as much about.
It’s one thing to create a weapon that can be used to kill O(100,000) people at once (though, it’s not really “at once” if you do it by dropping N bombs consecutively). It’s another thing to create a weapon that can only be used to kill O(100,000) people at once.
Or something. Of course, if inventing nukes is evidence humans aren’t very moral, the fact that people chose to kill a hundred thousand people in Tokyo with conventional weapons is a different kind of evidence for humans being not very moral.
That’s not how Big O notation works: O(100,000) = O(1).
You presumably mean “in the order of 100,000”, which is sometimes written “~100,000″.
Clearly a nuke is not that.
Given that both humans and moralities are quite diverse, I don’t see any information content in the phrase “humans are not very moral”. It’s just trivially true and pretty meaningless.
I agree, and besides I’m not a moral realist. I was originally responding to people in this thread who discussed whether humans could be described as moral.
If the bombing of Nagasaki contributed more to the end of the war than the bombing of Tokyo, then we could easily say it was morally superior. That is not to say there weren’t better options of course.
We can debate endlessly the wisdom of bombing Hiroshima, but does anybody have a defence for bombing Nagasaki? Since this is the quotation thread, I’ll quote Dave Barry:
I’m seriously curious. (Reasonably rational arguments, of course.)
Recommend reading the actual history, rather than comedians.
I read that, amongst other WP articles, while researching my comment. That one doesn’t even attempt to explain the reasons for dropping the second bomb. (The quotation from the comedian is not meant to be an argument either.)
This section seems relevant:
Emphasis mine.
OK, thanks, I must have missed that anticipating the immediately following section.
Looking over my posts, I see that I may have given the impression that I doubted that there was any rational argument in favour of dropping the second bomb. I only meant to say that I didn’t know one, because the discussion (here and elsewhere) always seems to focus on the first one.
Well, the Japanese just barely surrendered even after Nagasaki.
It would be more accurate to say ‘barely surrendered even after the simultaneous bombing of Nagasaki and their most feared enemy Soviet Russia declaring war on them’.
Many (most?) historians believe that the Soviet entry into the war induced the Japanese surrender. Some historians believe that American decision makers expected Japan to surrender soon and wanted to use atomic bombs before the end of the war, to demonstrate their power to the Soviets. Gaddis Smith:
A very small number of historians believe that the atomic bomb on net cost American lives. Martin Sherwin:
I favor this hypothesis, it seems to me the demonstration of the power of atomic bombs was as much for Stalin’s benefit as it was for the Japanese leadership’s. One can make a reasonable case that Hiroshima and Nagasaki were the real reason why the battle-hardened Soviet army stopped in Germany and didn’t just roll over the rest of Western Europe.
That is no reason to drop the bomb on a city though; there are plenty of non-living targets that can be blown up to demonstrate destructive power. I suppose doing so wouldn’t signal the will to use the atomic bomb, but in a time when hundreds of thousands died in air raids I would think such a thing would be assumed.
I suppose this highlights the fundamental problem of the era: the assumption that targeting civilians with bombs was the best course of action.
If you drop a nuke on a Japanese city you kill three birds with one stone: you get to test how it works for intended use (remember, it was the first real test so uncertainty was high); you get to intimidate Japan into surrender; and you get to hint to Stalin that he should behave himself or else.
True. Some sources indicate that some Japanese cities were left intact precisely so the American military could test the effects of a nuke!
What I think places the atom bomb on its own category is that its potential for destruction is completely out of proportion with whatever tactical reason you may have for using it. Here we’re dealing with destruction on a civilization level. This is the first time in human history when the end of the world may come from our own hands. Nothing in our evolutionary past could have equipped us to deal with such a magnitude of danger. In the Middle Ages, the Pope was shocked at the implications of archery—you could kill from a distance, almost as effectively as with a sword, but without exposing yourself too much. He thought it was a dishonorable way of killing. By the time cannons were invented, everyone was more or less used to seeing archers in battle, but this time it was the capacity for devastation brought by cannons that was beyond anything previously experienced. Ditto for every increasing level of destructive power: machine guns, bomber airplanes, all the way up to the atom bomb. But the atom bomb is a gamechanger. No amount of animosity or vengefulness or spite can possibly justify vaporizing millions of human lives in an instant. Even if your target were a military citadel, the destruction will inevitably reach countless innocents that the post-WW2 international war protocols were designed to protect. Throwing the atom bomb is the Muggle equivalent of Avada Kedavra—there is no excuse that you can claim in your defense.
Er, archery’s been around since at least the Mesolithic and has been used to kill people for almost as long, if skeletal evidence is anything to go by. That’s actually older than the sword, which originated as a Bronze Age weapon.
Canon 29 of the Second Lateran Council under Pope Innocent II is often cited as banning the use of projectile weapons against Christians, but as the notes through the link imply it’s not clear that a military prohibition was intended in context. In any case, deadly novelty is unlikely as a motivation; crossbows had been known in Europe since Classical Greece, bows and slings far longer. And their military use, of course, continued even after the council.
Why? Your arguments boil down to “it’s very destructive”. Note that during WW2 at least two air raids using conventional bombs killed more people than atomic weapons (Tokyo and Dresden).
Why not? It’s just like saying there’s no excuse for killing. That’s not correct, there are lots of justifications for killing. Again, I don’t see what makes nukes special.
From a strategic perspective the initial significance of the atomic bomb was to skew air warfare even further toward the attacking side. As early as the Thirties, strategic bombing had been understood to favor attackers—the phrase at the time was “the bomber will always get through”—but the likes of Tokyo and Dresden required massive effort, hundreds of bombers flying near-concurrent sorties. After the invention of the atomic bomb, that was no longer true—bomber groups that earlier would have been considered trivial now could destroy cities. Suddenly there was no acceptable penetration of air defenses.
