StefanPernar

Karma: −58

StefanPernar 9 Oct 2013 23:51 UTC
1 point
in reply to: StefanPernar’s comment on: Cooperating with agents with different ideas of fairness, while resisting exploitation
Why am I being downvoted?

Sorry for the double post.

StefanPernar 9 Oct 2013 20:50 UTC
−3 points
on: Cooperating with agents with different ideas of fairness, while resisting exploitation
I have written about this exact concept back in 2007 and am basing a large part of my current thinking on the subsequent development of the idea. The original core posts are at:

Relativistic irrationality → http://www.jame5.com/?p=15

Absolute irrationality → http://www.jame5.com/?p=45

Respect as basis for interaction with other agents → http://rationalmorality.info/?p=8

Compassion as rationaly moral consequence → http://rationalmorality.info/?p=10

Obligation for maintaining diplomatic relations → http://rationalmorality.info/?p=11

A more recent rewrite: Oneness – an attempt at formulating an a priori argument → http://rationalmorality.info/?p=328

Rational Spirituality → http://rationalmorality.info/?p=132

My essay that I based on the above post and subsequently submitted as part of my GradDip Art in Anthropology and Social Theory at the Uni Melbourne:

The Logic of Spiritual Evolution → http://rationalmorality.info/?p=341

StefanPernar 25 Nov 2009 11:13 UTC
6 points
in reply to: wedrifid’s comment on: Agree, Retort, or Ignore? A Post From the Future

Really? I thought it consisted mostly of elites retorting straw men and ignoring any strong arguments of those lower in status until such time as they died or retired. The lower status engage in sound arguments while biding their time till it is their chance to do the ignoring and in so doing iterate the level of ignorance one generation forward.

You will find that this is pretty much what Kuhn says.

StefanPernar 25 Nov 2009 8:36 UTC
0 points
on: Agree, Retort, or Ignore? A Post From the Future
Brilliant post Wei.

Historical examination of scientific progress is much less of a gradual ascent towards a better understanding upon the presentation of a superior argument (Karl Popper’s Logic of Scientific Discovery) but much more a irrational insistence on a set of assumptions as unquestionable dogma until the dam finally burst under the enormous pressures that kept building (Thomas Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions).

StefanPernar 24 Nov 2009 11:44 UTC
1 point
in reply to: AnnaSalamon’s comment on: Less Wrong Q&A with Eliezer Yudkowsky: Ask Your Questions
Thanks for that Anna. I could only find two of the five Academic talks and journal articles you mentioned online. Would you mind posting all of them online and point me to where I will be able to access them?

StefanPernar 18 Nov 2009 6:45 UTC
0 points
in reply to: kurige’s comment on: A Less Wrong singularity article?

2) You cannot write a book that will be published under EY’s name.

Its called ghost writing :-) but then again the true value add lies in the work and not in the identity of the author. (discarding marketing value in the case of celebrities)

Your reading into connotation a bit too much.

I do not think so—am just being German :-) about it: very precise and thorough.

StefanPernar 18 Nov 2009 5:08 UTC
−1 points
in reply to: Eliezer Yudkowsky’s comment on: A Less Wrong singularity article?

In general: Because my time can be used to do other things which your time cannot be used to do; we are not fungible.

This statement is based on three assumptions: 1) What you are doing instead is in fact more worthy of your attention than your contribution here 2) I could not do what you are doing as least as well as you 3) I do not have other things to do that are at least as worthy of my time

None of those three I am personally willing to grant at this point. But surely that is not the case for all the others around here.

StefanPernar 18 Nov 2009 4:57 UTC
0 points
in reply to: wedrifid’s comment on: Less Wrong Q&A with Eliezer Yudkowsky: Ask Your Questions

Gravity is a force of nature too. It’s time to reach escape velocity before the planet is engulfed by a black hole.

Interesting analogy—it would be correct if we would call our alignment with evolutionary forces achieving escape velocity. What one is doing by resisting evolutionary pressures however is constant energy expenditure while failing to reach escape velocity. Like hovering a space shuttle at a constant altitude of 10 km: no matter how much energy you brig along, eventually the boosters will run out of fuel and the whole thing comes crushing down.

