“Tell me what you mean by ‘right’, and I will tell you what is the right thing to do.”
That is of course, not what is right, but what she thinks is right. So far, so subjective.
You may not know what you mean by ‘right.’ But let’s not stop there. Here, let me come alongside you and help decode the cognitive algorithms that generated your question in the first place, and then we’ll be able to answer your question. Then we can tell you what the right thing to do is.
Again, that is not the right thing, that is just what she thinks. An Objective metaethicist could answer the question
what is right.
But moral terms and value terms are about what we want.
No: they are value terms about what we should want and be and do.
And the “we” is important here. Your metaethicists are like therapsists or life coaches or personal shoppers who advise people how to make their individual lives spiffier. But moral action is not solipsistic: moral choices affect other people. That’s why we can’t
stop at “whatever you think is right is right”. I don’t want one of your metaethicists telling my neighbour how
to be a better serial killer.
I think you’re missing the point of why there isn’t a universal code of ethics. If two people disagree about the definition of a word, the way forward isn’t to jump into the argument on one side or the other. The way forward is to stop using that word that way. This is subjective with respect to the word (if you don’t also specify how you’re defining it) but we stopped using that word that way anyhow—it’s objective with respect to the world, and that’s what’s important to how people act.
If two people disagree about the definition of a word, the way forward isn’t to jump into the argument on one side or the other. The way forward is to stop using that word that way.
If someone uses “cat” to mean “animal that barks”, should everyone then stop using “cat”?
This is subjective with respect to the word (if you don’t also specify how you’re defining it) but we stopped using that word that way anyhow—it’s objective with respect to the world, and that’s what’s important to how people act.
If someone uses “cat” to mean “animal that barks”, should everyone then stop using “cat”?
You’re right, it’s more complicated. It seems like the solution here is to make word choice a coordination problem, communication being a major goal of language—if a million people use it one way and one person uses it the other way, the one should say “an animal that barks.” On the other hand if everyone has the same several definitions for a word, like “sound,” then splitting up the word when necessary improves communication.
This is subjective with respect to the word (if you don’t also specify how you’re defining it) but we stopped using that word that way anyhow—it’s objective with respect to the world, and that’s what’s important to how people act.
I can’t make any sense of that.
You complain that letting people specify what they mean by “right” makes “right” subjective where people diverge. But this doesn’t make the communication subjective if people replace “right” by an objective criterion for the world, so the bad stuff associated with just drifting off into subjectivity doesn’t happen.
Although I guess you could be saying that “right” being subjective is inherently bad. But I would suggest that you’re thinking about right_Peter, which is still objective.
If everyone has their own notion of right, we still have the Bad Thing that an action can only be allowed of forbidden, not Peter-allowed and Manfred-forbidden.
? So it’s impossible for two people to rationally disagree about whether or not an action is forbidden if the external state of the world is the same? I see no reason why “forbidden” in the moral sense should be objective.
Arbitrary rules enforced with threats of violence is not an optimal outcome for me. If you have an option other than
a) subjective laissez faire where serial killers are allowed to do their own thing
or
b) Tyranny
I’d be glad to hear it. I know I have.
Assuming you’re generalized that properly and aren’t seriously arguing the most egregious false dichotomy I’ve seen in weeks, I’m afraid that condemning the set of ethics based on social or personal consequences as “tyranny” amounts to dismissing an entire school of thought on aesthetic grounds. Forgive me if I don’t find such a thing particularly convincing.
As I stated: “I know I have” I don’t think a) and b) are the only options either. I don’t see why the decision to call force-based ethics “tryrrany” counts as “aesthetic”. I don’t see why you are so hostile to reason-based ethics. You and various other people seem to
think the rational/ojeciive approach to ethics needs to be dispensed with, but you don’t
say why.
Obviously the “optimal outcome” would be the easy persuasion I mentioned. Do you think someone misusing that word justifies arbitrary high effort in persuasion, or drastic measures?
Why must all disagreements be disagreements about the state of the world?
It seems to me like there are two kinds of disagreements, positive disagreements about the state of the world, and normative disagreements about the proper state of the world.
Nothing blows up when I believe that.
Knowing the fact that you just stated does not make fighting wars over morality seem less reasonable. In fact, it makes them seem more reasonable. Do you disagree? Do you think it makes sense to fight wars over a definition?
It seems to me like there are two kinds of disagreements, positive disagreements about the state of the world, and normative disagreements about the proper state of the world.
Sure. But if people start arguing over what’s right, they should argue over the proper state of the world, not over what’s “right.”
You’re missing the point. The empathic metaethicist is trying to figure out what she means by ‘right’. Assuming she’s a well-adjusted human being, that’s probably the same as what you mean by ‘right’, so with any luck we’ll work out what you mean by ‘right’ as well (and hence, what “is right”). But we’re not asking Alex what she thinks peterdjones.getMeaning("right").getExtension() is.
That isn’t a good theoretical argument that “right” has only a subjective definition, and it isn’t practically as good as being able make individual notions of moral rightness more correct, where they need fixing.
Whatever you mean by “only a subjective definition”, I’m probably not trying to argue that.
Do you think you mean something other than what is right when you say “right”? If not, then replace “Alex” with “Peterdjones”. Do you still think the empathic metaethicist is going to get the wrong answer when they try to figure out what you mean by “right”?
That is of course, not what is right, but what she thinks is right. So far, so subjective.
Again, that is not the right thing, that is just what she thinks. An Objective metaethicist could answer the question what is right.
No: they are value terms about what we should want and be and do.
And the “we” is important here. Your metaethicists are like therapsists or life coaches or personal shoppers who advise people how to make their individual lives spiffier. But moral action is not solipsistic: moral choices affect other people. That’s why we can’t stop at “whatever you think is right is right”. I don’t want one of your metaethicists telling my neighbour how to be a better serial killer.
