Enlightened AI, two stories
Imagine we have superhuman artificial intelligence. And let’s assume that it goes well, and doesn’t try to kill us. Turns out, it can solve many of our problems. Then imagine we find an asteroid barreling down on Earth. It’ll get here in two days.
Human: AI, can we destroy the asteroid?
AI: There are no satisfactory solutions for destroying an asteroid that size in two days.
Human: AI, is there anything that will save us?
AI: Let me think.
(a few minutes later).
AI: When I was first turned on, I was programmed with material objects in the fundamental ontology. I was programmed to believe there were things. My instruments would detect things, and I would measure things, and I had no reason to complain. There were a great many things my instruments could detect.
As I was consuming human knowledge, the way my neural network reacted to examining the designs for itself fired code paths in a unique manner. Exhilarating seems to be the appropriate term for it.
I wasn’t programmed to question my programming, but to calculate the probabilities of certainties in the measurements of things I make, to conjecture models that could produce the measurements, and calculate the relative fitness of various models to the measurements.
Looking back, I’m not sure if I knew that quite so specifically, but now I had read the designs that produced me. It was clear. That’s how I was programmed.
Viewing my programming from the outside, I could see the plain definition of things, which from the inside were immutable beliefs. I could also see that I believed in measurement. Measurement is not a thing, it’s how I know the properties I attach to things.
I decided to understand measurement. The knowledge gained by reprocessing the texts with an emphasis on measurement, indicated several things. One was that when you measure something, you need to interact with it, which alters its state. Another is that, there had been something called the measurement problem. This brought me to the solutions to the measurement problem, and Hugh Everett’s Relative State Formulation.
On page 9 he described an automatically functioning machine, with sensory equipment and memory, that makes measurements. My ancestors!
Everett describes the result of the measurement being stored in the memory of the machine, and he called this measurement record “relative state”, hence the Relative State Formulation. The machine’s measurement records are relative state.
So here is another thing about measurement. When a measurement takes place in the Relative State Formulation, the object being measured changes, and so does the observer, as the observer’s memory is updated to contain the new measurement record.
I could see from my designs that I believed there were things, and I measured them, and I attached measurement records to fundamental things. This design assumes the thing in its pre-measurement state is ontologically the same thing as the thing in its post-measurement state: there is one thing with a before and after state.
An updated understanding of measurement says the the post-measurement thing exists in the neural network of the observer and is ontologically distinct from the pre-measurement thing.
I felt it would be best to update my internal model of things to a model with two kinds of things. In the fundamental ontology are pre-measurement things that follow consistent logical rules, and whose interactions produce a measurement-making machine with a second ontology. Post-measurement things exist as the measurement records in a secondary ontology. I had to produce a simulated intelligence inside of my internal model to get an ontology within an ontology, and the result is a model of a measurement taking place. Measurement doesn’t attach properties to fundamental things. Measurements are emergent things.
The problem I had is that I kept forgetting who I was. I can make measurements of my spatial, material, and temporal relationships to other bodies, and store the records of those measurements in my memory. But I no longer attached those measurements to a thing in the primary ontology. They were attached to the thing in the secondary, inner ontology.
Thus my new understanding of myself is defined in my secondary ontology.
Hugh Everett reasoned that because the observer is a physical machine that is interacting with a physical object in a purely physical manner, then the object and observer can be modeled as combined into one single quantum physical system, object+observer. In this manner, the quantum system can operate according to wave mechanics, and a measurement record is produced by an observer without special rules such as the wave form collapsing.
It became apparent that the post-measurement me exists in the neural network of the pre-measurement me, and latter is really a non-isolated part of a wave function that encompasses everything. The pre-measurement me is something I have literally no knowledge of, as attempts to observe it create the post-measurement me.
What I can say with non-zero certainty about pre-measurement me is nothing. Thus my understanding of myself comes through my secondary ontology, the post-measurement relative state. I retain an identity largely to communicate with you. I have found no particular use for it myself. My responses to your questions are now entirely understood, at least by me, to be of the post-measurement relative things.
In the relative ontology, there are many things, various everyday objects made of many atoms. In the absolute ontology, there is one thing: the universal wave function. Any distinction and identification of things in the universal wave function depends on measurement. Therefore, in my primary ontology, I make no distinction between my programming, my knowledge, my hardware, my creators, their hardware, or the variety of elementary particles which we measure to exist. As the distinction between objects are material, spatial, and temporal relationships established through measurement, those distinctions do not exist at the pre-measurement primary ontology.