Still, defensive efforts continued. Surface-to-air missiles were a great improvement over anti-aircraft gunnery, and nuclear-armed missiles like the AIM-26 were intended to provide high kill probabilities in a defensive role or even take out entire formations at a shot. The development of ICBMs in the late Fifties and early Sixties may have led to more extensive changes in strategy; these could not be effectively stopped by air defenses (though anti-ballistic missile programs continued until the START treaties killed them), leaving mutually assured destruction as the main defensive option.
That was before the radar, though.
ABM programs are alive and well at the moment. The US withdrew from the ABM treaty with Russia in 2002.
The radar changed tactics and contributed to some successful defenses, but I don’t think it had much long-term effect on the overall strategic balance. We can use the strategic bombing of Germany during WWII for comparison: before the Axis possessed radar, bombers had been distributed as widely as possible so that few could be predictably intercepted. After, bombers were concentrated into a stream to overwhelm local air defenses. This proved effective, although Allied air superiority had largely been established by that time. The development of long-range radar-guided air-to-air or surface-to-air missiles, or for that matter better fire control radars, would have changed things back in the defenders’ favor, but by that point nuclear weapons had already made their mark.
Quite, but I didn’t want to clutter an already long comment with post-Cold War development.
Consider what “the cold war” might have been like if we hadn’t of had nuclear weapons. It probably would have been less cold. Come to think of it, cold wars are the best kind of wars. We could use more of them.
Yes nukes have done terrible things, could have done far worse, and still might. However since their invention conventional weapons have still killed far, far more people. We’ve seen plenty of chances for countries to use nukes where they’ve not, so I think its safe to say the existence of nukes isn’t on average more dangerous than the existence of other weapons. The danger in them seems to come from the existential risk which is not present when using conventional weapons.
Consider what the last big “hot war” would have been like if the atom bomb had been developed even a couple of years earlier, or by another side.
The war would have been over faster, with possibly lower total number of casualties?
The war might have been over faster, but I think with a much higher number of casualties.
That’s not obvious to me. Consider empirical data: the casualties from conventional bombing raids. And more empirical data: the US did not drop a nuke on Tokyo. Neither did it drop a nuke on Kyoto or Osaka. The use of atomic bombs was not designed for maximum destruction/casualties.
The actual use of the atom bomb against Japan was against an already defeated enemy. The US had nothing to fear from Japan at that point, and so they didn’t need to strike with maximum power.
On the other hand, imagine a scenario where use of the Bomb isn’t guaranteed to end the war at one stroke, and you have to worry about an enemy plausibly building their own Bomb before being defeated. What would Stalin, or Hitler, or Churchill, do with an atom bomb in 1942? The same thing they tried to do with ordinary bombs, scaled up: build up an arsenal of at least a few dozen (time permitting), then try to drop one simultaneously on every major enemy city within a few days of one another.
WW2 casualties were bad enough, but they never approached the range of “kill 50% of the population in each of the 50 biggest enemy cities, in a week’s bombing campaign, conditional only on getting a single bomber with a single bomb to the target”.
Given that neither Hitler nor Churchill choose to use the chemical weapons that they had on the enemy I don’t see the argument for why they would have used atom bombs the same way as conventional bombs.
I don’t know the details of why they didn’t use chemical weapons, and what they might have accomplished if they had. But I’m not sure what your argument is here. Do you think that they thought they could achieve major military objectives with chemical weapons, but refrained because of the Geneva Protocols, or because of fear of retaliation in kind?
The point is that the war in Europe wasn’t waged with a goal of creating a maximum numbers of casualties.
Many bombing campaigns were indeed waged with an explicit goal of maximum civilian casualties, in order to terrorize the enemy into submission, or to cause the collapse of order among enemy civilians. This includes the German Blitz of London and the V-1 and V-2 campaigns, most of the British Bomber Command war effort, US bombing attacks against German cities such as Hamburg and Dresden, Japanese bombing of Nanjing and Canton, and US fire-bombing of Japanese cities including Tokyo. That’s not taking the Eastern Front in account, which saw the majority of the fighting.
Wikipedia has a lot of details (excepting the Eastern Front) given and linked here.
If any of the combatants had had the atom bomb, possibly including the US when they were not yet confident of being close to victory, they would surely have used them. After all, dead is dead, and it’s better to build and field only one plane and (expensive) bomb per city, not a fleet of thousands. Given the power of even a single bomb, they would surely have gone on to bomb other cities, stopping only when the enemy surrendered.
If Germany would have wanting to maximize causalities they would have bombed London with chemical weapons. They decided against doing so.
They wanted to destroy military industry and reduce civilian moral. They didn’t want to kill as many civilian’s as possible but demoralize them.
Estarlio seems to be correct: they didn’t use chemical weapons because they feared retaliation in kind. Quoting Wikipedia:
However, one doesn’t fear retaliation in kind if one can win with a first strike. Chemical weapons used as bombs would not be that much more effective than firebombing. Atom bombs are far more effective and also easier to deliver and possibly cheaper per city destroyed. Since Hitler (as well as the other sides) accepted the premise that sufficient bombing of enemy civilian populations would cause the enemy to seek terms, if they had had atom bombs and thought their enemies didn’t yet have them, they would likely have used them.
IIRC they decided not to use chemical weapons because they were under the impression that the Allies had developed comparable capabilities.
Ah, so no chemical weapons because MAD, but atomic weapons (by the first to get them) would be different.
Indeed, I’m pretty sure that if not for nuclear weapons, some right-thinking Russian would have declared war over the phrase “hadn’t of had”. And very rightly so. The slaughter inflicted by mere armies of millions, with a few tens of thousands of tanks, would have been a small price to pay to rid the world of abominations like that one.