Both rules work. In both games, one-boxing no matter what is the winning strategy.
I designed my rules have the feature that by one-boxing upon seeing an empty box B you visibly prove Omega wrong. In the version you linked to, you don’t necessarily: maybe Omega left box B empty because you would have two-boxed if it was full.
So both problems can be reasonably called “Transparent Newcomb”. The one you linked to was invented first and is simpler, though.
I see. Thank you, but I’m unimpressed—by committing to one-boxing in the Transparent NewComb one still entagles uncertainty but just entagles the uncertainty of if and how Omega will appear to him. Now knowing the rules I can commit to one-boxing, thus increasing the chances Omega will appear to me—but that’s as meaningful as an Omega that says to people “I would have given you a million dollars, if you’d only worn a green hat”, and therefore I’d have to wear a green hat. It’s nothing but a meaningless modified Pascal’s wager.
Transparent Newcomb therefore again isn’t similar to the situation described in this thread. In this situation the decider exists no matter what: there’s no uncertainty.
You know the rules. You choose your strategy with full knowledge. If you lose, it’s your fault, you knowingly chose a bad strategy. Nothing arbitrary or meaningless here.
Bongo, you didn’t understand my objection:
In the classical Newcomb, Omega explains the rules to you when he appears, and there’s one uncertain element (the contents of the opaque box). You determine the strategy, which by Omega’s predictive power has already been entangled with the uncertain contents of the box.
In the transparent Newcomb, you either don’t know the rules (so you can’t precommit to anything, and you can’t commit to any strategy in which Omega2 wouldn’t require the opposite strategy) or you know the rules in advance and therefore you can determine the strategy, which by Omega’s predictive power has already been entangled with the uncertain element of whether he’ll appear to you, and with how much money in the boxes.
In the problem that’s posed on this thread however, there’s no uncertainty whatsoever. You exist and that’s certain. The entanglement has been already resolved in favor of your existence. You don’t need to satisfy your mom’s expectations of you in order to keep on existing. You don’t need to become a musician if your dad expected you to be a musician, You don’t need to be a scientist if your mom expected you to be a scientist. In ANY universe where you get to decide a strategy, YOU EXIST. Or you wouldn’t be deciding anything.
People hopefully do understand that instead of “Omega and Prometheus speak of their predictions” we can quite easily have “Your mom and dad tell you of their pre-birth expectations for you”
If anyone here honestly thinks that by failing their parents’ expectations they’ll stop existing, then they’re literally insane. It’s exactly the same as with them foiling Prometheus’ expectations.
The only resolution for either scenario I can think of is that there is a very high chance that regardless of what you precommit to do here or otherwise, at the moment of decision, be compelled to choose to 1-box, or be unable to pull out.
But aside from that improbable outcome, these, along with transparent Newcomb, are nonsense; they’re intractable. I can simply precommit to use the strategy that contradicts what Prometheus/Omega/Azathoth predicted, a la halting problem.
And because of the three, Azathoth is the one that most nearly exists, I am actually very likely to have children. An overwhelming majority of men actually do highly value sleeping with many women; the only reason this doesn’t result in massive uncontrollable pregnancy is because Azathoth, being the slow thinker he is, hasn’t had time to adjust for birth control. Plus I can’t think of an outcome Azathoth would prefer to us creating AGI and proliferating across the universe.
Rules of (one version of) Transparent Newcomb.
Incorrect rules. You don’t need the “don’t invite to his games” one, and you don’t need randomization. Corrected here.
Both rules work. In both games, one-boxing no matter what is the winning strategy.
I designed my rules have the feature that by one-boxing upon seeing an empty box B you visibly prove Omega wrong. In the version you linked to, you don’t necessarily: maybe Omega left box B empty because you would have two-boxed if it was full.
So both problems can be reasonably called “Transparent Newcomb”. The one you linked to was invented first and is simpler, though.
I see. Thank you, but I’m unimpressed—by committing to one-boxing in the Transparent NewComb one still entagles uncertainty but just entagles the uncertainty of if and how Omega will appear to him. Now knowing the rules I can commit to one-boxing, thus increasing the chances Omega will appear to me—but that’s as meaningful as an Omega that says to people “I would have given you a million dollars, if you’d only worn a green hat”, and therefore I’d have to wear a green hat. It’s nothing but a meaningless modified Pascal’s wager.
Transparent Newcomb therefore again isn’t similar to the situation described in this thread. In this situation the decider exists no matter what: there’s no uncertainty.
You know the rules. You choose your strategy with full knowledge. If you lose, it’s your fault, you knowingly chose a bad strategy. Nothing arbitrary or meaningless here.
Bongo, you didn’t understand my objection: In the classical Newcomb, Omega explains the rules to you when he appears, and there’s one uncertain element (the contents of the opaque box). You determine the strategy, which by Omega’s predictive power has already been entangled with the uncertain contents of the box.
In the transparent Newcomb, you either don’t know the rules (so you can’t precommit to anything, and you can’t commit to any strategy in which Omega2 wouldn’t require the opposite strategy) or you know the rules in advance and therefore you can determine the strategy, which by Omega’s predictive power has already been entangled with the uncertain element of whether he’ll appear to you, and with how much money in the boxes.
In the problem that’s posed on this thread however, there’s no uncertainty whatsoever. You exist and that’s certain. The entanglement has been already resolved in favor of your existence. You don’t need to satisfy your mom’s expectations of you in order to keep on existing. You don’t need to become a musician if your dad expected you to be a musician, You don’t need to be a scientist if your mom expected you to be a scientist. In ANY universe where you get to decide a strategy, YOU EXIST. Or you wouldn’t be deciding anything.
People hopefully do understand that instead of “Omega and Prometheus speak of their predictions” we can quite easily have “Your mom and dad tell you of their pre-birth expectations for you”
If anyone here honestly thinks that by failing their parents’ expectations they’ll stop existing, then they’re literally insane. It’s exactly the same as with them foiling Prometheus’ expectations.
This.
The only resolution for either scenario I can think of is that there is a very high chance that regardless of what you precommit to do here or otherwise, at the moment of decision, be compelled to choose to 1-box, or be unable to pull out.
But aside from that improbable outcome, these, along with transparent Newcomb, are nonsense; they’re intractable. I can simply precommit to use the strategy that contradicts what Prometheus/Omega/Azathoth predicted, a la halting problem.
And because of the three, Azathoth is the one that most nearly exists, I am actually very likely to have children. An overwhelming majority of men actually do highly value sleeping with many women; the only reason this doesn’t result in massive uncontrollable pregnancy is because Azathoth, being the slow thinker he is, hasn’t had time to adjust for birth control. Plus I can’t think of an outcome Azathoth would prefer to us creating AGI and proliferating across the universe.