Okay, can you just state clearly whether you one-box or two-box, and whether you smoke or not-smoke in the smoking lesion problem, so that I understand what your position is, before trying to understand why it is?
I take the one box in Newcomb, and I do not smoke in the smoking lesion.
My position is that they are the same problem. The million is already there or it is not, and the lesion is there or it is not. I cannot change that in either case. But I still make a real decision, one that will be correlated with the outcome, and I choose the winning one.
I can’t even begin to model myself as “liking” smoking—it gives a disgusting smell that clings to everything and even being near second-hand smoke makes for uncomfortable breathing. If I try to model myself as someone who likes smoking, I don’t see myself living, because I’ve been altered beyond recognition.
Add to that that it seems to be a problem without a correct answer (“yes” seems to be the preferred option, given that there is no statement that you prefer smoking without cancer over smoking with cancer, thus “you prefer to smoke” + “some cancer related stuff that you may or may not have an opinion about” = “go smoke already”. But this isn’t the direct correct answer because if you take another worldview and look at the problem, “to smoke is to admit that you have this genetic flaw and thus you have cancer”), and I have massive problems when it comes to understanding this sort of thing.
This question seems to have the same thing going on—pick one! A) “everyone is tortured” or B) “everyone gets a dust speck”. But wait, there’s some numbers going on in the background where there’s either a lot of clones of you or only one of you. And if everyone gets tortured then there’s only one of you.
Here it is left unsaid that torture is far far far worse than the dust speck for a single individual, but the issue remains: I see “Do a really really really bad thing” or “Do a meh thing” and then some fancy attempts to trip up various logic systems—What about the logic that, hey, A is always worse than B? … I guess you could fix this by there being OTHER people present, so that it’s a “you get tortured” vs “you and everyone else (3^^^3) get a dust speck”… but then there’d be loopholes in the region of “yes, but my preferences prefer a world where there are people other than me, so I’ll take torture if that means I get to exist in such a world”.
As for one-box/two-box, I’d open B up, and if it was empty I’d take the contents of A home. If it contained the cash, well, I dunno. I guess I’d leave the 1000 behind, if the whole “if you take both then B is empty” idea was true. Maybe it’s false. Maybe it’s true! Regardless of that, I just got a million bucks, and an extra $1000, well, that’s not all that much after receiving a whole million. (Yes, you could do stuff with that money, like buying malaria nets or something, but I am not an optimal rational agent, my thinking capacity is limited, and I’d rather bank the $1m than get tripped up by $1000 because I got greedy). … weirdly enough, if you change the numbers so that A contained $1000 and B contained $1001, I’d open up B first… and then regardless of seeing the money, I’d take A home too.
Feel free to point out the holes in my thinking—I’d prefer examples that are not too “out there” because my answers tend to not be based on the numbers but on all the circumstances around it—that $1m would see me work on what I’d want to work on for the rest of my life, and that $1000 would reduce the time I’d need to spend working for doing what I wanna do by about a month (or 3 weeks).
I can’t even begin to model myself as “liking” smoking
Then for the “smoking lesion” problem to be any use to you, you need to perform a sort of mental translation in which it isn’t about smoking but about some other (perhaps imaginary) activity that you do enjoy but is associated with harmful outcomes. Maybe it’s eating chocolate and the harmful outcome is diabetes. Maybe it’s having lots of sex and the harmful outcome is syphilis. Maybe it’s spending all your time sitting alone and reading and the harmful outcome is heart disease. The important thing is to keep the structure of the thing the same: doing X is associated with bad outcome Y, it turns out (perhaps surprisingly) that this is not because X causes Y but because some other thing causes both X and Y, you find yourself very much wanting to do X, so now what do you do?
Having a smoking lesion make you choose smoking is vague. Does it make you choose smoking by increasing the utility you gain from smoking, but not affecting your ability to reason based on this utility? Or does it make you choose smoking by affecting your ability to do logical reasoning?
In the former case, switching from nonsmoking to smoking because you made a logical conclusion should not affect your chances of dying, even though switching to smoking in general should affect your chance of dying.
In the latter case, switching to smoking should affect your chance of dying, but you are then asking a question which presupposes under some circumstances that you can’t answer it.
I went looking around on wikipedia and found Kavka’s toxin puzzle which seems to be about “you can get a billion dollars if you intend to drink this poison (which will hurt a lot for a whole day similar to the worst torture imaginable but otherwise leave no lasting effects) tomorrow evening, but I’ll pay you tonight”… but there I don’t get the paradox either—whats stopping you from creating a sub agent (informing a friend) with the task of convincing you not to drink AFTER you’ve gotten the money? … Possibly by force. Possibly by relying on saying things in a manner that you don’t know that he knows he has to do this. Possibly with a whole lot of actors. Like scheduling a text “I am perfectly fine, there is nothing wrong with me” to parents and friends to be sent tomorrow morning.
