I can’t even begin to model myself as “liking” smoking—it gives a disgusting smell that clings to everything and even being near second-hand smoke makes for uncomfortable breathing. If I try to model myself as someone who likes smoking, I don’t see myself living, because I’ve been altered beyond recognition.
Add to that that it seems to be a problem without a correct answer (“yes” seems to be the preferred option, given that there is no statement that you prefer smoking without cancer over smoking with cancer, thus “you prefer to smoke” + “some cancer related stuff that you may or may not have an opinion about” = “go smoke already”. But this isn’t the direct correct answer because if you take another worldview and look at the problem, “to smoke is to admit that you have this genetic flaw and thus you have cancer”), and I have massive problems when it comes to understanding this sort of thing.
This question seems to have the same thing going on—pick one! A) “everyone is tortured” or B) “everyone gets a dust speck”. But wait, there’s some numbers going on in the background where there’s either a lot of clones of you or only one of you. And if everyone gets tortured then there’s only one of you.
Here it is left unsaid that torture is far far far worse than the dust speck for a single individual, but the issue remains: I see “Do a really really really bad thing” or “Do a meh thing” and then some fancy attempts to trip up various logic systems—What about the logic that, hey, A is always worse than B? … I guess you could fix this by there being OTHER people present, so that it’s a “you get tortured” vs “you and everyone else (3^^^3) get a dust speck”… but then there’d be loopholes in the region of “yes, but my preferences prefer a world where there are people other than me, so I’ll take torture if that means I get to exist in such a world”.
As for one-box/two-box, I’d open B up, and if it was empty I’d take the contents of A home. If it contained the cash, well, I dunno. I guess I’d leave the 1000 behind, if the whole “if you take both then B is empty” idea was true. Maybe it’s false. Maybe it’s true! Regardless of that, I just got a million bucks, and an extra $1000, well, that’s not all that much after receiving a whole million. (Yes, you could do stuff with that money, like buying malaria nets or something, but I am not an optimal rational agent, my thinking capacity is limited, and I’d rather bank the $1m than get tripped up by $1000 because I got greedy). … weirdly enough, if you change the numbers so that A contained $1000 and B contained $1001, I’d open up B first… and then regardless of seeing the money, I’d take A home too.
Feel free to point out the holes in my thinking—I’d prefer examples that are not too “out there” because my answers tend to not be based on the numbers but on all the circumstances around it—that $1m would see me work on what I’d want to work on for the rest of my life, and that $1000 would reduce the time I’d need to spend working for doing what I wanna do by about a month (or 3 weeks).
I can’t even begin to model myself as “liking” smoking
Then for the “smoking lesion” problem to be any use to you, you need to perform a sort of mental translation in which it isn’t about smoking but about some other (perhaps imaginary) activity that you do enjoy but is associated with harmful outcomes. Maybe it’s eating chocolate and the harmful outcome is diabetes. Maybe it’s having lots of sex and the harmful outcome is syphilis. Maybe it’s spending all your time sitting alone and reading and the harmful outcome is heart disease. The important thing is to keep the structure of the thing the same: doing X is associated with bad outcome Y, it turns out (perhaps surprisingly) that this is not because X causes Y but because some other thing causes both X and Y, you find yourself very much wanting to do X, so now what do you do?
Having a smoking lesion make you choose smoking is vague. Does it make you choose smoking by increasing the utility you gain from smoking, but not affecting your ability to reason based on this utility? Or does it make you choose smoking by affecting your ability to do logical reasoning?
In the former case, switching from nonsmoking to smoking because you made a logical conclusion should not affect your chances of dying, even though switching to smoking in general should affect your chance of dying.
In the latter case, switching to smoking should affect your chance of dying, but you are then asking a question which presupposes under some circumstances that you can’t answer it.
