Actually, the second one pretty much is only meaningful to Copenhagen.
Everett’s great insight was to treat measurement as a physical process, whcih required building a physical observer inside the model, aka a neural net:
There are elements of specialness in non .CI approaches , for instance .MW often requires measurements to be irreversible FAPP. “Special” is a term that should be avoided.
No, he does not, beyond the barest suggestion that they might be possible (which is not exactly an idea that was original to Everett, nor would he have claimed it was).
He says, in effect: To reduce the confusion we see when we think of our observations as some kind of magical process completely separate from the universe we’re observing, and to remove the temptation to think of them being carried out by some kind of immaterial souls, let’s explicitly consider observations being performed by machines.
Which is a very good idea, but what’s insightful here isn’t the mere idea that machines might be able to perform the functions we call vision and hearing and whatnot, it’s the idea of seeing scientific measurements in those terms and seeing what it means for the interpretation of quantum mechanics.
Don’t you think it at all interesting that he left theoretical physics, and later worked on computer vision and hearing?
Not very, no. (Is it even true? The only sources I can easily find online don’t say he worked in those fields, though what they do say is certainly consistent with his having done some work on them.)
Sure, it could be (e.g.) that he had a lifelong obsession with the idea of computers performing human tasks and that this is part of why the relative-state formulation occurred to him. That would be an interesting biographical detail. It’s not clear to me why this would have much actual importance, though. In particular, it wouldn’t make this correct:
Everett describes the result of the measurement being stored in the memory of the machine, and he called this measurement record “relative state”, hence the Relative State Formulation. The machine’s measurement records are relative state.
(What Everett means by “relative state” is not the contents of the machine’s memory. You could equally speak of the relative state of the thing being observed, relative to the state of the machine’s memory. It is frequently convenient to consider the state of the machine’s memory relative to the state of the thing being observed, but e.g. it’s also convenient to consider the state of one part of its memory relative to the state of another, or the state of one machine’s memory relative to that of another’s. “Relative state” is not about measurement records, it’s a more general concept some of whose applications involve measurement records.)
Which is a very good idea, but what’s insightful here isn’t the mere idea that machines might be able to perform the functions we call vision and hearing and whatnot, it’s the idea of seeing scientific measurements in those terms and seeing what it means for the interpretation of quantum mechanics.
From what I can tell in Everett’s papers, he wasn’t aiming for a simple interpretation.
He wanted to make a mathematical model wherein measurement happens.
That’s a model that hasn’t been created yet. I figure it’s a matter of time.
(I remark, though, that his thesis contains a number of approving-sounding uses of “simple”. E.g., ‘The whole issue of the transition from “possible” to “actual” is taken care of in the theory in a very simple way’ which Everett clearly regards as desirable. And, at the start of section 6, ‘The theory based on pure wave mechanics is a conceptually simple, causal theory …’ and so on, which again seems to see simplicity as a desirable characteristic. This is of course entirely standard; simplicity is nearly always seen by scientists as something to aim for. Do you have particular reason to think Everett’s view was different?)
That’s a model that hasn’t been created yet.
I think Everett’s thesis contains such a model, admittedly in a very simple boiled-down form. What more are you looking for?
it’s the idea of seeing scientific measurements in those terms and seeing what it means for the interpretation of quantum mechanics.
My response is that Everett wasn’t trying to provide an Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics.
The Relative State Formulation of Quantum Mechanics isn’t an interpertation. It’s a formulation.
It’s an actual plan to build an actual mathematical model that does something no other mathematical model has ever done: model a measurement being made.
I think Everett’s thesis contains such a model, admittedly in a very simple boiled-down form. What more are you looking for?
I beg to differ. Everett’s thesis contains the requirements for such a model. Requirements that lend themselves to a software implementation.
I think we all understand the difference between software requirements, and actual software, right?
Everett wasn’t trying to provide an Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics
Neither did I claim that he was. (Though he does describe what he’s doing as offering a “metatheory for the standard theory”, and I don’t think it’s so very far from providing an interpretation.) I said he is interested in what the inclusion of observers in the system means for the interpretation of quantum mechanics, and I think he clearly is.
The Relative State Formulation of Quantum Mechanics isn’t an interpretation. It’s a formulation.
You can parrot Sean Carroll, sure, but I find his MWI advocacy unconvincing, let alone yours. At least he derives a thing or two in http://arxiv.org/abs/1405.7907 .
Well, it seems to me Everett laid down the requirements. Not the code. Here’s a project for the code.
No, it’s just some words. Again, consider taking a course or two.