Of course, this relies on my ability to raise the probability of intervention, but that seems like an easier challenge than engaging in willful doublethink… … or you’d perhaps add various chemicals to your food the next day—I know I can be committed to an idea (I will do this task tonight), come home, eat dinner, and then I’d be totally uncommitted (that task can wait, I will play games first).
… A billion is a lot of money, perhaps I’d drink the poison and then have a hired person drug me to a coma, to be awoken the next day? You could hire a lot of medical staff with that kind of money.
Yet I get the feeling that all these “creative” solutions are not really allowed. Why is that?
all these “creative” solutions are not really allowed. Why is that?
Because the point of these questions isn’t to challenge you to find a good answer, it’s that the process of answering them may lead to insight into your actual value system, understanding of causation, etc. Finding clever ways around the problem is a bit like cheating in an optician’s eye test[1]: sure, maybe you can do that, but the result will be that you get less effective eyesight correction and end up worse off.
[1] e.g., maybe you have found a copy of whatever chart they use and memorized the letters on it.
So, e.g., the point of the toxin puzzle is to ask: can you, really, form an intention to do something when you know that when the time comes you will be able to choose and will have no reason to choose to do it and much reason not to?
That’s an interesting psychological and/or philosophical question. You can avoid answering it by saying “well, I’d find a way to make taking the toxin not actually do me any harm”, and that might be an excellent idea if you ever find yourself in that bizarre situation—but the point of the question isn’t to plan for an actual future where you encounter a quirkily sadistic but generous billionaire, it’s to help clarify your thinking about what happens when you form an intention to do something.
Of course you may repurpose the question, and then your “clever” answers may be entirely to the point. Suppose you decide that no, you cannot form an intention to do something that you will have good reason to choose not to do; well, situations might arise where it would be useful to do that (even though the precise situation Kavka describes is unlikely), so it’s reasonable to think about how you might make it possible, and then some “clever” answers may become relevant. But others probably won’t, and the “get drugged into a coma” solution is probably one of those.
(Incidentally, in the original puzzle the amount of money was a million rather than a billion. That’s probably still enough to hire someone to drug you into a coma.)
It is indeed a million, woops. Thanks for explaining in detail about the purpose of such questions. I find that I get into “come up with a clever answer” mode faster if the question has losses—not getting money is “meh”, a day worth of excruciating pain in exchange for money, well, that needs a workaround!
As for the puzzle itself, I don’t know if I can form such an intention… but I seem to be really good at it in real life. I call it procrastinating. I make a commitment that fails to account for time discounting and then I end up going to bed later than I wanted. After dinner I intended to go to bed early; at midnight I wanted to see another episode. So apparently it’s possible.
What’s stopping you from creating a sub agent (informing a friend) with the task of convincing you not to drink AFTER you’ve gotten the money? …
Like Odysseus with the Sirens, you’d have to “create a subagent”/hire a friend to convince you not to drink, before you intend to drink it, then actually change your intentions and want to drink it.
This doesn’t seem possible for a human mind, though of course it’s easier to imagine for artificial minds that can be edited at will.
How is it not possible? When force is allowed, the hired people could simply physically restrain me—I’d fight them with tooth and nail, their vastly superior training would have me on the floor within a minute, after which I’d be kept separate from the vial of toxin for the remainder of the day. … Although I guess “separation for a period of time”-based arguments rely on you both being obsessive AND pedantic enough to not care about it on the next day. Being really passionate about something and then dropping the issue the next day because the window of opportunity has been closed is … unlikely to occur, so my solution might end up making me rich but leaving me in the looney-bin.
I think a better argument against my ideas is logistics—how could I acquire everything I need in a span of (at most) 23 hours? (The wording is a such that at tonight as the day turns, you must intend to take the poison). A middle class worker generally doesn’t have ties to any mercenaries, and payment isn’t given until the morning after your intent has to be made.
I get your point, though—convincing someone to later convince you already carries massive penalties (“Why are you acting so weird?”), the situation carries massive penalties (“And you believe this guy?”, “For HOW MUCH?!”)...
My argument basically rests on turning the whole thing into a game: “Design a puzzle you cannot get out of. Then, a few minutes before midnight (to be safe), start doing your utmost best to break this puzzle.”
