Those are very normal preferences; they refer to states of the outside world, and we can estimate whether that state is met or not. Just because it’s potentially manipulative, doesn’t mean it isn’t well-defined.
But they are somehow recursive: I need to know the real nature of human preferences in order to be sure that other people actually want what I want.
In other words, such preferences about preference have embedded idea about what I think is “preference”: if M. will behave as if she loves me—is it enough? Or it should be her claims of love? Or her emotions? Or coherency of all three?
Side note: what do you think about preferences about preferences of other people?
For example: “I want M. to love me” or “I prefer that everybody will be utilitarian”.
Was it covered somewhere?
Those are very normal preferences; they refer to states of the outside world, and we can estimate whether that state is met or not. Just because it’s potentially manipulative, doesn’t mean it isn’t well-defined.
But they are somehow recursive: I need to know the real nature of human preferences in order to be sure that other people actually want what I want.
In other words, such preferences about preference have embedded idea about what I think is “preference”: if M. will behave as if she loves me—is it enough? Or it should be her claims of love? Or her emotions? Or coherency of all three?