None of which makes it any less true that words-with-definitions are sometimes useful in private thought as well as in communication. For instance, technical terms in mathematics such as “transitive” or “uncountable” can be used robustly in lengthy chains of reasoning largely because they have precise definitions. The fact that when I use such a word (privately or publicly) I have plenty of mental machinery linked with it besides the bare definition doesn’t stop it being a definition. (Perhaps you’re using “define” in what seems to me to be an eccentric way, such that in fact essentially no words have actual definitions. Feel free, but I don’t find that helpful.)
I think we agree, I’m not sure what distinction you are trying to show in this comment. Consider chess: what is the definition of knight’s moves? There are rules of the game that the actions of the player must follow, the distilled form of conclusions, and there is overarching machinery of thought. The rules make sure that you stay within the game after however many moves you need, and the thought allows to find the winning moves.
You seemed to be disagreeing with me, but declined to say just what your disagreement was. So I had to guess, and I tried to respond to the criticism I thought you were making. Now it appears that we are in agreement. Fair enough; what then was your point?
(My point, in case it wasn’t obvious, was that I think Eliezer erred when he wrote that the only legitimate use of definitions is to ease communication; I think they are sometimes helpful in private thought too.)
None of which makes it any less true that words-with-definitions are sometimes useful in private thought as well as in communication. For instance, technical terms in mathematics such as “transitive” or “uncountable” can be used robustly in lengthy chains of reasoning largely because they have precise definitions. The fact that when I use such a word (privately or publicly) I have plenty of mental machinery linked with it besides the bare definition doesn’t stop it being a definition. (Perhaps you’re using “define” in what seems to me to be an eccentric way, such that in fact essentially no words have actual definitions. Feel free, but I don’t find that helpful.)
I think we agree, I’m not sure what distinction you are trying to show in this comment. Consider chess: what is the definition of knight’s moves? There are rules of the game that the actions of the player must follow, the distilled form of conclusions, and there is overarching machinery of thought. The rules make sure that you stay within the game after however many moves you need, and the thought allows to find the winning moves.
You seemed to be disagreeing with me, but declined to say just what your disagreement was. So I had to guess, and I tried to respond to the criticism I thought you were making. Now it appears that we are in agreement. Fair enough; what then was your point?
(My point, in case it wasn’t obvious, was that I think Eliezer erred when he wrote that the only legitimate use of definitions is to ease communication; I think they are sometimes helpful in private thought too.)
“I think they are sometimes helpful in private thought too.”
Here I think you’re erring: definitions are absolutely necessary in conscious thought. Without them, you don’t have conscious processing.