How is it not possible? When force is allowed, the hired people
Why would you hire people to stop you from drinking it, if you intend to drink it, since you know that hiring such people will increase the chances you will end up not drinking it?
I get your point, though—convincing someone to later convince you already carries massive penalties
NO! That’s not my point. My point isn’t whether it’s expensive or difficult to hire someone, My point is that you don’t want to hire someone. Because you intend to drink the toxin, and hiring someone to stop you from doing that doesn’t match your intention.
If I intend to do my best at an exam tomorrow, but stay up late playing games, does this somehow lift my intention to do well on my exam?
By the original problem statement, I have to have the intention of taking the poison AT midnight. Rephrased—when it is midnight, I must intend to take the poison that next day. BEFORE midnight, it is allowed to have OTHER intentions. I intend to use that time to set up hurdles for myself—and then to try my hardest. It would be especially helpful if these hurdles are also things like tricking myself that it won’t actually hurt (via transquilizer to put me under straight afterward, for instance).
I know it sounds like doublethink, but that’s only if you think there is no difference between me before midnight and me after midnight.
By the original problem statement, I have to have the intention of taking the poison AT midnight. Rephrased—when it is midnight, I must intend to take the poison that next day. BEFORE midnight, it is allowed to have OTHER intentions. I intend to use that time to set up hurdles for myself—and then to try my hardest.
If you can change your intentions like that, that’s indeed a fine solution.
I’m not sure that a human mind can, though. Most human minds anyway.
Leaving Newcomb aside for the moment, in the smoking lesion case your decision is predetermined and you have no choice in the matter. I don’t see how that counts as “a real decision”.
“your decision is predetermined and you have no choice in the matter.”
Is LW now populated by the sort of people who haven’t even heard of compatibilism and of the idea that determinism not only doesn’t contradict having a choice, but is actually fundamental to the process of decision-making? You can only “choose”, if your values and personality can determine the outcome.
No, I meant that you seemed confused by the fact that someone can think of ‘predetermination’ as compatible with choice, to the point that you seemingly felt that saying “your decision is predetermined and you have no choice in the matter” was an argument.. and you “don’t see” how such predetermined choices are real choices.
It’s fine if you state your position, but you bring confusion when you present it in terms of ignorance and failure to understand the other one’s position.
Basically you spoke like I’d expect someone to speak who had indeed never heard of compatibilism, not merely disagreed with it.
Look, say whatever you like, I was genuinely, truly, sincerely, honestly not able to distinguish you from someone who hadn’t even heard of compatibilism.
Feel free to mock and jeer and lol as you like, but take nonetheless this datapoint into consideration, about what you were communicating to me.
I was genuinely, truly, sincerely, honestly not able to distinguish you from someone who hadn’t even heard of compatibilism.
If you think that’s a problem, you probably should fix it :-) Or at least take this datapoint into consideration :-P
about what you were communicating to me
Actually, I was having a reasonable conversation with entirelyuseless when you jumped in and sneered at that “sort of people”, those uncough peasants whose presence pollutes the rarefied air of LW with crass ignorance...
and sneered at that “sort of people”, those uncough peasants whose presence pollutes the rarefied air of LW with crass ignorance...
Well, see, you understood I was sneering at you.
I on the other hand, still don’t understand whether you were pretending at ignorance of compatibilism as a weird debating tactic (“1. Pretend that I don’t know there exist people who think determinism is compatible with free will, 2. ??? 3.Profit!”) or I just misread you that way.
Saying “But Bud Light is a bad beer” is not “pretending at ignorance” that there are people who like and drink Bud Light. It expresses my position which, absent other indicators, does NOT imply that all other positions are wrong and mistaken.
Speaking in expressions like “Bud Light is a bad beer, however I acknowledge the existence of people who like Bud Light and accept that there is nothing inherently wrong with them liking Bud Light and, moreover, the expression of my position should not be taken as disparagement of those aforementioned people who like Bud Light” is a bit unwieldy.
I agree that this is what most people think, but it is a mistake.
I don’t agree to leave Newcomb aside in considering this, because my position is that they are the same problem. If I have no choice in the smoking lesion, I have no choice in Newcomb.
Consider the Newcomb case.
I exist, and my brain and body are in a certain condition. I did not put them in that condition. I cannot make them not have been in that condition.
Omega looks at me. Using the condition of my brain and body—conditions over which I have no control whatsoever—he determines whether I am going to choose one box or two boxes. He has 100% accuracy, and this implies that the situation is completely determined by the condition of my brain and body.
In other words, “the condition of my brain and body” functions exactly like the lesion. It completely “predetermines” the outcome. If I have no choice in the lesion case, I have no choice in Newcomb.
