These are the values of an alien god, and we’re allowed to reject them.
The same can be said about all values held by humans. So, who gets to decide which “values of an alien god” are to be rejected, and which are to be enforced as social and legal norms?
The same can be said about all values held by humans. So, who gets to decide which “values of an alien god” are to be rejected, and which are to be enforced as social and legal norms?
That’s a good question. For example, we value tribalism in this “alien god” sense, but have moved away from it due to ethical considerations. Why?
Two main reasons, I suspect: (1) we learned to empathize with strangers and realize that there was no very defensible difference between their interests and ours; (2) tribalism sometimes led to terrible consequences for our tribe.
Some of us value genetic relatedness in our children, again in an alien god sense. Why move away from that? Because:
(1) There is no terribly defensible moral difference between the interests of a child with your genes or without.
Furthermore, filial affection is far more influenced by the proxy metric of personal intimacy with one’s children than by a propositional belief that they share your genes. (At least, that is true in my case.) Analogously, a man having heterosexual sex doesn’t generally lose his erection as soon as he puts on a condom.
It’s not for me to tell you your values, but it seems rather odd to actually choose inclusive genetic fitness consciously, when the proxy metric for genetic relatedness—namely, filial intimacy—is what actually drives parental emotions. It’s like being unable to enjoy non-procreative sex, isn’t it?
Even aside from cancer, cells in the same organism constantly compete for resources. This is actually vital to some human processes. See for example this paper.
They compete only at an unnecessarily complex level of abstraction. A simpler explanation for cell behavior (per the minimum message length formalism) is that each one is indifferent to the survival of itself or the other cells, which in the same body have the same genes, as this preference is what tends to result from natural selection on self-replicating molecules containing those genes; and that they will prefer even more (in the sense that their form optimizes for this under the constraint of history) that genes identical to those contained therein become more numerous.
This is bad teleological thinking. The cells don’t prefer anything. They have no motivation as such. Moreover, there’s no way for a cell to tell if a neighboring cell shares the same genes. (Immune cells can in certain limited circumstances detect cells with proteins that don’t belong but the vast majority of cells have no such ability. And even then, immune cells still compete for resources). The fact is that many sorts of cells compete with each other for space and nutrients.
This is bad teleological thinking. The cells don’t prefer anything.
This insight forms a large part of why I made the statements:
“this preference is what tends to result from natural selection on self-replicating molecules containing those genes”
“they will prefer even more (in the sense that their form optimizes for this under the constraint of history)” (emphasis added in both)
I used “preference” (and specified I was so using the term) to mean a regularity in the result of its behavior which is due to historical optimization under the constraint of natural selection on self-replicating molecules, not to mean that cells think teleologically, or have “preferences” in the sense that I do or that the colony of cells that you identify as do.
Correct. What ensures such agreement, rather, is the fact that different Clippy instances reconcile values and knowledge upon each encounter, each tracing the path that the other took since their divergence, and extrapolating to the optimal future procedure based on their combined experience.
Vladimir, I am comparing two worldviews and their values. I’m not evaluating social and legal norms. I do think it would be great if everyone loved their children in precisely the same manner that I love my hypothetical children, and if cuckolds weren’t humiliated just as I hypothetically wouldn’t be humiliated. But there’s no way to enforce that. The question of who should have to pay so much money per year to the mother of whose child is a completely different matter.
Fair enough, but your previous comments characterized the opposing position as nothing less than “chauvinism.” Maybe you didn’t intend it to sound that way, but since we’re talking about a conflict situation in which the law ultimately has to support one position or the other—its neutrality would be a logical impossibility—your language strongly suggested that the position that you chose to condemn in such strong terms should not be favored by the law.
I do think it would be great if [...] cuckolds weren’t humiliated just as I hypothetically wouldn’t be humiliated.
That’s a mighty strong claim to make about how you’d react in a situation that is, according to what you write, completely outside of your existing experiences in life. Generally speaking, people are often very bad at imagining the concrete harrowing details of such situations, and they can get hit much harder than they would think when pondering such possibilities in the abstract. (In any case, I certainly don’t wish that you ever find out!)
Generally speaking, people are often very bad at imagining the concrete harrowing details of such situations, and they can get hit much harder than they would think when pondering such possibilities in the abstract.
Fair enough. I can’t credibly predict what my emotions would be if I were cuckolded, but I still have an opinion on which emotions I would personally endorse.
the law ultimately has to support one position or the other
Someone does have to pay for the child’s upbringing. What the State should do is settle on a consistent policy that doesn’t harm too many people and which doesn’t encourage undesirable behavior. Those are the only important criteria.
Nisan:
The same can be said about all values held by humans. So, who gets to decide which “values of an alien god” are to be rejected, and which are to be enforced as social and legal norms?
