There’s exactly one function which is objectively the function which returns 1 for just those moves where a pawn moves one space, or two spaces on the first move, or the bishop moves diagonally, or the king moves one space, where none of the moves intersect other pieces without capturing, etc...
As I said, not every mind will care to evaluate this function.
As for whether mathematical objects exist… is this important? It really adds up to the same thing, either way.
There’s exactly one function which is objectively the function which returns 1 for just those moves where a pawn moves one space, or two spaces on the first move, or the bishop moves diagonally, or the king moves one space, where none of the moves intersect other pieces without capturing, etc...
Yes, of course. I wasn’t arguing anything else. The person I was contending with is a moral realist, who would say that the function which represents those rules, the rules under which we play chess now, is the correct set of rules, and that this correctness is objective and independent of the minds of chess players.
This person would, I presume, argue that if suddenly every chess player in the world at the same time agreed to eliminate en passant from the game of chess, that they would then be playing the game “wrong”.
That is the position which I find nonsensical. I’m not arguing for anything bizarre here. I’m a Bayesian rationalist and a reductionist and yes I have read the sequences.
The person I was contending with is a moral realist, who would say that the function which represents those rules, the rules under which we play chess now, is the correct set of rules, and that this correctness is objective and independent of the minds of chess players.
I explained the point I was making and that wasn’t it: The point was what obligation/compulsion means. It doesn’t mean it is physically impossible to
do what is morally forbidden. It doesn’t mean it is an edict you will be punished for
disobeying. It does mean that it is logically impossible to be moral (or rational or a chess player) after having significantly departed from the rules.
This person would, I presume, argue that if suddenly every chess player in the world at the same time agreed to eliminate en passant from the game of chess, that they would then be playing the game “wrong”.
They would be playing a different game..chess 2.0 or chess++. Plainly,
you can’t have one player using the revised rules and her opponent the old ones.
With your chess analogy, those moves that are forbidden are set by human minds and decisions. The game of chess itself is a product of human intelligence, and they can change the rules over time, and indeed they have.
Are you saying that morality works the same way? That what is morally forbidden are those things which most people find objectionable / assign negative value to?
They would be playing a different game..chess 2.0 or chess++. Plainly, you can’t have one player using the revised rules and her opponent the old ones.
Dude, you just said a minute ago that the word “chess” could be a family of different but related rulesets when I asked about castling, but now when it comes to changing en passant the game becomes something else entirely? I think you should respond to my question on that thread about a precise explanation of what you mean by “chess”, as I cannot figure out why some things count and others do not.
If you vary the way games work too much, you end with useless non-games (winning is undefinable, one player always wins...)
If you vary the way rationality works too much, you end up with paradox, quodlibet etc.
If you vary the rules of meta ethics too much, you end up with anyone being allowed to do anything, or nobody being allowed to do anything.
“The rules are made up” doesn’t mean the rules are abitrary.
There is a family of chess-type games, and they are different games, because they
are not intersubstitutable.
One could identify many different sets of rules for chess mathematically, but is one of them objectively the “correct” set of rules?
I find that perplexing. Perhaps you mean many sets of rules could be used to play games with chess boards and pieces. But they are not all chess. Chess is its rules.
Same rules+differrent pieces=same game. Different rules+same pieces=different game.
Chess is its rules. Same rules+differrent pieces=same game. Different rules+same pieces=different game.
This isn’t strictly speaking true. Note that there have many different games called chess. For example, pawns being able to move 2 squares on their first move, en passant, castling, and the queen being able to move as she can, are all recent innovations. But let’s put that aside and explore your analogy. If there’s one thing called “morality” then I fail to see how that isn’t but one game among many. You seem to be treating morality like chess (in that there’s an objective thing that is or is not chess) but are then bringing along for the particular game called “morality” all sorts of assumptions about whether or not people should play it or expect to play it. This seems akin to asserting that because there’s only one objective game called “chess” that entities “should” play it.
In Italy one can still find older chess players who use an alternative castling rule, from when castling was first being introduced, called “free castling” in which the rook can take any of the squares between itself and the king, or the king’s position, rather than the single permitted position (depending on the side) of the more common castling rules we play with today.
Is one of these versions the “correct” way to play chess? Or does it depend entirely on the subjective viewpoint of the chess players?
Which way is the correct way to play “chess” depends on which definition of the word chess you are using. In general, we resolve ambiguities like that by looking at the speaker’s intent. (The speaker does not have to be one of the players.)