Nonetheless, I say I have a choice in Newcomb, because the condition of my brain and body imply that I will engage in a certain process of reasoning, considering the alternatives of one boxing and two boxing, and choose one of them.
Likewise, I have a choice in the lesion case, because the lesion implies that I will engage in a certain process of reasoning, considering the alternatives of smoking and not smoking, and choose one of them.
In both cases, the outcome is predetermined. In both cases, the outcome is the result of a choice that results from a process of thought.
I don’t agree to leave Newcomb aside in considering this, because my position is that they are the same problem.
If they are the same problem, you shouldn’t care about leaving one aside. The smoking lesion is a simpler and clearer problem because it doesn’t need to postulate a supernatural entity.
In other words, “the condition of my brain and body” functions exactly like the lesion. It completely “predetermines” the outcome.
So you’re a determinist. OK.
Nonetheless, I say I have a choice in Newcomb, because the condition of my brain and body imply that I will engage in a certain process of reasoning, considering the alternatives of one boxing and two boxing, and choose one of them.
That, to me, doesn’t follow at all. You don’t choose, you’re just an automaton going through the motions. It is, as you say, similar to the lesion—there might well be complicated intermediate steps but there is no choice involved. You literally do not have a choice.
In which way your choice is different from the choice of a calculator which also goes through a bunch of processes before deciding to output 4 as a response to 2+2?
This is all in the context of discussing Newcomb and the smoking lesion. It is possible that libertarian free will is true. If it is, neither Newcomb nor the smoking lesion is possible in the real world, at least in the 100% way.
So I do not assert that determinism is necessarily true (although I do not know that it is not). But if it is true, it is equally true in Newcomb and in the smoking lesion, and if it is false, it is equally false in both cases.
The situation is different from the calculator because the calculator does not consider various possible answers, but just calculates a single answer directly. However, the determinist choice would be similar to a chess computer, which considers various possible moves, but still computes a determinate outcome.
This is all in the context of discussing Newcomb and the smoking lesion. It is possible that libertarian free will is true. If it is, neither Newcomb nor the smoking lesion is possible in the real world, at least in the 100% way.
Hold on. Are you saying that determinism is a precondition, an axiom built into the formulation of the Newcomb and the lesion problems? That they make no sense unless you accept determinism?
Besides, I don’t think Newcomb is possible in the real world anyway since, again, it requires a supernatural entity.
The situation is different from the calculator because the calculator does not consider various possible answers, but just calculates a single answer directly. However, the determinist choice would be similar to a chess computer
This implies that the gap between a chess computer and a human is smaller than a gap between a calculator and a chess computer. I am not sure I’m willing to accept that :-/
Yes, I am saying that 100% predictive accuracy does not make sense apart from determinism. I agree that lower degrees of accuracy could happen without complete determinism. Even lower degrees of accuracy would not necessarily change my decision in the scenarios (although it would change the decision once the degree of accuracy became too low.)
I agree with you about the gap between humans, calculators, and chess computers. I am just saying that “making a choice” just implies considering several possibilities before selecting one of them. So it isn’t true that “you don’t have a choice” if you consider several possibilities, even if there are reasons why you will definitely choose a particular one.
So for example, even if determinism is false, I am quite sure that I am not going to kill myself tomorrow. That doesn’t change the fact that it is one possibility that I could consider. So I have a choice between killing myself and not killing myself, even though I know which one I am going to choose.
I am just saying that “making a choice” just implies considering several possibilities before selecting one of them. So it isn’t true that “you don’t have a choice” if you consider several possibilities,
That’s a straightforward logical fallacy. You’re saying “If A then B, therefore if B then A” where A=”making a choice” and B=”considering several possibilities”.
Besides, you just moved the heavy-lifting part to the word “considering”. If I’m going to count to 3, whether I will consider 2 or 4 (five is right out) is quite irrelevant because I will count to 3 regardless.
A considered alternative is one you could choose, but in the situation we’re talking about you could not (since your choice is predetermined). And in this case, it’s merely something your attention slides over before settling on the inevitable.
I am saying “making a choice” is nothing more and nothing less than “considering two or more possibilities and selecting one of them.” Each one implies the other.
If you are planning to count to three, you do not consider stopping at two, so there is no choice.
Your objection is that there are not really two or more possibilities, but only one. But that is not the way consideration works. When you consider two possible choices, they are both possible as far as you know, since you do not know which one you are going to choose. So from your point of view, you are making a choice, even if more fundamentally something is determining which choice you are making.
