if we have another kind of system—let’s call it bayesianism—and we have a reason to believe this other kind of system corresponds better to reality even though it doesn’t rely perfectly on testing and experimenting, would you reject that in favor of physics? Why?
Replace “bayesianism” with “Christianity” in the above and answer your own question.
The moment a model of the world becomes disconnected from “testing and experimenting” it becomes a faith (or math, if you are lucky).
I guess one could argue that “bayesianism” (probability-as-logic) is testable practically and, indeed, well-tested by now. (But I still don’t understand how raisin proposes to reject physics in favor of probability theory or vice versa.)
But I still don’t understand how raisin proposes to reject physics in favor of probability theory or vice versa.
Well, ‘reject’ was a bad word. Physics is fine for mostly everything. What I meant was that “bayesianism” could supplement physics in areas that are hard to test like MWI, parallel universes etc. Basically what Tegmark argues here.
I guess one could argue that “bayesianism” (probability-as-logic) is testable practically and, indeed, well-tested by now.
Well, sure, the techniques based on Bayesian interpretations of probabilities (subjective or objective) work at least as well as frequentist (not EYish straw-frequentist, but actual frequentist, Kolmogorov-style), and sometimes better. And yeah, I have no idea what raisin is on about. Bayesianism is not an alternative to physics, just one of its mathematical tools.
Replace “bayesianism” with “Christianity” in the above and answer your own question.
The moment a model of the world becomes disconnected from “testing and experimenting” it becomes a faith (or math, if you are lucky).
I guess one could argue that “bayesianism” (probability-as-logic) is testable practically and, indeed, well-tested by now. (But I still don’t understand how raisin proposes to reject physics in favor of probability theory or vice versa.)
Well, ‘reject’ was a bad word. Physics is fine for mostly everything. What I meant was that “bayesianism” could supplement physics in areas that are hard to test like MWI, parallel universes etc. Basically what Tegmark argues here.
Well, sure, the techniques based on Bayesian interpretations of probabilities (subjective or objective) work at least as well as frequentist (not EYish straw-frequentist, but actual frequentist, Kolmogorov-style), and sometimes better. And yeah, I have no idea what raisin is on about. Bayesianism is not an alternative to physics, just one of its mathematical tools.