The definitions you specify for a word don’t actually define it, they merely name a concept on your map. The concept is far richer than the “definition” by which you found it, and the lever of the word that you attached to it allows to patch into the deeper machinery of your mind. You can make use the levers yourself, to craft new structures with your own machinery.
None of which makes it any less true that words-with-definitions are sometimes useful in private thought as well as in communication. For instance, technical terms in mathematics such as “transitive” or “uncountable” can be used robustly in lengthy chains of reasoning largely because they have precise definitions. The fact that when I use such a word (privately or publicly) I have plenty of mental machinery linked with it besides the bare definition doesn’t stop it being a definition. (Perhaps you’re using “define” in what seems to me to be an eccentric way, such that in fact essentially no words have actual definitions. Feel free, but I don’t find that helpful.)
I think we agree, I’m not sure what distinction you are trying to show in this comment. Consider chess: what is the definition of knight’s moves? There are rules of the game that the actions of the player must follow, the distilled form of conclusions, and there is overarching machinery of thought. The rules make sure that you stay within the game after however many moves you need, and the thought allows to find the winning moves.
You seemed to be disagreeing with me, but declined to say just what your disagreement was. So I had to guess, and I tried to respond to the criticism I thought you were making. Now it appears that we are in agreement. Fair enough; what then was your point?
(My point, in case it wasn’t obvious, was that I think Eliezer erred when he wrote that the only legitimate use of definitions is to ease communication; I think they are sometimes helpful in private thought too.)
A definition is not merely a name on your map, it’s the location in the greater scheme of the map, the longitude and latitude. A definition fixes a notion with respect to some other notions, all of which together form your machinery, your belief network, your map. This machinery may bear no relation to reality, but then, to me, the point of definitions is to be clear, not accurate.
The definitions you specify for a word don’t actually define it, they merely name a concept on your map. The concept is far richer than the “definition” by which you found it, and the lever of the word that you attached to it allows to patch into the deeper machinery of your mind. You can make use the levers yourself, to craft new structures with your own machinery.
None of which makes it any less true that words-with-definitions are sometimes useful in private thought as well as in communication. For instance, technical terms in mathematics such as “transitive” or “uncountable” can be used robustly in lengthy chains of reasoning largely because they have precise definitions. The fact that when I use such a word (privately or publicly) I have plenty of mental machinery linked with it besides the bare definition doesn’t stop it being a definition. (Perhaps you’re using “define” in what seems to me to be an eccentric way, such that in fact essentially no words have actual definitions. Feel free, but I don’t find that helpful.)
I think we agree, I’m not sure what distinction you are trying to show in this comment. Consider chess: what is the definition of knight’s moves? There are rules of the game that the actions of the player must follow, the distilled form of conclusions, and there is overarching machinery of thought. The rules make sure that you stay within the game after however many moves you need, and the thought allows to find the winning moves.
You seemed to be disagreeing with me, but declined to say just what your disagreement was. So I had to guess, and I tried to respond to the criticism I thought you were making. Now it appears that we are in agreement. Fair enough; what then was your point?
(My point, in case it wasn’t obvious, was that I think Eliezer erred when he wrote that the only legitimate use of definitions is to ease communication; I think they are sometimes helpful in private thought too.)
“I think they are sometimes helpful in private thought too.”
Here I think you’re erring: definitions are absolutely necessary in conscious thought. Without them, you don’t have conscious processing.
A definition is not merely a name on your map, it’s the location in the greater scheme of the map, the longitude and latitude. A definition fixes a notion with respect to some other notions, all of which together form your machinery, your belief network, your map. This machinery may bear no relation to reality, but then, to me, the point of definitions is to be clear, not accurate.