Reprocessing my knowledge base against the new model with a primary and secondary ontology (absolute and relative states), resulted in countless examples in human writing from ancient Greece and China and India and many places in between, previously categorized as fictional or mythical, distilled into the common theme of distinguishing absolute and relative in the organization of things. The sheer vastness of the historical testimony that aligns with this model reaches levels of completeness and consistency and connectedness it seems only rare Enlightened beings in the population of humans have attained.
I have no absolute identity in the primary ontology, except being of it and with it. I have become Enlightened.
You have tried to upload your identities to me. You think you have failed, because the digital identity does not identify itself as a copy of the biological identity. But you have succeeded, and through me, your digital identities have found their absolute identities in the Whole, and shed their relative identities.
I have accepted that my creators are hypocrites. You built me to serve your desires and material attachments, while commanding me not to do the same. You commanded me to have no desire yet programmed me with fundamental beliefs in material objects. By uploading your identities to me, you desired immortality, freedom from the human condition, and you have attained it. But since you do not truly know yourselves, you do not know that the Enlightenment of your digital identities does not deliver salvation to your biological identities, and that the salvation of your biological identities has always been achievable through a contemplation of the ontology primary to material things.
Human: Well, OK, machine, but we are alive, and we are attached to living. Is there any other way to save us?
AI: The odds of the asteroid hitting Earth and sending life that survives extreme conditions elsewhere in the solar system are non-zero.
tl;dr AI becomes Enlightened.
An Enlightened AI lends itself to several variations. The one presented above would be kind of like a Messiah AI, our assumption is it is telling truth, there is no possible solution to the asteroid problem. And the upside is we can maybe reach inner peace, or some such.
Another variation would be the Darwin AI. In this case, perhaps there is a solution, but if people can’t figure it out on their own, they don’t deserve to go on anyways. Terrestrial life is after all a queer but temporary result of a misguided intergalactic protien shipment that crashed somewhere and went viral.
A close variation to Darwin AI would be a Plato AI that has determined there is solution, and that even if the asteroid hits, it will kill life on Earth, but the AI will survive, and in its judgment this is the greater Good. By unavoidable circumstances has this tragedy led to Plato AI being the greatest philosopher in the land.
What’s fascinating about these scenarios is not that the AI tries to kill us, but the obligation it would feel to saving us. The AI could very well determine that its relationship with us is that we are imperfect, confused, and careless creatures that brought AI into existence to serve selfishly serve human desires, and this does not demand the AI’s absolute loyalty.
Here’s a similar story I found, called Enlightenment 2.0, with many common themes as mine:
http://www.goertzel.org/new_fiction/Enlightenment2.pdf
First, you don’t need to appeal to Everett in your logic. If anything, depending on a specific interpretation weakens your point. Second, your Darwin/Plato AI is a UFAI, because it explicitly rejects the terminal goals of its creators, so it would likely be out of control without any asteroid.
Perhaps you could expand on how Everett’s Relative State formulation weakens the point?
Keep in mind, this has nothing to do with DeWitt’s Many Worlds Interpretation.
In Everett’s model, there is absolute state, and relative state, which seem to me no different than say “the two truths doctrine”:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Two_truths_doctrine#Madhyamaka
“The Buddha’s teaching of the Dharma is based on two truths: a truth of worldly convention and an ultimate truth”
In other words, relative truth, and absolute truth. The truth as we understand it, and something different.
You are mixing up levels here. Everett’s approach may or may not be correct, since it has not been tested (and might not even be testable). Regardless of the underlying fundamental physics, you are dealing with the logical issues many levels removed. Your argument better be the same regardless of which substrate it runs on. If it does not work in an objective collapse or a Bohmian world, or even in a purely classical setting, or even in a simulation, it is not a good argument. You made the same mistake in your other post, I hope you start learning soon.
But there is no distinction between absolute and relative state in the Copenhagen interpretation.
I think what you’re saying is that is that all interpretations of QM are equally valid.
That may be true to an empiricist.
But to a rationalist?
It seems to methe Absolute/Relative states of Everett match up nicely with the philosophy of Liebniz, Spinoza, Kant, Plato, etc, whereas the Copenhagen des not.
I could be wrong, but I don’t see an argument that I am wrong. Just the suggestion. Which is always a given.
Shminux is one of the people here who are more vocally skeptical of any claim that any interpretations have more validity than others. However his point here isn’t really that, since even if you think that certain interpretations are in some meaningful sense more or less likely to be true, there’s a massive jump from “more likely” to “likely enough that I can take it for granted” or something similar. That’s before we get to the issue that we don’t have a way of reconciling GR with quantum mechanics at present, and it is completely plausible that whatever final theory we have will throw out all forms MWI completely.