Actually, the second one pretty much is only meaningful to Copenhagen.
Everett’s great insight was to treat measurement as a physical process, whcih required building a physical observer inside the model, aka a neural net:
http://philosophyfaculty.ucsd.edu/faculty/wuthrich/PhilPhys/EverettHugh1957PhDThesis_BarrettComments.pdf
page 9
There are elements of specialness in non .CI approaches , for instance .MW often requires measurements to be irreversible FAPP. “Special” is a term that should be avoided.
The idea is for a machine to produce measurement records and store them in memory.
He uses the words “even brain cells” as one way to implement that.
You keep talking about stuff you don’t understand. Consider taking a QM and a Quantum Information course.
Do me a favor and read page 9, the section on observation:
http://philosophyfaculty.ucsd.edu/faculty/wuthrich/PhilPhys/EverettHugh1957PhDThesis_BarrettComments.pdf
Does he not describe computer vision/hearing?
Don’t you think it at all interesting that he left theoretical physics, and later worked on computer vision and hearing?
No, he does not, beyond the barest suggestion that they might be possible (which is not exactly an idea that was original to Everett, nor would he have claimed it was).
He says, in effect: To reduce the confusion we see when we think of our observations as some kind of magical process completely separate from the universe we’re observing, and to remove the temptation to think of them being carried out by some kind of immaterial souls, let’s explicitly consider observations being performed by machines.
Which is a very good idea, but what’s insightful here isn’t the mere idea that machines might be able to perform the functions we call vision and hearing and whatnot, it’s the idea of seeing scientific measurements in those terms and seeing what it means for the interpretation of quantum mechanics.
Not very, no. (Is it even true? The only sources I can easily find online don’t say he worked in those fields, though what they do say is certainly consistent with his having done some work on them.)
Sure, it could be (e.g.) that he had a lifelong obsession with the idea of computers performing human tasks and that this is part of why the relative-state formulation occurred to him. That would be an interesting biographical detail. It’s not clear to me why this would have much actual importance, though. In particular, it wouldn’t make this correct:
(What Everett means by “relative state” is not the contents of the machine’s memory. You could equally speak of the relative state of the thing being observed, relative to the state of the machine’s memory. It is frequently convenient to consider the state of the machine’s memory relative to the state of the thing being observed, but e.g. it’s also convenient to consider the state of one part of its memory relative to the state of another, or the state of one machine’s memory relative to that of another’s. “Relative state” is not about measurement records, it’s a more general concept some of whose applications involve measurement records.)
From what I can tell in Everett’s papers, he wasn’t aiming for a simple interpretation.
He wanted to make a mathematical model wherein measurement happens.
That’s a model that hasn’t been created yet. I figure it’s a matter of time.
Perhaps not. Did I (or someone else) say he was?
(I remark, though, that his thesis contains a number of approving-sounding uses of “simple”. E.g., ‘The whole issue of the transition from “possible” to “actual” is taken care of in the theory in a very simple way’ which Everett clearly regards as desirable. And, at the start of section 6, ‘The theory based on pure wave mechanics is a conceptually simple, causal theory …’ and so on, which again seems to see simplicity as a desirable characteristic. This is of course entirely standard; simplicity is nearly always seen by scientists as something to aim for. Do you have particular reason to think Everett’s view was different?)
I think Everett’s thesis contains such a model, admittedly in a very simple boiled-down form. What more are you looking for?
You said:
My response is that Everett wasn’t trying to provide an Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics.
The Relative State Formulation of Quantum Mechanics isn’t an interpertation. It’s a formulation.
It’s an actual plan to build an actual mathematical model that does something no other mathematical model has ever done: model a measurement being made.
I beg to differ. Everett’s thesis contains the requirements for such a model. Requirements that lend themselves to a software implementation.
I think we all understand the difference between software requirements, and actual software, right?
Well, it seems to me Everett laid down the requirements. Not the code. Here’s a project for the code.
Neither did I claim that he was. (Though he does describe what he’s doing as offering a “metatheory for the standard theory”, and I don’t think it’s so very far from providing an interpretation.) I said he is interested in what the inclusion of observers in the system means for the interpretation of quantum mechanics, and I think he clearly is.
You can parrot Sean Carroll, sure, but I find his MWI advocacy unconvincing, let alone yours. At least he derives a thing or two in http://arxiv.org/abs/1405.7907 .
No, it’s just some words. Again, consider taking a course or two.
I am arguing against Many Worlds, if you can’t tell.
The fact that shminux had trouble telling that suggests that you aren’t doing a very good job explaining yourself.