The measure of a good fanfic isn’t really relevant.
If the point isn’t about separating good fanfic from bad one, what your goal?
Do decide whether someone is acting rational you need to know their goals.
No. I thought that was why they were labeled as haters.
My goal is to stop feeling revulsion when I read something I’m ideologically opposed to.
Emotions are part of being human, most ways of supressing emotions aren’t healthy. Sometimes it might be necessary to ignore your emotions but it shouldn’t be a primary goal.
As a more practical matter, playing devil’s advocate can help you to be more comfortable with ideas that you are ideologically opposed to.
Perhaps a good question you should ask yourself is what do you want to feel, and under what circumstances?
For instance, take racist literature, young earth creationist literature, and political opposition literature. It is entirely plausible that you would not have the same new reaction to reading those three things, even though you are probably ideologically opposed to all three.
By breaking it down, you can take an approach that notices that when you read literature A, you react differently when you read literature B. Maybe literature B is less revulsive and literature A is almost instantly revulsive. So you can think “Alright, I want to treat literature A more like literature B.”
This allows you to make your goals more specific, while also making it into smaller goals which may be more achievable.
Should you be “ideologically opposed” to anything in the first place? Judge correctness and goodness without making those judgments part of your identity. Is the emotional response appropriate, does it reflect your judgment? What is the purpose of hacking the emotional response?
Should you be “ideologically opposed” to anything in the first place? Judge correctness and goodness without making those judgments part of your identity.
This kind of ‘should’ claims about ideals on what belongs in the identity seem to fit the definition of ‘ideologically opposed’ and ‘judgements that are part of your identity’ for all practical purposes (and most theoretical ones too).
Well, in the broad sense that you ask the question: signalling ideological opposition to a common-enemy-soldier idea is a way of inspiring in-group feelings among people inclined to that sort of thing. And expensive signalling of ideological opposition to such ideas is a way of providing actual evidence of being part of the relevant in-group for people inclined to evaluate actual evidence. And for most people, actually having an emotional reaction is a much more reliable way of ensuring the unhesitating and convincing production of expensive signals than deciding to simulate such emotional reactions when it seems appropriate.
But I assume you already knew all that, and what you really meant by the question was the assertion that the benefits of keeping one’s identity small outweigh the benefits of that sort of social-network management.
Rejecting identity as a relevant consideration in your own thinking doesn’t obviously depend on hacking emotions. My point is not that one should hack emotions in any particular way, but that it’s largely a separate issue from fixing of the more straightforward error of reasoning based on identity (that is, using properties you associate with yourself to bias the thinking about questions that are not related to those properties of yourself).
If the point isn’t about separating good fanfic from bad one, what your goal? Do decide whether someone is acting rational you need to know their goals.
Then what’s the definition?
My goal is to stop feeling revulsion when I read something I’m ideologically opposed to.
Emotions are part of being human, most ways of supressing emotions aren’t healthy. Sometimes it might be necessary to ignore your emotions but it shouldn’t be a primary goal.
As a more practical matter, playing devil’s advocate can help you to be more comfortable with ideas that you are ideologically opposed to.
Perhaps a good question you should ask yourself is what do you want to feel, and under what circumstances?
For instance, take racist literature, young earth creationist literature, and political opposition literature. It is entirely plausible that you would not have the same new reaction to reading those three things, even though you are probably ideologically opposed to all three.
By breaking it down, you can take an approach that notices that when you read literature A, you react differently when you read literature B. Maybe literature B is less revulsive and literature A is almost instantly revulsive. So you can think “Alright, I want to treat literature A more like literature B.”
This allows you to make your goals more specific, while also making it into smaller goals which may be more achievable.
Should you be “ideologically opposed” to anything in the first place? Judge correctness and goodness without making those judgments part of your identity. Is the emotional response appropriate, does it reflect your judgment? What is the purpose of hacking the emotional response?
This kind of ‘should’ claims about ideals on what belongs in the identity seem to fit the definition of ‘ideologically opposed’ and ‘judgements that are part of your identity’ for all practical purposes (and most theoretical ones too).
Well, in the broad sense that you ask the question: signalling ideological opposition to a common-enemy-soldier idea is a way of inspiring in-group feelings among people inclined to that sort of thing. And expensive signalling of ideological opposition to such ideas is a way of providing actual evidence of being part of the relevant in-group for people inclined to evaluate actual evidence. And for most people, actually having an emotional reaction is a much more reliable way of ensuring the unhesitating and convincing production of expensive signals than deciding to simulate such emotional reactions when it seems appropriate.
But I assume you already knew all that, and what you really meant by the question was the assertion that the benefits of keeping one’s identity small outweigh the benefits of that sort of social-network management.
Which may well be true.
Rejecting identity as a relevant consideration in your own thinking doesn’t obviously depend on hacking emotions. My point is not that one should hack emotions in any particular way, but that it’s largely a separate issue from fixing of the more straightforward error of reasoning based on identity (that is, using properties you associate with yourself to bias the thinking about questions that are not related to those properties of yourself).