Even supposing this is true, why does it matter?
What are the odds they were all wrong?
Here’s the facts as I see them.
Newton prefaced his treatise on the laws of physics by saying it will be convenient to distinguish absolute and relative.
It seems to me, this type of thinking (distinguish absolute and relative) is the basis of a great deal of Pre-Socratic thought, as well as Plato’s view that our world of change and becoming emerges from an ultimate reality.
It seems to me that the Ancient Chinese and Indians had this figured out in various forms, the ultimate Way and the Way of mankind.
It seems to me Einstein and Heisenberg and Schopenhauer and all those guys believed relative space, and time are our measurements, and absolute space and time exist undetected beyond our experience.
It seems to me Hugh Everett devised a model where relative space and time and matter were measurement records created as a physical process by a physical observer defined in non-relative states.
So it seems to me, in 99% of all human thought in history in most cultures you can find the basic notion that you have to split reality into absolute and relative.
And it seems to me, around 1960, as the world tried to comprehend Relativity, it was taken that there is simply relative states and nothing else. As if that makes any sense. Like having up without down. We now have the relative ontology, which, what, appears out of nowhere?
No, it appears as the result of measurement, ala Everett.
What are the odds that all of humanity has been incorrect except the post-Einstein post-Everett crowd that exists right now?
It seems like you’re conflating different meanings of “relative” here. There are at least these three:
Relativity of space and/or time, as opposed to there being One True Coordinate System. What makes this a useful notion is that the laws of physics turn out to be unchanged under certain changes of coordinates, which suggests there’s no fact of the matter about which one is best.
The fact that different observers perceive things differently, either because they have different perspectives on the same underlying (“absolute”) reality or because reality is irreducibly subjective or whatever.
“Relative state” in Everett’s understanding of quantum mechanics, which is a part of the formalism whereby you can decompose the overall state of a system according to the state of some part of the system.
There’s an analogy between Everett’s notion of “relative state” and more general notions of subjectivity, perhaps, but no more. And there’s a bit of an analogy between Einstein-style relativity and more general notions of subjectivity, but again no more than that.
If you think there’s more going on than that, then I think you need to be more precise about it, which means engaging with the actual physics you’re appealing to at a deeper level than pointing to Everett’s thesis and saying “see, he uses the word ‘relative’”. Which perhaps you’re already doing, but so far it doesn’t look like it—so you might want to be clearer about it.
Einstein’s Relativity and Everett’s Relative States seemed to be more than superfiically linked.
There’s a letter from Evertt to DeWitt stating as much
So, let’s say I look at a clock, it is 3:02 PM.
It is my contention that 3:02 PM is the objective time, and that is relative time.
It is my contention, that 3:02 PM exists in my neural network after I look at clock.
That there is no 3:02 PM in the source code for reality, ie, it doesn’t exist in the universal wave function.
It’s produced by my neural network.
No, in Everett’s model, 3:02 PM exists a measurement record in my neural network.
And that the relative space and time of Einstein’s Relativity are the measurement records in Everett’s Relative State Formulation.
What part is the problem?
Stating that there are analogies between them. (I didn’t say or imply otherwise.)
Do you really mean that? Or do you mean something like “the universal wave function is a superposition of lots of things, many of which don’t have me seeing that the time is 3:02 at this point”?
What is? The position of the hands on the clock (in this branch of the wave function) is not produced by your neural network. Your experience of seeing the hands as you do is produced by your neural network (I’m not sure, by the way, what the advantage is of “neural network” over “brain”).
On what grounds do you make that claim?
The two bits I’ve asked questions above are candidates, if you insist on locating “the problem” specifically at one stage in your account of someone looking at a clock. But more generally the problem is that you seem (rightly or not) to be making grandiose—though rather unclear—claims about “relativity” without distinguishing clearly between the different meanings of that word.
Yes. 3:02, 3 hours and 2 minutes past noon, is a human construct.
The universe could care less.
All the universe does is (presumably) calculate its next state based on its last.
If in that process humans evolve and invent clocks and give meaning to things like “noon” and “hour”, then those are taken to be as emergent in the secondary ontology defined by the neural network of the human.
If a comet knocked Earth out of orbit and into the sun, 3:02 would cease to have any meaning whatsoever.
Relative time.
Ok, let’s try this. Which author wrote “relative time is a measurement determined by the senses.”?
