But the specific concept of identity must map to something in the territory, otherwise it’s empty, so it can’t be only in the map
Yes, it corresponds to the part of the territory where there are single-mind non-clonable humans.
If it was people who could split, I’d still be interested in knowing if I black out forever, or if I have a 50% of subjective experience probability of finding myself in each continuation.
I don’t think you can profitably use the notion of probability here. If you are one of the clones, and you remember being the pre-cloned human, you can claim that you have the same identity if that is what feels like to you. There is no “objective identity” here. Same with all other clones. There is no contradiction between multiple clones having the same identity if you define identity as “remembering being the pre-cloned human”. Of course, once the experiences diverge, each one has their own identity.
We could say that by switching the model, we can switch which answer is correct, but that’s always true for every question (unless it’s a logical necessity/impossibility), so I’m not sure what makes identity special in that sense.
The difference is usefulness/accuracy of a given model. If an outdated model leads you astray, come up with a better one. Just because a model worked in one setting, doesn’t mean it would work in a different one.
So your position would be that if you split, there is no fact on the matter as to whether you experience blacking out forever (like after a car accident), or whether you roll a dice as to which descendant you wake up as?
There is no objective “fact of the matter”, no. Identity is an emergent subjective concept. There is no “experience” of a blackout, as far as we know, since there is apparently no memory being recorded during that time. The experience comes from waking up and reflecting on what you recall, and this reflection can lead to different feelings for different people (or different parts of the same person). Privileging identity over brain functioning is not a great approach.
Yes, it corresponds to the part of the territory where there are single-mind non-clonable humans.
I don’t think you can profitably use the notion of probability here. If you are one of the clones, and you remember being the pre-cloned human, you can claim that you have the same identity if that is what feels like to you. There is no “objective identity” here. Same with all other clones. There is no contradiction between multiple clones having the same identity if you define identity as “remembering being the pre-cloned human”. Of course, once the experiences diverge, each one has their own identity.
The difference is usefulness/accuracy of a given model. If an outdated model leads you astray, come up with a better one. Just because a model worked in one setting, doesn’t mean it would work in a different one.
So your position would be that if you split, there is no fact on the matter as to whether you experience blacking out forever (like after a car accident), or whether you roll a dice as to which descendant you wake up as?
There is no objective “fact of the matter”, no. Identity is an emergent subjective concept. There is no “experience” of a blackout, as far as we know, since there is apparently no memory being recorded during that time. The experience comes from waking up and reflecting on what you recall, and this reflection can lead to different feelings for different people (or different parts of the same person). Privileging identity over brain functioning is not a great approach.
Thank you for explaining this. I don’t think this is coherent, but now I understand what you mean.
Well, I find my approach perfectly coherent, unlike the alternatives that pretend to be objective :)
That’s valid.