Pure curiosity, in response to the whole non-discounted utility argument.
In a case similar to the beginning to Kill Bill—orderly selling sex with a comatose, brain dead woman—how does your utilitarian calculator come out? Assume (unlike the movie) she is in fact completely gone. Do you simply bite the bullet and agree it’s a positive outcome?
I’ve never seen that movie, and based on your description I’m thinking I probably shouldn’t. But I agree with Nick Tarleton—the relevant preferences are those of the people who are not in comas, but know that one day they might be.
...I think lots and lots of the population assign a negative utility to brain-dead women getting raped. Or for that matter to gravedigging and mutilating corpses to produce grotesque puppet plays.
In a hypothetical alien world where alien psychologies don’t bestow dignity and respect to the dead (or the brain-dead), I wouldn’t consider it inherently wrong for such to happen.
What if people thought, “If I were gay, I would not want to be allowed to engage in homosexual sex because it’s wrong/immoral/ungodly/unhealthy/whatever.”
What if people thought, “If I were addicted to crack, I would not want to be allowed to use crack because it’s wrong/immoral/unhealthy/ungodly/whatever.”
These are opinions about future situations where someone has a positive desire—as opposed to people having no desire, like in the coma-rape case—but in either case deals with a present desire that necessarily contradicts a future desire. How would you resolve the two above?
(Note I do not think these two behaviours are morally equivalent at all. It’s because this concept seems to fail to correctly separate them that I bring them up.
I’ve not yet fully resolved in my mind to what extent people should be allowed to constrain the freedom of their future selves.
But as to your particular examples, the two situations could (don’t know about “should”, but they could) be resolved differently by the fact that a crack-addict will have a better overall existence if he de-toxes (which the former desire helps him accomplish); while the gay person will probably have a better overall existence if he does engage in gay sex (which the future desire will help him accomplish). Though the superficial desires are different, at their core, they presumably both desire some sort of happiness, peace of mind, etc, etc.
This assumes the problem away. How do you know which will have a better existence? Each individual, who presumably understands himself far better than you do, has declared that if the specified event comes to pass, he will have a worse overall existence.
I do think the prior “mistake of fact” issue would probably resolve this, though it feels unsatisfactory. The individual who says he wants to avoid being a crack addict is probably fairly accurate about his assumptions. The person who wants to avoid being gay is very likely to have that desire out of some religious concern or concern for his soul or some similar thing. If we’re willing to say that his factual error (i.e. there is no Hell) allows the discounting of all his entwined beliefs, it’d solve the problem.
Incidentally, none of this solves the people-are-offended problem. Sure, the idea of someone having sex with a comatose woman bothers most people. But 100 years ago, the idea of two people of different races bothered a lot of people (arguably more). I think the two are completely different, but how do you distinguish between the two? Ignoring utility based on factual error (there is no Hell) and utility based on counter-utilitarian preference (preventing people from engaging in consensual relationships is, with exceptions that don’t apply here, counter-utilitarian). It seems like a simpler utilitarianism might be stuck imposing the will of the many on the few.
Pure curiosity, in response to the whole non-discounted utility argument.
In a case similar to the beginning to Kill Bill—orderly selling sex with a comatose, brain dead woman—how does your utilitarian calculator come out? Assume (unlike the movie) she is in fact completely gone. Do you simply bite the bullet and agree it’s a positive outcome?
There are other ways around this conclusion, like taking into account people’s typical preference not to have this done to them even if brain-dead.
I’ve never seen that movie, and based on your description I’m thinking I probably shouldn’t. But I agree with Nick Tarleton—the relevant preferences are those of the people who are not in comas, but know that one day they might be.
If I may offer my own position...
...I think lots and lots of the population assign a negative utility to brain-dead women getting raped. Or for that matter to gravedigging and mutilating corpses to produce grotesque puppet plays.
In a hypothetical alien world where alien psychologies don’t bestow dignity and respect to the dead (or the brain-dead), I wouldn’t consider it inherently wrong for such to happen.
Two hypotheticals:
What if people thought, “If I were gay, I would not want to be allowed to engage in homosexual sex because it’s wrong/immoral/ungodly/unhealthy/whatever.”
What if people thought, “If I were addicted to crack, I would not want to be allowed to use crack because it’s wrong/immoral/unhealthy/ungodly/whatever.”
These are opinions about future situations where someone has a positive desire—as opposed to people having no desire, like in the coma-rape case—but in either case deals with a present desire that necessarily contradicts a future desire. How would you resolve the two above?
(Note I do not think these two behaviours are morally equivalent at all. It’s because this concept seems to fail to correctly separate them that I bring them up.
I’ve not yet fully resolved in my mind to what extent people should be allowed to constrain the freedom of their future selves.
But as to your particular examples, the two situations could (don’t know about “should”, but they could) be resolved differently by the fact that a crack-addict will have a better overall existence if he de-toxes (which the former desire helps him accomplish); while the gay person will probably have a better overall existence if he does engage in gay sex (which the future desire will help him accomplish). Though the superficial desires are different, at their core, they presumably both desire some sort of happiness, peace of mind, etc, etc.
This assumes the problem away. How do you know which will have a better existence? Each individual, who presumably understands himself far better than you do, has declared that if the specified event comes to pass, he will have a worse overall existence.
I do think the prior “mistake of fact” issue would probably resolve this, though it feels unsatisfactory. The individual who says he wants to avoid being a crack addict is probably fairly accurate about his assumptions. The person who wants to avoid being gay is very likely to have that desire out of some religious concern or concern for his soul or some similar thing. If we’re willing to say that his factual error (i.e. there is no Hell) allows the discounting of all his entwined beliefs, it’d solve the problem.
Incidentally, none of this solves the people-are-offended problem. Sure, the idea of someone having sex with a comatose woman bothers most people. But 100 years ago, the idea of two people of different races bothered a lot of people (arguably more). I think the two are completely different, but how do you distinguish between the two? Ignoring utility based on factual error (there is no Hell) and utility based on counter-utilitarian preference (preventing people from engaging in consensual relationships is, with exceptions that don’t apply here, counter-utilitarian). It seems like a simpler utilitarianism might be stuck imposing the will of the many on the few.