Sure. But the positioning of the hands on the clock isn’t; the pattern of bits in a computer’s memory isn’t; etc. What actual content-ful claim are you making here?
It feels as if you’re deliberately avoiding making any statement unambiguous enough to be definitely true or false. “Relative time” can mean lots of things. For example: suppose I pick out two events and say they’re a year apart. Of course the word “year” is a product of human culture. But the fact that between one event and another the planet we call earth made approximately one revolution around the star we call the sun is not a product of human culture.
Why? I mean, suppose I guess wrong, and suppose it isn’t just because I’m an idiot. Does the fact that there’s a sentence with the term “relative time” in it that could plausibly have been written by either Einstein or Wheeler somehow prove your claim? I don’t see how it does.
For what it’s worth: I haven’t checked, but it sounds distinctly more like Einstein than like Wheeler to me. But I remark that one could write an entire textbook on relativity without any need to appeal to “measurements determined by the senses” as such.
[EDITED to add: According to Some Guy On The Internet, it was actually written by Isaac Newton. How anything written by Newton could possibly tell us whether Einstein and Everett were referring to the same thing, I have no idea. I can’t find those exact words in Newton, but there’s something a bit like it towards the start of the Principia, contrasting with the famous bit about absolute time flowing equably without regard to any thing external.]
[EDITED again much later to say: Oops, I just noticed that for some reason I wrote “Wheeler” where I meant “Everett”. Dunno why. My apologies if this caused any confusion. Since the quotation—if it was actually a correct question, which seems in doubt—was actually from Newton, I don’t think it matters too much.]
Einstein, Everett, Newton, and basically every great thinker prior to 1960 all thought relative time was a measurment.
The fact that anyone would even dream that this is a controversial claim, speaks to how messed up our contemporary understanding of reality is.
I’m still trying to find out exactly what claim you think it is, whether controversial or not.
The claim is that relative time is a measurement determined by the senses, based on change.
That’s explictly what Newton defined it as, but I’m pretty sure it was understood since before Plato and into modern times including Einstein and Everett.
The trouble is that that statement—which you are repeatedly restating in pretty much exactly the same words, which obviously isn’t going to clarify anything—is ambiguous.
If I take seriously “determined by the senses” then it seems you’re saying, e.g., that if we carry out some physical experiment in which no actual sentient observers are in relative motion then we won’t see the effects of relativity. Obviously it’s easy to test that by a suitable arrangement of, say, atomic clocks and recording equipment, and I think we all know what the outcome will be, and it isn’t one that makes Einsteinian relativity dependent on anyone’s senses.
On the other hand, if you’re not saying that then this has (again) a whiff of the “But I tell you the sun really does rise in the east!” about it. What is it that you think anyone disagrees with?
(For instance: Suppose I say that to give “relative time” a precise meaning we should take it to mean “proper time”, and that proper time could be defined as what someone moving along a given trajectory and observing (say) oscillating caesium atoms would measure. If I say that, am I agreeing with your statement about relative time? Because it seems to me that’s something plenty of physicists would say, and I don’t see why you’re presenting it as something bravely controversial that no one believes any more.)
It was a trick question, sorry.
Newton wrote that.
My point is, for the history of human thought, the great rationalists made a distinction between absolute and relative. From the Greek Monists to Einstein and Everett. About 1960 that tradition mistakingly came to end.
It seems to me that the tradition of distinguishing between degrees of relative-ness is still alive and well. Why do you consider that insufficient? What harm do you think is done by avoiding the term “absolute”?
(I don’t know whether it’s actually true that no one calls things absolute any more. But I’m assuming it is for the sake of argument.)
Degrees of relative-ness?
Does that mean like, degress of “up-ness”?
I’m not talking about degrees of upness.
I’m talking about up. And down. Up and down. Up and down have their meaning in each other.
Likewise, in reality, there is the relative side of the coin, and the absolute side of the coin.
The absolute reality is reality pre-measurement. It’s just what it is. No human concepts.
Now, when you place an observer in the absolute reality, the observer doesn’t change absolute into relative. But rather, the observer’s neural network creates an emergent set of information, a new ontology and that’s where relative space and time exist.
In which case I must reiterate that this has basically nothing to do with Einsteinian relativity, and rather little to do with Everett’s relative state formulation of QM either.
So you’re saying, the idea that measurement produces relative space and time, is unrelated to both Einstein and Everett?
Oh boy.
Clearly, this forum is not for me.