I went looking around on wikipedia and found Kavka’s toxin puzzle which seems to be about “you can get a billion dollars if you intend to drink this poison (which will hurt a lot for a whole day similar to the worst torture imaginable but otherwise leave no lasting effects) tomorrow evening, but I’ll pay you tonight”… but there I don’t get the paradox either—whats stopping you from creating a sub agent (informing a friend) with the task of convincing you not to drink AFTER you’ve gotten the money? … Possibly by force. Possibly by relying on saying things in a manner that you don’t know that he knows he has to do this. Possibly with a whole lot of actors. Like scheduling a text “I am perfectly fine, there is nothing wrong with me” to parents and friends to be sent tomorrow morning.
Of course, this relies on my ability to raise the probability of intervention, but that seems like an easier challenge than engaging in willful doublethink… … or you’d perhaps add various chemicals to your food the next day—I know I can be committed to an idea (I will do this task tonight), come home, eat dinner, and then I’d be totally uncommitted (that task can wait, I will play games first).
… A billion is a lot of money, perhaps I’d drink the poison and then have a hired person drug me to a coma, to be awoken the next day? You could hire a lot of medical staff with that kind of money.
Yet I get the feeling that all these “creative” solutions are not really allowed. Why is that?
all these “creative” solutions are not really allowed. Why is that?
Because the point of these questions isn’t to challenge you to find a good answer, it’s that the process of answering them may lead to insight into your actual value system, understanding of causation, etc. Finding clever ways around the problem is a bit like cheating in an optician’s eye test[1]: sure, maybe you can do that, but the result will be that you get less effective eyesight correction and end up worse off.
[1] e.g., maybe you have found a copy of whatever chart they use and memorized the letters on it.
So, e.g., the point of the toxin puzzle is to ask: can you, really, form an intention to do something when you know that when the time comes you will be able to choose and will have no reason to choose to do it and much reason not to?
That’s an interesting psychological and/or philosophical question. You can avoid answering it by saying “well, I’d find a way to make taking the toxin not actually do me any harm”, and that might be an excellent idea if you ever find yourself in that bizarre situation—but the point of the question isn’t to plan for an actual future where you encounter a quirkily sadistic but generous billionaire, it’s to help clarify your thinking about what happens when you form an intention to do something.
Of course you may repurpose the question, and then your “clever” answers may be entirely to the point. Suppose you decide that no, you cannot form an intention to do something that you will have good reason to choose not to do; well, situations might arise where it would be useful to do that (even though the precise situation Kavka describes is unlikely), so it’s reasonable to think about how you might make it possible, and then some “clever” answers may become relevant. But others probably won’t, and the “get drugged into a coma” solution is probably one of those.
(Incidentally, in the original puzzle the amount of money was a million rather than a billion. That’s probably still enough to hire someone to drug you into a coma.)
It is indeed a million, woops. Thanks for explaining in detail about the purpose of such questions. I find that I get into “come up with a clever answer” mode faster if the question has losses—not getting money is “meh”, a day worth of excruciating pain in exchange for money, well, that needs a workaround!
As for the puzzle itself, I don’t know if I can form such an intention… but I seem to be really good at it in real life. I call it procrastinating. I make a commitment that fails to account for time discounting and then I end up going to bed later than I wanted. After dinner I intended to go to bed early; at midnight I wanted to see another episode. So apparently it’s possible.
What’s stopping you from creating a sub agent (informing a friend) with the task of convincing you not to drink AFTER you’ve gotten the money? …
Like Odysseus with the Sirens, you’d have to “create a subagent”/hire a friend to convince you not to drink, before you intend to drink it, then actually change your intentions and want to drink it.
This doesn’t seem possible for a human mind, though of course it’s easier to imagine for artificial minds that can be edited at will.
How is it not possible? When force is allowed, the hired people could simply physically restrain me—I’d fight them with tooth and nail, their vastly superior training would have me on the floor within a minute, after which I’d be kept separate from the vial of toxin for the remainder of the day. … Although I guess “separation for a period of time”-based arguments rely on you both being obsessive AND pedantic enough to not care about it on the next day. Being really passionate about something and then dropping the issue the next day because the window of opportunity has been closed is … unlikely to occur, so my solution might end up making me rich but leaving me in the looney-bin.