I think you’re missing the point of why there isn’t a universal code of ethics. If two people disagree about the definition of a word, the way forward isn’t to jump into the argument on one side or the other. The way forward is to stop using that word that way. This is subjective with respect to the word (if you don’t also specify how you’re defining it) but we stopped using that word that way anyhow—it’s objective with respect to the world, and that’s what’s important to how people act.
If someone uses “cat” to mean “animal that barks”, should everyone then stop using “cat”?
I can’t make any sense of that.
You’re right, it’s more complicated. It seems like the solution here is to make word choice a coordination problem, communication being a major goal of language—if a million people use it one way and one person uses it the other way, the one should say “an animal that barks.” On the other hand if everyone has the same several definitions for a word, like “sound,” then splitting up the word when necessary improves communication.
You complain that letting people specify what they mean by “right” makes “right” subjective where people diverge. But this doesn’t make the communication subjective if people replace “right” by an objective criterion for the world, so the bad stuff associated with just drifting off into subjectivity doesn’t happen.
Although I guess you could be saying that “right” being subjective is inherently bad. But I would suggest that you’re thinking about right_Peter, which is still objective.
If everyone has their own notion of right, we still have the Bad Thing that an action can only be allowed of forbidden, not Peter-allowed and Manfred-forbidden.
? So it’s impossible for two people to rationally disagree about whether or not an action is forbidden if the external state of the world is the same? I see no reason why “forbidden” in the moral sense should be objective.
If they disagree and they are both being rational, where’s the objectivity?
Try explaining to someone that something they like should be forbidden because you don’t like it.
I agree, it doesn’t look like there is much in this concept.
Okay. “If you don’t stop, I will shoot you.”
But seriously, WTF? Is that supposed to be an argument that if something is morally forbidden to one person it should be the same for another person?
If you don’t go looking for it, you won’t find it. As is so ofen the case on LW, that door has been shut without even trying to see what is behind it.
Arbitrary rules enforced with threats of violence is not an optimal outcome for me.
If you have an option other than
a) subjective laissez faire where serial killers are allowed to do their own thing
or
b) Tyranny
I’d be glad to hear it. I know I have.
Of course. No one should murder. I’m surprised you find that surprising.
Rather than chastising me, why not explain how “forbidden” is objective?
Re: shooting people: it was a joke. The WTF was not with respect to shooting people. It was because your demand was a non sequitur.
For start: are you aware of various (googleablle) standard defenses of metaethical ojectivism?
Is there some other place where you have defended metaethical (or even moral) objectivism?
I am aware of various defenses and find them all thoroughly lacking, but I doubt I have exhausted even the common possibilities. Go for it.
Assuming you’re generalized that properly and aren’t seriously arguing the most egregious false dichotomy I’ve seen in weeks, I’m afraid that condemning the set of ethics based on social or personal consequences as “tyranny” amounts to dismissing an entire school of thought on aesthetic grounds. Forgive me if I don’t find such a thing particularly convincing.
As I stated: “I know I have” I don’t think a) and b) are the only options either. I don’t see why the decision to call force-based ethics “tryrrany” counts as “aesthetic”. I don’t see why you are so hostile to reason-based ethics. You and various other people seem to think the rational/ojeciive approach to ethics needs to be dispensed with, but you don’t say why.
In conversations with that particular person, assuming they can’t easily be persuaded to change their usage? Yes, definitely.
That’s hardly an optimal outcome. They are making a mistake, although it seems no one wants to admit that.
Obviously the “optimal outcome” would be the easy persuasion I mentioned. Do you think someone misusing that word justifies arbitrary high effort in persuasion, or drastic measures?
Why do you think it’s the definition of the word that’s at issue?
Because it is possible for people to disagree about whether something is right or wrong without disagreeing about the state of the world.
Why must all disagreements be disagreements about the state of the world?
It seems to me like there are two kinds of disagreements, positive disagreements about the state of the world, and normative disagreements about the proper state of the world.
Nothing blows up when I believe that.
Knowing the fact that you just stated does not make fighting wars over morality seem less reasonable. In fact, it makes them seem more reasonable. Do you disagree? Do you think it makes sense to fight wars over a definition?
Sure. But if people start arguing over what’s right, they should argue over the proper state of the world, not over what’s “right.”
I don’t see much difference between “right” and “proper”.
He could also mean that we have to argue about states of the world.
But what else would we argue about, normatively? Abstract concepts, say, like “drugs are bad”. But then I would agree with him.
So I think we agree.
Again, I don’t follow you.
So perhaps he is saying that people should argue over the proper state of the world and not over the right XYZ, for some concept XYZ.
For instance, people should argue over the proper state of the world, not the right flavor of ice cream.
That is a true statement, there is certainly no objective right flavor of ice cream.
It is the most reasonable explanation I can come up with.
I agree that Luke’s approach has at times seemed implausibly individualistic. Moral reasoning is interpersonal from the get-go.
You’re missing the point. The empathic metaethicist is trying to figure out what she means by ‘right’. Assuming she’s a well-adjusted human being, that’s probably the same as what you mean by ‘right’, so with any luck we’ll work out what you mean by ‘right’ as well (and hence, what “is right”). But we’re not asking Alex what she thinks
peterdjones.getMeaning("right").getExtension()is.That isn’t a good theoretical argument that “right” has only a subjective definition, and it isn’t practically as good as being able make individual notions of moral rightness more correct, where they need fixing.
Whatever you mean by “only a subjective definition”, I’m probably not trying to argue that.
Do you think you mean something other than what is right when you say “right”? If not, then replace “Alex” with “Peterdjones”. Do you still think the empathic metaethicist is going to get the wrong answer when they try to figure out what you mean by “right”?