Should you be “ideologically opposed” to anything in the first place? Judge correctness and goodness without making those judgments part of your identity. Is the emotional response appropriate, does it reflect your judgment? What is the purpose of hacking the emotional response?
Should you be “ideologically opposed” to anything in the first place? Judge correctness and goodness without making those judgments part of your identity.
This kind of ‘should’ claims about ideals on what belongs in the identity seem to fit the definition of ‘ideologically opposed’ and ‘judgements that are part of your identity’ for all practical purposes (and most theoretical ones too).
Well, in the broad sense that you ask the question: signalling ideological opposition to a common-enemy-soldier idea is a way of inspiring in-group feelings among people inclined to that sort of thing. And expensive signalling of ideological opposition to such ideas is a way of providing actual evidence of being part of the relevant in-group for people inclined to evaluate actual evidence. And for most people, actually having an emotional reaction is a much more reliable way of ensuring the unhesitating and convincing production of expensive signals than deciding to simulate such emotional reactions when it seems appropriate.
But I assume you already knew all that, and what you really meant by the question was the assertion that the benefits of keeping one’s identity small outweigh the benefits of that sort of social-network management.
Rejecting identity as a relevant consideration in your own thinking doesn’t obviously depend on hacking emotions. My point is not that one should hack emotions in any particular way, but that it’s largely a separate issue from fixing of the more straightforward error of reasoning based on identity (that is, using properties you associate with yourself to bias the thinking about questions that are not related to those properties of yourself).
Should you be “ideologically opposed” to anything in the first place? Judge correctness and goodness without making those judgments part of your identity. Is the emotional response appropriate, does it reflect your judgment? What is the purpose of hacking the emotional response?
This kind of ‘should’ claims about ideals on what belongs in the identity seem to fit the definition of ‘ideologically opposed’ and ‘judgements that are part of your identity’ for all practical purposes (and most theoretical ones too).
Well, in the broad sense that you ask the question: signalling ideological opposition to a common-enemy-soldier idea is a way of inspiring in-group feelings among people inclined to that sort of thing. And expensive signalling of ideological opposition to such ideas is a way of providing actual evidence of being part of the relevant in-group for people inclined to evaluate actual evidence. And for most people, actually having an emotional reaction is a much more reliable way of ensuring the unhesitating and convincing production of expensive signals than deciding to simulate such emotional reactions when it seems appropriate.
But I assume you already knew all that, and what you really meant by the question was the assertion that the benefits of keeping one’s identity small outweigh the benefits of that sort of social-network management.
Which may well be true.
Rejecting identity as a relevant consideration in your own thinking doesn’t obviously depend on hacking emotions. My point is not that one should hack emotions in any particular way, but that it’s largely a separate issue from fixing of the more straightforward error of reasoning based on identity (that is, using properties you associate with yourself to bias the thinking about questions that are not related to those properties of yourself).