I’m not sure what you mean by “a choice from an external point of view.” Other people can see that you considered several possibilities and selected one of them. It may be (if this deterministic theory is true) that someone can figure out in advance which one you are going to select, and perhaps that person wouldn’t describe it as a choice. That’s just a question of how they are using the word.
I’m not sure what you mean by “a choice from an external point of view.”
The usual—e.g. in the “perfect predictor” version of the Newcomb problem you might think you’re making a choice, but Omega knows what you are going to choose and so from its point of view (“external” to you) you don’t actually have a choice and will do what you are predetermined to do.
In any case, we’ve dug down to the more or less standard free-will debate...
Okay, can you just state clearly whether you one-box or two-box, and whether you smoke or not-smoke in the smoking lesion problem, so that I understand what your position is, before trying to understand why it is?
I take the one box in Newcomb, and I do not smoke in the smoking lesion.
My position is that they are the same problem. The million is already there or it is not, and the lesion is there or it is not. I cannot change that in either case. But I still make a real decision, one that will be correlated with the outcome, and I choose the winning one.
I can’t even begin to model myself as “liking” smoking—it gives a disgusting smell that clings to everything and even being near second-hand smoke makes for uncomfortable breathing. If I try to model myself as someone who likes smoking, I don’t see myself living, because I’ve been altered beyond recognition.
Add to that that it seems to be a problem without a correct answer (“yes” seems to be the preferred option, given that there is no statement that you prefer smoking without cancer over smoking with cancer, thus “you prefer to smoke” + “some cancer related stuff that you may or may not have an opinion about” = “go smoke already”. But this isn’t the direct correct answer because if you take another worldview and look at the problem, “to smoke is to admit that you have this genetic flaw and thus you have cancer”), and I have massive problems when it comes to understanding this sort of thing.
This question seems to have the same thing going on—pick one! A) “everyone is tortured” or B) “everyone gets a dust speck”. But wait, there’s some numbers going on in the background where there’s either a lot of clones of you or only one of you. And if everyone gets tortured then there’s only one of you. Here it is left unsaid that torture is far far far worse than the dust speck for a single individual, but the issue remains: I see “Do a really really really bad thing” or “Do a meh thing” and then some fancy attempts to trip up various logic systems—What about the logic that, hey, A is always worse than B? … I guess you could fix this by there being OTHER people present, so that it’s a “you get tortured” vs “you and everyone else (3^^^3) get a dust speck”… but then there’d be loopholes in the region of “yes, but my preferences prefer a world where there are people other than me, so I’ll take torture if that means I get to exist in such a world”.
As for one-box/two-box, I’d open B up, and if it was empty I’d take the contents of A home. If it contained the cash, well, I dunno. I guess I’d leave the 1000 behind, if the whole “if you take both then B is empty” idea was true. Maybe it’s false. Maybe it’s true! Regardless of that, I just got a million bucks, and an extra $1000, well, that’s not all that much after receiving a whole million. (Yes, you could do stuff with that money, like buying malaria nets or something, but I am not an optimal rational agent, my thinking capacity is limited, and I’d rather bank the $1m than get tripped up by $1000 because I got greedy). … weirdly enough, if you change the numbers so that A contained $1000 and B contained $1001, I’d open up B first… and then regardless of seeing the money, I’d take A home too.
Feel free to point out the holes in my thinking—I’d prefer examples that are not too “out there” because my answers tend to not be based on the numbers but on all the circumstances around it—that $1m would see me work on what I’d want to work on for the rest of my life, and that $1000 would reduce the time I’d need to spend working for doing what I wanna do by about a month (or 3 weeks).
Then for the “smoking lesion” problem to be any use to you, you need to perform a sort of mental translation in which it isn’t about smoking but about some other (perhaps imaginary) activity that you do enjoy but is associated with harmful outcomes. Maybe it’s eating chocolate and the harmful outcome is diabetes. Maybe it’s having lots of sex and the harmful outcome is syphilis. Maybe it’s spending all your time sitting alone and reading and the harmful outcome is heart disease. The important thing is to keep the structure of the thing the same: doing X is associated with bad outcome Y, it turns out (perhaps surprisingly) that this is not because X causes Y but because some other thing causes both X and Y, you find yourself very much wanting to do X, so now what do you do?
Having a smoking lesion make you choose smoking is vague. Does it make you choose smoking by increasing the utility you gain from smoking, but not affecting your ability to reason based on this utility? Or does it make you choose smoking by affecting your ability to do logical reasoning?
In the former case, switching from nonsmoking to smoking because you made a logical conclusion should not affect your chances of dying, even though switching to smoking in general should affect your chance of dying.
