FDT doesn’t unconditionally prescribe ignoring threats. The idea of ignoring threats has merit, but FDT specifically only points out that ignoring a threat sometimes has the effect of the threat (or other threats) not getting made (even if only counterfactually). Which is not always the case.
Consider a ThreatBot that always makes threats (and follows through on them), regardless of whether you ignore them. If you ignore ThreatBot’s threats, you are worse off. On the other hand, there might be a prior ThreatBotMaker that decides whether to make a ThreatBot depending on whether you ignore ThreatBot’s threats. What FDT prescribes in this case is not directly ignoring ThreatBot’s threats, but rather taking notice of ThreatBotMaker’s behavior, namely that it won’t make a ThreatBot if you ignore ThreatBot’s threats. This argument only goes through when there is/was a ThreatBotMaker, it doesn’t work if there is only a ThreatBot.
If a ThreatBot appears through some process that doesn’t respond to your decision to respond to ThreatBot’s threats, then FDT prescribes responding to ThreatBot’s threats. But also if something (else) makes threats depending on your reputation for responding to threats, then responding to even an unconditionally manifesting ThreatBot’s threats is not recommended by FDT. Not directly as a recommendation to ignore something, rather as a consequence of taking notice of the process that responds to your having a reputation of not responding to any threats. Similarly with stances where you merely claim that you won’t respond to threats.
China under Mao definitely seemed to do more than say they won’t respond to threats. Thus, the Korean war, and notably no nuclear threats were made, proving conventional war was still possible in a post-nuclear world.
For practical decisions, I don’t think threatbots actually exist if you’re a state by form other than natural disasters. Mao’s china was not good at natural disasters, but probably because Mao was a marxist and legalist, not because he conspicuously ignored them. When his subordinates made mistakes which let him know something was going wrong in their province, I think he would punish the subordinate and try to fix it.
FDT doesn’t unconditionally prescribe ignoring threats. The idea of ignoring threats has merit, but FDT specifically only points out that ignoring a threat sometimes has the effect of the threat (or other threats) not getting made (even if only counterfactually). Which is not always the case.
Consider a ThreatBot that always makes threats (and follows through on them), regardless of whether you ignore them. If you ignore ThreatBot’s threats, you are worse off. On the other hand, there might be a prior ThreatBotMaker that decides whether to make a ThreatBot depending on whether you ignore ThreatBot’s threats. What FDT prescribes in this case is not directly ignoring ThreatBot’s threats, but rather taking notice of ThreatBotMaker’s behavior, namely that it won’t make a ThreatBot if you ignore ThreatBot’s threats. This argument only goes through when there is/was a ThreatBotMaker, it doesn’t work if there is only a ThreatBot.
If a ThreatBot appears through some process that doesn’t respond to your decision to respond to ThreatBot’s threats, then FDT prescribes responding to ThreatBot’s threats. But also if something (else) makes threats depending on your reputation for responding to threats, then responding to even an unconditionally manifesting ThreatBot’s threats is not recommended by FDT. Not directly as a recommendation to ignore something, rather as a consequence of taking notice of the process that responds to your having a reputation of not responding to any threats. Similarly with stances where you merely claim that you won’t respond to threats.
China under Mao definitely seemed to do more than say they won’t respond to threats. Thus, the Korean war, and notably no nuclear threats were made, proving conventional war was still possible in a post-nuclear world.
For practical decisions, I don’t think threatbots actually exist if you’re a state by form other than natural disasters. Mao’s china was not good at natural disasters, but probably because Mao was a marxist and legalist, not because he conspicuously ignored them. When his subordinates made mistakes which let him know something was going wrong in their province, I think he would punish the subordinate and try to fix it.