Downvoted for reposting yet another untestable QM foundations paper, under a misleading title (there is nothing “common-sense” about QM).
In quantum physics, MWI does quite naturally resolve some difficult issues in the “wavefunction-centristic” view. However, we see that the concept wavefunction is not really central for quantum mechanics. This removes the whole problem of wavefunction collapse that MWI seeks to resolve.
Physical theories live and die by testing (or they ought to, unless they happen to be pushed by famous string theorists). I agree that “This removes the whole problem of wavefunction collapse”, but only in the minds of philosophers of physics and some misguided philosophically inclined physicists. This paper adds nothing to physics.
Thank you. The title plays on the idea of deriving quantum mechanics from the rules of “common-sense” probabilistic reasoning. Suggestions for a better title are, of course, welcome.
In my view this is not so much “QM foundations” or “adding to physics” (one could argue it takes away from physics) as it is an interesting application of Bayesian inference, providing another example of its power. It is however interesting to discuss it in the context of MWI which is a relatively big thing for some here on Less Wrong.
I agree with everything Scott Aaronson said there, actually. As for the common sense, apparently our definitions of it differ. Furthermore, while I agree that this paper might be an interesting exercise in some mathematical aspects of Bayesian inference as applied to something or other, I question its relevance to physics in general and QM in particular.
I agree that “This removes the whole problem of wavefunction collapse”, but only in the minds of philosophers of physics and some misguided philosophically inclined physicists. This paper adds nothing to physics.
Giving an alternative formalism that “clears up the mysteries” and suggests an approach for new problems is a huge advance, IMO.
Jaynes did this before for statistical mechanics. Now they’ve applied the same principles to Quantum Mechanics. Maybe they could apply the gauge extensions of maximum entropy to this new derivation as well.
I agree that “This removes the whole problem of wavefunction collapse”, but only in the minds of philosophers of physics and some misguided philosophically inclined physicists. This paper adds nothing to physics.
Is physics important to you in ways other than how well it corresponds to reality? Physics relies on testing and experiments, but if we have another kind of system—let’s call it bayesianism—and we have a reason to believe this other kind of system corresponds better to reality even though it doesn’t rely perfectly on testing and experimenting, would you reject that in favor of physics? Why?
if we have another kind of system—let’s call it bayesianism—and we have a reason to believe this other kind of system corresponds better to reality even though it doesn’t rely perfectly on testing and experimenting, would you reject that in favor of physics? Why?
Replace “bayesianism” with “Christianity” in the above and answer your own question.
The moment a model of the world becomes disconnected from “testing and experimenting” it becomes a faith (or math, if you are lucky).
I guess one could argue that “bayesianism” (probability-as-logic) is testable practically and, indeed, well-tested by now. (But I still don’t understand how raisin proposes to reject physics in favor of probability theory or vice versa.)
But I still don’t understand how raisin proposes to reject physics in favor of probability theory or vice versa.
Well, ‘reject’ was a bad word. Physics is fine for mostly everything. What I meant was that “bayesianism” could supplement physics in areas that are hard to test like MWI, parallel universes etc. Basically what Tegmark argues here.
I guess one could argue that “bayesianism” (probability-as-logic) is testable practically and, indeed, well-tested by now.
Well, sure, the techniques based on Bayesian interpretations of probabilities (subjective or objective) work at least as well as frequentist (not EYish straw-frequentist, but actual frequentist, Kolmogorov-style), and sometimes better. And yeah, I have no idea what raisin is on about. Bayesianism is not an alternative to physics, just one of its mathematical tools.
Downvoted for reposting yet another untestable QM foundations paper, under a misleading title (there is nothing “common-sense” about QM).
Physical theories live and die by testing (or they ought to, unless they happen to be pushed by famous string theorists). I agree that “This removes the whole problem of wavefunction collapse”, but only in the minds of philosophers of physics and some misguided philosophically inclined physicists. This paper adds nothing to physics.
Thank you. The title plays on the idea of deriving quantum mechanics from the rules of “common-sense” probabilistic reasoning. Suggestions for a better title are, of course, welcome.
In my view this is not so much “QM foundations” or “adding to physics” (one could argue it takes away from physics) as it is an interesting application of Bayesian inference, providing another example of its power. It is however interesting to discuss it in the context of MWI which is a relatively big thing for some here on Less Wrong.
Regarding testability I’m reminded of the recent discussion at Scott Aaronson’s blog: http://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/?p=1653
I agree with everything Scott Aaronson said there, actually. As for the common sense, apparently our definitions of it differ. Furthermore, while I agree that this paper might be an interesting exercise in some mathematical aspects of Bayesian inference as applied to something or other, I question its relevance to physics in general and QM in particular.
Giving an alternative formalism that “clears up the mysteries” and suggests an approach for new problems is a huge advance, IMO.
Jaynes did this before for statistical mechanics. Now they’ve applied the same principles to Quantum Mechanics. Maybe they could apply the gauge extensions of maximum entropy to this new derivation as well.
Is physics important to you in ways other than how well it corresponds to reality? Physics relies on testing and experiments, but if we have another kind of system—let’s call it bayesianism—and we have a reason to believe this other kind of system corresponds better to reality even though it doesn’t rely perfectly on testing and experimenting, would you reject that in favor of physics? Why?
Replace “bayesianism” with “Christianity” in the above and answer your own question.
The moment a model of the world becomes disconnected from “testing and experimenting” it becomes a faith (or math, if you are lucky).
I guess one could argue that “bayesianism” (probability-as-logic) is testable practically and, indeed, well-tested by now. (But I still don’t understand how raisin proposes to reject physics in favor of probability theory or vice versa.)
Well, ‘reject’ was a bad word. Physics is fine for mostly everything. What I meant was that “bayesianism” could supplement physics in areas that are hard to test like MWI, parallel universes etc. Basically what Tegmark argues here.
Well, sure, the techniques based on Bayesian interpretations of probabilities (subjective or objective) work at least as well as frequentist (not EYish straw-frequentist, but actual frequentist, Kolmogorov-style), and sometimes better. And yeah, I have no idea what raisin is on about. Bayesianism is not an alternative to physics, just one of its mathematical tools.