In the latter case, switching to smoking should affect your chance of dying, but you are then asking a question which presupposes under some circumstances that you can’t answer it.
I went looking around on wikipedia and found Kavka’s toxin puzzle which seems to be about “you can get a billion dollars if you intend to drink this poison (which will hurt a lot for a whole day similar to the worst torture imaginable but otherwise leave no lasting effects) tomorrow evening, but I’ll pay you tonight”… but there I don’t get the paradox either—whats stopping you from creating a sub agent (informing a friend) with the task of convincing you not to drink AFTER you’ve gotten the money? … Possibly by force. Possibly by relying on saying things in a manner that you don’t know that he knows he has to do this. Possibly with a whole lot of actors. Like scheduling a text “I am perfectly fine, there is nothing wrong with me” to parents and friends to be sent tomorrow morning.
Of course, this relies on my ability to raise the probability of intervention, but that seems like an easier challenge than engaging in willful doublethink… … or you’d perhaps add various chemicals to your food the next day—I know I can be committed to an idea (I will do this task tonight), come home, eat dinner, and then I’d be totally uncommitted (that task can wait, I will play games first).
… A billion is a lot of money, perhaps I’d drink the poison and then have a hired person drug me to a coma, to be awoken the next day? You could hire a lot of medical staff with that kind of money.
Yet I get the feeling that all these “creative” solutions are not really allowed. Why is that?
Because the point of these questions isn’t to challenge you to find a good answer, it’s that the process of answering them may lead to insight into your actual value system, understanding of causation, etc. Finding clever ways around the problem is a bit like cheating in an optician’s eye test[1]: sure, maybe you can do that, but the result will be that you get less effective eyesight correction and end up worse off.
[1] e.g., maybe you have found a copy of whatever chart they use and memorized the letters on it.
So, e.g., the point of the toxin puzzle is to ask: can you, really, form an intention to do something when you know that when the time comes you will be able to choose and will have no reason to choose to do it and much reason not to? That’s an interesting psychological and/or philosophical question. You can avoid answering it by saying “well, I’d find a way to make taking the toxin not actually do me any harm”, and that might be an excellent idea if you ever find yourself in that bizarre situation—but the point of the question isn’t to plan for an actual future where you encounter a quirkily sadistic but generous billionaire, it’s to help clarify your thinking about what happens when you form an intention to do something.
Of course you may repurpose the question, and then your “clever” answers may be entirely to the point. Suppose you decide that no, you cannot form an intention to do something that you will have good reason to choose not to do; well, situations might arise where it would be useful to do that (even though the precise situation Kavka describes is unlikely), so it’s reasonable to think about how you might make it possible, and then some “clever” answers may become relevant. But others probably won’t, and the “get drugged into a coma” solution is probably one of those.
(Incidentally, in the original puzzle the amount of money was a million rather than a billion. That’s probably still enough to hire someone to drug you into a coma.)
It is indeed a million, woops. Thanks for explaining in detail about the purpose of such questions. I find that I get into “come up with a clever answer” mode faster if the question has losses—not getting money is “meh”, a day worth of excruciating pain in exchange for money, well, that needs a workaround!
As for the puzzle itself, I don’t know if I can form such an intention… but I seem to be really good at it in real life. I call it procrastinating. I make a commitment that fails to account for time discounting and then I end up going to bed later than I wanted. After dinner I intended to go to bed early; at midnight I wanted to see another episode. So apparently it’s possible.
There are reasons.
Like Odysseus with the Sirens, you’d have to “create a subagent”/hire a friend to convince you not to drink, before you intend to drink it, then actually change your intentions and want to drink it.
This doesn’t seem possible for a human mind, though of course it’s easier to imagine for artificial minds that can be edited at will.
How is it not possible? When force is allowed, the hired people could simply physically restrain me—I’d fight them with tooth and nail, their vastly superior training would have me on the floor within a minute, after which I’d be kept separate from the vial of toxin for the remainder of the day. … Although I guess “separation for a period of time”-based arguments rely on you both being obsessive AND pedantic enough to not care about it on the next day. Being really passionate about something and then dropping the issue the next day because the window of opportunity has been closed is … unlikely to occur, so my solution might end up making me rich but leaving me in the looney-bin.
I think a better argument against my ideas is logistics—how could I acquire everything I need in a span of (at most) 23 hours? (The wording is a such that at tonight as the day turns, you must intend to take the poison). A middle class worker generally doesn’t have ties to any mercenaries, and payment isn’t given until the morning after your intent has to be made.