Which way is the correct way to play “chess” depends on which definition of the word chess you are using. In general, we resolve ambiguities like that by looking at the speaker’s intent. (The speaker does not have to be one of the players.)
Yes, I know that. I’m asking rhetorical questions to Peter who is a moral realist.
Alright, this is your analogy, and instead of dancing around and arguing definitions can you explain, in precise terms, what you mean when you say chess?
The rules of chess would certainly exist, as much as any other mathematical object does. Of course, not every mind would care to follow them...
One could identify many different sets of rules for chess mathematically, but is one of them objectively the “correct” set of rules?
Or does selecting a set of rules from the possibilities always require the action of a subjective mind?
Edit: Also...
… that’s a whole other rabbit hole, no?
There’s exactly one function which is objectively the function which returns 1 for just those moves where a pawn moves one space, or two spaces on the first move, or the bishop moves diagonally, or the king moves one space, where none of the moves intersect other pieces without capturing, etc...
As I said, not every mind will care to evaluate this function.
As for whether mathematical objects exist… is this important? It really adds up to the same thing, either way.
(By the way, have you read the metaethics sequence?)
Yes, of course. I wasn’t arguing anything else. The person I was contending with is a moral realist, who would say that the function which represents those rules, the rules under which we play chess now, is the correct set of rules, and that this correctness is objective and independent of the minds of chess players.
This person would, I presume, argue that if suddenly every chess player in the world at the same time agreed to eliminate en passant from the game of chess, that they would then be playing the game “wrong”.
That is the position which I find nonsensical. I’m not arguing for anything bizarre here. I’m a Bayesian rationalist and a reductionist and yes I have read the sequences.
I explained the point I was making and that wasn’t it: The point was what obligation/compulsion means. It doesn’t mean it is physically impossible to do what is morally forbidden. It doesn’t mean it is an edict you will be punished for disobeying. It does mean that it is logically impossible to be moral (or rational or a chess player) after having significantly departed from the rules.
They would be playing a different game..chess 2.0 or chess++. Plainly, you can’t have one player using the revised rules and her opponent the old ones.
With your chess analogy, those moves that are forbidden are set by human minds and decisions. The game of chess itself is a product of human intelligence, and they can change the rules over time, and indeed they have.
Are you saying that morality works the same way? That what is morally forbidden are those things which most people find objectionable / assign negative value to?
Dude, you just said a minute ago that the word “chess” could be a family of different but related rulesets when I asked about castling, but now when it comes to changing en passant the game becomes something else entirely? I think you should respond to my question on that thread about a precise explanation of what you mean by “chess”, as I cannot figure out why some things count and others do not.
If you vary the way games work too much, you end with useless non-games (winning is undefinable, one player always wins...) If you vary the way rationality works too much, you end up with paradox, quodlibet etc. If you vary the rules of meta ethics too much, you end up with anyone being allowed to do anything, or nobody being allowed to do anything. “The rules are made up” doesn’t mean the rules are abitrary.
There is a family of chess-type games, and they are different games, because they are not intersubstitutable.
I find that perplexing. Perhaps you mean many sets of rules could be used to play games with chess boards and pieces. But they are not all chess. Chess is its rules. Same rules+differrent pieces=same game. Different rules+same pieces=different game.
This isn’t strictly speaking true. Note that there have many different games called chess. For example, pawns being able to move 2 squares on their first move, en passant, castling, and the queen being able to move as she can, are all recent innovations. But let’s put that aside and explore your analogy. If there’s one thing called “morality” then I fail to see how that isn’t but one game among many. You seem to be treating morality like chess (in that there’s an objective thing that is or is not chess) but are then bringing along for the particular game called “morality” all sorts of assumptions about whether or not people should play it or expect to play it. This seems akin to asserting that because there’s only one objective game called “chess” that entities “should” play it.
In Italy one can still find older chess players who use an alternative castling rule, from when castling was first being introduced, called “free castling” in which the rook can take any of the squares between itself and the king, or the king’s position, rather than the single permitted position (depending on the side) of the more common castling rules we play with today.
Is one of these versions the “correct” way to play chess? Or does it depend entirely on the subjective viewpoint of the chess players?
Which way is the correct way to play “chess” depends on which definition of the word chess you are using. In general, we resolve ambiguities like that by looking at the speaker’s intent. (The speaker does not have to be one of the players.)
Yes, I know that. I’m asking rhetorical questions to Peter who is a moral realist.
Chess might be a small and closely related family of rule-sets. That doesn’t affect anything.
Alright, this is your analogy, and instead of dancing around and arguing definitions can you explain, in precise terms, what you mean when you say chess?