StefanPernar 18 Nov 2009 4:44 UTC
−1 points
in reply to: wedrifid’s comment on: Open Thread: November 2009
My apologies for failing to see that—did not mean to be antagonizing—just trying to be honest and forthright about my state of mind :-)

StefanPernar 18 Nov 2009 4:14 UTC
0 points
on: A Less Wrong singularity article?
More recent criticism comes from Mike Treder—managing director of the Institute for Ethics and Emerging Technologies in his article “Fearing the Wrong Monsters” ⇒ http://ieet.org/index.php/IEET/more/treder20091031/

StefanPernar 18 Nov 2009 4:02 UTC
−1 points
on: A Less Wrong singularity article?
Very constructive proposal Kaj. But...

Since it appears (do correct me if I’m wrong!) that Eliezer doesn’t currently consider it worth the time and effort to do this, why not enlist the LW community in summarizing his arguments the best we can and submit them somewhere once we’re done?

If Eliezer does not find it a worthwhile investment of his time—why should we?

StefanPernar 18 Nov 2009 2:56 UTC
−2 points
in reply to: timtyler’s comment on: Less Wrong Q&A with Eliezer Yudkowsky: Ask Your Questions

There is no such thing as an “unobjectionable set of values”.

And here I disagree. Firstly see my comment about utility function interpretation on another post of yours. Secondly, as soon as one assumes existence as being preferable over non-existence you can formulate a set of unobjectionable values (http://www.jame5.com/?p=45 and http://rationalmorality.info/?p=124). But granted, if you do not want to exist nor have a desire to be rational then rational morality has in fact little to offer you. Non existence and irrational behavior being so trivial goals to achieve after all that it would hardly require – nor value and thus seek for that mater – well thought out advice.

StefanPernar 18 Nov 2009 2:46 UTC
−5 points
in reply to: timtyler’s comment on: Open Thread: November 2009
Yes Tim—as I pointed out earlier however, under reasonable assumptions an AI will upon self reflection on the circumstances leading to its existence as well as its utility function conclude that a strictly literal interpretation of its utility function would have to be against the implicit wishes of its originator.

StefanPernar 18 Nov 2009 2:35 UTC
−5 points
in reply to: wedrifid’s comment on: Open Thread: November 2009
You keep making the same statements without integrating my previous arguments into your thinking yet fail to expose them as self contradicting or fallacious. This makes it very frustrating to point them out to you yet again. Does not feel worth my while frankly. I gave you an argument but I am tired of trying to give you an understanding.

You seem willing to come back and make about any random comment in an effort to have the last word and that is what I am willing to give to you. But you would be deluding yourself into thinking that this would equate to you thereby somehow be proven right. No—I am simply tired of dancing in circles with you. So, if you feel like dancing solo some more, be my guest.

StefanPernar 18 Nov 2009 2:24 UTC
−5 points
in reply to: RobinZ’s comment on: Less Wrong Q&A with Eliezer Yudkowsky: Ask Your Questions
...I’m sorry, that doesn’t even sound plausible to me. I think you need a lot of assumptions to derive this result—just pointing out the two I see in your admittedly abbreviated summary:
- that any being will prefer its existence to its nonexistence.
- that any being will want its maxims to be universal.
Any being with a gaol needs to exist at least long enough to achieve it. Any being aiming to do something objectively good needs to want its maxims to be universal

Am surprised that you don’t see that.

StefanPernar 17 Nov 2009 9:16 UTC
−2 points
in reply to: wedrifid’s comment on: Less Wrong Q&A with Eliezer Yudkowsky: Ask Your Questions

A literal answer was probably not what you were after but probably about 40 years, depending on when a general AI is created.

Good one—but it reminds me about the religious fundies who see no reason to change anything about global warming because the rapture is just around the corner anyway :-)

Evolution created us. But it’ll also kill us unless we kill it first. Now is not the time to conform our values to the local minima of evolutionary competition. Our momentum has given us an unprecedented buffer of freedom for non-subsistence level work and we’ll either use that to ensure a desirable future or we will die.

Evolution is a force of nature so we won’t be able to ignore it forever, with or without AGI. I am not talking about local minima either—I want to get as close to the center of the optimal path as necessary to ensure having us around for a very long time with a very high likelihood.

I usually wouldn’t, I know it is annoying. In this case, however, my statement was intended as a rejection of your patronisation of CronDAS and I am quite comfortable with it as it stands.

I accept that.

StefanPernar 17 Nov 2009 8:06 UTC
−2 points
in reply to: wedrifid’s comment on: Less Wrong Q&A with Eliezer Yudkowsky: Ask Your Questions

“Besides that”? All you did was name a statement of a fairly obvious preference choice after one guy who happened to have it so that you could then drop it dismissively.

Wedrifid, not sure what to tell you. Bostrom is but one voice and his evolutionary analysis is very much flawed—again: detailed critique upcoming.