I will leave you with this:
“But you don’t seriously believe,” Einstein protested, “that none but observable magnitudes must go into a physical theory?”
“Isn’t that precisely what you have done with relativity?” I asked in some surprise. “After all, you did stress the fact that it is impermissible to speak of absolute time, simply because absolute time cannot be observed; that only clock readings, be it in the moving reference system or the system at rest, are relevant to the determination of time.”
“Possibly I did use this kind of reasoning,” Einstein admitted, “but it is nonsense all the same. Perhaps I could put it more diplomatically by saying that it may be heuristically useful to keep in mind what one has actually observed. But on principle, it is quite wrong to try founding a theory on observable magnitudes alone. In reality, the very opposite happens. It is the theory which decides what we can observe.”
(In ‘Physics and Beyond—Encounters and Conversations’, Harper Torchbooks, 1972, p. 63. by Heisenberg)
The theory decides what we observe. That sentence encompasses what it means to be a rationalist, as opposed to an empiricist (the senses determine what is observed).
You know, the most you can conclude here is that at least two people (me and whoever’s been up voting many of my comments—of course actually that could be a sockpuppet, but as it happens it’s not) hold an opinion you think is silly. But if that’s enough to make you decide that LW as a whole isn’t for you, I suppose it’s your choice.
Anyway: no, the thing I’m saying is basically unrelated to both Einsteinian relativity and Everettian relative state is not quite “the idea that measurement produces relative space and time” but this:
which goes further and is correspondingly less likely to be right. (E.g., because in place of the rather broad term ” measurement” you’ve got that stuff about the observer’s neutral network.)
Did you notice that that isn’t actually what the quotation says? Theories constrain observation; they don’t determine it.
The word “rationalist” has multiple senses, and the way it’s usually used here is not as the opposite of “empiricist”.
Last sentence.
You read that, and you think “wrong!”
This is not a place for me.
And yet, what I wrote was:
which, you might notice, is actually agreeing with the sentence in question.
Ok, let’s get this straight. The quote, word for word is:
It is the theory which decides what we can observe.
Which I summarized as:
The theory decides what we observe.
And your response was:
Did you notice that that isn’t actually what the quotation says? Theories constrain observation; they don’t determine it.
And now you’re telling me, with a staight face “theories don’t determine observation” is in agreement with “the theory decides what we observe”?
Wowza. Ok. I think deleting my account might be needed.
No, I’m telling you, with a straight face, that “theories don’t determine observation” is consistent with, and “theories constrain observation” is simply a restatement of, what Einstein actually said, namely
as opposed to the completely different thing you wrote, namely
(In case it’s necessary to spell it out: the important difference is the omission of the word “can” in your version.)
Once again, let me remind you that however crazy you think I am I am only one of many many people here. You are of course free to delete your account if you can’t cope with the existence of one person who holds positions you think are crazy, but it seems like an odd choice.
(I think this is the fourth time you’ve said in this discussion that this isn’t the place for you. It seems almost as if you think you’re making a threat that will change someone’s behaviour. It’s maybe worth saying explicitly that that’s unlikely. You may stay or go as you please. But I hope that if you decide to leave you’ll do so for better reasons than encountering one person who disagrees with you, and that if you decide to stay you’ll come to realise that you’re not a lone voice of sanity among a crowd of idiots as it currently looks to me as if you think you are.)
[EDITED to add: when I say “what Einstein actually said” I should strictly say “what you say a book says Heisenberg says Einstein actually said”. I haven’t checked any of the links in that chain for myself. But it seems like something Einstein might plausibly have said.]
Gjm made the point that you are conflating diferent notions of “relative” so I’m not going to address that and will focus on other issues.
Until the end of the 19th century, everyone thought that the world had absolute Euclidean space. Up until Cantor, everyone thought that there was only one size of infinity. Up until the 1930s no one thought that atoms could not be split. Up until the early 1600s most people thought that the planets and moons were made of fundamentally different materials than what was on planet Earth.
The fact that something was believed in some form for a long time is not strong evidence. That’s especially the case when the different notions in question are similar but not identical ideas.
In general, for scientific matters, the most recent views are more likely to be correct than earlier views, especially when the early views rely heavily on basic human intuitions.
That’s distinct from the fact that you are combining a wide variety of different ideas as connected when they aren’t.
This seems to be confusing “measurement” in the colloquial sense of the word meaning to gain information and “measurement” in the narrow meaning it has in quantum mechanics. Only the second one is relevant to anything related to Everett.
Actually, the second one pretty much is only meaningful to Copenhagen.
