Also, dualism is a much broader group of models than is admitted here.
Yep
dualism hardly ‘defies’ physics. In dualism, physics is simply ‘under’ a meta-physics that includes consciousness as another category, without even changing physic
Well, there are some pretty difficult issues around causal closure, interactionism, and eiphenomenalism.
Interactionism would simply require an extension of physics to include the interaction between the two, which would not defy physics any more than adding the strong nuclear force did. You can hold against it that we do not know how it works, but that’s a weak point because there are many things where we still don’t know how they work.
Epiphenomenalism seems irrelevant to me since it is simply a way you could posit things to be. A normal dualist ignores the idea because there is no reason to posit it. We can obviously see how consciousness has effects on the body, so there simply isn’t a reason to believe it only goes the other way. Additionally, to me, Epiphenomenalism seems clearly false. Dualism as a whole has never said the body can’t have effects on consciousness either.
Causal closure seems unrelated to the actuality of physics. It is simply a statement of philosophical belief. It is one dualists obviously disagree with in the strong version, but that is hardly incompatibility with actual physics. Causal closure is not used to any real effect, and is hard to reconcile with how things seem to actually be. You could argue that causal closure is even denying things like the idea of math, and the idea of physics being things that can meaningfully affect behavior.
Interactionism would simply require an extension of physics to include the interaction between the two, which would not defy physics any more than adding the strong nuclear force did.
It would be a problem if all the existing forces fully explain everything,IE closure.
. A normal dualist ignores the idea because there is no reason to posit it.
If you do have closure , and you don’t have overdetermination, then you get eiphenomenalism whether you want it or not.
Causal closure seems unrelated to the actuality of physics
I partly agree. I don’t see how closure can be proven without proving determinism.
Yep
Well, there are some pretty difficult issues around causal closure, interactionism, and eiphenomenalism.
Interactionism would simply require an extension of physics to include the interaction between the two, which would not defy physics any more than adding the strong nuclear force did. You can hold against it that we do not know how it works, but that’s a weak point because there are many things where we still don’t know how they work.
Epiphenomenalism seems irrelevant to me since it is simply a way you could posit things to be. A normal dualist ignores the idea because there is no reason to posit it. We can obviously see how consciousness has effects on the body, so there simply isn’t a reason to believe it only goes the other way. Additionally, to me, Epiphenomenalism seems clearly false. Dualism as a whole has never said the body can’t have effects on consciousness either.
Causal closure seems unrelated to the actuality of physics. It is simply a statement of philosophical belief. It is one dualists obviously disagree with in the strong version, but that is hardly incompatibility with actual physics. Causal closure is not used to any real effect, and is hard to reconcile with how things seem to actually be. You could argue that causal closure is even denying things like the idea of math, and the idea of physics being things that can meaningfully affect behavior.
It would be a problem if all the existing forces fully explain everything,IE closure.
If you do have closure , and you don’t have overdetermination, then you get eiphenomenalism whether you want it or not.
I partly agree. I don’t see how closure can be proven without proving determinism.