I think a better argument against my ideas is logistics—how could I acquire everything I need in a span of (at most) 23 hours? (The wording is a such that at tonight as the day turns, you must intend to take the poison). A middle class worker generally doesn’t have ties to any mercenaries, and payment isn’t given until the morning after your intent has to be made.
I get your point, though—convincing someone to later convince you already carries massive penalties (“Why are you acting so weird?”), the situation carries massive penalties (“And you believe this guy?”, “For HOW MUCH?!”)...
My argument basically rests on turning the whole thing into a game: “Design a puzzle you cannot get out of. Then, a few minutes before midnight (to be safe), start doing your utmost best to break this puzzle.”
How is it not possible? When force is allowed, the hired people
Why would you hire people to stop you from drinking it, if you intend to drink it, since you know that hiring such people will increase the chances you will end up not drinking it?
I get your point, though—convincing someone to later convince you already carries massive penalties
NO! That’s not my point. My point isn’t whether it’s expensive or difficult to hire someone, My point is that you don’t want to hire someone. Because you intend to drink the toxin, and hiring someone to stop you from doing that doesn’t match your intention.
If I intend to do my best at an exam tomorrow, but stay up late playing games, does this somehow lift my intention to do well on my exam?
By the original problem statement, I have to have the intention of taking the poison AT midnight. Rephrased—when it is midnight, I must intend to take the poison that next day. BEFORE midnight, it is allowed to have OTHER intentions. I intend to use that time to set up hurdles for myself—and then to try my hardest. It would be especially helpful if these hurdles are also things like tricking myself that it won’t actually hurt (via transquilizer to put me under straight afterward, for instance).
I know it sounds like doublethink, but that’s only if you think there is no difference between me before midnight and me after midnight.
By the original problem statement, I have to have the intention of taking the poison AT midnight. Rephrased—when it is midnight, I must intend to take the poison that next day. BEFORE midnight, it is allowed to have OTHER intentions. I intend to use that time to set up hurdles for myself—and then to try my hardest.
If you can change your intentions like that, that’s indeed a fine solution.
I’m not sure that a human mind can, though. Most human minds anyway.
I can’t even begin to model myself as “liking” smoking—it gives a disgusting smell that clings to everything and even being near second-hand smoke makes for uncomfortable breathing. If I try to model myself as someone who likes smoking, I don’t see myself living, because I’ve been altered beyond recognition.
Add to that that it seems to be a problem without a correct answer (“yes” seems to be the preferred option, given that there is no statement that you prefer smoking without cancer over smoking with cancer, thus “you prefer to smoke” + “some cancer related stuff that you may or may not have an opinion about” = “go smoke already”. But this isn’t the direct correct answer because if you take another worldview and look at the problem, “to smoke is to admit that you have this genetic flaw and thus you have cancer”), and I have massive problems when it comes to understanding this sort of thing.
This question seems to have the same thing going on—pick one! A) “everyone is tortured” or B) “everyone gets a dust speck”. But wait, there’s some numbers going on in the background where there’s either a lot of clones of you or only one of you. And if everyone gets tortured then there’s only one of you. Here it is left unsaid that torture is far far far worse than the dust speck for a single individual, but the issue remains: I see “Do a really really really bad thing” or “Do a meh thing” and then some fancy attempts to trip up various logic systems—What about the logic that, hey, A is always worse than B? … I guess you could fix this by there being OTHER people present, so that it’s a “you get tortured” vs “you and everyone else (3^^^3) get a dust speck”… but then there’d be loopholes in the region of “yes, but my preferences prefer a world where there are people other than me, so I’ll take torture if that means I get to exist in such a world”.
