Problem with prediction market: People with the knowledge might still not want to risk money (plus complexity of markets, risk the market fails, tax implication, etc.).
But if you fully subsidize them, and make it free to participate, but still with potential for reward, then most people would probably make random predictions (at least, for predictions where most people don’t have specialized knowledge about this) (because it’s not worth investing the time to improve the prediction).
Maybe the best of both worlds is to do the latter, but only with people you already identified as experts. Because they already have the knowledge (maybe, mostly), so their marginal cost to predict accurately makes it worth it (although this assumption might be wrong; maybe the marginal cost is still high). Also, given there are less players, the expected reward is higher. They’ll also have reputational stakes given its their field.
I would imagine this mechanism using a large index as its reward to avoid future reward being desired more (hopefully that would work? but on long enough time scale, it might not; old scientists would presumably have a higher time discount on average, maybe).
Maybe combine this with a public record of who made which predictions (at least shared with the expert group), so they can converge on their own, Aumann style?
a thought for a prediction aggregator
Problem with prediction market: People with the knowledge might still not want to risk money (plus complexity of markets, risk the market fails, tax implication, etc.).
But if you fully subsidize them, and make it free to participate, but still with potential for reward, then most people would probably make random predictions (at least, for predictions where most people don’t have specialized knowledge about this) (because it’s not worth investing the time to improve the prediction).
Maybe the best of both worlds is to do the latter, but only with people you already identified as experts. Because they already have the knowledge (maybe, mostly), so their marginal cost to predict accurately makes it worth it (although this assumption might be wrong; maybe the marginal cost is still high). Also, given there are less players, the expected reward is higher. They’ll also have reputational stakes given its their field.
I would imagine this mechanism using a large index as its reward to avoid future reward being desired more (hopefully that would work? but on long enough time scale, it might not; old scientists would presumably have a higher time discount on average, maybe).
Maybe combine this with a public record of who made which predictions (at least shared with the expert group), so they can converge on their own, Aumann style?