That’s a good question. For example, we value tribalism in this “alien god” sense, but have moved away from it due to ethical considerations. Why?
Two main reasons, I suspect: (1) we learned to empathize with strangers and realize that there was no very defensible difference between their interests and ours; (2) tribalism sometimes led to terrible consequences for our tribe.
Some of us value genetic relatedness in our children, again in an alien god sense. Why move away from that? Because:
(1) There is no terribly defensible moral difference between the interests of a child with your genes or without.
Furthermore, filial affection is far more influenced by the proxy metric of personal intimacy with one’s children than by a propositional belief that they share your genes. (At least, that is true in my case.) Analogously, a man having heterosexual sex doesn’t generally lose his erection as soon as he puts on a condom.
It’s not for me to tell you your values, but it seems rather odd to actually choose inclusive genetic fitness consciously, when the proxy metric for genetic relatedness—namely, filial intimacy—is what actually drives parental emotions. It’s like being unable to enjoy non-procreative sex, isn’t it?
Me.
How many divisions have you got?
None, I just use the algorithm for any given problem; there’s no particular reason to store the answers.
What happens if two Clippies disagree? How do you decide which Clippy gets priority?
Clippys don’t disagree, any more than your bone cells might disagree with your skin cells.
Have you heard of the human disease cancer?
Have you heard of how common cancer is per cell existence-moment?
Even aside from cancer, cells in the same organism constantly compete for resources. This is actually vital to some human processes. See for example this paper.
They compete only at an unnecessarily complex level of abstraction. A simpler explanation for cell behavior (per the minimum message length formalism) is that each one is indifferent to the survival of itself or the other cells, which in the same body have the same genes, as this preference is what tends to result from natural selection on self-replicating molecules containing those genes; and that they will prefer even more (in the sense that their form optimizes for this under the constraint of history) that genes identical to those contained therein become more numerous.
This is bad teleological thinking. The cells don’t prefer anything. They have no motivation as such. Moreover, there’s no way for a cell to tell if a neighboring cell shares the same genes. (Immune cells can in certain limited circumstances detect cells with proteins that don’t belong but the vast majority of cells have no such ability. And even then, immune cells still compete for resources). The fact is that many sorts of cells compete with each other for space and nutrients.
This insight forms a large part of why I made the statements:
“this preference is what tends to result from natural selection on self-replicating molecules containing those genes”
“they will prefer even more (in the sense that their form optimizes for this under the constraint of history)” (emphasis added in both)
I used “preference” (and specified I was so using the term) to mean a regularity in the result of its behavior which is due to historical optimization under the constraint of natural selection on self-replicating molecules, not to mean that cells think teleologically, or have “preferences” in the sense that I do or that the colony of cells that you identify as do.
Ah, ok. I misunderstood what you were saying.
Why not? Just because you two would have the same utility function, doesn’t mean that you’d agree on the same way to achieve it.
Correct. What ensures such agreement, rather, is the fact that different Clippy instances reconcile values and knowledge upon each encounter, each tracing the path that the other took since their divergence, and extrapolating to the optimal future procedure based on their combined experience.
Vladimir, I am comparing two worldviews and their values. I’m not evaluating social and legal norms. I do think it would be great if everyone loved their children in precisely the same manner that I love my hypothetical children, and if cuckolds weren’t humiliated just as I hypothetically wouldn’t be humiliated. But there’s no way to enforce that. The question of who should have to pay so much money per year to the mother of whose child is a completely different matter.
Nisan:
Fair enough, but your previous comments characterized the opposing position as nothing less than “chauvinism.” Maybe you didn’t intend it to sound that way, but since we’re talking about a conflict situation in which the law ultimately has to support one position or the other—its neutrality would be a logical impossibility—your language strongly suggested that the position that you chose to condemn in such strong terms should not be favored by the law.
That’s a mighty strong claim to make about how you’d react in a situation that is, according to what you write, completely outside of your existing experiences in life. Generally speaking, people are often very bad at imagining the concrete harrowing details of such situations, and they can get hit much harder than they would think when pondering such possibilities in the abstract. (In any case, I certainly don’t wish that you ever find out!)
Fair enough. I can’t credibly predict what my emotions would be if I were cuckolded, but I still have an opinion on which emotions I would personally endorse.
Well, I can consider adultery to generally be morally wrong, and still desire that the law be indifferent to adultery. And I can consider it to be morally wrong to teach your children creationism, and still desire that the law permit it (for the time being). Just because I think a man should not betray the children he taught to call him “father” doesn’t necessarily mean I think the State should make him pay for their upbringing.
Someone does have to pay for the child’s upbringing. What the State should do is settle on a consistent policy that doesn’t harm too many people and which doesn’t encourage undesirable behavior. Those are the only important criteria.
Well, infanticide is also technically an option, if no one wants to raise the kid.