I get your point, though—convincing someone to later convince you already carries massive penalties (“Why are you acting so weird?”), the situation carries massive penalties (“And you believe this guy?”, “For HOW MUCH?!”)...
My argument basically rests on turning the whole thing into a game: “Design a puzzle you cannot get out of. Then, a few minutes before midnight (to be safe), start doing your utmost best to break this puzzle.”
Why would you hire people to stop you from drinking it, if you intend to drink it, since you know that hiring such people will increase the chances you will end up not drinking it?
NO! That’s not my point. My point isn’t whether it’s expensive or difficult to hire someone, My point is that you don’t want to hire someone. Because you intend to drink the toxin, and hiring someone to stop you from doing that doesn’t match your intention.
If I intend to do my best at an exam tomorrow, but stay up late playing games, does this somehow lift my intention to do well on my exam?
By the original problem statement, I have to have the intention of taking the poison AT midnight. Rephrased—when it is midnight, I must intend to take the poison that next day. BEFORE midnight, it is allowed to have OTHER intentions. I intend to use that time to set up hurdles for myself—and then to try my hardest. It would be especially helpful if these hurdles are also things like tricking myself that it won’t actually hurt (via transquilizer to put me under straight afterward, for instance).
I know it sounds like doublethink, but that’s only if you think there is no difference between me before midnight and me after midnight.
If you can change your intentions like that, that’s indeed a fine solution.
I’m not sure that a human mind can, though. Most human minds anyway.
I get the feeling maybe this ought to be two comments, one on the main thread and one here. But they’re too entangled.
Leaving Newcomb aside for the moment, in the smoking lesion case your decision is predetermined and you have no choice in the matter. I don’t see how that counts as “a real decision”.
“your decision is predetermined and you have no choice in the matter.”
Is LW now populated by the sort of people who haven’t even heard of compatibilism and of the idea that determinism not only doesn’t contradict having a choice, but is actually fundamental to the process of decision-making? You can only “choose”, if your values and personality can determine the outcome.
By “heard of”, do you actually mean “agree with”?
No, I meant that you seemed confused by the fact that someone can think of ‘predetermination’ as compatible with choice, to the point that you seemingly felt that saying “your decision is predetermined and you have no choice in the matter” was an argument.. and you “don’t see” how such predetermined choices are real choices.
It’s fine if you state your position, but you bring confusion when you present it in terms of ignorance and failure to understand the other one’s position.
Basically you spoke like I’d expect someone to speak who had indeed never heard of compatibilism, not merely disagreed with it.
I was not trying to change entirelyuseless’ mind. I was trying to figure out where exactly the disagreements between us are.
No, I do not see that. Is there anything wrong with that?
LOL. Are you quite sure I am allowed to disagree with compatibilism for reasons other than being a confused ignorant fool?
Well, you speak like someone who does not understand why people could possibly disagree with compatibilism.
Look, say whatever you like, I was genuinely, truly, sincerely, honestly not able to distinguish you from someone who hadn’t even heard of compatibilism.
Feel free to mock and jeer and lol as you like, but take nonetheless this datapoint into consideration, about what you were communicating to me.
If you think that’s a problem, you probably should fix it :-) Or at least take this datapoint into consideration :-P
Actually, I was having a reasonable conversation with entirelyuseless when you jumped in and sneered at that “sort of people”, those uncough peasants whose presence pollutes the rarefied air of LW with crass ignorance...
Well, see, you understood I was sneering at you.
I on the other hand, still don’t understand whether you were pretending at ignorance of compatibilism as a weird debating tactic (“1. Pretend that I don’t know there exist people who think determinism is compatible with free will, 2. ??? 3.Profit!”) or I just misread you that way.
Saying “But Bud Light is a bad beer” is not “pretending at ignorance” that there are people who like and drink Bud Light. It expresses my position which, absent other indicators, does NOT imply that all other positions are wrong and mistaken.
Speaking in expressions like “Bud Light is a bad beer, however I acknowledge the existence of people who like Bud Light and accept that there is nothing inherently wrong with them liking Bud Light and, moreover, the expression of my position should not be taken as disparagement of those aforementioned people who like Bud Light” is a bit unwieldy.
I agree that this is what most people think, but it is a mistake.
I don’t agree to leave Newcomb aside in considering this, because my position is that they are the same problem. If I have no choice in the smoking lesion, I have no choice in Newcomb.
Consider the Newcomb case.
I exist, and my brain and body are in a certain condition. I did not put them in that condition. I cannot make them not have been in that condition.
Omega looks at me. Using the condition of my brain and body—conditions over which I have no control whatsoever—he determines whether I am going to choose one box or two boxes. He has 100% accuracy, and this implies that the situation is completely determined by the condition of my brain and body.