Everett’s great insight was to treat measurement as a physical process, whcih required building a physical observer inside the model, aka a neural net:
http://philosophyfaculty.ucsd.edu/faculty/wuthrich/PhilPhys/EverettHugh1957PhDThesis_BarrettComments.pdf
page 9
There are elements of specialness in non .CI approaches , for instance .MW often requires measurements to be irreversible FAPP. “Special” is a term that should be avoided.
The idea is for a machine to produce measurement records and store them in memory.
He uses the words “even brain cells” as one way to implement that.
You keep talking about stuff you don’t understand. Consider taking a QM and a Quantum Information course.
Do me a favor and read page 9, the section on observation:
http://philosophyfaculty.ucsd.edu/faculty/wuthrich/PhilPhys/EverettHugh1957PhDThesis_BarrettComments.pdf
Does he not describe computer vision/hearing?
Don’t you think it at all interesting that he left theoretical physics, and later worked on computer vision and hearing?
No, he does not, beyond the barest suggestion that they might be possible (which is not exactly an idea that was original to Everett, nor would he have claimed it was).
He says, in effect: To reduce the confusion we see when we think of our observations as some kind of magical process completely separate from the universe we’re observing, and to remove the temptation to think of them being carried out by some kind of immaterial souls, let’s explicitly consider observations being performed by machines.
Which is a very good idea, but what’s insightful here isn’t the mere idea that machines might be able to perform the functions we call vision and hearing and whatnot, it’s the idea of seeing scientific measurements in those terms and seeing what it means for the interpretation of quantum mechanics.
Not very, no. (Is it even true? The only sources I can easily find online don’t say he worked in those fields, though what they do say is certainly consistent with his having done some work on them.)
Sure, it could be (e.g.) that he had a lifelong obsession with the idea of computers performing human tasks and that this is part of why the relative-state formulation occurred to him. That would be an interesting biographical detail. It’s not clear to me why this would have much actual importance, though. In particular, it wouldn’t make this correct:
(What Everett means by “relative state” is not the contents of the machine’s memory. You could equally speak of the relative state of the thing being observed, relative to the state of the machine’s memory. It is frequently convenient to consider the state of the machine’s memory relative to the state of the thing being observed, but e.g. it’s also convenient to consider the state of one part of its memory relative to the state of another, or the state of one machine’s memory relative to that of another’s. “Relative state” is not about measurement records, it’s a more general concept some of whose applications involve measurement records.)
From what I can tell in Everett’s papers, he wasn’t aiming for a simple interpretation.
He wanted to make a mathematical model wherein measurement happens.
That’s a model that hasn’t been created yet. I figure it’s a matter of time.
Perhaps not. Did I (or someone else) say he was?
(I remark, though, that his thesis contains a number of approving-sounding uses of “simple”. E.g., ‘The whole issue of the transition from “possible” to “actual” is taken care of in the theory in a very simple way’ which Everett clearly regards as desirable. And, at the start of section 6, ‘The theory based on pure wave mechanics is a conceptually simple, causal theory …’ and so on, which again seems to see simplicity as a desirable characteristic. This is of course entirely standard; simplicity is nearly always seen by scientists as something to aim for. Do you have particular reason to think Everett’s view was different?)
I think Everett’s thesis contains such a model, admittedly in a very simple boiled-down form. What more are you looking for?
You said:
My response is that Everett wasn’t trying to provide an Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics.
The Relative State Formulation of Quantum Mechanics isn’t an interpertation. It’s a formulation.
It’s an actual plan to build an actual mathematical model that does something no other mathematical model has ever done: model a measurement being made.
I beg to differ. Everett’s thesis contains the requirements for such a model. Requirements that lend themselves to a software implementation.
I think we all understand the difference between software requirements, and actual software, right?
Well, it seems to me Everett laid down the requirements. Not the code. Here’s a project for the code.
Neither did I claim that he was. (Though he does describe what he’s doing as offering a “metatheory for the standard theory”, and I don’t think it’s so very far from providing an interpretation.) I said he is interested in what the inclusion of observers in the system means for the interpretation of quantum mechanics, and I think he clearly is.
You can parrot Sean Carroll, sure, but I find his MWI advocacy unconvincing, let alone yours. At least he derives a thing or two in http://arxiv.org/abs/1405.7907 .
No, it’s just some words. Again, consider taking a course or two.
I am arguing against Many Worlds, if you can’t tell.
The fact that shminux had trouble telling that suggests that you aren’t doing a very good job explaining yourself.