As for one-box/two-box, I’d open B up, and if it was empty I’d take the contents of A home. If it contained the cash, well, I dunno. I guess I’d leave the 1000 behind, if the whole “if you take both then B is empty” idea was true. Maybe it’s false. Maybe it’s true! Regardless of that, I just got a million bucks, and an extra $1000, well, that’s not all that much after receiving a whole million. (Yes, you could do stuff with that money, like buying malaria nets or something, but I am not an optimal rational agent, my thinking capacity is limited, and I’d rather bank the $1m than get tripped up by $1000 because I got greedy). … weirdly enough, if you change the numbers so that A contained $1000 and B contained $1001, I’d open up B first… and then regardless of seeing the money, I’d take A home too.
Feel free to point out the holes in my thinking—I’d prefer examples that are not too “out there” because my answers tend to not be based on the numbers but on all the circumstances around it—that $1m would see me work on what I’d want to work on for the rest of my life, and that $1000 would reduce the time I’d need to spend working for doing what I wanna do by about a month (or 3 weeks).
Then for the “smoking lesion” problem to be any use to you, you need to perform a sort of mental translation in which it isn’t about smoking but about some other (perhaps imaginary) activity that you do enjoy but is associated with harmful outcomes. Maybe it’s eating chocolate and the harmful outcome is diabetes. Maybe it’s having lots of sex and the harmful outcome is syphilis. Maybe it’s spending all your time sitting alone and reading and the harmful outcome is heart disease. The important thing is to keep the structure of the thing the same: doing X is associated with bad outcome Y, it turns out (perhaps surprisingly) that this is not because X causes Y but because some other thing causes both X and Y, you find yourself very much wanting to do X, so now what do you do?
Having a smoking lesion make you choose smoking is vague. Does it make you choose smoking by increasing the utility you gain from smoking, but not affecting your ability to reason based on this utility? Or does it make you choose smoking by affecting your ability to do logical reasoning?
In the former case, switching from nonsmoking to smoking because you made a logical conclusion should not affect your chances of dying, even though switching to smoking in general should affect your chance of dying.
In the latter case, switching to smoking should affect your chance of dying, but you are then asking a question which presupposes under some circumstances that you can’t answer it.
I went looking around on wikipedia and found Kavka’s toxin puzzle which seems to be about “you can get a billion dollars if you intend to drink this poison (which will hurt a lot for a whole day similar to the worst torture imaginable but otherwise leave no lasting effects) tomorrow evening, but I’ll pay you tonight”… but there I don’t get the paradox either—whats stopping you from creating a sub agent (informing a friend) with the task of convincing you not to drink AFTER you’ve gotten the money? … Possibly by force. Possibly by relying on saying things in a manner that you don’t know that he knows he has to do this. Possibly with a whole lot of actors. Like scheduling a text “I am perfectly fine, there is nothing wrong with me” to parents and friends to be sent tomorrow morning.
Of course, this relies on my ability to raise the probability of intervention, but that seems like an easier challenge than engaging in willful doublethink… … or you’d perhaps add various chemicals to your food the next day—I know I can be committed to an idea (I will do this task tonight), come home, eat dinner, and then I’d be totally uncommitted (that task can wait, I will play games first).
… A billion is a lot of money, perhaps I’d drink the poison and then have a hired person drug me to a coma, to be awoken the next day? You could hire a lot of medical staff with that kind of money.
Yet I get the feeling that all these “creative” solutions are not really allowed. Why is that?
Because the point of these questions isn’t to challenge you to find a good answer, it’s that the process of answering them may lead to insight into your actual value system, understanding of causation, etc. Finding clever ways around the problem is a bit like cheating in an optician’s eye test[1]: sure, maybe you can do that, but the result will be that you get less effective eyesight correction and end up worse off.
[1] e.g., maybe you have found a copy of whatever chart they use and memorized the letters on it.
So, e.g., the point of the toxin puzzle is to ask: can you, really, form an intention to do something when you know that when the time comes you will be able to choose and will have no reason to choose to do it and much reason not to? That’s an interesting psychological and/or philosophical question. You can avoid answering it by saying “well, I’d find a way to make taking the toxin not actually do me any harm”, and that might be an excellent idea if you ever find yourself in that bizarre situation—but the point of the question isn’t to plan for an actual future where you encounter a quirkily sadistic but generous billionaire, it’s to help clarify your thinking about what happens when you form an intention to do something.