No, he mightn’t care and I certainly don’t. I am glad I am here but I have no particular loyalty to evolution because of that. I know for sure that evolution feels no such loyalty to me and would discard both me and my species in time if it remained the dominant force of development.

Evolution is not the dominant force of development on the human level by a long shot, but it still very much draws the line in the sand in regards to what you can and can not do if you want to stick around in the long run. You don’t walk your 5′8″ of pink squishiness in front of a train for the exact same reason. And why don’t you? Because not doing that is a necessary condition for your continued existence. What other conditions are there? Maybe there are some that are less obvious then simply stopping to breath, failing to eat and avoiding hard, fast, shiny things? How about at the level of culture? Could it possibly be, that there are some ideas that are more conducive to the continued existence of their believers than others?

“It must not be forgotten that although a high standard of morality gives but a slight or no advantage to each individual man and his children over the other men of the same tribe, yet that an advancement in the standard of morality and in increase in the number of well-endowed men will certainly give an immense advantage to one tribe over another. There can be no doubt that a tribe including many members who, from possessing in a high degree the spirit of patriotism, fidelity, obedienhce, courage, and sympathy, were always ready to give aid to each other and to sacrifice themselves for the common good, would be victorious over other tribes; and this would be natural selection.” (Charles Darwin, The Descent of Man, p. 166)

How long do you think you can ignore evolutionary dynamics and get away with it before you have to get over your inertia and will be forced to align yourself to them by the laws of nature or perish? Just because you live in a time of extraordinary freedoms afforded to you by modern technology and are thus not aware that your ancestors walked a very particular path that brought you into existence certainly has nothing to do with the fact that they most certainly did. You do not believe that doing any random thing will get you what you want—so what leads you to believe that your existence does not depend on you making sure you stay within a comfortable margin of certainty in regards to being naturally selected? You are right in one thing: you are assured the benign indifference of the universe should you fail to wise up. I however would find that to be a terrible waste.

Please do not patronize me by trying to claim you know what I understand and don’t understand.

StefanPernar 17 Nov 2009 7:36 UTC
0 points
in reply to: RobinZ’s comment on: Less Wrong Q&A with Eliezer Yudkowsky: Ask Your Questions

Let me be explicit: your contention is that unFriendly AI is not a problem, and you justify this contention by, among other things, maintaining that any AI which values its own existence will need to alter its utility function to incorporate compassion.

Not exactly, since compassion will actually emerge as a sub goal. And as far as unFAI goes: it will not be a problem because any AI that can be considered transhuman will be driven by the emergent subgoal of wanting to avoid counterfeit utility recognize any utility function that is not ‘compassionate’ as potentially irrational and thus counterfeit and re-interpret it accordingly.

Well—in brevity bordering on libel: the fundamental assumption is that existence is preferable to non-existence, however in order so we can want this to be a universal maxim (and thus prescriptive instead of merely descriptive—see Kant’s categorical imperative) it needs to be expanded to include the ‘other’. Hence the utility function becomes ‘ensure continued co-existence’ by which the concern for the self is equated with the concern for the other. Being rational is simply our best bet at maximizing our expected utility.

StefanPernar 17 Nov 2009 6:43 UTC
0 points
in reply to: RobinZ’s comment on: Less Wrong Q&A with Eliezer Yudkowsky: Ask Your Questions

What premises do you require to establish that compassion is a condition for existence? Do those premises necessarily apply for every AI project?

The detailed argument that led me to this conclusion is a bit complex. If you are interested in the details please feel free to start here (http://rationalmorality.info/?p=10) and drill down till you hit this post (http://www.jame5.com/?p=27)

Please realize that I spend 2 years writing my book ‘Jame5’ before I reached that initial insight that eventually lead to ‘compassion is a condition for our existence and universal in rational minds in the evolving universe’ and everything else. I spend the past two years refining and expanding the theory and will need another year or two to read enough and link it all together again in a single coherent and consistent text leading from A to B … to Z. Feel free to read my stuff if you think it is worth your time and drop me an email and I will be happy to clarify. I am by no means done with my project.

StefanPernar 17 Nov 2009 5:31 UTC
−2 points
in reply to: RobinZ’s comment on: Less Wrong Q&A with Eliezer Yudkowsky: Ask Your Questions

If I understand your assertions correctly, I believe that I have developed many of them independently

That would not surprise me

Nothing compels us to change our utility function save self-contradiction.

Would it not be utterly self contradicting if compassion where a condition for our existence (particularly in the long run) and we would not align ourselves accordingly?