In other words, “the condition of my brain and body” functions exactly like the lesion. It completely “predetermines” the outcome. If I have no choice in the lesion case, I have no choice in Newcomb.
Nonetheless, I say I have a choice in Newcomb, because the condition of my brain and body imply that I will engage in a certain process of reasoning, considering the alternatives of one boxing and two boxing, and choose one of them.
Likewise, I have a choice in the lesion case, because the lesion implies that I will engage in a certain process of reasoning, considering the alternatives of smoking and not smoking, and choose one of them.
In both cases, the outcome is predetermined. In both cases, the outcome is the result of a choice that results from a process of thought.
If they are the same problem, you shouldn’t care about leaving one aside. The smoking lesion is a simpler and clearer problem because it doesn’t need to postulate a supernatural entity.
So you’re a determinist. OK.
That, to me, doesn’t follow at all. You don’t choose, you’re just an automaton going through the motions. It is, as you say, similar to the lesion—there might well be complicated intermediate steps but there is no choice involved. You literally do not have a choice.
In which way your choice is different from the choice of a calculator which also goes through a bunch of processes before deciding to output 4 as a response to 2+2?
This is all in the context of discussing Newcomb and the smoking lesion. It is possible that libertarian free will is true. If it is, neither Newcomb nor the smoking lesion is possible in the real world, at least in the 100% way.
So I do not assert that determinism is necessarily true (although I do not know that it is not). But if it is true, it is equally true in Newcomb and in the smoking lesion, and if it is false, it is equally false in both cases.
The situation is different from the calculator because the calculator does not consider various possible answers, but just calculates a single answer directly. However, the determinist choice would be similar to a chess computer, which considers various possible moves, but still computes a determinate outcome.
Hold on. Are you saying that determinism is a precondition, an axiom built into the formulation of the Newcomb and the lesion problems? That they make no sense unless you accept determinism?
Besides, I don’t think Newcomb is possible in the real world anyway since, again, it requires a supernatural entity.
This implies that the gap between a chess computer and a human is smaller than a gap between a calculator and a chess computer. I am not sure I’m willing to accept that :-/
Yes, I am saying that 100% predictive accuracy does not make sense apart from determinism. I agree that lower degrees of accuracy could happen without complete determinism. Even lower degrees of accuracy would not necessarily change my decision in the scenarios (although it would change the decision once the degree of accuracy became too low.)
I agree with you about the gap between humans, calculators, and chess computers. I am just saying that “making a choice” just implies considering several possibilities before selecting one of them. So it isn’t true that “you don’t have a choice” if you consider several possibilities, even if there are reasons why you will definitely choose a particular one.
So for example, even if determinism is false, I am quite sure that I am not going to kill myself tomorrow. That doesn’t change the fact that it is one possibility that I could consider. So I have a choice between killing myself and not killing myself, even though I know which one I am going to choose.
That’s a straightforward logical fallacy. You’re saying “If A then B, therefore if B then A” where A=”making a choice” and B=”considering several possibilities”.
Besides, you just moved the heavy-lifting part to the word “considering”. If I’m going to count to 3, whether I will consider 2 or 4 (five is right out) is quite irrelevant because I will count to 3 regardless.
A considered alternative is one you could choose, but in the situation we’re talking about you could not (since your choice is predetermined). And in this case, it’s merely something your attention slides over before settling on the inevitable.
I am saying “making a choice” is nothing more and nothing less than “considering two or more possibilities and selecting one of them.” Each one implies the other.
If you are planning to count to three, you do not consider stopping at two, so there is no choice.
Your objection is that there are not really two or more possibilities, but only one. But that is not the way consideration works. When you consider two possible choices, they are both possible as far as you know, since you do not know which one you are going to choose. So from your point of view, you are making a choice, even if more fundamentally something is determining which choice you are making.
Ah, so you’re defining the expression “making a choice” as “considering and selecting”. OK.
Am I making a choice from an external point of view?
I’m not sure what you mean by “a choice from an external point of view.” Other people can see that you considered several possibilities and selected one of them. It may be (if this deterministic theory is true) that someone can figure out in advance which one you are going to select, and perhaps that person wouldn’t describe it as a choice. That’s just a question of how they are using the word.
The usual—e.g. in the “perfect predictor” version of the Newcomb problem you might think you’re making a choice, but Omega knows what you are going to choose and so from its point of view (“external” to you) you don’t actually have a choice and will do what you are predetermined to do.
In any case, we’ve dug down to the more or less standard free-will debate...