Of course you may repurpose the question, and then your “clever” answers may be entirely to the point. Suppose you decide that no, you cannot form an intention to do something that you will have good reason to choose not to do; well, situations might arise where it would be useful to do that (even though the precise situation Kavka describes is unlikely), so it’s reasonable to think about how you might make it possible, and then some “clever” answers may become relevant. But others probably won’t, and the “get drugged into a coma” solution is probably one of those.
(Incidentally, in the original puzzle the amount of money was a million rather than a billion. That’s probably still enough to hire someone to drug you into a coma.)
It is indeed a million, woops. Thanks for explaining in detail about the purpose of such questions. I find that I get into “come up with a clever answer” mode faster if the question has losses—not getting money is “meh”, a day worth of excruciating pain in exchange for money, well, that needs a workaround!
As for the puzzle itself, I don’t know if I can form such an intention… but I seem to be really good at it in real life. I call it procrastinating. I make a commitment that fails to account for time discounting and then I end up going to bed later than I wanted. After dinner I intended to go to bed early; at midnight I wanted to see another episode. So apparently it’s possible.
There are reasons.
Like Odysseus with the Sirens, you’d have to “create a subagent”/hire a friend to convince you not to drink, before you intend to drink it, then actually change your intentions and want to drink it.
This doesn’t seem possible for a human mind, though of course it’s easier to imagine for artificial minds that can be edited at will.
How is it not possible? When force is allowed, the hired people could simply physically restrain me—I’d fight them with tooth and nail, their vastly superior training would have me on the floor within a minute, after which I’d be kept separate from the vial of toxin for the remainder of the day. … Although I guess “separation for a period of time”-based arguments rely on you both being obsessive AND pedantic enough to not care about it on the next day. Being really passionate about something and then dropping the issue the next day because the window of opportunity has been closed is … unlikely to occur, so my solution might end up making me rich but leaving me in the looney-bin.
I think a better argument against my ideas is logistics—how could I acquire everything I need in a span of (at most) 23 hours? (The wording is a such that at tonight as the day turns, you must intend to take the poison). A middle class worker generally doesn’t have ties to any mercenaries, and payment isn’t given until the morning after your intent has to be made.
I get your point, though—convincing someone to later convince you already carries massive penalties (“Why are you acting so weird?”), the situation carries massive penalties (“And you believe this guy?”, “For HOW MUCH?!”)...
My argument basically rests on turning the whole thing into a game: “Design a puzzle you cannot get out of. Then, a few minutes before midnight (to be safe), start doing your utmost best to break this puzzle.”
Why would you hire people to stop you from drinking it, if you intend to drink it, since you know that hiring such people will increase the chances you will end up not drinking it?
NO! That’s not my point. My point isn’t whether it’s expensive or difficult to hire someone, My point is that you don’t want to hire someone. Because you intend to drink the toxin, and hiring someone to stop you from doing that doesn’t match your intention.
If I intend to do my best at an exam tomorrow, but stay up late playing games, does this somehow lift my intention to do well on my exam?
By the original problem statement, I have to have the intention of taking the poison AT midnight. Rephrased—when it is midnight, I must intend to take the poison that next day. BEFORE midnight, it is allowed to have OTHER intentions. I intend to use that time to set up hurdles for myself—and then to try my hardest. It would be especially helpful if these hurdles are also things like tricking myself that it won’t actually hurt (via transquilizer to put me under straight afterward, for instance).
I know it sounds like doublethink, but that’s only if you think there is no difference between me before midnight and me after midnight.
If you can change your intentions like that, that’s indeed a fine solution.
I’m not sure that a human mind can, though. Most human minds anyway.
I get the feeling maybe this ought to be two comments, one on the main thread and one here. But they’re too entangled.